Land of Dreams

Greek and Latin Studies
in Honour of A.H.M. Kessels

Edited by

A.P.M.H. Lardinois
M.G.M. van der Poel
V.J.C. Hunink

BRILL

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Professor A.H.M. Kessels

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TUTA SUB AEGIDE PALLAS
· 1 6 8 3 ·

Πὰρ δ' ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην,
ἠδὲ παρ' Ἠελίοιο πύλας καὶ δῆμον ὀνείρων
ἤϊσαν· αἶψα δ' ἵκοντο κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,
ἔνθα τε ναίουσι ψυχαί, εἴδωλα καμόντων.
εὗρον δὲ ψυχὴν Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος
καὶ Πατροκλῆος καὶ ἀμύμονος Ἀντιλόχοιο
Αἴαντός θ', ὃς ἄριστος ἔην εἶδός τε δέμας τε
τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ' ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα.

Homer, *Odyssey* 24.11–18

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PREFACE

This collection of essays is intended as a tribute to prof.dr. A.H.M. Kessels on the occasion of his retirement as professor of Greek Language and Literature at the Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands), where he has served for twenty years in the Department of Classics. The essays have been written by his present colleagues in Nijmegen, former colleagues from Utrecht University (Netherlands), where Ton Kessels held the chair of Greek until 1985, by colleagues from other universities in the Netherlands, and by a number of his former and present Ph.D. students. The collection as a whole may be considered a sampler attesting the breadth and depth of present-day classical scholarship in the Netherlands.

It has been the aim of the editors to present Ton Kessels with a collection of essays that reflect his broad interests in the entire field of classical scholarship, ranging from early Greek literature to later Latin literature, the reception of classics, and the role of classics in secondary school education. At the same time, the volume also singles out some areas to which Ton Kessels has paid special attention in the course of his long academic career, both in his publications and in his teaching.

In the first place, this concerns the area of ancient dreams, which captivated Ton Kessels already as a student. Dreams formed the main theme of his doctoral thesis *Studies on the Dream in Greek literature* (1973), a study which has gained the status of a standard work in the field. The present volume starts off with six contributions in which dreams play a major role, varying from early Greek literature (the period that is probably most dear to Ton Kessels) to the Latin medieval period. Dreams appear to be of great signifance in antiquity well beyond Greek literature, and even in the christian era. Indeed, it is perhaps not completely unjustified to designate the whole of Greek and Latin literature as a 'land of dreams' (δῆμος ὀνείρων), where one may encounter 'the ghosts of Peleus' son Achilles and Patroclus and noble Antilochus, and of Ajax, who in beauty and form was best of the Danaans after the peerless son of Peleus' (*Od.* 24.11–18).

A second subject which is particularly loved by Ton Kessels is that of drama, notably Greek tragedy. Kessels' admiration for the classical tragic poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides has not suffered any

decrease as a result of his long years of study and teaching, quite the contrary. Therefore, the editors are happy to present no fewer than seven pieces that are concerned with classical drama, five of them focusing on Greek tragedy, both from a literary and a linguistic point of view, two dealing with special cases of the later reception of tragic themes.

The third section is devoted to the poet of poets, the very source of classical literature, Homer and his reception in later antiquity and in modern times. Ton Kessels' interest in 'the poet' was manifest to all generations of students who have enjoyed his teaching. He confronted them with Homer not only at at an initial stage, where reading Homer would simply mean learning to read Greek in the first place, but also at a more advanced level, where Homer's literary style, subtle narrative techniques, and the various links between his epics and later literature, including the themes of literary criticism and textual history, were given more prominence. Four contributions in this volume are devoted to the manifold traces left by Homer in ancient literature and the arts.

Ton Kessels has always maintained and expressed his view that classical antiquity should be studied as a whole. To illustrate this, the final two sections of this volume contain ten further essays on various themes and subjects related to Greek and Latin literature in a broad sense. While showing differences as to the period, language, and genre of the material studied, all essays share their devotion to some fundamental principles that have always been upheld and defended by Ton Kessels: soundness of argument and reasoning, relevance, accuracy and bibliographical reliability, or to put it succinctly: a genuine love of words (*philologia*) such as forms the foundation of the study of classics.

It goes without saying that some of the studies included here occupy themselves with the reception and the later tradition of classical culture. However, it is perhaps less obvious in a volume presented to a university professor to find a concluding essay on the status of Greek and Latin in Dutch secundary education. This topic reflects Ton Kessels' heartfelt concern for the position of classics as an important field of studies in contemporary society as a whole. Presently, there is an alarming lack of professionally trained teachers of classics in the Netherlands, which has given rise to a high percentage of unqualified teachers of Greek and Latin in the secundary schools. After some experiments, starting in 2000, Ton Kessels initiated a special course at the Radboud University Nijmegen intended for such teachers, enabling them to obtain additional instruction in the entire field of classics and a formal qualifica-

tion to teach Greek and Latin in the Dutch high schools. This success-
ful three year course, which is unique in the Netherlands, has already
attracted numerous enthusiastic students, and plans to start a nation-
wide program are on the way. It is a comfort and a joy to know that
even after his formal retirement, Ton Kessels will continue to take care
of this special course at the Radboud University Nijmegen, allowing
students to profit from his rich experience as a well-read scholar and an
inspiring teacher.

<div align="right">

Nijmegen, December 2005
AL, MvdP, VH

</div>

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DREAMS IN CLASSICAL LITERATURE

HERODOTUS AND THE
DREAM OF CAMBYSES (*HIST*. 3.30, 61–65)

Irene J.F. de Jong

A recurrent and characteristic element in Herodotus' *Histories* is the dream. Sixteen times we hear of a person having a dream, an event which may be merely mentioned (6.118) but usually takes the form of a proper dream-scene. Dreams belong to a larger group of oracles, omens, prophecies, and warnings of which Herodotus is very fond and which colours, indeed shapes his histories.[1] He may have taken over the dream from Homer, in so many other respects his model too, or from Near Eastern sources, or they may simply be considered universals of storytelling.

In this paper I will discuss the dream of Cambyses (*Histories* 3.30), which leads to the murder of his brother Smerdis, the usurpation of the throne by the false Smerdis, and his own death (3.61–65). This episode is one of the very few instances where we can actually compare Herodotus' *Histories* with another historical source. Cambyses' successor Darius had the story of his accession commemorated in a trilingual inscription at Behistun. Now of course this inscription commissioned by the Persian king is not necessarily an objective and reliable account and therefore no infallible standard against which to compare Herodotus' version.[2] But it does provide us with at least a skeleton of the main events. Comparison of these main events and Herodotus' version makes clear what he added, left out, or changed, and thereby suggests what he intended with his narrative of the death of Cambyses.[3] In 1980 Köhnken undertook such a comparison and came up with an excellent analysis.

I nevertheless think it is worthwhile to concentrate once more on the dream, which, as appears from the appendix at the end of this

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[1] For a recent overview and discussion, see Harrison 2000, 122–157.

[2] The point is acknowledged by all, but an extreme position is taken by Balcer 1987, who argues that it was Darius who killed Smerdis and perhaps Cambyses, too.

[3] Most scholars assume Herodotus to have been familiar with the Behistun inscription, at least with its content.

paper, in which I have summarized the Behistun and Herodotus' ver-
sion, is one of Herodotus' additions. Indeed, the dream more or less
determines the whole story of Cambyses' death (being presented no
less than three times), making it one of the most elaborate dream-
scenes in Herodotus, comparable in its extent and degree of detail with
Croesus' dream of 1.34, which likewise dominates the entire story of
Atys and Adrastus (1.34–45) or the series of Persian dreams inaugurat-
ing Xerxes' expedition against Greece (7.12–19). Since in Herodotus
form and content always go hand in hand, I will first undertake a
narratological close reading of the dream-scene and then turn to the
question of its historiographical function. I will start, however, with
a brief discussion of dreams in Herodotus, in order to create a gen-
eral background against which to judge his particular handling of this
dream.

<div style="text-align:center">Dreams in Herodotus</div>

The corpus of fifteen dream-scenes in Herodotus has been studied by
Huber, Frisch, van Lieshout, and Lévy.[4] They all come up with their
own typologies: Huber distinguishes between dreams which announce
a future event and those which suggest a course of action; Frisch
between fate dreams, death dreams, injunction dreams, consolation
dreams, and birth dreams; van Lieshout between objective dreams
(when some sort of contact is made between the dreamer and reality)
and subjective dreams (when there is no such contact, but something
is communicated to the dreamer through words, images, or symbols);
Lévy between messenger dreams (dreamer dreams that he is visited
by a person who says something to him) and symbolic scene dreams
(dreamer sees a scene with a symbolic meaning). Of these typologies I
find the one by Lévy the most attractive, because it uses formal criteria
and resembles the typology of Homeric[5] and Near Eastern dreams,[6] of
which I said earlier that one or both may have been Herodotus' model.
Messenger dreams are found in 1.34; 2.139, 141; 5.55–56; 7.12, 14, 17–

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[4] Huber 1965, 10–18; Frisch 1968; van Lieshout 1980, passim; Lévy 1995. See also
Kessels 1994, who in his introduction gives a typology very similar to Levy's.

[5] De Jong 2001, ad 4.795–841 ('visit' dreams vs. 'action' dreams). For Homeric
dreams, see also Kessels 1978.

[6] West 1997, 185–190 (message dream vs. symbolic dream).

18; symbolic scene dreams in 1.107, 108, 209; 3.124; 6.107. 131; 7.19; while 3.30, the dream of Cambyses, forms, as we will see, an effective combination of both types.

Whatever type of dream we are dealing with, dream-scenes in Herodotus consist of (some of) the following elements: 1) point of time; 2) dream; 3) reaction of dreamer; 4) fulfilment; and 5) evaluation by dreamer.[7] There are only a handful of dream-scenes which combine all five elements. An example is the dream of Polycrates' daughter in 3.124–125: 1) Polycrates is about to depart for his enemy Oroetes; 2) his daughter has a dream; 3) interpreting it as a bad omen, she urges him not to go, but he departs all the same; and 4) is killed; 5) since Polycrates no longer can evaluate his own dream, it is the narrator who explains it. This dream-scene takes up two chapters. What makes the dream-scene of Cambyses such a special case is that it takes up no less than six chapters.

A narratological close reading of Cambyses' dream

1. *Point of time (3.30.1–2)*

As is his wont, the Herodotean narrator opens the episode with a kind of 'chapter-heading', which announces its content ('And the first of his (mad) crimes was that he killed his brother Smerdis, born from the same father and mother, …'). He then starts his story by going back in time ('…, whom he sent from Egypt to Persia out of envy, because he alone of the Persians drew the bow, which the Fish-eaters had brought from the Ethiopians') and then proceeds forward again ('Smerdis having left for Persia, Cambyses had the following dream').[8] This elaborate presentation of the point of time of the dream is highly relevant in that in the dream there will be a messenger from Persia with news about Smerdis and in that Cambyses' jealousy explains his ensuing interpretation of the dream; the narratees are supposed to recall that to be able to draw the Ethiopian bow signifies royal power (cf. 3.23.3).

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[7] Cf. Frisch 1968, 66–71.

[8] This technique is epic (see De Jong 2001, xiv: 'epic regression') and is described for Herodotus by Lang 1984, 1–17 and Munson 2001, 24–32.

2. *The dream (3.30.2)*

The actual dream is described in typical Herodotean fashion in the form of an infinitive construction: ἐδόκεέ οἱ ἄγγελον ἐλθόντα ἐκ Περσέων ἀγγέλλειν ὡς ἐν τῷ θρόνῳ τῷ βασιληίῳ ἱζόμενος Σμέρδις τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ψαύσειε ('it appeared to him that a messenger came from the Persians and reported him that Smerdis was sitting on the royal throne and touched heaven with his head').[9] We are dealing here with a combination of a symbolic scene (Smerdis is sitting on the royal throne and his head touches the sky) and a messenger, who reports this to the dreamer. In a normal symbolic scene dream the dreamer sees the scene himself directly (e.g., 'Astyages dreamt that there grew from his daughter's genitals a vine, which covered the whole of Asia', 1.108), while in a normal messenger dream a messenger stands near or over the dreamer and says something to him (e.g. 'Sabacus dreamt that a man stood over him and advised him to gather all the priests of Egypt and cut them in sunder', 2.139). The reason why Herodotus in the case of Cambyses' dream combines the two types is not difficult to see: the symbolic scene announces the change of power, exactly as in the case of Astyages' dream, but the introduction of a messenger ensures that Cambyses does not see Smerdis himself and therefore cannot note that it is not his brother but the magian Smerdis II. In other words, the combination ensures that the dream can be both true and misleading, a combination which Herodotus favours, for reasons to be set out later in the section on the function of the dream. The messenger in the dream, who only in this case literally is a messenger (*aggelos*), also anticipates the messenger of reality (3.62–63).[10]

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[9] There are only two dreams which are not described in dependent clauses, but independently (1.34 and 7.14); the dream of 7.17–18 is introduced independently, but capped dependently.

[10] In other messenger dreams the messenger is a dream (*oneiros*), man, or god. Note that the messenger of Cambyses' dream is called *aggelos*, that of reality *kerux* (3.61.3; 62.1, 2, 4; 63.1), except for 3.63.1, when Prexaspes calls him *aggelos*. Though the distinction between *kerux* and *aggelos* in Herodotus is not absolute, the use of *kerux* may be intended to stress the public nature of the announcement of the change of power, while Prexaspes focuses on the messenger being sent by Smerdis. Likewise, the messenger of the dream is an *aggelos* because it is sent (by the gods?: see the section on the function of the dream below) privately to Cambyses. For a discussion of the distinction *kerux—aggelos*, I refer to the forthcoming study by M.P. de Bakker on the speeches in Herodotus, who also kindly discussed this place with me.

3. *The dreamer's reaction (3.30.3)*

Cambyses rightly interprets the symbols of the dream as an attempt to take over his throne, but wrongly takes the Smerdis on the throne to be his brother and has him killed. In other words, he takes the dream seriously and tries to prevent it from coming true. Indeed, most dreamers in Herodotus take their dream seriously[11] and act upon it, though usually basing their action on an incorrect interpretation. Sometimes dreamers offer their dream for interpretation to official dream-experts (*magoi* or *oneiropoloi*), who as a matter of fact need not see things rightly (cf. notably 7.19.1), but here—for obvious reasons—Cambyses does not do so, just as the ensuing murder of course is kept a secret (cf. his own words in 65.1: 'I need to reveal to you a thing which I have very much kept secret'). The narrator, too, has his motive, because in this way the mistaken interpretation of the dream, resulting in the mistaken murder of Smerdis, is entirely Cambyses' own responsibility. He does not even have Cambyses inform the murderer of Smerdis, Prexaspes, about his dream, so as to allow the latter's release of the crucial information about the existence of another Smerdis only to take place when it is too late.

4. *The fulfilment of the dream (3.61–64.1)*

With one exception,[12] Herodotean dreams always come true, as do most oracles and warnings. Usually this is recorded by the narrator and/or the dreamer himself. The narrator either says explicitly that a dream was fulfilled (e.g. 'Atys hit by a spear fulfilled the utterance of the dream', 1.43) and/or implies its fulfilment through word-echo: e.g. βληθεὶς τῇ αἰχμῇ ('hit by the spear'), which is said at the moment of Atys' death in 1.43, recalls the dream's announcement in 1.35: ὡς ἀπολέει μιν αἰχμῇ σιδηρέῃ βληθέντα ('that he would loose him hit by

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[11] The only ones who do not take a dream seriously are: Polycrates (3.124), Hipparchus (5.56), and Xerxes (7.12).

[12] The one exception is the dream of the Ethiopian Sabacus, who is urged to kill Egyptian priests but refuses to do so and instead voluntarily leaves Egypt (2.139). The set of four dreams in 7.12–19, which together persuade Xerxes to attack Greece, has often been called deceptive. They are, however, no more deceptive than all other Herodotean dreams, which announce what is bound to happen but in ambiguous terms. The Persian attack on Greece which the four dreams announce indeed will take place, but the final result will not be the conquest which the Persian king expects.

an iron spear') and cf. the repetition in 1.38: ὑπὸ … αἰχμῆς σιδηρέης ἀπολέεσθαι ('to die through an iron spear').[13] Characters may mark the fulfilment by words (e.g. Croesus, who comforts the slayer of his son, Adrastus, by saying 'It is not you whom I hold responsible for this evil, …, but one of the gods, who also showed long ago what was bound to happen', 1.45) or deeds (e.g., Sethus who erects a monument for the god who comforted him in his dream in 2.141.6).[14]

In the case of Cambyses' dream the element of its fulfilment is turned by the narrator into a protracted and suspenseful process of gradual understanding. The magian Patizeithes, steward of Cambyses' palace in Susa, notes that the death of Smerdis is not generally known and suggests his brother, who resembles Smerdis and also is called Smerdis, to rebel with him against Cambyses. Having persuaded him, εἷσε ἄγων ἐς τὸν βασιλήιον θρόνον ('he led him to the royal throne and made him sit down on it'). With this formulation, a graphic description of what so far was consistently referred to as 'rebel against' (ἐπανίστασθαι) and an obvious echo of the dream (ἐν τῷ θρόνῳ τῷ βασιληίῳ ἱζόμενος, 'sitting on the royal throne'), the narrator already marks for his narratees that—and how—the dream has come true: the Smerdis of Cambyses' dream was the magian Smerdis II and not his brother. But for Cambyses himself the way towards recognition is much longer. Patizeithes sends round heralds to announce that the Persians from now on have to obey Smerdis instead of Cambyses. One of the heralds comes to Cambyses and his troops, and when he hears the news he at first accuses Prexaspes of not having killed his brother Smerdis. Prexaspes advises to interrogate the herald, who has to admit that he has not seen Smerdis himself but merely reports what he has been instructed to say by the steward of Cambyses' palace. In retrospect we may admire the subtlety of the narrator's formulation in 62.1 ('the herald proclaimed the things instructed by the magian'): looking like an absolutely natural abbreviation of what earlier was formulated in full ('Patizeithes sent round heralds to say to the army that from now on they had to listen to Smerdis and not Cambyses'), the phrase 'the things instructed by the magian' now turns out to have had an additional significance.

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[13] Cf. Huber 1965, 11.

[14] There is one case where such an explicit or implicit marker is lacking: the set of four dreams connected with the Persian expedition against Greece (7.12–19). As a consequence, scholars have argued about the exact message of the dreams and their fulfilment. I find the interpretation by Köhnken 1988 the most convincing.

Cambyses asks Patizeithes who may have usurped Smerdis' name, coming close to but still not understanding exactly what has happened. Prexaspes, however, does understand it and explaining it to Cambyses mentions the names of the magians Patizeithes and Smerdis. Now finally follows the moment of insight of Cambyses: Ἐνθαῦτα ἀκούσαντα Καμβύσεα τὸ Σμέρδιος οὔνομα ἔτυψε ἡ ἀληθείη τῶν τε λόγων καὶ τοῦ ἐνυπνίου ('There having heard the name of Smerdis the truth of the words and of his dream struck Cambyses'). The narrator here explicitly notes the fulfilment of the dream in the form of Cambyses' embedded focalization ('the truth of the words[15] and of his dream struck him'), repeating almost verbatim the dream: ὃς ἐδόκεε ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ ἀπαγγεῖλαί τινά οἱ ὡς Σμέρδις ἱζόμενος ἐς τὸν βασιλήιον θρόνον ψαύσειε τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ('who dreamt that someone reported to him that Smerdis was sitting on the royal throne and with his head touched heaven'). It seems likely that we are still dealing with Cambyses' embedded focalization and that this is *his* recollection of the dream (cf. Croesus, who 'remembered his dream' in 1.36.3). It looks like a simple repetition, but, in fact, there is a significant difference between the two versions. In the first version the first words of the clause, which, according to Dik 1995, have focus function, had been ἐν τῷ θρόνῳ τῷ βασιληίῳ, because at that stage Cambyses paid most attention to the threat to his power. In the present (second) version the first word is Σμέρδις, because he now understands that the crucial element of the dream had been the identity of Smerdis and that he has killed the wrong Smerdis. In retrospect we may admire the narrator's subtlety in formulating the dream, which mentions Σμέρδις *tout court* and not ὁ Σμέρδις or Σμέρδις ὁ Κύρου, as the real Smerdis is usually called.[16]

The whole protracted scene of Cambyses gradually finding out the true state of affairs is a subtle piece of suspenseful narrative, but it may have an additional significance. After all, this is also the fulfilment of the rest of his dream: the arrival of a messenger from Persia with news about Smerdis. While Cambyses after having his dream jumped to the conclusion that the Smerdis on the throne was his brother, now there is Prexaspes who urges him to interrogate the messenger and thus makes

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[15] Which words? It seems most likely to think of the herald's words (63.2), which had been introduced by Prexaspes with 'tell me the truth and you may go in peace', and capped by the narrator with 'he spoke [thus] to them, not lying a single word'.

[16] I owe this observation to Mathieu de Bakker. Note, however, that thrice the real Smerdis is referred to by a simple Σμέρδις: 62.2, 63.1, 64.2.

him find out that there is another Smerdis. This, the narrator seems to imply, is what Cambyses should have done the first time. But he, as he himself soon will admit, acted 'with more haste than wisdom'.

Cambyses jumps on his horse in order to speed back to Persia and revenge his brother, but wounds himself. He asks where he is and upon hearing that he is in Syrian Ecbatana—the narrator had provided the narratees this information already as a seed[17] in 3.62.1—, he recalls an oracle prophesying his death in Ecbatana, which he had incorrectly understood to be Median Ecbatana. Knowing that he is certain to die, he wants to make a full confession and to incite the other Persians to take revenge on the magians.

5. *The evaluation (3.65)*

In Cambyses' confession the dream passes review a third time, this time interspersed with evaluatory remarks:

> When in Egypt I had a dream, *which I would wish I had never seen*; It appeared to me that a messenger came from my palace and reported that Smerdis was sitting on the royal throne and with his head touched heaven (ἐδόκεον δέ μοι ἄγγελον ἐλθόντα ἐξ οἴκου ἀγγέλλειν ὡς Σμέρδις ἱζόμενος ἐς τὸν βασιλήιον θρόνον ψαύσειε τῇ κεφαλῇ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ).[18] Fearing that my power would be taken over by my brother, *I acted with more haste than wisdom*; for, as I now understand, no human power can avert what is fated to happen. But I, *fool*, sent Prexaspes to Susa to kill Smerdis. Having done such a great crime [Cambyses here repeats the wording of the narrator in 30.1] I lived on without fear, never reckoning that with Smerdis out of the way another man would stand up against me. Wholly *mistaking* what was fated to be I have become a fratricide when there was no need, and am deprived of my kingdom all the same. For the Smerdis whom the dream foreshowed me to rebel was the magian.

This is the most elaborate evaluation of a dream in Herodotus, comparable to the evaluation of Croesus' oracles by the Pythia in 1.91. Even though Cambyses does not have the authority of the Pythia, his evaluation looks like a reliable one. Indeed, just before it we have heard that after his madness, which cropped up after he had killed a sacred

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[17] A seed is a piece of information the relevance of which becomes clear only later.

[18] The change 'from my palace' (ἐξ οἴκου) instead of 'from Persia' (in the first version) may be significant, in that it reflects Cambyses' present state of knowledge: he now knows that the messenger in the dream was sent by the housekeeper *of his palace* (τῶν οἰκίων: 61.1, 63.2, 63.4).

Apis-bull (3.30.1; cf. 33, 34.1, 37.1, 38.1), and one of the manifestations of which had been the murder of his brother, he now, as a result of the shock of his wound, 'became sane again' (ἐσωφρόνησε).

What Cambyses has come to understand is that he should have thought more carefully about the dream, considering whether there might be another Smerdis involved (cf. Prexaspes urging him to inter-rogate the herald, and the Pythia telling Croesus in 1.91 that he should have made further inquiry *which* great power the oracle had announced he would destroy), realizing that it is impossible for mortals to change fate, and that he has only worsened the situation by killing his own brother while losing his throne all the same. These conclusions, formu-lated so clearly and candidly by Cambyses, provide us with important clues as to how to understand the function of this dream.

The function of the dream

Why does Herodotus include the dream? An easy answer is provided by Frisch (1968, 71), who claims that all dreams were taken over by Herodotus from his sources, in this case from Egyptian sources (cf. 30.1); in other words, it was not his own invention but a ready-made element. All other scholars, however, ascribe the dream to the imagination of Herodotus himself.[19] This seems to me highly plausible in view of the extraordinary care with which it has been worked out and the many changes vis-à-vis the Behistun inscription that it entails. I recapitulate: Herodotus devises a dream which necessitates a usurping magian with the same name Smerdis (Behistun has a magian called Gaumata) and a second magian (Behistun has only one magian), who can instruct a her-ald to bring the news of Smerdis' usurpation without having actually seen him. The narrative sleight-of-hand with the doubling of names is repeated in the case of the Syrian/Median Ecbatana from the oracle. Finally, the triple repetition of the dream (with subtle alterations) also betrays the sure hand of the master of narration Herodotus.

Assuming that the dream is Herodotus' product, we are still left with the question why he introduced it. In order to answer this question we must return to the very beginning of the episode: 'As a result of that wrongful deed [his killing of the Apis-bull] Cambyses, as the Egyptians

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[19] E.g., Köhnken 1980, 49–50; Bichler 1985, 136–139; Erbse 1992, 53–55.

say, immediately became mad, having before that been already not completely sane. And the first of his (mad) crimes was that he killed his brother Smerdis' (30.1). We know what follows: the death of Smerdis allows the magians to usurp power, the detection of which makes Cambyses jump on his horse and wound himself in the thigh 'at the same spot where he himself earlier had hit the god of the Egyptians Apis' (3.64). Though Herodotus does not spell it out the hint is clear: Cambyses' death is a punishment for his killing of the sacred Apis-bull. This suggests the hand of the gods. Can we detect it? In the first place there is Cambyses' madness, which the Egyptians clearly consider to be sent by the gods as divine retribution (3.30). Herodotus is more cautious, also mentioning a rational explanation: Cambyses was not sane even before killing the bull (3.30) and the madness may have been caused by his 'sacred' disease (3.33); but, as in the case of the madness of Cleomenes, where he also mention both rational and divine causes, he may in the end have believed in a divine or at least a double motivation of the madness.[20]

In the second place there is the dream: is it sent by the gods? Herodotus here is less explicit than Homer, who almost without exception has gods in mortal disguise visit dreamers. He has abandoned this model in favour of a purely mental one (all dreams are introduced by the verb δοκέω).[21] But even such mental dreams may still be thought of as deriving from a god, and most characters say they do (e.g. Croesus in 1.45 and Cambyses in 3.65), while the narrator once backs them up explicitly (1.210) and more often implicitly suggests a divine source (e.g. in 1.34, where 'immediately' after Croesus' claim to be the most fortunate of men he is visited by a dream which sets off the divine punishment for this claim). So on the whole I am inclined, together with the majority of scholars,[22] to think that Herodotus presents his dreams as coming from the gods.

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[20] Cf. Munson 1991; Erbse 1992, 51–52; and Harrison 2000, 86.

[21] The only exceptions are those listed in note 9, where we hear of a dream visiting the dreamer. However, as 7.17–18 makes clear (where the dream is introduced as 'there came to him the same dream …' but capped as 'the dream seemed to Artabanus to threaten him with these words …'), this may be no more than a narrative shorthand. Cf. Levy 1995, 20: 'le rêve de Crésus est le seul qui ne soit pas introduit par ce verbe [*dokein*], mais c'est sans doute parce que l'historien n'évoque pas la perception du rêve et se content d'en résumer le message.'

[22] Cf. Huber 1965, 5–6; Frisch 1968, passim; Köhnken 1980, 47; Levy 1995, 25; Harrison 2000, 122–123. Interestingly enough, the one place where Herodotus has one of his characters mention a rational interpretation of a dream (7.16), this character is

Assuming that Herodotus created the dream and presents it as sent by the gods, the question still is why—he has—the gods send Cambyses this dream? A first interpretation is that of How and Wells, who write that the dream is a warning for Cambyses against a dangerous man, and adduce as parallel the dream of Astyages in 1.209.[23] This seems to me to be highly implausible:[24] why would the gods want to warn an obviously impious man like Cambyses and why would they try to avert the fated course of events?

A second interpretation is moralistic. Thus Erbse (1992, 55) states that both dream and madness are the punishment of the gods for Cambyses' *hybris*, which found its extreme manifestation in his murder of the bull. They send him an ambiguous dream, which in his madness he interprets wrongly and thereby brings about his own demise.[25] A slightly different moralistic interpretation is that of Kirchberg (1965, 30–31): the gods announce to Cambyses his end but instead of reacting to it with moderation he acts with blindness and rashness. I disagree with both interpretations, since they suggest that Cambyses had a choice: if only he had been sane or moderate, things could have developed differently from the way they actually did. But in his evaluation Cambyses stresses that no mortal can change what is fated to happen, and this is in fact a Herodotean truism, adhered to by both narrator and characters.[26]

Is the dream a sign of a fatalistic worldview then? This third interpretation has been defended by Frisch (1968, 5), who suggests that the dream must ensure that the oracle announcing Cambyses' death in Ecbatana comes true: 'Orakel und Traum wirken nebeneinander um den Lauf der Dinge nach den Gesetzen des Schicksals zu gestalten'. But this suggestion only shifts the problem: why the oracle? It also leaves out of account many of the details of both dream and fulfilment.

I therefore would favour a fourth interpretation, which has also been proposed by Huber.[27] The key to this interpretation is the observation that the dream though true is highly ambiguous, as are most dreams

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'overruled' by the appearance of a (divine) dream (7.17–18). Passages like this (and those about Cleomenes' and Cambyses' madness) show Herodotus as a transitional thinker, wavering between religious and rational models of explanation.

[23] How-Wells 1928, 264 (ad 30.2).
[24] Cf. also Frisch 1968, 5.
[25] Cf. also Walser 1983, 18.
[26] See Harrison 2000, 223–242.
[27] Huber 1965, 10–13 and cf. Brown 1982, 403; Bichler 1985, 137–138.

(and oracles). As such they often trigger a reaction of the dreamer which is based on a (partial) misunderstanding and has the opposite effect, indeed backfires: Croesus does not want his son to go out in war or hunt and therefore has him married, but shame before his newly wed wife actually induces the boy to beg his father to let him go on the hunt; in our case, the killing of Smerdis (and all the secrecy around it) gives the magians the opportunity to usurp power and robs Cambyses of the one person who could have revenged him and won back power. In other words, dreams increase the involvement or responsibility of the one who is undergoing the fate announced, they make him bring about that fate himself, and sometimes add to its unpleasantness: Croesus not only loses his son but himself takes the measures which cause his death; Cambyses not only loses his throne but also becomes the murderer of his brother. This is a tragic interpretation; as Huber writes: 'Das ist die Tragödie des Kambyses, die von jenem Traum ihren Ausgang nahm und durch sein eigenes Handeln verwirklicht wurde'.[28]

The boundaries between a tragic, moralistic, and fatalistic interpretation here and elsewhere in Herodotus are thin, and one might even argue that the tragic worldview is a combination of moralism and fatalism:[29] the course of history by and large is determined by fate (fatalism), but when characters 'ask for it' the gods may make fate worse for them by increasing their own involvement and responsibility (moralism); since the gods communicate via ambiguous signs, however, the misunderstanding and wrong measures of the mortals involved if not excusable at least become understandable (tragic).

If, in the end, I favour a tragic interpretation, there are two final observations which I would like to adduce in order to back up my position. The first is Cambyses' use in 65.4 of the technical term for 'tragic error' *par excellence*: ἁμάρτων.[30] The second is Herodotus'

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[28] Huber 1965, 13.

[29] Cf. Köhnken 1980, who combines a fatalistic (50: 'der das ganze Werk umgreifenden Schicksalsidee') and a moralistic interpretation (49: 'numinose Vergeltung'); Erbse 1992, who combines a moralistic (see above) with a tragic interpretation (55: 'Durch diese späte, aber nützlose Einsicht wird er zur tragischen Gestalt und erweckt das Mitleid auch des nachgeborenen Betrachters'); and Lévy 1995, who combines a fatalistic and a tragic interpretation (26: 'les rêveurs qui luttent vainement contre le sort retrouvent la grandeur du tragique dans une fatalité sans fatalisme').

[30] See Bremer 1969 and Said 1978. Both briefly discuss Herodotus (1969, 37–38 and 1978, 264–267) but not this place.

narrative strategy here (as in the case of most dreams and oracles),[31] which consists of not giving away their true significance right away. Thus Asheri is mistaken, when he notes ad 30.2: 'Esso [the dream] preannuncia al lettore le vicende che seguiranno' ('It foretells the reader the events that follow'). Rather, the reader has to await the development of the story to understand what the dream announced. And though usually understanding it earlier than the dreamer himself, he still shares his blindness for a while and therefore is likely to see him in a tragic rather than a moralistic light.[32]

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[31] The one exception is the dream of Cyrus in 1.209, the wrong interpretation of which is immediately corrected by the narrator in 1.210.

[32] I wish to thank M.P. de Bakker and S.R. van der Mije for their corrections and suggestions.

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APPENDIX. A COMPARISON OF THE
BEHISTUN INSCRIPTION AND HERODOTUS

Behistun	Herodotus
	Cambyses wounds an Apis bull (29)
	Smerdis is in Egypt with Cambyses (30)
	Cambyses sends Smerdis back to Persia out of jealousy because he can draw the Ethiopian bow (30)
	Cambyses has a dream, in which a messenger reports that Smerdis sits on the throne (30)
Cambyses kills Bardiya (=Smerdis) and leaves for Egypt	He sends Prexaspes to Persia to kill Smerdis (30)
Death of Bardiya is kept a secret	Death of Smerdis is kept a secret (31)
A magian, Gaumata, pretending to be Bardiya, usurps the throne	Two magians, Smerdis II and Patizeithes, usurp the throne, Smerdis II pretending to be Smerdis (61)
	A herald proclaims that the Persians should obey Smerdis instead of Cambyses (62)
	Interrogated by Prexaspes, the herald/messenger has to admit that he has not seen Smerdis (63)
	Prexaspes informs Cambyses that Smerdis is Smerdis II (63)
	Cambyses understands his dream (64)
	Jumping on his horse to go to Persia, he mortally wounds himself at the same place where he had wounded the Apis bull (64)
Cambyses dies	Cambyses relates his mistaken understanding of the dream and unjustified murder of his brother to the Persian nobles and dies (65)

DREAMS IN APULEIUS' *METAMORPHOSES*

Vincent Hunink

Dreams are a recurrent motif throughout Greek literature, notably in the main genres of poetry, such as epic, tragedy and lyric, but also in genres of prose.[1] Historiography comes to mind here, with some well-known stories from Herodotus, but some less renowned works may be mentioned as well, such as the famous book on dreams by Artemidoros, and the Greek novels.[2]

Roman authors did not hesitate either to adopt dreams as a literary device in a similar broad range of genres.[3] In this essay I will concentrate on one Latin work of prose that may properly be seen as a synthesis of much that is best in Greek and Roman literature, the Latin *Metamorphoses* by Apuleius (ca. 125–180),[4] and I will try to analyse the function of dreams in the plot of the novel. Within the structure of the narrative as a whole, so I hope to show, dreams constitute more than just ornaments or superficial motifs.[5]

The *Metamorphoses* open with a travel scene: the protagonist, young Lucius of Corinth, is on his way to Thessaly, the land of witchcraft. He meets some fellow-travellers, who tell him a number of gruesome tales, which may even be called horror stories. A certain Aristomenes tells

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[1] For a survey see Kessels 1973; cf. further e.g. Walde 2001 (Greek and Roman poetry). Among general studies of dreams in antiquity, see e.g. Hanson 1980.

[2] Some work has been done on dreams in the Greek novel. See e.g. Plastira-Valkanou 2001 on Xenophon of Ephesus, esp. p. 137 with references to earlier studies.

[3] There is no monography on dreams in Roman literature. Cf. however studies on specific genres, such as Bouquet 2001 (Roman epic) and titles mentioned in note 1.

[4] For a survey of recent literature on Apuleius and a discussion on the state of affairs concerning his life and works, see Sandy 1999 and Harrison 2000, 1–38 (general) and 210–259 (the *Met.*); a recent book on the *Met.* is Finkelpearl 1998. Dreams and visions in the *Met.* are sometimes mentioned in studies of other themes in the novel; cf. e.g. Dowden 1998.

[5] This paper about dreams in a thoroughly Roman text that nonetheless qualifies itself as a *fabula Graecanica* (1,1) is meant as a tribute to Prof. A. Kessels. With his never failing humour and good sense, and his love and knowledge of Greek literature, Ton Kessels has always been a great teacher and an inspiring colleague.

Lucius about an old friend of his, Socrates,[6] whom he has found sitting in the gutter, dressed like a poor beggar. Aristomenes takes Socrates to a bath and to an inn, where he helps him recover.[7] Socrates claims that he has become the victim of a witch, Meroë, for whom he seriously warns Aristomenes.

Having finished his story Socrates falls asleep. Aristomenes, who has started sceptical but meanwhile has become afraid, barricades the door of their room in the inn and tries to stay awake and vigilant, but without much success. Strange things begin to happen.

> *...dein circa tertia ferme uigiliam paululum coniueo. Commodum quieueram, et repente impulsu maiore quam ut latrones crederes ianuae reserantur, immo uero fractis et euolsis funditus cardinibus prosternuntur.* (1,11)[8]

What follows is a frightening scene. Two witches enter the room, cruelly cut the throat of poor Socrates, catch all his blood in a leather receptacle, take out his heart, and leave a little sponge in his wound while uttering an incantation. They also urinate on Aristomenes, who is, however, allowed to live in order that he may bury the corpse of Socrates.

Next morning the damage to the doors strangely appears to be undone. As a matter of fact, Aristomenes told us that as soon as the witches left, the doors reverted undamaged to their previous positions (1,14). Socrates does appear to be still alive, and both men happily resume their journey.

But what exactly did Aristomenes experience? Was it a dream or reality? Although the witch scene had been pictured very realistically and lively, and in a rather noisy fashion at that, the suggestion of a dream is unmistakable. Aristomenes himself explicitly says so to Socrates. He has had a bad dream, he argues, caused by heavy eating and drinking the evening before, in defiance of what doctors commonly

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[6] On the novelist's obvious play and irony with names such as Socrates and Plutarch, see: Hunink 2004.

[7] It may be noted how Apuleius manages to bring his tale to considerable narrative complexity within just a few pages, even if the puzzling 'prologue' of the novel is left out of account. For what Socrates tells about Meroë (1,7–10) is, at least, a doubly embedded speech: the narrating Lucius quotes Aristomenes reporting Socrates' words. In recent years, the complexly structured *Met.* have proven to provide highly suitable material for narratological analysis; see e.g. Van Mal-Maeder/Zimmerman 1998.

[8] 'about half way through the night I began to nod off. I had just fallen asleep when the doors were suddenly flung open, with a violence greater than you would associate with robbers; indeed, the hinges were smashed and torn from their sockets, and the doors sent crashing to the ground'. (Walsh 1994, 7)

advice (1,18),[9] and thinks he has been spattered with human blood. Socrates even laughs about it:

> *Ad haec ille subridens: 'At tu', inquit, 'non sanguine, sed lotio perfusus es, uerum tamen et ipse per somnium iugulari uisus sum mihi.' (1,18).*[10]

The whole thus seems to become a lighthearted matter about a dream.[11] Both friends decide to have breakfast in an idyllic setting, under a plane tree near a gentle stream. But it is here that tragedy suddenly unfolds: Socrates seems to faint, and as soon as his thirsty lips touch the water, the wound in his neck opens up, the sponge rolls out with just a drop of blood, and he dies. Aristomenes buries him and escapes, to live in voluntary exile.

Aristomenes' tale is an exciting, sensational story, that makes good reading at the start of the novel. But it also leaves the audience, including the first listener, Lucius, teasingly in the dark. If Aristomenes' story is taken for granted, it remains unclear if what he reports about the visit of witches has been a dream or a live experience.

The witches were said to enter around midnight, the proper time for apparitions,[12] and although Aristomenes did not actually state at the beginning that he was dreaming, he did say he had fallen asleep. The impression therefore, that it was but a dream, seems clear, and it becomes stronger as the story goes on, until the unexpected death of Socrates.

On the other hand, a first reader cannot not help reading the story of the witches as if it is really happening. The awesome noise with which the women burst into the room could even suggest that Aristomenes must have woken up. Moreover, although next morning both friends readily conclude that Aristomenes has had a nightmare, it does seem rather unsettling that Socrates' nightmare (1,18) closely corresponds to that of Aristomenes.[13] And in the end, much of what Aristomenes has

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[9] On the ancient ideas about a relation between nightmares and heavy drinking, that play a role behind this scene, see Panayotakis 1998.

[10] 'He smiled and said: "It's not blood but piss you were drenched with. But to tell the truth, I too had a dream, that my throat was cut."' (Kenney 1998, 16)

[11] It may be observed that Socrates even seems to discard a supernatural explanation for the urine with which Aristomenes has been covered. He does not actually say that Aristomenes wetted himself, but the insinuation is clear enough. The translation by Walsh 1994, 12 spoils the point by making it explicit ('you merely wet yourself').

[12] Cf. Keulen 2003, 224 ad. loc.

[13] For the motif of the 'double dream' which by mutual confirmation is bound to reveal the turth, see Keulen 2003, 306 ad loc., with further references.

seen from the witches during their nocturnal visit, turns out to be true: the wound in Socrates' neck, the sponge coming out of it at his touch of water, and the few drops of blood that suggest that Socrates' blood has actually been taken. One wonders why nothing is said about Socrates' heart, which the witches were said to have taken out. Therefore, what first seems 'just a nightmare' appears to be as real and true as can be.

But what Aristomenes tells is so bizarre that serious doubts emerge as to his tale as such. For is it a true account or a piece of complete fiction? Is Aristomenes a reliable witness or an imaginative story-teller? Aristomenes' travel companion immediately calls his story into question, calling it a *fabula* and a *mendacium* (1,20), and asking Lucius if he can believe such fiction. In a rather complex statement Lucius says that he does, but his words show that he is mainly captured by the force of the story, rather than asserting anything positive about the possibility of its content.[14]

In the end, the whole tale remains enigmatic. The reader has been given mutually exclusive indications as to the status of what was told: it may have been a bad dream, but some horrible details of this nightmare seem all too real. That is, *if* the story-teller is to believed, which is something we cannot know.[15]

Apuleius' use of the dream motif in the Aristomenes tale is highly effective both to captivate and to unsettle the reader. He or she will certainly be amused, but will also be forced to ask fundamental questions about the reliability of the various voices that may be heard in this narrative text, and about the nature of prose fiction as such.

Dream-like tales

In the rest of the opening books of the *Met.*, many more mysterious stories follow. The motif of dreams does not play an explicit role here, but the magical and incredible character of many of them might tempt readers to interpret them as yet other instances of nightmares. This goes notably for the horrible tale of Thelyphron in the second book (2,20–30).[16] His bizarre story hardly merits more credit than Aris-

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[14] See the sensible remarks by Keulen 2003, 335–335 on 1,20,5.

[15] On the alternative explanations of the Aristomenes tale, see further Winkler 1985, 82–86.

[16] Thelyphron relates how he was hired to guard a corpse during the night, to

tomenes' and it would not seem unnatural to take what he reports as another instance of a bad dream. But here too, the dream would then have come true: for Thelyphron actually has injuries in his face that he has suffered as a result of the events he told about. Since the story-teller could, if asked, show the wounds, his story, as unlikely as it may seem, cannot be dismissed as readily as Aristomenes'. Nonetheless, it is received with laughter by his immediate listeners (2,31), possibly under the influence of wine.[17] Again, it is only the entertainment value that appears to count.

Much the same goes for the famous episode of the 'Festival of Laughter' in the third book (2,32–3,11).[18] Lucius is strongly convinced he has done the right, lawful thing in killing three criminals, but finds himself sued for this on a capital charge. His feelings could perhaps be described as a bad dream. It only ends when people make him understand the practical joke that he has undergone. In the end, the trial is only comedy, whereas the murder he has committed turns out to be unreal. Again, reality and illusion are mixed up in a confusing way, leaving Lucius and his readers with many questions as to what really took place.

As if to make the point that such scenes have a dream-like quality, shortly afterwards, Lucius actually says that he believes to be dreaming. On witnessing the magical scene of a woman changing into a bird, he asserts:

> *praesentis tantum facti stupore defixus quiduis aliud magis uidebar esse quam Lucius: sic exterminatus animi, attonitus in amentiam uigilans somniabar; defrictis adeo diu pupulis, an uigilarem, scire quaerebam.* (3,22)[19]

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prevent witches robbing it of certain limbs or parts. Although he could not keep awake all night, next day everything appeared to be fine. Only after some further unlikely developments, with the dead man resuscitated by an Egyptian magician, it appears that it is Thelyphron himself who has been robbed of his ears and nose, instead of the dead man.

[17] Cf. Van Mal-Maeder 2001, 397 ad.loc. Cf also above, note 8.

[18] Late at night, so Lucius tells, and rather drunk he killed three robbers who were breaking into the house of his host Milo. The next morning he is arrested and put on trial, where he has to plead his case in the theatre. After some further developments, the three murdered robbers turn out to be damaged, inflated wineskins. Lucius appears to be the victim of a practical joke in honour of Risus. In recompense, he is awarded a statue.

[19] 'I was rooted to the ground with astonishment at this event, and I seemed to have become something other than Lucius. In this state of ecstasy and riveted mindlessness, I was acting out a waking dream, and accordingly I rubbed my eyes repeatedly in an effort to discover whether I was awake'. (Walsh 1994, 52)

An intriguing, dream-like quality may also be attributed to the largest inserted story in the *Met.*, the much appreciated tale of *Cupid and Psyche*. In the story as a whole, many strange, unnatural, and mysterious motifs and events may be seen, from the supernatural beauty of Psyche and her mysterious encounter with a divine lover, to her final reunion and marriage with Cupid in heaven. Women transported by the wind Zephyrus towards lofty dwellings, rivers and trees gifted with human speech, helpful animals assisting poor Psyche in carrying out impossible tasks, all of this reinforces the fictional character of the story, or, for that matter, suggests that everything is but a dream.

Interestingly, the *Cupid and Psyche* story is told in the *Metamorphoses* as a remedy against a horrible nightmare. Lucius, by now transformed into an ass, has been captured by a group of robbers. He hears how the robbers' housekeeper, an old woman, tries to comfort a young girl, Charite. The girl has told her about her sad fate: on her wedding day she was kidnapped by the robbers from the arms of her mother. She also had a nightmare: she felt she was dragged away from her house, after which her husband came after her, but one of the robbers killed him with a big stone (4,26–27).

On hearing the girl's account, the old woman makes an important observation about dreams:

> '*Bono animo esto, mi erilis, nec uanis somniorum figmentis terreare. Nam praeter quod diurnae quietis imagines falsae perhibentur, tunc etiam nocturnae uisiones contrarios euentus nonnumquam pronuntiant. Denique flere et uapulare et nonnumquam iugulari lucrosum prosperumque prouentum nuntiant, contra ridere et mellitis dulciolis uentrem saginare uel in uoluptatem ueneriam conuenire tristitie animi languore corporis damnisque ceteris uexatum iri praedicabunt. Sed ego te narrationibus lepidis anilibusque fabulis protinus auocabo*' (4,27)[20]

So according to the old woman, a daylight dream such as Charite has had, is by definition untrue.[21] This reassuring claim, and the following, long story of Cupid and Psyche, which takes up about two books

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[20] "'Cheer up, my lady; don't be frightened by the baseless fancies of dreams. For one thing, dreams in daylight hours are held to be false, and for another, even night-dreams sometimes tell of untruthful happenings. So tears, beating, even murders sometimes portend a profitable and favourable outcome, while on the other hand, smiles, bellyfuls of honey-cakes and pleasurable love-encounters foretell future afflictions with melancholy, physical illness, and all such hardships. Come then, here and now I'll divert you with the pretty story of an old wife's tale.'" (Walsh 1994, 74).

[21] For the notion that unfavourable events may predict a happy outcome and vice versa, Mignogna 1996, 95 compares Artem. *Oneir.* 2,60. Hijmans 1977, 205 further adds Plin. *Ep.* 1,18,2 *refert tamen, euentura soleas an contraria somniare. Mihi reputanti somnium meum*

(4,28–6,24), is bound to make Charite, Lucius and others forget all about the nightmare. However, matters ultimately take a grim turn for Charite. After she and the ass Lucius have been rescued by her husband Tlepolemus, who has come to save her, her man becomes the victim of envy by a rival, Thrasyllus, who kills him during a hunting scene. Charite discovers the truth, which her dead husband himself reveals to her in a nocturnal dream (8,8–9). In an act of cruel revenge she cuts short Thrasyllus' illusions by blinding him,[22] and commits suicide (8,1–14).

Returning to her initial nightmare as reported in 4,27, one might observe that it has more or less come true.[23] Thrasyllus does not actually belong to the group of robbers who has captured her, but he is characterized as a degenerate drunk, who is explicitly said to associate himself with gangs of robbers (8,1). So, by extension, he may well be identified with the robber from Charite's nightmare. And although he uses a hunting lance to get Tlepolemus killed (with the help of a boar) (8,5), rather than a stone, as the nightmare foretold, such differences are of minor importance. In the end it amounts to this: Charite's husband, who has come to save her, is killed by a robber, and this was the essence of her nightmare.

On a further note of irony, not only has her bad dream come true, but the truth about Tlepolemus has been revealed to her in a second dream.[24] Charite does not call it into question for a moment, although the old woman has warned her about the unreliability of all dreams, even those experienced at night. Dreams can be misleading and confusing, but in the *Metamorphoses* they do seem to contain a disturbingly high proportion of truth.

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istud, quod times tu, egregiam actionem portendere uidetur. On the complex Roman attitudes concerning the truthfulness of dreams, see Harris 2003.

[22] Charite delivers a proper farewell speech to Thrasyllus in 8,12. In her speech, she repeatedly refers to his eyes seeing her beauty and his dreams of having sex with her, something she will make impossible by condemning him to eternal darkness. So the motifs of human vision and illusion play a role at this final stage of the episode as well.

[23] In Hijmans 1985, 5–6 it is argued that Charite's first dream does not come true, although it is admitted that 'there seems to be a link between the robber-element there and the characterisation of Thrasyllus in the present tale as *factionibus latronum male sociatus*', 8,1. Hijmans 1977, 203–204 on 4,27 had remained undecided on the issue. Other scholars argue that Charite's first dream, with a few changes, has actually come true; e.g. Mignogna 1996, 95–96; cf. further Winkler 1985, 52–53.

[24] According to Hijmans 1985, 5–6, Charite's second dream rather reflects only her subconscious imagination. A psychological interpretation, while perfectly legitimate by itself, does not seem to be suited to explain the Latin text here.

At the end of the Charite episode, we may safely conclude that everything that the old woman told was false and unreliable. Her characterisation as a *delira et temulenta illa … anicula* (crazy, drunken old hag) (6,25) now gains special significance: she cannot be trusted. Her statements about the lack of veracity of dreams are contradicted by the developments in the story, and the comfort she gave Charite turns out to have been an illusion.

There is a further, intriguing implication for our interpretation of the *Cupid and Psyche* story, if the point of its dream-like character is briefly pursued. For according to the old woman's claim, the story would not qualify as a true account, but as a lie, or at best as an entertaining piece of fiction. That is how the old woman actually announced it in 4,27 (*narrationibus lepidis anilibusque fabulis*), and how it seems to be perceived by the listening Charite and by Lucius.[25] But if the old woman is not to be trusted, her story of Cupid and Psyche may in the end be 'true' at some higher level, of which the story-teller herself is unaware.

The distinction between dreams and reality, between truth and fiction, is deliberately blurred in a rather intricate way. In the *Metamorphoses.*, a dream or a story may somehow be false, or true, or both at the same time. Every new example thus poses a further little puzzle to the reader, who must be ready to expect just about anything.

After the Charite episode, many scenes follow that are in some way unpleasant to Lucius and other protagonists, but the sense of magic and mystery becomes less prominent.[26] Accordingly, the motif of dreams recedes into the background, although it is readily activated when the storyline requires so. Thus, in 9,31, in one of the inserted stories in book 9 that focus on the motif of 'cuckolding', the truth about a wicked stepmother's criminal behaviour is revealed in a dream: a loyal daughter receives a vision of her dead father, who tells her everything.[27]

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[25] Having heard the story, Lucius regrets not having writing-tablets and a *stilus* to write down *tam bellam fabulam*. (6,25)

[26] For instance, in the episode of the exotic priests of Dea Syria (8,24–9,10), it is not their religion or other special quality that is highlighted, but their lowly lusts and their trickery.

[27] The dream motif comes at the end of what is a rather complexly structured episode about a baker's wife. It is used almost casually to quickly round off the narrative, and so it cannot be said to fulfil an important, structural role, as e.g. in the scenes with Aristomenes or Charite. Meanwhile, we may note that once again, a dream contains the 'truth' of the matter, in a context of bizarre, incredible events.

Dreaming of Isis

In the final, eleventh book of the novel, the so called 'Isis' book, the atmosphere is dominated by magic, wonder, religion and Egyptian mystery cult. No wonder, perhaps, that dreams occur with increasing frequency.

The first dream brings a great surprise. At the point of his deepest misery, Lucius the ass has escaped from the theatre of Corinth and arrives on the coast near Cenchreae, where he falls asleep at the end of the day (10,35). In the early evening he wakes up and watches how a full moon rises from the sea. Inspired by a religious awe, he delivers a fervent prayer to Isis, entreating her to finally liberate him from his asinine shape. After this long, impressive prayer (11,2), he falls asleep again.

> *Nec satis coniueram, et ecce pelago medio uenerandos diis etiam uultus attollens emergit diuina facies …* (11,3)[28]

This divine figure appears to be none other than Isis herself, of whom Lucius gives a vivid, detailed description (11,3–4), and who in turn delivers a long, personal address to Lucius (11,5–6), in which she instructs him about the manner in which he is to be liberated and to regain his human shape. He must wait for a certain procession for Isis, and approach the priest, who will hand him some roses that will change him back into a human being. After this, he is to become a priest of Isis.

The apparition of Isis, as elaborately as it has been described, is nonetheless clearly characterised as a dream: immediately afterwards, Lucius wakes up (11,7), and meditates upon his instructions. The overall situation rather resembles that of the first passage that has been discussed (1,11): it is night, the protagonist has barely closed his eyes,[29] and an impressive sight imposes itself upon him. The explicit dream character of the scene in 11,3 would seem to confirm a reader (or 'second reader') of the *Met.* that the parallel scene in 1,11 certainly must have concerned a dream. At the beginning of the novel, this was not yet entirely clear, as has been argued above.

In the course of book 11, the truth of what Isis has suggested to Lucius gradually comes to light, with dreams continuing to play a

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[28] 'But scarcely had I closed my eyes when suddenly from the midst of the sea, a divine figure arose'. (Walsh 1994, 219)

[29] Cf. 1,11 … *paululum coniueo. Commodum quieueram, et repente …* and 11,3 *Nec satis coniueram, et ecce …*.

major role in this. Isis already announced to Lucius that she would reveal everything about him to her priest in a dream[30] and a few pages later, the priest in question, looking exactly as she foretold, appears to been informed by her in this manner, so Lucius tells us.[31] Next, Lucius is actually retransformed and regains his human shape (11,13–14).[32]

By now, all seems well and clear: Lucius is a man again, and Isis has kept her promise. No more uncertainty, no more ambiguity, no more narrative complexity, but only the simplicity and clarity of the Isis religion, to which Lucius now devotes himself. Dreams turn out to be a vehicle of the supernatural, and appear not to have revealed lies but truth.

A problem, however, is that our storyteller Lucius, has shown himself to be credulous and naive throughout the novel. In an incessant urge to experience new things (his infamous *curiositas*), he does not reject any story, as unlikely as it may be. Shortsighted and not too intelligent, rash and silly at times, a prey of voracity[33] and carnal desires, Lucius has appeared to be highly impressionable to anything remotely magical or 'supernatural', and he does not seem to have undergone any development in the course of his adventures as an ass and his latest metamorphosis. That is, at this stage dreams are presented by Lucius as vehicles of truth, but there are some grounds to disbelieve the story-teller himself.

In the end, even Lucius himself might have felt some doubts, one feels inclined to say.[34] For by the time he is to obtain his initiation as a priest, he receives innumerable dreams:

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[30] '*quae sunt sequentia sacerdoti meo per quietem facienda praecipio*'. (11,6)

[31] *At sacerdos, ut reabse cognoscere potui, nocturni commonefactus oraculi miratusque congruentiam mandati muneris, confestim restitit* (11,13).

[32] Having discussed a number of episodes from the *Met.* in terms of dreams, one might feel tempted to regard Lucius' entire account of his unlikely change into an ass, the following dangerous adventures, and the no less unlikely change back into human shape as one long-drawn-out dream; cf. Winkler 1985, 9 who mentions the idea of books 1 to 10 as 'a long narrative dream' with book 11 as a 'waking coda'. However, there are no concrete indications in the text in support of such theories. The whole *Met.* are, by all means, a piece of fiction. It is to be noted that Lucius himself firmly believes everything that he tells us.

[33] Even at the crucial moment of receiving the liberating roses, Lucius almost devours them: *coronam … auido ore susceptam cupidus promissi deuoraui* (11,13).

[34] Cf. Harrison 2000, 247 about the doubts repeatedly expressed by Lucius (e.g. 11,29,3), which produce a comic effect: 'even the dupe Lucius suspects that all is not well'.

> *Nec fuit nox una uel quies aliqua uisu deae minituque ieiuna, sed crebris imperiis sacris suis me, iam dudum destinatum, nunc saltem censebat initiari.* (11,19)[35]

Nocturnal visions are almost piled up, occurring with a rather alarming frequency, which reveals perhaps more about Lucius and his ardent desire to devote himself to Isis than about her divine power.

Meanwhile, dreams are invariably presented as reliable: in 11,20 Lucius is told in a dream about a slave of his, Candidus, who has arrived from Thessaly; next morning, slaves bring back a white horse (*equum … colore candidum*) that once belonged to Lucius. Shortly afterwards, the impatient Lucius finally obtains nocturnal instructions by Isis about his initiation, and the exact expenses he will have to make (11,22). After his festive initiation, the goddess inspires him, no doubt in yet another dream, to travel to Rome (11,26), where he is to receive another, costly initiation in the temple of Isis at the Campus Martius, into the cult of Osiris.

As in earlier cases, the priest,[36] who will perform this sacred act is equally instructed by the goddess in a dream:

> *audisse mitti sibi Madaurensem, sed admodum pauperem, cui statim sua sacra deberet ministrare; nam et illi studiorum gloriam et ipsi grande compendium sua comparari prouidentia* (11,27)[37]

This is a hotly debated passage in the novel, since the author Apuleius of Madauros here seems to confuse his real name and biography with that of his protagonist Lucius, who was told to be a Corinthian. This would be a breach of the most basic of narrative conventions. The passage can reasonably be explained as a deliberate, practical joke by Apuleius to confuse the readers at the end of the book.[38] But perhaps the dream element of the context has not sufficiently been taken into account.

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[35] 'No single night, no siesta passed which was not haunted with the vision and the advice of the goddess. By numerous sacred commands she decreed that since I had been so inclined for some time, I should now at last undergo initiation'. (Walsh 1994, 230).

[36] He is called *Asinius Marcellus*, with a name ironically recalling Lucius' asinine nature.

[37] 'he had heard … that a man from Madauros who was quite poor was being sent to him, and that he must at once initiate him into his divine rites. By the god's providence this man would gain fame in his studies and the priest himself would obtain a rich reward'. (Walsh 1994, 237–238).

[38] Cf. Van der Paardt 1981; for further discussion see e.g. Finkelpearl 1998, 215–217.

Unlike what is often thought, Lucius does not actually identify himself as a man from Madauros who will earn glory in literature, but he tells that this is what the priest heard in a dream. At this stage of the novel, dreams bring information that is presented by Lucius as 'true', but for him dreams do not have to be literally exact to qualify as true, but some changes seem allowed, as was shown in the dream about Candidus, which was true only as a linguistic pun. Thus, the motif of dreams has allowed the author Apuleius to insert his own name. This seems teasing and funny indeed, but it cannot properly be said to form a break with narrative conventions.

After Lucius' second initiation, the gods still do not seem to have enough. The divinity instructs poor Lucius for a third, again costly initiation. In a final vision in the last paragraph of the novel (11,30) Osiris himself appears to Lucius, in person, telling him not to hesitate to continue his work as an advocate in court and to neglect all envy he is confronted with, and announcing Lucius' appointment to the college of *pastophori*. Lucius does not question the dream at all (would the great god Osiris really care about Lucius' success as a lawyer?) and joyfully starts on his career.[39]

Scholars have pointed out that his joy seems rather misplaced: after three successive initiations, he has spent an enormous amount of money on the cult of Isis, without obtaining much more than a post in a relatively unimportant class of priests. One might argue that the gullible Lucius has been tricked somehow by shrewd, calculating priests into exercising his professional talents for their material benefit.[40] But even if one takes Lucius' religiosity and the Isis cult rather less lightly, the end of the novel, with its repetitive, almost tiresome sequence of dreams, is bound to raise doubts and questions.[41] What if, in the end, all these dreams are but deceit and illusion?

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[39] The last words of the novel are *gaudens obibam*. Laird 1997, 275–276 notes the ambiguity of the final word, which as such might also refer to death, a common motif at the end of a book.

[40] The Isis priests, then, would be like the priests of Dea Syria in *Met.* 8, whom Lucius-the-ass so vehemently condemned for their bad practices. The notion of Lucius as a dupe of the Isis priests, as one among several possible readings of book 11, was first advanced by Winkler 1985, esp. 215–223. Cf. further e.g. Van Mal-Maeder 1997, 100–110 and Harrison 2000, 238–252, who regards book 11 as a satire of the Isis cult. In this reading, one may add, Lucius' 'truthful dreams' could be explained as opportune ideas deliberately suggested to him by *Isiaci coniectores*, interpreters of dreams given to Isis adepts, as mentioned by e.g. Cic. *Div.* 1,132.

[41] According to Finkelpearl 2004, Apuleius ends the *Met.* at least three times, playing

Focus

Dreams in the *Metamorphoses* play an important role at what may be called crucial moments in the narrative. Right at the start, in the opening scenes, they serve to raise tension and ambiguity, and to picture an atmosphere of wonder and mystery. A first reader is likely to be uncertain about the reality of many of the stories that are told. The dream-like quality and narrative ambiguity of some of the later parts, including the striking story of Cupid and Psyche in the centre of the novel, and the Charite episode that encircles it, are bound to fascinate the reader and keep his or her attention. In the final book, dreams invariably reveal the 'truth', even if not always in a literal way. But by the end of the book, the truths of the narrator Lucius have become at least questionable to the reader. At the end, certainty is no more within reach than in the horror stories of the beginning.

Both at the opening and the close of the book, as well as in its central part, dreams are artfully inserted, furthering doubts about the nature of what is told and about the persons who are telling or the man who is writing it. Postmodern readers may even raise additional questions about those who are reading the text.

In the end, Apuleius' narrative remains thoroughly elusive, and this may well be considered as one of its most fundamental qualities. It has made the novel into a classic work, worthy to be mentioned among the most enjoyable and lasting achievements from Greek and Latin literature.

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with the narrative device of closure, and producing a complex text that stands somehow outside the text, much as the prologue to book 1.

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SELF-KILLING IN ARTEMIDOROS' DREAM WORLD

Anton J.L. van Hooff

I had a dream

Once I dreamed of struggling with a man who was about to throw himself over the railing of a high building. During the fight I struggled with myself as well, wondering: 'Why do you prevent this man from killing himself? Are you not the one who in public debates advocates the unqualified right to put an end to one's life?' In these discussions I often present the ancient pragmatic approach as an alternative to the modern paradigm of suicide. What the Greeks and Romans used to denote as voluntary death (*hekousios thanatos*, *mors voluntaria*) became only in Christian times the mortal sin of self-murder. On the other hand, the modern psycho-social explanations of self-killing as a failed cry for help by a disturbed person who has to be pitied and needs a psychiatrist were completely alien to the Greco-Roman world.[1]

How would Artemidoros look upon my nightmare? Probably my personal preoccupation with the problem of self-killing would cause the ancient dream expert to deny it an entry into in his *Oneirokritika*. In his eyes my nightly vision would just have been an *enhypnion*, i.e. the continuation of daily experiences in one's sleep. What interests Artemidoros is only the authentic *oneiros*. An oneiros is a vision that sets the soul in motion (*oneirein*) and directs its attention to the future (1.1).

Does he have a dream?

Repeatedly Artemidoros assures his reader that he is a truly professional oneirocritic. Therefore he not only collected numerous dreams both from personal experience (*empeiria*), and from extant publications, but in his ambition (*philotimia*) Artemidoros visited market places and

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asked common interpreters of dreams for their materials, as he says in the prooimion of the *Oneirokritika*.

Both antiquity and Byzantine civilization acknowledged the outstanding quality of Artemidoros' collection by preserving it as the only representative to survive of what must have been a vast genre in ancient writing. There are good reasons to trust the good judgement of ancient scribes and scholars. Artemidoros deals in a systematic way with his material, for instance when he categorizes dreams by scanning all the parts of the body from hair to toe. It is hardly possible to catch him making contradictory statements, as he is consistent in his explanations, thus refuting the expectations of the modern critic on the pseudo-science that dream reading is; there is system in Artemidoros' nonsense.[2] This quality makes his work an invaluable source of folkloric material, even if he may have made up some dreams for the sake of the system. Obviously he reflects popular mentality and morality.

The value of Artemidoros as a source for social history lies in the first place in the dreams he reports. They show the concerns of the ancients. Some of the dreams, e.g. being pursued, seem to stem from the general human condition, independent of time and culture. Most of the topics however, are highly culturally specific. Modern man, apart perhaps from the devoted classicist, will not dream of ancient gods or of having to fight as a gladiator in the arena. In this way Artemidoros' *oneiroi* offer invaluable insights into the anxieties and the desires of ancient people.

Not only the dreams themselves reflect common experiences of the ancient world; also the way Artemidoros explains the *oneiroi* is highly enlightening. He demonstrates a good deal of common sense when he explains specific dreams and dream types, constantly referring to real life situations and experience.

Artemidoros is not writing about the august world of gods, heroes and great men that make history, but he is firmly rooted in the middle class society of urban Asia Minor. If one may believe him, even slaves and robbers belonged to his customers. Anyway, the values Artemidoros' subscribes to, are not those of the intellectual elite. Rather they represent middle class ideals. The Cicero's may make us believe that it is 'illiberal' to practice *quaestus sordidi* (*Off.*1.150), but Artemidoros' people do not at all despise profit making or having financial luck.

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[2] White speaks of 'a logical, seemingly scientific way'; White 1975, 7. 'The most conspicuous feature of the dream-book of Artemidorus is perhaps its reasonable character', Blum 1936, 80.

These rather unique qualities as well as the quantity of the examples Artemidoros gives make many an ancient historian reach for the *Oneirokritika* when studying any topic: is there a dream on my special field of interest? Rarely does the ancient author disappoint the expectations. Also on self-killing, my special interest, he has something to offer.

Preponderance of hanging

'Dreams about being hanged and hanging oneself predict disaster', Artemidoros assures in *Oneirokritika* 2.50. This casual remark lends support to my conviction that self-hanging was the most frequently used exit in antiquity, although the data of the more than 1300 ancient cases of suicide I have gathered suggest otherwise. They indicate preponderance in the use of weapons and other cutting instruments. This honourable method accounts for 36 % of all cases, whereas hanging has only 17 % as the graph shows:

Methods in ancient self-killing

The overrepresentation of weapons in the image antiquity presents is easily explained by the nature of our literary sources. They are concerned with generals, politicians and other members of the elite rather than with common men and women. There is no reason to assume that the Greco-Roman world was different from other pre-industrial societies, in which self-hanging is by far the most popular method of self-killing. In a comparable way the habit of *hara-kiri* or *seppuku* determines our view of Japanese self-killing, but in fact it was very rare. Similarly, the honorable way out by the use of weapons was much exaggerated by our ancient spokesmen.

Other informal sources, such as humorous texts like the *Philogelôs*, confirm that hanging oneself was seen as the primary exit for common people. Sometimes, especially in tragedy and in novel, desperate people discuss with themselves the method they will use:

> To die were best. How then with honour die?
> Unseemly is the noose 'twixt earth and heaven:
> Even of thralls 'tis held a death of shame,
> Noble the dagger is and honourable,
> And one short instant rids the flesh of life. (Eur. *Hel.* 298–303).[3]

In such interior monologues hanging always comes out as a despicable method, befitting only slaves and women. So it does not come as a surprise that Artemidoros sees dreams about the *nodum informis leti* (*Aeneis* 12.603) as sinister visions. Obviously it does not matter which person has such a nightmare, whereas Artemidoros in general stresses that the status of a dreamer makes all the difference for the outcome of an *oneiros*. He simply declares: 'To be hanged or hanging oneself indicates pressures (θλίψεις) and confinements (στενοχωρίας) because this is just what happens to the hanged. Moreover it indicates not staying in one's country or staying in the place where one was when one saw the dream. For the hanged does not tread upon the earth nor is he on a fixed site' (2.50).

With hanging there is apparently no difference between the poor and the rich whereas dreaming of another shameful way of ending one's life, namely being crucified, is only bad to the rich, for the crucified are naked and lose their flesh. To seafarers, however, it is favourable for the cross consists of wood and nails just like a ship. To the poor it predicts—in one of the direct parallels Artemidoros is fond of—a high position. Slaves will be freed, for the crucified are not subjected to anybody (2.53). In hanging, however, the status of the dreamer does not make any difference at all. It only matters whether one is being hanged or hangs oneself. This circumstance predicts who will be the executor of the bad outcome, the dreamer himself or another person. This is in accordance with the general rule that Artemidoros has laid down with regard to dreams about dying: if somebody kills himself (in his dream), he himself will bring about the fulfillment (2.49).

The low status of death by the halter is confirmed in a case, in which somebody hanged himself. It is an example of one of the four

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[3] Translation Arthur S. Way. 1912. *Euripides* I. London/Cambridge MA.

patterns Artemidoros distinguishes: 1. much can be predicted by much; 2. little by little; 3. much by little and 4. little by much—so anything goes. The person who hanged himself was a neat example of much that was predicted by little. He only dreamed that he had lost his name. For him the outcome was that he lost his son, for this was not only his most valuable asset, but he also happened to have the same name as his son. Furthermore he lost all his property when lawsuits were brought against him, in which he was convicted of having damaged the state. Dishonoured and driven into exile he hanged himself and thus ended his life, so that he did not have a name after his death. For only those among the deceased who hanged themselves are not called by their relatives at funeral meals, Artemidoros assures the reader (1.4).

That people who hanged themselves were excluded from funeral meals is told by no other source. But we know that mourning for those people was not common. Roman jurisprudents say so putting them on a par with *hostes* and with people convicted of treason. Together they form the infamous group of those who *non solent lugeri*.[4]

Hanging as a method of suicide suggested a bad conscience (*mala conscientia*). This is not only suggested by the passage on mourning, but also in a passage where the *Digesta* discuss a difficult problem of the right to inherit: are the goods of a person who is indicted but who during the legal proceedings kills himself to be confiscated by the fiscus? For killing oneself could be regarded as an implicit confession of guilt. In an imperial rescript Antoninus Pius had laid down the ruling that confiscation was only appropriate if the crime was so serious that capital punishment or exile would have been the punishment. If it was only a case of 'moderate' stealing, the possessions of the defendant who killed himself were never forfeited. Therefore his goods could not be withheld from the heirs *even if the accused had ended his life by hanging.* So hanging oneself was looked upon as the strongest proof of a bad conscience.[5]

Also in the corpus of about 1300 suicide cases, which the ancient sources report, a connection is made between a bad conscience and

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[4] *Non solent autem lugeri, ut Neratius ait, hostes uel perduellionis damnati nec suspendiosi nec qui manus sibi intulerunt non taedio uitae, sed mala conscientia*; Dig. 3.2.11.3.

[5] *Ut autem divus Pius rescripsit, ita demum bona eius, qui in reatu mortem sibi conscivit, fisco vindicanda sunt, si eius criminis reus fuit, ut, si damnaretur, morte aut deportatione adficiendus esset. Idem rescripsit eum, qui modici furti reus fuisset, licet vitam suspendio finierit, non videri in eadem causa esse, ut bona heredibus adimenda essent, sicuti neque ipsi adimerentur, si compertum in eo furtum fuisset*; Dig. 48.21.23.3.

self-inflicted death by hanging. In one third of the suicides, in which *mala conscientia* is indicated as the main motive, self-hanging was practiced.[6]

Those who hanged themselves were regarded as infamous, as some funerary regulations demonstrate. So Horatius Balbus excluded from the cemetery he bestowed on the fellow-citizens of Sarsina (Umbria) those who had laid hands upon themselves by the halter (*qui sibi laqueo manu attulissent*). They were ranked with people who had practiced a foul profession (*quaestum spurcum*).[7] The restriction does apply only to the specific category of self-killers, viz. the *suspendiosi*.

Artemidoros makes the general statement that the hanged are not called upon at funeral meals. In the context of what other sources say about the low status of *suspendiosi* we can assume that his information is right. In this way the dream-reader adds to our knowledge of ancient habits.

Self-slaughter

The models of ancient self-killing are Aias for the males and Lucretia for the females. Both use a manly way out, viz. a weapon. Ancient sources present weapons as the main instrument, as was indicated above for most of the recorded cases concern military men or philosophers like Seneca who had their veins cut by a medic with the help of a scalpel.[8] Euphemistic expressions were made to denote this form of medically assisted suicide: *venas porrigere / praebere exsolvendas, praebere … brachium*.[9]

As Artemidoros' public is to be found in the middle class, his suicides do not use noble weapons like swords, daggers or scalpels. They reach for knives to cut their throat. The exposé on hanging in dreams (2.50) is followed by a section on dreaming of slaughter. 'Slaughtering oneself or being slaughtered by somebody signifies the same as has been said above about death' (i.e. whether the evil outcome will be brought about by an outsider or the dreamer himself) 'it only brings

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[6] See Table 8c in my *From Autothanasia to Suicide*, 238.
[7] ILS 7846=CIL XI 6528.
[8] Tac. *Ann.* 15.64.
[9] Tac. *Ann.* 16.35.2; 4.22.3; Hier. *Chron.* 210.3. See Van Hooff 2000, 143–161 and Ancient euthanasia: 'good death' and the doctor in the Graeco-Roman world. *Social Science and Medicine*, 58, 2004, 975–985.

a faster fulfillment'(2.51). That it is about cutting the throat is clear from what follows: 'Being sacrificed and being slaughtered near an altar of a god or publicly in the assembly or the square is good to all, but especially to slaves: they will live in respect and honour as free men'.

Artemidoros' remarks are an invitation to have a closer look into the subcategory of self-slaughter done with a knife. Historical examples of this gruesome way out are poorly attested, but in myth and fiction they have a place. Parthenios, writing on passion, has the case of one Dimoites. The curse his wife Euopis had put upon him[10] caused him to fall in love with the corpse of a woman that had washed ashore. When the body had decayed so that he no longer could have his way, he erected a pyre, and not able to cope with his passion he slaughtered himself.[11] Clearly there is an association with sacrifice, as there is in the mythical case of Kyanê. Her father Kyanippos, a Syracusan, had omitted to sacrifice to Dionysos. In his anger the god cast upon Kyanippos a fit of drunkenness, in which he violated his daughter in a dark place. She managed to take off his ring and gave it to her nurse as a mark of identification. When the Syracusans were oppressed by a plague, and the Pythian god pronounced that they should sacrifice the impious man to the Averting Deities (ἀποτροπαίοις θεοῖς) people did not understand whom the oracle referred to. But Kyanê knew, and seized her father by the hair and dragged him forth. And when she had cut her father's throat, she killed herself upon his body in the same manner.[12] Another mythical case is that of the Athenian king Erechtheus. When he had sacrificed his youngest daughter to meet the oracle's conditions for an Athenian victory the other two, Protogeneia and Pandora slaughtered themselves because they had sworn to die together.[13]

In cutting the throat, like in having one's veins cut, the self-killer often called another person to help. So did Monimê, one of the two Greek wives of Mithridates. When the Pontic king fled Lucullus' advance he ordered all the Greek women to be killed. First Monimê hanged herself with the royal diadem, which had proved to be so fatal

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[10] He had made public her love for her brother. Fearing the disgrace she hanged herself cursing Dimoites; Parth. *Er. Path.* 31.

[11] Parth. *Er. Path.* 31.

[12] Plut. *Mor.* 310B–C (Par.Min.).

[13] Apoll. 3.5.4.5; Hyg. *Fab.* 46; Dem. *Epith.* 60.27; *Suda* s.v. Parthenoi.

to her. But even then it was of no use, for it broke. Then she ordered a trusted eunuch to slaughter her.[14]

At the defeat of the republican cause at Philippi (42 BCE) there was a wave of self-killings in various ways. Already before the battle Cassius died of his own will, taking approaching troops for enemies. 'He covered his head with his military cloak and undismayed he presented his neck to the sword of his freedman'.[15] After the defeat Brutus killed himself, as did Drusus Livius, the father of Augustus' wife Livia. Sextus Quintilius Varus, however, father of the Varus who lost the battle of the Teutoburger Forest (9 CE) first covered himself with the insignia of his offices and then had his throat cut by the hand of the freedman whom he had forced to do so.[16]

Maybe Velleius Paterculus who tells these stories expresses some misgivings by confronting the outright way Brutus and Drusus took their own lives, with the help Cassius and Varus needed to do away with themselves. Anyway, in the case of Nero's death there is outspoken disdain in Suetonius' description. He had to be helped by his secretary Epaphroditus to put the iron in his neck.[17]

So the ancient stories suggest that cutting one's throat is highly regarded only if it can be associated with sacrifice for the common good. Artemidoros' assessment that being sacrificed and having one's throat cut in public is good to all seems to be confirmed by the concrete cases.

Why do they kill themselves?

So far we only discussed methods of self-killing as mentioned by Artemidoros, comparing them to general patterns. What about the reasons? Only in the case of the man who dreamed that he had lost his name— see above—we are informed about the motive of why he finally hanged himself. Persecuted and driven into exile he had metaphorically lost his name. Losing one's dignity was clearly a major reason for people in the ancient world to kill themselves. Shame comes out as the main

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[14] Plut. *Luc*. 18.6.

[15] *Lacerna caput circumdedit extentamque cervicem interritus liberto praebuit*; Vell. 2.70.2.

[16] *Liberti, quem id facere coëgerat, manu, cum se insignibus honorum velasset, iugulatus est*; Vell. 2.71.2.

[17] *Ferrum iugulo adegit iuuante Epaphrodito a libellis*; Suet. *Nero* 49.4.

incentive for self-killing among the circa 1300 cases recorded. It is by far the most important cause, accounting for about 30% of all cases recorded in our sources. In their motivation of shame Aias and Lucretia are the models just as much as they are in method. In Artemidoros' circle shame was mainly caused by indebtedness. *Pudor aeris alieni* is also the reason Roman jurisprudents give as an excusable ground for self-killing next to being fed up with life, *taedium vitae*.[18]

We have two cases of suicidal debtors in Artemidoros. In the fifth book of the *Oneirokritika*, which he specifically presented to his son and namesake, Artemidoros lists 95 dreams, all beginning with 'Somebody dreamed'. So they all have the appearance of reality. 'Somebody dreamed that he stooped and then sensed an evil smell in the region of the navel. He drank a deadly drug of his own accord, for he was not able to stand a crisis caused by urgent debts. From fear that his problems, although still secret, would begin "to smell" and he would get known more than was due, he burnt rather fast (inside by poison) and died'. (5.33)[19]

Shortly before, in the same fifth book (5.31), somebody dreamed that he penetrated himself. This Freudian experience happened to a man of importance who was a tax-farmer. 'He got in so much trouble that in his need and accumulation of debts he led himself out of life and understandably so. For so much was he debarred from another body and so grave was his incapacity to spend money that he had to direct his desire onto himself'. In this case Artemidoros uses the fine expression 'to lead oneself out of life' that was used by philosophers; was it respect or horror that made him use a euphemism?

The only woman

There is no heroic Aias among Artemidoros' people, but there is a kind of a Lucretia in 5.63. This female 'somebody' dreamed that ears of corn grew from her bosom. They bent and got into her vagina. Later in a

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[18] *Eius bona, qui sibi ob aliquod admissum flagitium mortem conscivit et manus intulit, fisco vindicantur: quod si id taedio vitae aut pudore aeris alieni vel valetudinis alicuius impatientia admisit, non inquietabuntur, sed suae successioni relinquuntur*; *Dig.* 49.14.45.2.

[19] The manuscripts have ἐκαύθη, which make more sense than Gomperz' emendation κατέκανον ἑαυτὸν, which is followed by several translators: Brackertz 1979 and Mooij-Valk 2003.

peristasis, a change of luck that is not specified, the woman unknowingly had intercourse with her own son. Thereupon she did away with herself and found a miserable death. The ears of corn of course signified the son, their getting into the vagina the intercourse, and the fate that befell her was indicated by the seeds that grew from her own body. For, as Artemidoros explains in his characteristic and direct way, ears grow from the earth and not from bodies.

Pragmatic dreamer

Artemidoros' suicides have not much to do with the paradigm of voluntary death that the ancient elite presents, and as such it is a welcome correction to the established view. In art for instance, weapons account for 82 out of 108 instances (76%).[20] There Aias proves to be literally the icon of ancient self-killing, with 47 (44%) of all representations. Only two self-hangings were represented in antiquity, those of Phaidra and Judas. In Artemidoros, however, hanging is the primary way out. With regard to weapons we only found a general discussion on throat cutting, which does not appear as the noblest way out.

Not only the methods of self-hanging and self-slaughter are common, also the motives Artemidoros ascribes to suicides are far from noble: debt and shame from incestuous intercourse. Artemidoros deals with the suicides in a matter-of-fact way. He does not present self-killing as a glorious act of will, but as an unhappy fate.

In combining sensitivity to dreams with reasonability Artemidoros neatly prefigures the colleague who is honoured with these miscellanea.

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[20] This is a slight increase, namely of two representations compared to the instances I discussed in The Image of Ancient Suicide, *Syllecta Classica* 9 (1998): 47–69; these new cases do not affect the views presented in that paper.

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DREAMS IN THE *RES GESTAE* OF AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS

Jan den Boeft

Near the end of the year 354 A.D. the Caesar Constantius Gallus, who had been conducting a reign of terror in the eastern part of the Roman Empire, was recalled by the emperor Constantius II and subsequently executed. Next Gallus' friends and adherents were brought to trial: they were accused of having served as the tools of his brutal savagery, and severely punished. According to the historian Ammianus Marcellinus the entire affair made the emperor more suspicious and susceptible to all sorts of gossip. This offered ample opportunities to crafty rumour-mongers, among whom two men stood out: Paul the Chain and Mercurius. The former of these owed his nickname *Catena* to his remarkable skill in linking together a series of slanderous rumours. Mercurius operated along another track: he insinuated himself into dinner-parties and other meetings and then listened to people telling their dreams. He then only needed to give a negative twist to such stories in his reports to the emperor in order to put his victims in dire straits. His strategy earned him the nickname *somniorum comes*, 'count of dreams'. As a consequence nobody revealed his dreams any more and people were loath to admit to strangers that they had slept at all. Some erudite people even regretted that they had not been born in the neighbourhood of Mount Atlas, *ubi memorantur somnia non videri*, 'where dreams are said to be unknown (tr. Hamilton)'.[1]

This remarkable passage is quite instructive. Obviously telling dreams was part of normal conversation and the emperor and his advisers were quite interested in these stories. This was not due to a lively involvement with amateur psychology. The dreams in which the entourage of Constantius II took an interest had a divinatory character.

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[1] The paraphrased episode can be found in *Res Gestae* 15.3.4–6. Herodotus is the first author who mentions the Atlantes' curious deficiency (4.184 λέγονται … οὔτε ἐνύπνια ὁρᾶν). Ammianus may, however, have borrowed this information from Solinus 31.2 *adfirmant eos somnos non videre*. See also Pliny, *Naturalis Historia* 5.45 and Pomponius Mela 1.43.

People dreamt about a great future of power and glory, and this was
not appreciated by those who were in power at that moment. Here we
encounter a significant difference with the modern world, which is per-
haps not always valued properly even by scholars who are engaged in
the study of antiquity. Divination is not a curious aberration of Greek
and Roman civilization, but an indispensable part of it. Of course, in
antiquity too cheats and quacks were at work, but the more serious
forms of divination, like the great oracles in Greece, and the various
types of omina, for a long time were part and parcel of military, polit-
ical and religious affairs. One has only to leaf through the pages of
Herodotus or Livy to find out that divination was a necessary part of
all processes of decision making. In spite of the ongoing christianization
of many departments of private and public life in the fourth century
A.D. it had by no means disappeared from the agenda. Small wonder
that the reader often comes across its various forms in the *Res Gestae*
of Ammianus Marcellinus.[2] The absence of dreams and omina would
have surprised ancient readers.

This paper surveys all instances of dreams in the *Res Gestae* from
different angles. It will appear that dreams are fully integrated in the
narrative, usually as signs which prove to be significant. The dreams
are not numerous and in most cases the author explicitly refers to the
provenance of his information about the contents.

The author himself has devoted a brief, but telling digression to div-
ination at the beginning of book 21. When Julian after his usurpation
at Paris, where he was hailed Augustus, had travelled southwards to
Vienne, he was reflecting upon the course he had to fix against his
cousin and rival Constantius II, the official Augustus: negotiations or
open attack. He was inclined to choose the latter option, *coniciens eum
per vaticinandi praesagia multa, quae callebat, et somnia, e vita protinus exces-
surum*, 'since he inferred from many prophetic signs (in which he was
an adept) and from dreams, that Constantius would shortly depart

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[2] In this paper the Latin text is quoted from W. Seyfarth's Teubner edition of 1978.
The English translations are sometimes borrowed from J.C. Rolfe's bilingual edition
in the Loeb Classical Library or W. Hamilton's Penguin translation. There are also
French, German, Italian and Spanish translations, some of which bilingual. A series of
commentaries on individual books was started by P. de Jonge, who dealt with books
14–19, and continued by a team consisting of J. den Boeft, J.W. Drijvers, D. den Hengst
and H.C. Teitler, who until now have produced commentaries on books 20–25. I take
the liberty to use the term 'the commentary', when referring to these twelve volumes.

from life' (21.1.6, tr. Rolfe). Immediately after this statement the author deliberately adds the digression about divination (21.1.7–14) in order to silence any objections of malicious people: divination is *doctrinae genus haud leve*, 'a highly important branch of learning'. The survey, in which astrology is conspicuously absent, successively deals with the flight of birds, the entrails of sacrificial victims, prophetic ecstasy, thunder and lightning. The last item on the list is dreaming, which is the subject of §12:

> *Somniorum autem rata fides et indubitabilis foret, ni ratiocinantes coniectura fallerentur interdum. quae, ut Aristoteles affirmat, tum fixa sunt et stabilia, cum animantis altius quiescentis ocularis pupilla neutrubi inclinata rectissime cernit*, 'the reliability of dreams would be sure and beyond doubt, were it not that interpreters sometimes go astray in their conclusions. Aristotle assures that dreams are on firm ground, when someone is in a deep sleep and the pupil of his eye is not inclined to either side, but looks directly forward'.[3]

In the final two sections of the digression Ammianus polishes off the doubts of those who point to cases in which people did not know beforehand what lay in store for them: nobody will write off grammar, music or medicine because of the errors committed by experts in these disciplines.

Divination is a serious discipline and dreams are an authorized form of it. Their presence in the *Res Gestae* is normal and they do not figure there as curious anecdotes, but as telling facts. According to Ammianus true historiography is accustomed to *discurrere per negotiorum celsitudines*, 'to deal with prominent events' (26.1.1, tr. Hamilton). This policy implies that at crucial moments dreams have to be introduced in the report.

Before surveying the individual cases I have to deal briefly with terminological questions. Ancient philosophers paid due attention to the phenomenon of dreams and this has also resulted in various systems of dream-classification. Those of Artemidorus (1.1–2), Calcidius (*Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum* 250–256) and Macrobius (*Commentarius in Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis* 1.3.1–4) are perhaps the best known, but, as Kessels has shown,[4] there are traces of various other systems too, especially in

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[3] The source of this statement cannot be found in any of Aristotle's extant works. See the commentary ad loc., and consult also Aristoteles, *De insomniis. De divinatione per somnum* übersetzt und erläutert von P.J. van der Eijk (Berlin 1994) 61 n. 43.

[4] Kessels 1969, 389–424. See also Waszink 1941, 65–85.

medical theories. The *Res Gestae* contain precious few statements which might be regarded as reminiscent of such systematic overviews. One of the passages involved is the reference to Aristotle in 21.1.12, which, as was already shown in note 3, cannot be traced to a particular Aristotelean theory.

There is, however, another passage, which at first sight seems more promising. In 14.11.17 Ammianus mentions the Caesar Gallus' nightmares, when he feared for his life, and then adds a general reflection:

> *solutus enim corporeis nexibus animus semper vigens motibus indefessis ex cogitationibus subiectis et curis, quae mortalium sollicitant mentes, colligit visa nocturna quas phantasias nos appellamus*, 'set free from its ties with the body, the soul, which is always engaged in tireless motions, from the reflections and worries which pester the human mind, gathers nightly visions, called "appearances" by us' (14.11.18).

The first part of this is reminiscent of Artemidorus 1.1, where ὄνειρος, which indicates a future state of affairs, is carefully distinguished from ἐνύπνιον, which reflects the present. The author illustrates the latter's character in these words: τὰ ποιὰ τῶν παθῶν προσανατρέχειν πέφυκε καὶ προσανατάσσειν ἑαυτὰ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τοὺς ὀνειρωγμοὺς ἀποτελεῖν, 'it is in the nature of certain experiences to run their course in proximity to the mind and to subordinate themselves to its dictates, and so to cause manifestations that occur in sleep' (tr. R.J. White).[5] Macrobius agrees with this, but within this non-divinatory category he makes a further distinction: apart from ἐνύπνιον or *insomnium* there is φάντασμα *quod Cicero, quotiens opus hoc nomine fuit, visum vocavit* (Macr. *somn.* 3.2). This seems to be very close to Ammianus, apart from the word φάντασμα. However, precisely this small difference is quite important. Lindenbrog refers to Gellius 19.1.15 sqq., where a passage from Epictetus is rendered into Latin; the first words are: *Visa animi, quas* φαντασίας *philosophi appellant*. The commentary ad Amm. 14.11.18 adds Gellius 11.5.6 about the Pyrronian philosophers: *visa dicunt fieri, quas* φαντασίας *appellant*. An even more interesting parallel is Cicero, *Academica* 40.1, in a passage on Zeno's theory of sense perception: *quam ille* φαντασίαν, *nos visum appellemus licet*. The parallel phrases in Cicero and Gellius do not occur in passages concerning dreams. Now it cannot be doubted that Ammianus made use of Gellius in a number of passages of the *Res Gestae*, but Cicero has a far more prominent place in his work, and concern-

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[5] Translation and Commentary White 1975. See also White's note 6 ad loc. on pp. 75–76. This type of dream has no divinatory meaning.

ing 14.11.18 it is tempting to assume a borrowing from Cicero, with a charming changeover of *nos*, which in Cicero means 'we Romans', but in Ammianus 'we Greeks'.[6] If this is correct, the phrase does not derive from any systematic account of dreams. A further argument is Macr. *somn.* 1.3.7, where a *visum* (φάντασμα) is said to occur *inter vigiliam et adultam quietem*, 'between waking and sleeping'. However, Julian's vision in *Res Gestae* 21.2.2 evidently has a divinatory character, yet it happened to him *modo non vigilanti*, precisely the time of Macrobius' non-oracular φαντάσματα.

The absence of a consistent terminology can also be witnessed where the eventual difference between dreams and visions is concerned. In the case of the latter, one expects some form of the verb *videre*, as in 25.2.3, where we find that Julian, engaged in philosophical studies *obscuro noctis*, 'in the darkness of night', 'saw' (*vidit*), albeit dimly, an appearance of the Spirit of the Commonwealth (*Genius publicus*), but the earlier appearance of the same *genius* is worded in 20.5.10 by *per quietem* ('during his sleep') … *visum*, which can only indicate a dream. In this paper I take dreams and visions together, quoting the precise words only where this is opportune, since Ammianus is not interested in the niceties of systematical terminology, but rather in the function of a dream (or vision) within his narrative.

Ammianus is a historian, one of whose principles is to use only reliable evidence. So his readers are fully entitled to examine the reliability of his information concerning dreams. It is, of course, impossible to distinguish truth and fiction in the reports of the dreamers themselves. Apart from the fact that modern dream research has found that it is wellnigh impossible to remember a dream in all its details, dreams are individual experiences which simply withdraw from tight verification. We have to go by the stories which are eventually told by the dreamers themselves and in the case of historiography it is only possible to test the reliability of a historian's use of information that (a) certain person(s) declared to have had a particular dream. Ammianus is fully aware of this, for in eight cases he explicitly says that the dreamer told his dream to other people, in four cases such a 'confession' is in some way implicit and only in three cases there is no clear sign of this.

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[6] See Den Boeft 1992, 9–18, especially 12.

The clear instances are: *si per quietem quisquam … vidisse aliquid amico narrasset* (15.3.5), *ut ipse firmavit* (15.6.2), *saepe auditus multo antehac rettulisse, quod … per quietem … figmenta viderat multa* (19.12.10), *iunctioribus proximis rettulerat* (20.5.10), *confessus est iunctioribus proximis* (21.14.2), *ut confessus est proximis* (25.2.3), *dicebatur … duobus amicis commisisse fidissimis* (25.10.16). To this category we may safely add 23.3.3, where immediately after the statement that Julian had disquieting divinatory dreams, his consulting of the *visorum interpretes* is mentioned. He obviously must have told the contents of his dreams to these experts.

In four of the other seven cases such a confession is less clearly implied, but it can be argued that the author took it for granted that his readers would understand it in this way. In 26.1.7 Valentinian delays taking up his duties as an Augustus officially after his election, i.a. because of repeated dreams (*somniorum assiduitate*). Unfortunately there is a lacuna in the immediately preceding text, but it is reasonable to assume that Ammianus implies that Valentinian mentioned these dreams to his entourage to excuse himself. In the night before his death the same emperor had a horrible dream. The next morning he appeared 'looking sad and depressed' (*contractiore vultu subtristis*, 30.5.19). The context can imply that he explained the reason of his dejection to his aides-de-camp. The first chapter of book 28 is almost entirely devoted to a terrible period in Rome, during which many prominent citizens were slanderously accused, tortured and punished. The result was that *quisque … tortorem et vincula somniabat*, 'everybody dreamt about torturers and chains' (28.1.16). This hyperbolic phrase must imply that people exchanged these experiences with one another. The first sections of book 31 contain a number of omina pointing to the disaster of Adrianople, and the shades of murdered people *per … quietem … multos terroribus agitabant*, 'tormented many during their sleep with horrible terror' (31.1.3). Here *multos*, like *quisque* in 28.1.6, can only mean that people told their nightmares to one another.

In three instances a clear implication that a dreamer told his dream to others is absent or at most remote. When the Caesar Gallus travelled to the West, filled with anxious fears for his life, at night his sleep was troubled by bad dreams about his victims. This prompts the author to a brief digression about this particular kind of dreams, which has been examined above, but there are no indications of Gallus telling his dreams to others. In 21.1.6 Julian, i.a. on the basis of certain dreams, concludes (Ammianus uses the technical term *coniciens*) that Constantius' death is imminent. There are no signs in the text that he made

his dreams and interpretations of them known. Somewhat later, in the middle of the night, he saw an *imago quaedam … splendidior*, 'a shining appearance', which declaimed a prediction in four Greek dactylic hexameters (21.2.2). Here it could be argued that the mere quotation of these verses implies that the historian (indirectly) owes the text to Julian, but, on the other hand, such a full quotation could have done with a clear authorization.

From this overview it can be concluded that the author found it desirable to leave the reader in no doubt about the origin of the information about dreams. Of course, this does not prove the truth of the information or its origin, but it does express that in the case of dreams too Ammianus wants to present himself as a historian who avails himself of serious evidence and does not produce fiction.

Since in the *Res Gestae*, as in all imperial historiography, the emperor is at the center of the stage, it is reasonable to expect dreams of emperors (*Augusti*) and *Caesares* at crucial points. This is born out by the facts: with nine of fifteen instances such dreams surpass the other cases, which are not neglected by the author, because he regarded them as apt to illustrate his report with. My survey begins with those cases.

First, 15.3.5–6, a passage which has already been touched upon above. The paranoia after Gallus' fall caused people to be wary about making known their dreams. This proved dangerous in a world in which only the authority in power had a 'Wissensmonopol' in the contacts with the supernatural world. This German term has been coined by Marie Theres Fögen in her admirable study of the use of omina as signs of the gods in Late Antiquity. Her main point is that the management of these signs is in the end a privilege of the emperor.[7] Those who challenged this privilege willingly or accidentally were regarded as potential revolutionaries. So it is not surprising that people refrained from telling their dreams to friends and relations in fear of that notorious 'count of dreams', Mercurius. However, Ammianus does not neglect individual cases. In ch. 6 of book 15 the 'assumed' complices of the usurper Silvanus are introduced. Among them a certain Proculus, Silvanus' adjutant, steadfastly refused to betray his boss and friends, *memor enim somnii, quo vetitus erat per quietem, ut ipse firmavit, pulsare quendam insontem*, 'remembering a dream in which he was forbid-

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[7] Fögen 1997.

den, as he declared himself, to hit an innocent person' (15.6.2). Extreme torture did not make him totter. As can be seen, Proculus' dream was entirely functional: it shows that loyalty is a praiseworthy virtue in all circumstances. In 19.12.10 Ammianus relates that a former prefect of Egypt, Parnasius, *homo simplicium morum*, long before he was tried for a capital crime, during another raid of Paul the Chain had dreamt that 'many shadowy figures in tragic garb escorted him', *per quietem deducentia se habitus tragici figmenta viderat multa* (19.12.10, tr. Rolfe), when he left his home town at the start of his career. This instance illustrates the dangers awaiting people in public offices from the side of fanatical inquisitors. A comparable case is 28.1.16, at the height of a sustained persecution of aristocrats in Rome: everybody dreamt of torturers, captivity and a stay in dark cells. Later the impending disasters of the Gothic invasion were announced by all sorts of omina, among which the fact that many in their dreams saw the piteous shades of the emperor Valens' victims and besides military and juridical actions (31.1.3).[8]

However, the majority of the dreams in the *Res Gestae* is made up by those of rulers. As could be expected, Julian has the lion's share with five of the nine cases. Two of the other cases concern Valentinian, and Gallus and Constantius are restricted to one each. In discussing these cases we can benefit from Gregor Weber's huge and instructive monograph.[9] The first is the case of the Caesar Gallus, who in his deep anxiety was plagued by dreams about the many victims of his cruel reign. These 'seized him and then flung him to the claws of the Furies', *correptum eum … uncis furialibus obiectabant* (14.11.17). Above I have dealt with the digression which was prompted by this statement. Weber p. 470 lists this instance in the category of 'Alpträume' ('nightmares') and does not regard it as 'eine direkte Aussage des Todes'. This can be questioned. Immediately after the brief digression in 14.11.18 Ammianus continues with these words: *pandente itaque viam fatorum sorte tristissima*, 'when his miserable predicament opened the way for fate's decrees' (14.11.19), quoted by Weber in his note 343. The direct connection with the bad dreams can hardly be overlooked. These proved to be portentous. Indeed, after his execution *cadaver est relictum informe* (14.11.23), as his former victims had threatened in these dreams.

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[8] Weber 2000, 483–485.
[9] Weber has the following categories: birth and childhood; promise of power; victory; exercise of power; divine favour; approach of death.

The next instance is the appearance of the Spirit of the Commonwealth in a dream of Julian in the night before the usurpation at Paris: *per quietem aliquem visum, ut formari Genius publicus solet*, 'he dreamt of a person who appeared in the shape which was usual for this particular Spirit' (20.5.10).[10] The *Genius publicus* chided Julian for repeatedly refusing to seize the opportunity to raise his status, and told him that this was the last chance offered to him. Weber has incorporated this very clear case of a divinatory dream in his long section 'Verheissung der Herrschaft'.

Having been hailed Augustus, Julian had to solve the problem of his relation with the official Augustus, Constantius II. When he was thinking over the various methods which were available, he had a reassuring dream that Constantius would soon die (21.1.6). In Ammianus' narrative this dream is entirely functional in that it added to Julian's self-confidence. This was further increased when he dreamt that four Greek dactylic hexameters were clearly and repeatedly recited to him by an *imago … splendidior* (21.2.2), which the commentary calls 'a very much watered-down version of Helios', one of Julian's favourite gods, mentioned in Zosimus' parallel report (3.9.6). The hexameters predicted the date of Constantius' death in oracular style. Julian felt that now all his worries were over: *quibus fretus nihil asperum sibi superesse existimabat*, and the rest of book 21 testifies to this optimism. In spite of this his rival's position in the East and Africa was still wellnigh unassailable. Nevertheless Constantius II, on his part, was worried by the hazards of the situation. Nightmares were the result: *nocturnis imaginibus terrebatur* (21.14.1) and one night, when he was between waking and sleeping, he saw that his late father put a beautiful child in his lap, which snatched the orb from his right hand and threw it far away.[11] The oneirocritics tried to explain this away, but Constantius confessed to his staff that he no longer saw his tutelary spirit which had made itself manifest on

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[10] See the commentary ad loc., which refers to a comparable dream in Suetonius' *Life of Galba* 4.3. This passage may have served as a model for Ammianus, which does not necessarily entail that Julian's dream was entirely fictional. Apart from this, in this paper I am concerned with the author's presentation, not with the reliability of his information.

[11] The commentary ad loc. assumes that the child points to Julian, 'who robbed his cousin of his power', but Weber 2000, 473 does not think that the 'Wegschleudern der Kugel' tallies with this. He refers to Artemidorus 1.60, where being defeated by a child is interpreted as a bad sign.

some occasions. It could only be concluded that it had left the emperor, now that he would very soon leave the world, *eum reliquisse mundo citius digressurum* (21.14.2). This was a more realistic and, as it turned out, correct conclusion.

In book 23 Julian's great campaign against Persia finally gets going. From the start it was continuously accompanied by bad omina, and once by the emperor's bad dreams, which, as he realized himself, boded ill: *Iuliani quiescentis animus agitatus insomniis eventurum triste aliquid praesagibat* (23.3.3). Contrary to his general tendency to neglect the omina, this time he paid serious attention to the warning, and agreeing with the interpreters of dreams he decided to refrain from action the next day, 19 March, 363. Weber p. 475 registers this as a case of 'das nahende Ende' (of the emperor's life). This is a reasonable inference, but the failure of the project may also be implied.

The last of Julian's dreams in the *Res Gestae* took place in the night preceding 26 June 363. When he was absorbed in philosophical study Julian *vidit squalidius, ut confessus est proximis, speciem illam Genii publici, quam, cum ad Augustum surgeret culmen, conspexit in Galliis, velata cum capite cornucopia per aulaea tristius discedentem*, 'as he confessed to his intimates, he dimly saw that figure of the Spirit of the Commonwealth, which he had seen in Gaul at the time of his rise to Augustan dignity, leaving sadly through the curtains of the tent, with its head and horn of plenty veiled' (25.2.3).[12] For a brief moment he was petrified, but then he surmounted his fear, only to be shocked by another omen, the appearance of a shooting star. The haruspices advised him to suspend all actions and at least to postpone the breaking of camp, but the emperor turned a deaf ear to their warnings. A few hours later he was mortally wounded during a battle.

After the emperor Jovian's death on 17 February 364 the leading civil and military officials met at Nicea to choose a successor. They unanimously chose Valentinian, an officer of the imperial guards, who was then summoned from Ancyra, where he had been left. When he arrived, he refused to appear in public the next day, 25 February 364, because of repeated dreams, which were directly connected with the dangers inherent in this intercalary day. Weber pp. 223–224 lists this as a case of 'Verheissung der Herrschaft', which seems rather curious, since Valentinian had already been informed of his designation. More

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[12] This is the only instance in which the phrasing clearly points to a vision.

than eleven years later, in the night preceding his death, he had a dream which in part resembled Julian's experience in June 363:

> *nocte, quam lux ereptura eum vita secuta est, ut per quietem solet, videbat coniugem suam absentem sedere passis capillis amictu squalenti contectam; quam aestimari dabatur Fortunam eius esse cum taetro habitu iam discessuram*, 'on the night before the day which was to be his last he had a dream, as sleepers often do; he saw his absent wife sitting with dishevelled hair and dressed in mourning, and it was not hard to deduce that this gloomily-clad figure was his good fortune, which was about to desert him' (30.5.18, tr. Hamilton).

Weber p. 483 deals with the question why specifically Valentinian's wife, who was still alive, is said to have appeared. For some reason he does not consider the simple possibility that this is what Valentinian told himself. In contrast to Julian it was not the *Genius publicus* who appeared in mourning attire, but his personal fortune. In this respect the dream is more akin to the departure of Constantius' tutelary spirit in 21.14.2.

Summarizing the dreams in the *Res Gestae*, the following facts can be noted:

1. The author has not overloaded his narrative with dreams: fifteen instances in 580 Teubner pages cannot be called excessive.[13]
2. A comparable restriction can be witnessed in the contents of the imperial dreams. They belong to only two of Weber's categories: 'Die Verheissung der Herrschaft' and 'Das nahende Ende'.
3. The dreams are functional in the narrative and they have been carefully integrated in their respective contexts.
4. The author tends to pay explicit attention to the provenance of his evidence, viz. the fact that the dreamer told his experience to his entourage or to close friends.
5. Being an instrument of divination, dreams and their warnings have to be taken seriously. In the *Res Gestae* this is normally the

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[13] My survey does not contain the cases in which *somniare* evidently denotes day-dreaming: 15.1.4 (Alexander the Great) *mundorum infinitates*, 16.1.1 (Julian on the eve of his campaigns against the Alamanni) *pugnarum fragores caedesque barbaricas*, 22.12.2 (Julian looking forward to the Persian expedition) *lituos … et proelia*. Other cases which were not included are 22.2.5 concerning the reaction of the populace when Julian entered Constantinopel: *somnio enim propius videbatur*, the anecdote in 23.5.3, where an actress on the stage of the theatre in Antioch suddenly saw the Persians invading the city: *'nisi somnus est', inquit, 'en Persae'* (see the commentary ad loc.), 31.2.6: the Huns are always on horseback; they even fall asleep there *ad usque varietatem … somniorum*, 'to the point of experiencing a variety of dreams'.

case. There is one tragic exception: Julian in the night before his death. However, this was only one example of his more general tendency to underrate various omina, which is especially illustrated in a number of cases in book 23.

As the reader will have noticed, so far only fourteen of the fifteen dreams in the *Res Gestae* have been dealt with. The only remaining case is perhaps the most curious, not so much because of its contents as such, but in view of its function. In the very last part of book 25 Jovian's inauguration as consul together with his baby son on 1 January 364 and his sudden death at Dadastana on 17 February 364 are briefly described, followed by a concise necrology. The reader now expects a closure, by way of an epilogue or in some other form, for two reasons: 1. Ammianus opens the series of 'Julianic' books with a brief introductory statement in 15.1.1. Some sort of counterpart at the end of these eleven books would have been opportune. 2. The first two sections of book 26 contain a thoughtful introduction to the author's treatment of the period of the emperors Valentinian and Valens.[14] In fact, however, book 25 ends with these two sections:

> *dicebatur autem Varronianus pater eius monitu cuiusdam somnii dudum praescisse, quod evenit, idque duobus amicis commisisse fidissimis illo adiecto, quod ipsi quoque deferetur trabea consularis. sed impetrato uno adipisci non potuit aliud. audita enim filii celsiore fortuna, antequam eum videret, fatali praeventus est morte. Et quia huic nomini amplissimum magistratum portendi per quietem praedictum est seni, Varronianus nepos eius, infans etiamtum, cum Ioviano patre declaratus est, ut supra rettulimus, consul*, 'it was said that his father Varronian had previous intimation of what would happen from a dream, which he confided to two close friends, adding that he himself would also wear the consular robe. Part of this prophecy came true, but he was disappointed of the rest. He heard of his son's elevation, but death carried him off before he saw him again. And because the old man was told in his dream that the highest magistracy would fall to 'Varronianus', it was Varronian, his grandson, still a small child, who was proclaimed consul with his father Jovian, as I have related' (25.10.16–17, tr. Hamilton, slightly adapted).

At first sight this seems to be a dream which has no function in the context at all. Why did not the author incorporate it in his report on the

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[14] For my purpose it is not of prime importance whether a vital phrase in this introduction implies that Ammianus had at first decided to stop at the end of book 25, as most scholars think, or that he always intended to continue with the story of Valentinian and Valens, as Matthews 1989, 203–204 argues; see also his note 34 on p. 401.

ceremony of January 1, 364? What is the sense of the dream of a historically unimportant person and his misunderstanding of its contents? Precisely the last fact may help to find the answer. 'Dreams would be truly reliable, if interpreters at times did not err in their interpretation': that was the message concerning dreams in §12 of the digression on divination (21.1.7–14), and in the next two sections Ammianus enlarges upon this aspect of divination in general. The signs are true, but men can fail when interpreting them, with fatal consequences. That was the case in the overpowering disaster of book 25, Julian's death. The author had no intention to return to this heartrending event at the end of the book. Instead he chose a minor example to illustrate this sad truth in a quiet and almost hidden way, but clear enough for the sympathizing reader. Dreams do not fail, but in trying to understand them men can get it badly wrong.[15]

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[15] I thank my collegae Ammianei (see note 2) for their timely suggestions.

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THE VISION OF CONSTANTINE

Jan N. Bremmer

Can one still say something new about the vision of Constantine and his conversion? Already in the middle of the 1950s, Kurt Aland (1915–1994), who was a reputable church historian in addition to being editor of the Greek New Testament, wrote that he had composed a bibliography of more than 1500 titles on Constantine, and since those years several hundreds more have appeared. Whereas recent decades have enriched our understanding of the chronology and political developments of Constantine's era, there has not always been attention to the fact that (1) the history of mentalities has sharpened our sensitivity to the interpretation of private and collective experiences through the ages, that (2) the sociology of religion has developed new ideas about conversion and that (3) historiography has shown that historians not always reproduce facts and their interrelationship, but often construct them.[1] It is therefore perhaps possible to advance our insight into Constantine's vision and conversion by taking these three factors into account. We will limit our discussion mainly to the most recent literature,[2] in part because the publication in the last decades of new coins, papyri and inscriptions has made many earlier analyses obsolete. But in our case the interpretation of the sources and the right methodological approach sometimes matter more than the presentation of new facts, as Aland already observed.[3]

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[1] For example, the way in which the best modern study of Constantine, Barnes 1981, presents the facts, insufficiently takes this into account, cf. Cameron 1983a and 1983b.

[2] Clauss 1996 and Pohlsander 1996 do not much advance our understanding of Constantine, cf. Barnes 1998. Much better, Bleckmann 1996; Girardet 1998; Drake 2000; Weber 2000.

[3] Aland 1960, 202, 204.

Constantine's vision as reported by himself

Let us start with the canonical version of the vision as reported by Constantine himself. In his biography by Eusebius, he provides the following version of the events concerning his vision and conversion.[4] After he had heard that a 'tyrant' (Maxentius) had taken possession of Rome and several attempts at defeating him had failed, he saw it as his duty to overthrow the 'tyranny' (*VC* 1.26). As the magical devices of his opponent could not be countered by purely military measures only, he looked for 'divine assistance'. When wondering which god to chose, he realised that all previous emperors had met an unwelcome end despite their cultivation of the pagan gods. Only his own father, who had worshipped God and had found him a 'saviour and guardian of his Empire', had been saved. On the basis of these considerations 'he decided that he should venerate his father's God alone' (*VC* 1.27.3).

Subsequently, 'he began to invoke this God in prayer, beseeching and imploring him to show him who he was, and to stretch out his right hand to assist him in his plans'. During these prayers 'there appeared to the Emperor a most remarkable divine sign. If someone else had reported it', Eusebius continues, 'it would perhaps not be easy to accept; but since the victorious Emperor himself told the story to the present writer a long while after, when I was privileged with his acquaintance and company, and confirmed it with oaths, who could hesitate to believe the account, especially when the time which followed provided evidence for the truth of what he said?' (*VC* 1.28.1).[5] The sign was as follows:

> About the time of the midday sun, when the day was just turning (…) he saw with his own eyes, up in the sky and resting over the sun, a cross-shaped trophy formed from light, and a text attached to it which said: 'By this conquer'. Amazement at the spectacle seized both him and the whole company of soldiers which was then accompanying him on a campaign he was conducting somewhere, and witnessed the miracle (*VC* 1.28.2).

Whilst Constantine was wondering about the significance of the mani-festation, 'as he slept, the Christ of God appeared to him with the sign

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[4] I quote from the new translation by Cameron and Hall 1999, 67–182. Note also the Spanish translation with a good introduction and notes by Gurruchaga 1994.

[5] As Eusebius claims to report Constantine's very own words, the story should not have been omitted by Dörries 1954, who carefully collects and analyzes all Constantine's utterances about the faith; see also Silli 1987.

which had appeared in the sky, and urged him to make himself a copy of the sign which had appeared in the sky, and to use this as protection against the attacks of the enemy' (*VC* 1.29). The next day Constantine summoned goldsmiths and jewelers, and he instructed them to copy this sign in gold and precious stones.

This was the version as told by the Emperor in, possibly, about AD 325 but more probably, as we will see (§3), in about AD 335. However, the event itself took place in 312 and we have four more or less contemporary sources for this vision. Surely, a sound historical approach first looks at contemporary sources and only then proceeds to analyse later versions. So what did happen in 312?

Contemporary reports of the vision

After a short rest on the political front, the year 312 witnessed the confrontation between Constantine, whose power base was Gaul, and his competitors Maxentius in Italy, Licinius on the Balkans, and Maximinus in the East. The next two decades Constantine would slowly but surely eliminate this competition, but that result was not yet foreseeable when he crossed the Alps in the spring of 312. Having mastered Northern Italy in a *Blitzkrieg* he slowly advanced to Rome where Maxentius had withdrawn behind its safe walls. However, for obscure reasons he felt obliged to confront the enemy and on October 28 he crossed the Tiber via a pontoon bridge. The Battle of the Milvian Bridge was short but decisive. Maxentius had to withdraw in disorder and, heavily armed as he was, drowned together with his horse in the Tiber.[6]

The events of this decisive confrontation are described by four contemporaneous sources, two of which, Lactantius and Eusebius, provide more detailed information about a divine intervention preceding the battle. The earliest, often most detailed mention of the battle and the preceding campaign we find in a panegyric pronounced in the presence of Constantine in Trier in the late summer or autumn of 313.[7] In this oration the panegyrist says: 'You must share some secret with

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[6] For the events before the battle see Barnes 1981, 41–43; for the battle itself, Kuhoff 1991; Raeck 1998.

[7] Liebeschuetz 1979, 285–288; Barnes 1981, 46–47; Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 289–290. For these panegyrics see now L'Huillier 1992. Note that Weber 2000, 284–285 still follows older scholars and opts for 315 or shortly afterwards.

that divine mind, Constantine, which has delegated care of us to lesser gods and deigns to reveal itself to you alone'. And Constantine's victory in spite of a superior opponent (*tam dispari contentione*) leads him to the rhetorical question: 'tell us, I beg you, what you had as a counsel if not a divine power?' (tr. Nixon and Rodgers).[8] Noticeable in these words is the stress on the private character of the communication of the emperor with the highest divinity, but also the absence of any mention of the Christian God, a vision or a conversion.

Our second source is the already quoted Bishop Eusebius of Caesarea, who in the ninth book of the first edition of his *Ecclesiastical History* described the events of 311–313 and published them in Caesarea in 313/4.[9] Eusebius mentions divine assistance (*symmachia*) and reports that shortly after the Battle Constantine erected a statue of himself with in his hand the 'victorious trophy of the saving suffering' and an inscription mentioning 'this saving sign' (9.9.10–11).[10] The connection between a trophy after a battle and the cross may surprise us, but it was often made by the early Christians.[11] Several prominent Constantinian scholars, such as Andreas Alföldi (1895–1981), Joseph Vogt (1895–1986) and Tim Barnes, explain this sign as the later imperial standard in the shape of a cross, the so-called *labarum* (§3).[12] For this interpretation they appeal to Eusebius' Latin translator Rufinus, who, curiously, does not speak of a 'saving' but a 'special sign' (*singulari signo*).[13] However, anyone who looks at the Rufinian passage in more detail soon notices that Rufinus not only translates the Eusebian passage but in his translation also includes the vision of the later Eusebian *Life of Constantine*. The later Eusebius, as we will see shortly (§3), indeed mentions the *labarum*, but the earlier one does not.[14]

In 314–315, the Christian Lactantius presents a more detailed report in his *De mortibus persecutorum*, a dramatic history of the persecutors writ-

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[8] *Pan. Lat.* XII.2.5 *Habes profecto aliquod cum illa mente divina, Constantine, secretum, quae delegata nostri diis minoribus cura uni se tibi dignatur ostendere*; 4.1 … *dic, quaeso, quid in consilio nisi divinum numen habuisti?*

[9] Cf. Louth 1990 and Burgess 1997 against Barnes 1981, 158–162 and 1982, 67–68.

[10] Eusebius often uses this expression for the cross, cf. *LC* 9.14.16 and *VC* 1.31.3, 1.37.1, 4.21.

[11] Franchi de' Cavalieri 1962, 207, 260; Storch 1970.

[12] Cf. Alföldi 1974, 234; Vogt 1974, 254–255; Barnes 1981, 46; Singor 2003, 482–484.

[13] Rufinus, *HE* 9.9.11, cf. Grünewald 1990, 70f. For Rufinus' translation see now Heim 2001.

[14] This argument was already put forward by me in the Dutch version of my contribution (see note 82) and is accepted by Weber 2000, 285.

ten under the immediate impression of the death of the last pagan emperor, Maximin Daia. As the treatise is not entirely favorable to Licinius, it was probably (nothing in this matter is certain!) published in Constantine's part of the empire, but its general reliability is guaranteed by coins, papyri and inscriptions of the period.[15] According to Lactantius, the following happened at, presumably, the eve of the Battle: 'Constantine was advised in a dream to mark the heavenly sign of God on the shields of his soldiers and then engage in battle.[16] He did as he was commanded and by means of a slanted letter X with the top of its head bent round, he marked Christ on their shields' (44.5–6, tr. Creed).[17] Earlier scholars were unable to understand his description, but this changed when since the 1960s it was recognised that already in the beginning of the third century the Greek word for cross, *stauros*, was abbreviated with the sign as described by Lactantius.[18] This sign, the so-called staurogram (⳨), has to be distinguished from the much better known Christogram (☧), which stands for Christ Himself. Papyri and comparable expressions for the cross in Lactantius' work, such as 'immortal sign' (*immortale signum*: 10.2), demonstrate that Lactantius' expression, 'the heavenly sign of God', indeed means the cross.[19]

The evidence of Lactantius has repeatedly been rejected because Constantine himself, according to his own words in Eusebius' version (§1), used the Christogram; he has been accused of a mistake, and the suggestion has even been made to remove the description of the staurogram from the text as an interpolation or gloss.[20] However, this is most unlikely, since the Latin text is correct, and Lactantius evidently went into some detail to describe the cross to his readers, whom he clearly considered to be unfamiliar with the sign. It is also most improbable

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[15] Barnes 1981, 13–14 (who sees Nicomedia as place of publication); Creed 1989[2], XXV–XXXV (Constantine's part of the empire); Digeser 2000, 171.

[16] For the belief by Constantine and his contemporaries in the magical efficiency of these and other signs see MacMullen 1990, 107–111, 312–316; note also the brief observations by Syme 1991, 120.

[17] *Commonitus est in quiete Constantinus, ut caeleste signum dei notaret in scutis atque ita proelium committeret. Fecit ut iussus est et transversa X littera, summo capite circumflexo, Christum in scutis notat.* For parallels of the expression *caeleste signum dei* see Franchi de' Cavalieri 1962, II.220.

[18] The fullest survey is Horsley and Waterhouse 1984, 211–230.

[19] Cf. Traube 1907, 118–120; Black 1970, who also compares Lact. *Inst. Div.* V. 26, 42; 27.2, 8.

[20] *Contra* Seeliger 1989; Rougé 1978, 13–22 (gloss), enthousiastically, albeit without arguments, followed by Barnes 1985 383–384, reprinted in Barnes 1994, Ch. III; Weber 2000, 282 note 215 ('Randglosse'); Singor 2003, 488 (fourth- or fifth-century gloss).

that a later interpolator would have inserted a description of the stau-
rogram, when Constantine himself used the Christogram and the stau-
rogram already became less popular in the course of the fourth cen-
tury, although it still occurs on one of the Emperor's coins of 336/7.[21]
According to Barnes, the version of Lactantius need not have been
more than rumour, since the latter assimilates the conversion (Barnes'
not Lactantius' term) of Constantine to one of the 'most familiar of
ancient religious stereotypes—action in response to a dream'.[22] This
is typically a case of special pleading, since Barnes can only adduce
Eusebius' later version in support of his scepticism and elsewhere con-
siders Lactantius a trustworthy historian. Moreover, the cross also bet-
ter fits Eusebius' description (above) which points to a simple object in
the hand of the imperial statue rather than to the Christogram or the
imperial standard.[23]

   The fourth mention dates from somewhat later. Once again we have
a panegyrist, this time probably speaking at Rome in 321, but, unlike
the earlier one, not in the presence of Constantine.[24] It is rather striking
to note the changes compared to earlier reports:

> Finally it is the talk of all the Gauls that armies were seen which let it be
> known that they had been divinely sent (…) Their flashing shields were
> aflame with something dreadful; their celestial weaponry was ablaze
> with a terrible glow; for they had come in such a form that they were
> believed to be yours. This was their discourse, this was the speech they
> composed in the midst of their hearers: 'We seek Constantine, we go
> to help Constantine'. (…) Your father Constantius, I believe, was their
> leader, who had yielded earthly triumphs to you, greater than he, and
> who, now deified, was enjoying divine expeditions (*Pan. Lat.* IV.14, tr.
> Nixon and Rodgers).

As late as 321, then, an orator publicly could describe the divine help
to Constantine without any mention of a clear Christian aspect or, for
that matter, a conversion.

   What, then, can we conclude so far? Before the Battle at the Milvian
Bridge, Constantine was clearly thought to have had a dream about the
assistance of the Christian god and to have ordered some of his soldiers,

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[21] Franchi de' Cavalieri 1953, 74–75 (text); Vogt 1955 and 1974, 363 f.
[22] Barnes 1985, 384.
[23] Alföldi 1974, 238. This is even, if grudgingly, admitted by Franchi 1953, 27, who
attaches much weight to the later Eusebius.
[24] See the discussion by Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 338; Weber 2000, 285–288.

perhaps his body guards, to attach a Christian sign to their shields.[25] The dream was originally not spectacular but, as the later panegyrist shows, a tendency to exaggeration soon seems to have developed. However, neither Lactantius or Eusebius nor the pagan panegyrists mention a conversion of Constantine. We conclude from these silences that, at least for his contemporaries, 312 does not seem to have been an important year in Constantine's personal religious development.[26]

We will end this section with another dream. In the winter of 313, Maximinus marched from Syria and threatened the power base of Licinius on the Balkans. The latter had just received Constantine's sister Constantia as bride in Milan in February and hastily returned with a small number of troups. Near Adrianople, on April 30, it came to a confrontation, with Licinius having less than half of his opponent's number of soldiers. At this critical moment, as Lactantius (*Mort.* 46.3) relates, 'an angel of God stood over him,[27] telling him to arise quickly and pray to the supreme God with all his army; the victory would be his if he did this'. Licinius followed the divine advice and indeed gained the victory. The parallel with Constantine is too striking to be pure chance: in both cases a dream takes place at the eve of a decisive battle against a pagan, and victory is gained by intervention of the Christian God. Moreover, both dreams happen shortly after one another. At the same time, this dream is indirect proof of the fairly modest character of Constantine's dream, since it would be difficult to imagine that Licinius had reported a simple dream after a spectacular vision of the competition.[28]

Eusebius and Constantine's vision

Having looked at the contemporaneous reports it is now time to take a closer look at the report by Constantine himself. Unfortunately, we cannot be totally certain when Eusebius heard this version from the Emperor. We know that after Constantine's death, on 22 May 337,[29] Eusebius resumed working on his *Life of Constantine*, the biography of

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[25] See the good discussion by Singor 2003, 488–490.
[26] This is debated, as appears from the differing views of Bonamente 1981; Paschoud 1992–1993; Fowden 1994b; Vecchio 1998; Van Dam 2003.
[27] For this traditional motif see Bremmer 1983, 19.
[28] For Licinius' dream see also Corsaro 1989; Weber 2000, 294–296.
[29] Burgess 1998.

the emperor that he had started after the Council of Nicaea of 325.[30]
However, Eusebius died in (probably) May 339 before completing the
project and the book was published unfinished.[31]

According to Tim Barnes, the result is 'tendentious, passionate, par-
tial, deliberately lacunose, but not knowingly mendacious',[32] but this
might be too favourable a judgment,[33] as the following example illus-
trates. In his biography the bishop creates the impression that he was a
close confidant of the emperor, which is demonstrably untrue. In fact,
he met the emperor only four times, including an episode in 301/2
when Constantine accompanied Diocletian to Palestine (*VC* 1.19).[34] So,
when did Eusebius hear this story from the Emperor? Possibly, it was
already at the Council of Nicaea at 325, when Constantine addressed
the bishops. Yet, in that case one would have expected the story to be
much wider known.[35] Moreover, Eusebius' words suggest that he had
been acquainted with the Emperor for some time already—which cer-
tainly was not the case during the Council. On the other hand, in an
oration held in the presence of Constantine at the occasion of the ded-
ication of the Holy Sepulchre in 335, Eusebius addresses the emperor
as follows:[36] 'You yourself, Emperor, if time permitted, could tell us,
if you so wanted, of the many manifestations of our Saviour and His
numerous personal visions in your sleep'.[37] These words seem to pre-
figure the report of the vision in the *Life of Constantine*. As its Book IV,
which was written after the visit to Constantinople in autumn 335 in
order to deliver his oration on the Holy Sepulchre, clearly demon-
strates, contacts between the Emperor and the bishop had intensified
after that visit. It is much more likely, then, that Constantine had told

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[30] Cameron and Hall 1999, 9–12.

[31] For the authenticity of the work see Winkelmann 1962; Barnes 1981, Ch. XI (note
29) and Ch. XII ('The Two Drafts of Eusebius' *Life of Constantine*').

[32] Barnes 1981, XII ('Panegyric, history and hagiography in Eusebius' *Life of Constan-
tine*', 1989[1]).11; differently, Elliott 1991, who goes much too far in claiming all kinds of
frauds.

[33] See the considerations of Burgess 1999, 70.

[34] Barnes 1981, 266–267; Cameron and Hall 1999, 3.

[35] *Contra* Barnes 1985, 385 and the fascinating, albeit too pro-pagan, Lane Fox 1986,
614.

[36] This oration has been handed down in our manuscripts as the second part of the
Oratio de laudibus Constantini, as has been shown by Drake 1976, 30–45, who also gave it
the title *De sepulchro Christi*; see also Barnes 1977; Maraval 1997.

[37] Eusebius, *De sepulchro Christi* (see note 33), 18, cf. Cameron 1983b, 78. Several later
sources know of many more visions, but these are hardly credible, cf. Bleckmann 1991
and 1992–1993; Fowden 1994b, 159; Chantraine 1993–1994.

his version around that time when Eusebius delivered several orations before the Emperor than supposing a *tête-à-tête* during the Council of Nicaea.

Yet the question must be posed: is Constantine's version more credible than those of the earlier reports? Evidently, Eusebius himself had expressed some doubts or amazement, since otherwise it is hard to see why the Emperor would have confirmed his story with oaths. Recent studies of the vision even appeal to these oaths for the trustworthiness of Constantine's version,[38] but to take politicians on their word suggests an uncommon degree of credulity for a historian. Moreover, the oaths also strongly suggest that Eusebius did not yet know this version, which flatly contradicts his own from about 313, when he did not yet know about the cross in the sky and the making of the imperial standard.

When two versions of an event contradict one another, one can of course try to harmonise them. This is done by Robin Lane Fox, who argues that both versions 'should be combined, not contrasted, and their common core of truth can be detached in each case from error'.[39] In his case, he reaches this harmony by unreservedly swallowing Constantine's version, but also by ascribing certain details, which are evidently wrong, to errors of Eusebius. Such an approach is arbitrary. A methodologically more responsible analysis must always take into account the nature and chronology of the material and begin with the contemporary sources. Later versions should be analyzed subsequently, and differences with earlier versions should be noted and, if possible, explained.

So let us now look more in detail at Constantine's own version. There are a number of arguments, which all point in the direction of a later refashioning of the events of 312 by Constantine himself. First, it is of course highly unlikely that, a quarter of a century after the event, Eusebius, who was one of the most erudite scholars of his time, had never heard of Constantine's version. That by itself should already be proof of later tinkering. Second, the event is not located in time and place. It took place 'on a campaign he was conducting somewhere' (*VC* 2.28.2), even before his campaign against Maxentius (2.32.3, 37.2). Such vagueness never points to authenticity, and even less so when we realize how detailed Constantine's version is in comparison with Lactantius' much more sober version.

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[38] Barnes 1985; Lane Fox 1986, 612–621.
[39] Lane Fox 1986, 616.

Third, divine intervention in a critical situation was a standard fea-
ture of ancient descriptions of battles, and the saving intervention of
saints is well attested until the Great War.[40] However, in all these
descriptions there is a clear moment of crisis requiring divine interven-
tion, whereas such a moment is lacking in this particular version. More-
over, the vision appears 'about the time of the midday sun', which was
the traditional moment of the appearance of gods and ghosts in antiq-
uity, just as in modern times ghosts tend to appear at midnight. This
seems to point to a literary cliché rather than to an authentic experi-
ence.[41] There is also a clear redundancy in the story: first a vision and
then a dream. Now dreams and visions are repeatedly mentioned in
antiquity as media for conversions, important decisions and special rev-
elations: Thessalus, Perpetua, Apollonius of Tyana, Mani, Augustine—
we have plenty of examples.[42] However, I would not know of any com-
bination of the two in one story. Clearly, Constantine felt the need to
stress divine contact as much as possible.[43] As we will see momentarily,
this attitude fits in with the general tendency of the *Life of Constantine*,
but does not inspire confidence in the report.

Fifth, the vision clearly suffers of at least two anachronisms. The
standard is always pictured with a Christogram, but this sign is not
attested before 315 on a coin with Constantine's helmet.[44] Lane Fox
ascribed this error to Eusebius, but the bishop clearly reports the detail
as deriving from Constantine himself.[45] The question is more serious
as to when Constantine introduced the *labarum*. Eusebius had seen this
standard with his own eyes, as he tells us, and he indeed supplies a
detailed description of the imperial standard. Yet hardly any recent
discussion seems to ask when we first hear about this standard, of which

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[40] Graus 1977; MacDonald 1979; Speyer 1989, 499–501; Clarke 2004.

[41] Caillois 1937; Friedman 1966; Fernandéz Marcos 1975, 39–40; Perella 1979; Livrea
1986; Leopardi 1990, 705–712 (probably written in 1817); Bremmer 2002a, 128.

[42] Nock 1972, 1.368–374 (visions); Le Goff 1985, 265–316 (important study of dreams
from the second until the seventh century, but unsatisfactory in its analysis of Constan-
tine's dream and vision: 301).

[43] The combination of dream and vision is absent in *Acts of the Apostles* 10.10–16,
19–20 and *Hermas* 1.4–2.1, 2.2–4, 3.

[44] The value of the informative survey of staurogram and Christogram by E. Dinkler
and E. Dinkler-von Schubert, in *Reallexikon zur byzantinischen Kunst* 5 (1991) 34–44, is
impaired by their statement that the Christogram appeared on Constantine's helmet
already in 313; similarly, Alföldi 2001, 93. The date of 315 is now generally accepted
by numismatists, cf. Kraft 1974, reprinted in Kraft, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur antiken Geldge-
schichte und Numismatik*, 2 vols (Darmstadt, 1985) II.95–142.

[45] Lane Fox 1986, 616.

Eusebius adds, in a usually overlooked observation, that its use as a standard in battle 'was, however, somewhat later' (*VC* 1.32.1). In other words, the bishop explicitly notes that the standard came later into the open than the moment it was supposed to have been made. Evidently, he, or the Emperor, felt a problem in connecting the standard all too directly with the moment of the vision, since it must have been common knowledge that the standard was of a much later date. In fact, the standard only starts to appear on coins in 327, and it fits in with this date that the standard contains the portraits of the Emperor and only two sons, since his eldest son, Crispus, was executed in 326.[46]

If we take all these observations into account, the conclusion must be that Constantine's own version does not square with the contemporaneous reports of the vision of 312 and shows all the hallmarks of a later *bricolage* of fact and fiction. That is probably also why the Emperor dates his own report to a moment before the campaign against Maxentius. He must have known that the vision of 312 was too well attested to be supplanted by a completely new version.

This conclusion immediately raises the question as to why Constantine presented this particular story as he did. So let us look again at Constantine's report but now ask what he may have intended with his version. When we read it, we cannot be but struck by the fact that he presents his vision as the report of a conversion. Now few studies of his vision and religious policy have raised the question what a conversion actually entails and how it takes place. Yet sociologists of religion have done much research into this question in the last decades.[47] For our purpose it is sufficient to note some of their results.

First, conversions rarely happen as the result of a lightning insight, as in the case of Paul and Augustine: those are typically, what I would call, textual conversions. Normal conversions are more often the result of a rational choice, a weighing of possibilities, and take place over a period of time. Usually, converts first join their new groups and only afterwards gradually appropriate the lifestyles and doctrines of their new commitments. Second, the report of a conversion is always a report after the fact. The convert relates a story that must look credible

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[46] Date: Bruun 1997; Bech 1999; Singor 2003, who dates the *labarum* too early. Number of sons: Bleckmann 1996, 61 also notes that in 312 the Emperor had only one son. Either way, the standard of 327 does not fit the date of 312. These anachronisms also refute the rationalising interpretation of Weiss 2003.

[47] For good surveys see Nauta 1989; Krech 1994; the contributions of S. Bruce and H. Zock to Bremmer 2006.

in the eyes of his new community. In other words, it is a kind of self-presentation, which the convert may believe, but the historian need not necessarily accept.[48]

Both aspects, the gradualism and the self-presentation, exactly fit what we know about Constantine. As we already noted, the reports of 312 do not mention a conversion. The fact that pagan counter propaganda could locate Constantine's conversion after 326 (below) also seems to be an indication that a precise date of his conversion was not something of general knowledge. Although Constantine openly showed his Christian sympathies and privileged the Church after his victory of 312, he remained his whole life *pontifex maximus*, and forbid pagan sacrifice only in 324 after his victory on Licinius;[49] until 325, he even issued coins with Sol.[50] Constantine also transferred many statues of pagan divinities to Constantinople and not only for embellishing his new capital: a statue of Fortuna was installed in a temple.[51] He even employed a high official of the Eleusinian mysteries to fetch an obelisk from Egypt.[52] It is therefore not surprising that Constantine was baptised only on his deathbed (*VC* 4.62.4). This way of looking at Constantine's religiosity is of course—and we should stress this—a looking from our point of view. We cannot exclude that Constantine considered himself already converted in 314. Contemporaries must have seen his sympathy but need not have spoken of a conversion.[53]

Modern scholars have their own ideas about this conversion. According to Jacob Burckhardt (1818–1897), in his still highly readable *Die Zeit Constantins des Grossen* (1853), such a 'genialer Mensch' could only be 'ganz wesentlich *unreligiös*' (p. 271). Of course, this judgement entailed that Burckhardt had to consider the reports about Constantine's vision and conversion as 'nicht einmal den Wert einer Sage, überhaupt keinen populären Ursprung' (p. 275) and also had to explain the information about Constantine's sermons as 'Mittel der Macht', just as modern governments could not do without the media ('Zeitungspresse': p. 276).[54]

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[48] For fine examples see Lawless 1991.

[49] Barnes 1994, Ch. IV ('Constantine's prohibition of pagan sacrifice', 1984¹); Gaudemet 1990, 18–22; Bradbury 1994; Curran 1996; Pérez Medina 1996; Barnes 2002; note also Norderval 1995.

[50] Alföldi 2001, 52–59.

[51] For interesting ideas about this (re-)use of pagan statues see Lepelley 1994.

[52] Fowden 1991, 129–130; *SEG* 27.1650.

[53] See also Ritter 1996.

[54] I have used the edition in Burckhardt 1978, 1–353, reprinted, with a good introduction and survey of later studies, as J. Burckhardt, *Die Zeit Constantin des Grossen. Mit*

Whereas Burckhardt, then, denied Constantine's conversion because, in his view, the emperor never was a Christian, it has recently been argued that the emperor did not convert because he had been a Christian all of his life.[55] The most important argument for this surprising view is the supposed Christian origin of Constantine. Is this new approach persuasive?

To start with, the religious background of Constantine's family is certainly not crystal clear.[56] His own words, as reported by Eusebius, hardly leave any doubt about the fact that his father Constantius (ca. 250–306) had died as a pagan. Although he had been rather tolerant and had abstained from persecutions, he had ordered the destruction of Christian churches and driven Christians into exile.[57] In later times, Constantine represents him as Christian as he can, but all that he can really say is that his father invoked the 'saviour God' (*VC* 2.49). As regarding his mother Helena, according to Eusebius Constantine had converted her and there seems to be no reason to doubt this information.[58] The only Christian element in his family, then, remains the name of his sister Anastasia, who could well have changed her name after the conversion of Constantine, as there are no indications that she had a Christian background.[59]

The new 'revisionist' approach is thus hardly convincing, and even less as it insufficiently takes into account Constantine's life before 312. After his father had married Theodora in 289 and Helena had been banned from the imperial stage, Constantine was educated at the court of Diocletian. In this period he played a prominent role in several military expeditions, and he must have participated in the sacrifices which had been made obligatory for officers and soldiers.[60] Several church historians have dedicated striking studies to the attitude of the early Christians to the military, in particular my Groningen colleagues A.J. Visser (1918–1976) and, in perhaps the most sophisticated analysis

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einem Nachwort von Karl Christ (Munich, 1982). For the background see Kaegi 1956, 377–421; Brennan 1995; Gossmann 2000, 267–282; Bowersock 2000.

[55] See especially the following studies by T.G. Elliot: 1987; 1988–1989; 1992 and 1996.

[56] For Constantine's tinkering with his ancestry to improve his Christian standing see Bird 1997.

[57] Cf. *VC* 1.27; Liebeschuetz 1979, 279–280; Barnes 1994, Ch. IX.643; Smith 1997 and 2000.

[58] Eusebius, *VC* 3.47, cf. Drijvers 1992, 35–38; Heinen 1998.

[59] Grünewald 1990, 81–82; Chausson 2002, 131–156.

[60] Heim 1991, 264.

of the problem, J. Roldanus. They have shown that pre-Constantine Christianity was not concerned with the permissiveness of war and violence as such. On the other hand, the early Christians unanimously condemned the thoroughly pagan-religious character of the army and, regularly albeit less prominent in our sources, they displayed a certain reticence concerning the shedding of blood.[61] Whatever Constantine may have believed in the depth of his soul, his practice at the court and in the army can hardly have been but pagan in character. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Constantine had to lie about his age during the Diocletian persecution and pretended that he had been much younger than he was in reality—lies that were undoubtedly meant to prevent difficult questions about his former actions.[62]

But perhaps we have to go even further. In an oration in praise of Constantine, which had been pronounced shortly after his victory on his rival Maximianus in 310, the Gallic orator relates that during his expedition the emperor left his intended route and made a visit to 'the finest temple in the whole wide world', in which nowadays scholars recognise the sanctuary of the Gallic Apollo Grannus in Grand in France.[63] Here, as the orator continues, 'you saw, I believe, O Constantine, your Apollo, accompanied by Victory, offering you laurel wreaths, each of which carries a portent of thirty years … And—now why do I say "I believe"?—you saw and recognized yourself in the likeness of him to whom the divine songs of the bards had prophesied that rule over the whole world was due. And this I think has now happened, since you are, O Emperor, like he, youthful, joyful, a bringer of health and very handsome. Rightly, therefore, have you honoured those most venerable shrines with such great treasures that they do not miss their old ones, any longer' (*Pan. Lat.* VI.21.3–7, tr. Nixon and Rodgers).

The precise interpretation of these words is debated, but for our purpose we can limit ourselves to a few observations.[64] In the passage the orator lets Constantine have a private meeting with Apollo, of which he emphasizes the intimate character by his pretended reticence

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[61] Visser 1967–1968; Roldanus 1982; van der Horst 1988, 210–228 and the extensive bibliography of Ruggiero 1992, XLIV–XLVIII.

[62] *VC* 2.51, cf. Barnes 1992, 639.

[63] For this sanctuary see now the finely illustrated 'Grand, prestigieux sanctuaire de la Gaule' = *Les dossiers d'archéologie* no. 162 (1991).

[64] For an excellent analysis of this passage see Müller-Rettig 1990, 275–289, 330–348; see also L'Huillier 1992, 376–390; Lieu 1996.

in his description of the meeting ('I believe').[65] Such a close tie of the emperor with a divine alter ego was characteristic for that era, in which important figures believed to have (or were believed to have) a direct contact with the divine.[66] In this case, Constantine—for in these orations it was not customary that the orator made up such details on his own initiative—clearly claimed a close contact with Apollo, the god who was often identified with Sol, and Sol Invictus does indeed become more and more prominent on the coins of Constantine after 310.[67] 'Revisionist' historians rightly argue that it is not necessary to believe that Constantine ever had this meeting (a vision?) with the god.[68] Lack of data prevent us of demonstrating the opposite: too little is known about the youth of Constantine to say anything with any certainty about such events. However, it does seem certain that Constantine did not deny the report about his encounter with Apollo and he did present important votives to the sanctuary—probably to make a favourable impression on the Gallic aristocracy and to win them in this way for his cause. However this may be, it is in no way possible to interpret the event as a convincing illustration of the deeply felt Christian faith of the emperor.

Let us now return to the self-presentation of Constantine. The element of rescription of one's life we clearly find in a letter of Constantine to the bishops of the Council of Arles (314), which had been convened by the Emperor to solve a dispute with the Donatists. In this letter, in which Constantine addresses the bishops as 'dearest brethren' for the very first time, he pictures the past in rather sombre colours, just as so often happens in modern conversion stories:

> For there were initially in me many obvious defects in righteousness, nor did I think that the supernatural Power saw any of those things that I did in the secrecy of my heart. So, then, what lot awaited these offences of which I have spoken? Obviously that which abounds with all ills. But Almighty God, who sits in the vantage-point of heaven, bestowed upon me what I did not deserve; it is certainly impossible to tell or enumerate those benefits that his heavenly benevolence has vouchsafed to his servant.[69]

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[65] So, convincingly, Müller-Rettig 1990, 276. The 'I believe', then, is not a sceptical qualification by the orator, as is suggested by Lane Fox 1986, 619: this would have been totally inappropriate in the company of the emperor.

[66] Den Boeft, den Hengst, Teitler 1991, 218–221.

[67] Tontillo 2003.

[68] See, for example, Barnes 1981, 36.

[69] For the letter see Optatus, Appendix 5 = K. Ziwsa, *CSEL* 26 (Vienna, 1893) 208 =

Constantine is very circumspect with his language, but the progress from a state of a seeming lack of justice to the grace of God is clear. With this letter he justified his position to the bishops as one of them, and thus he must have become accepted in higher Christian circles.

However, at the end of his life other factors had become important. The Emperor now could present himself as an active actor in his process of conversion, which is described as a rational search for truth: by weighing the various possibilities he arrives at his choice for Christ, which is immediately sanctioned by a 'remarkable divine sign'. This close tie with the divine is also stressed in an oration, the so-called *Laus Constantini* (*LC*), which Eusebius gave in 335/6 at the occasion of the thirty-year jubilee of Constantine's rule. In this oration the bishop states that the Emperor is protected by 'heavenly armies' and 'countless supernatural troops' (*LC* 5.5). Apparently, one of the goals of Constantine's conversion story, like the whole of the *Life of Constantine*, was the demonstration of the divine legitimation and protection of the Emperor.[70] That is why Eusebius, in spite of his skepticism, relates Constantine's version. That is why the imperial standard is, as it were, the climax of his story: behind this standard Constantine gained the military victories which eventually had made him the sole ruler of the Roman Empire.

But why did Eusebius and Constantine stress the divine legitimating of the Emperor in the way they did? Three groups certainly need to be taken into account. First, Constantine stresses that his army had also seen the cross in the sky. The military standard was most important in Roman military tradition, and by Christianizing it Constantine must have tried to assure himself of the continuing support of his army, which during his rule will have been still largely pagan. The importance of his army is also clearly reflected in their prominent role during his last days, both before and immediately after his death (*VC* 4.63.2–66).

The bishops were the second group. As Constantine promoted the position of the bishops since the Council of Arles, the question of his relationship with this increasingly influential group must have become more and more pressing to him. That is probably why he once said at a dinner party with bishops, perhaps jokingly (but many a true thing is said in jest): 'You are bishops of those within the Church, but I am perhaps a bishop appointed by God over those outside' (*VC* 4.24).

Edwards 1997, 189.
    [70] As is argued by Cameron 1983b.

A last group, which is usually neglected, were the pagans. Pagan intellectuals, such as the orator Libanius (314–393) and the Emperor Julian the Apostate (331–363), soon understood the revolutionary character of Constantine's choice.[71] They located the emperor's conversion relatively late in his life, after the executions of his son and wife in 326;[72] a pagan legend about Constantine's deathbed baptism, which was incorporated into the Christian *Actus beati Silvestri*, would even become highly popular in the Middle Ages.[73] In this way they could devalue the conversion as a means for the emperor to absolve himself of his crimes. Constantine may already have heard of such suggestions and have felt that a story about divine support and protection could counter such rumours.

It is time to come to a close. In our analysis we have preferred the version of Lactantius,[74] but also tried to give a place to Constantine's later version. For later generations Constantine now became *the* bringer of the Christian faith and his fame would last well into the seventeenth century,[75] when Louis XIV still frequently modeled himself on Constantine.[76] The process of debunking started only with the Pietists and accelerated with the Enlightenment,[77] when Gibbon (1737–1794), in a still valuable analysis, rejected the version of the Emperor, but without accusing him of hypocrisy, as Burckhardt would do: a subtle approach which still can teach something to many a modern historian.[78] Contemporary historians go much further.[79] One of our best modern experts on Constantine, Tim Barnes, has recently argued that the Constantinian 'Wende' was not really a 'Wende' at all, since the progressive Christianisation of the Roman Empire had already advanced too far to be reversed.[80] It is true that a considerable part of the population had

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[71] Libanius and Constantine: Wiemer 1994; Malosse 1997. Julian and Constantine: Vogt 1960, 289–304.

[72] Paschoud 1975, 34–35, overlooked by Chadwick 1978.

[73] The first allusions to this text emerge about 500, but a modern edition is still *in statu nascendi*, cf. Fowden 1994b, 154–155 (to be read with Paschoud 1997) and 1994a.

[74] Similarly, Vogt 1960², 164; Dörries 1972, 35.

[75] Markschies 1997.

[76] Vgl. Kazhdan, 1987; Bonamente and Fusco 1992; Burke 1992; Magdalino 1994; Drijvers 1994, XVIII.197–201, XIX.70–71; Marcone 2003.

[77] Kaegi 1958.

[78] Gibbon 1896, II, 299–307, cf. Straub 1986, 252–282 ('Gibbons Konstantin-Bild'); Frend 1994.

[79] Note also Schlange-Schöningen 1997.

[80] Barnes 1998, 294.

become Christian in his time, nevertheless it was hardly more than 10 percent;[81] moreover, the male members of the aristocracy and the army were still largely pagan. It is rather Constantine's longevity—often an overlooked aspect of history—, the Christian education of his sons and his careful politics regarding pagan cults that insured the Christianisation of the Roman Empire. His vision may not have been the sign of his conversion; it certainly was the first sign of a lasting change in the direction of Western civilisation.[82]

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[81] Lane Fox 1986, 585–592 (who is perhaps too conservative in his views); Praet 1992–1993; van Minnen 1994; Hopkins 1998; Bremmer 2002b, 85f.

[82] This is the updated and revised version of Bremmer 1995, which had profited from comments by Mirjam de Baar, Jan den Boeft, Jan Willem Drijvers and Ton Hilhorst. Later versions also profited from lectures at The Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton (2000) and the University of Bremen (2004). Ian Rutherford kindly corrected my English.

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TRÄUME UND VISIONEN IN DEN
DIALOGEN GREGORS DES GROßEN

GERARD BARTELINK

Die vier Bücher der Dialoge Gregors des Großen (593–594) weisen eine Vielzahl von Erzählungen von Träumen und Visionen auf, insgesamt mehr als fünfzig. In 4,49 nimmt Gregor eine Klassifikation der Träume nach den Ursachen ihres Entstehens vor, die er fast wörtlich seinem ersten Werk, den *Moralia in Job*, entnommen hat (8,41–43[1]). An diesem ausführlichen Kommentar zum Buch Hiob hatte er gearbeitet, als er sich zwischen 579 und 586 als päpstlicher Gesandter (*apocrisiarius*) in Konstantinopel aufhielt.

Die Exegese von Hiob 7, 13–14 veranlasste ihn, näher auf das Phänomen des Traumes einzugehen. Der Bibeltext beschreibt, wie Hiob sich in seiner Not an Gott wendet und über sein Leiden wehklagt:[2] ‚Sagte ich: Mein Lager soll mich trösten, mein Bett trage das Leid mit mir, so quältest du mich mit Träumen, und mit Gesichtern jagtest du mich in Angst‘. Gregor deutet diese schreckenerregenden Träume als Bilder des Jüngsten Gerichts,[3] ohne zwischen *somnium* und *visio* näher zu differenzieren. Im Gegenteil, etwas weiter in seinem Kommentar kombiniert er sogar beide Wörter[4] und setzt die beängstigenden Gedanken, die den Sünder quälen (*pavida imaginatio*), mit einem *triste somnium* gleich.

Die sechs Ursachen von Träumen

Der darauf folgende Exkurs über Träume im allgemeinen wird von Gregor in 4,49 nochmals verwendet. Diesen Text werden wir hier zuerst analysieren. Gregor teilt die Ursachen von Träumen in sechs Kategorien ein (*sex causae*), eine Klassifikation, die allerdings bei den

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[1] *Patrol. Lat.* 75, 826–828.

[2] *Si dixero ,consolabitur me lectulus meus et relevabor loquens mecum in stratu meo‘, terrebis me per somnia et per visiones horrore concuties.*

[3] *Quid vero hoc loco somnia vel visiones accipimus nisi imaginationes ultimi districtique examinis?*

[4] *In ipsa strati sui requie somnii visione turbantur* (Selbst wenn sie in ihrem Bette ruhen, werden sie durch ein Traumgesicht in Verwirrung gebracht).

christlichen Schriftstellern weiter nicht vorzukommen scheint. Die ersten zwei Arten von Träumen entstehen ihm zufolge durch physische Ursachen: durch einen vollen oder einen leeren Magen (*plenitudo* oder *inanitas*). Wir kennen sie aus Erfahrung (,*experimento cognoscimus*'), sagt er, ohne weiter darauf einzugehen, wahrscheinlich, weil er nicht über biblische Vorbilder verfügt, wie er sie für die anderen Kategorien zur Erläuterung verwendet. Wenn wir Texte über Träume in der profanen Literatur zum Vergleich heranziehen, sehen wir, dass dort Bemerkungen über diese Art von Träumen nicht völlig fehlen.

Cicero zufolge kann man, wenn man mit Speis und Trank übersättigt ist, verwirrte und chaotische Träume erwarten.[5] Lege man sich dagegen nach einer bescheidenen Mahlzeit zur Ruhe, dann werde man eher wahre Träume schauen. Er beruft sich hierfür auf Plato (*Staat* 571B): Wenn der rationelle Teil der Seele schlummere, hätten die zwei anderen Teile freies Spiel, namentlich wenn wir unmäßig gegessen und getrunken hätten,[6] wodurch nur irrationelle Traumbilder entständen. Ob Gregor diesen Text gekannt hat, mag fraglich erscheinen.

Zweifelsohne kannte er aber die Behandlung der schädlichen Folgen der Unmäßigkeit beim Essen und Trinken sowie der Folgen des extremen Fastens, die sich in asketischen christlichen Schriften findet. In seiner Abhandlung über die *discretio* bei den Mönchen (*Collationes* 2) spricht Cassianus über das Maßhalten beim Essen.[7] Man solle Exzesse vermeiden,[8] sonst drohe die Gefahr, dass trügerische Träume entständen.[9] Der Asket soll nicht erst tagelang fasten, um dann mit dem aufgesparten Brot zu völlen (2,24).

Für die anderen vier Arten von Träumen hingegen kann Gregor, der sich gerne auf die Bibel beruft, Bibelstellen anführen (,*in sacrae Scripturae paginis invenimus*'). Obwohl er sie in vier Gruppen einteilt, handelt es sich hier eigentlich um zwei entgegengesetzte Hauptkategorien, die

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[5] *De divinatione* 1,29,60: *onusti cibo et vino perturbata et confusa cernimus* (Mit Speisen und Wein übersättigt spüren wir nur Unruhe und Verwirrung).

[6] *Immoderato obstupefacta potu atque pastu* (Fassungslos durch unmäßigen Gebrauch von Speisen und Getränken).

[7] *Collationes* 2,18: *inter utramque nimietatem inlaesi transire* (unversehrt zwischen beiden Exzessen hindurchgehen).

[8] *Collationes* 2,22: *quisquis inaequalitatem tenens nunc ventrem ariditate constringit, nunc escarum nimietate distendit* (Jeder, der in Ungleichmäßigkeit beharrt, indem er bald seinen Magen durch Austrocknung zusammenzieht, bald durch zuviel Speisen übersättigt).

[9] *Collationes* 2,23: *fallax imago index occultae voluptatis* (ein trügerisch Bild, das verborgene Genusssucht verrät).

beide eine Subkategorie enthalten: Die trügerischen Träume, die in der
Überzahl sind, stehen den viel selteneren wahren Offenbarungsträu-
men gegenüber. Aber beide Arten können, wie Gregor bemerkt, auch
aus vorhergehenden Gedanken entstehen. Die trügerischen Träume
würden vom Teufel (*hoste abscondito*, dem verborgenen Feind) verursacht,
die wahren Träume dagegen kämen von Gott. So wird es von den
meisten christlichen Schriftstellern formuliert. Die bestehenden profa-
nen Kategorien sind nur christianisiert: Gott ersetzt die alten Götter,
der Teufel und seine Gehilfen die alten Dämonen (die, anders als bei
den Christen, sowohl gut als auch böse sein konnten).

Dass die meisten Traumgesichte nur auf Trug und Täuschung beru-
hen, geht Gregor zufolge aus zwei biblischen Aussagen allgemeiner Art
hervor. In Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) 34,7 lesen wir: ‚Die Träume haben
viele in die Irre geführt‘[10] und in Leviticus 19,26 werden die Träume
eng mit der verbotenen heidnischen Wahrsagekunst verbunden. Dass
neben die *illusio* von seiten des Teufels und der Dämonen auch irrefüh-
rende Gedanken treten können, leitet Gregor aus Prediger 5,2 her.[11]

Die Existenz von durch Gott gesandten Offenbarungsträumen erläu-
tert Gregor nicht mit allgemeinen Aussagen, sondern mit konkreten
Vorbildern. Zuerst weist er auf einen alttestamentlichen Text hin, den
bekannten Traum des Joseph, eines der zwölf Söhne Jakobs, der sich
im Traum über seine Brüder gestellt sieht, was sich nachher als wahr
erweist (Genesis 37,5–10). Dann folgt ein warnender Traum aus dem
Neuen Testament: Ein Engel erscheint Joseph, dem Gatten Marias, als
Bote Gottes und trägt ihm auf, mit Frau und Kind nach Ägypten zu
fliehen (Matth. 2,13).

Für die letzte Art von Träumen, die von Gedanken eingeleiteten
Offenbarungsträume, führt Gregor die biblische Schilderung der Vi-
sion Nebukadnezars an (Daniel 2,29 und 31): ‚Auf deinem Lager kamen
dir, König, Gedanken darüber, was dereinst geschehen werde; da ließ
er, der die Geheimnisse enthüllt, dich wissen, was geschehen werde‘.
Und: ‚Du, König, hattest eine Vision. Du sahst ein gewaltiges Stand-
bild. Es war groß und von außergewöhnlichem Glanz; es stand vor dir
und war furchtbar anzusehen‘.[12]

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[10] *Multos enim errare fecerunt somnia.*
[11] *Multas curas sequuntur somnia* (Die Träume kommen aus vielen Sorgen fort).
[12] *Tu rex cogitare coepisti in strato tuo, quid esset futurum post haec, et qui revelat mysteria, ostendit tibi quae ventura sunt … Tu rex videbas, et ecce, quasi statua una grandis. Statua illa magna et statura sublimis stabat contra te, et intuitus eius erat terribilis.*

Diese von Gregor angeführten berühmten biblischen Träume finden sich mehrfach bei den christlichen Schriftstellern als Beweis dafür, dass Gott sich nicht selten auf dem Weg der Offenbarungsträume an die Menschen wende. Andere christliche Schriftsteller, wie Laktanz, führen als Beweis dafür nicht nur die von den Propheten erfahrenen Träume an, sondern auch die Träume bei den profanen Historiographen, die sich als wahr erwiesen haben:[13] ‚Gott behielt sich die Möglichkeit vor, die Menschen durch Träume über die Zukunft zu belehren. Auch die Werke der Historiker bezeugen vielfach, dass Träume sich ereignet haben, die unmittelbar auf wunderbare Weise in Erfüllung gegangen sind. Die Antworten unserer Propheten fanden ebenfalls teilweise ihre Grundlage in Träumen‘.

Gregor schließt seine Skizze der sechs verschiedenen Arten von Träumen mit einem nachdrücklichen Rat ab: Am besten reagiere man zurückhaltend auf die gesehenen Traumbilder, da ja sehr oft die Tükken der Dämonen mitspielten. Man brauche das Charisma der Unterscheidung zwischen den guten und den bösen Geistern (*discretio spirituum*), um Offenbarung und Sinnestäuschung nicht zu verwechseln. Die heiligen Männer, welche diese Gabe besitzen, sind eben die von Gregor in seinen *Dialogen* beschriebenen asketischen Mönche und Priester. Sie seien imstande zu erkennen, welche Erscheinungen schreckenerregend und welche beruhigend seien, denn sie hätten die Fähigkeit zur Unterscheidung von Gut und Böse, Wahr und Falsch. Die *discretio* gehört zu den in den Mönchsschriften oft erörterten Themen (so bereits bei Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* 35,4: ‚Mit Gottes Hilfe ist es möglich, zwischen dem Herannahen böser und guter Geister zu unterscheiden‘).[14] Zweifellos hat Gregor die Behandlung dieser wichtigen Tugend in den *Collationes* des Cassianus gelesen, und ihm ist somit bekannt, dass dieser die *discretio* an die Spitze der Tugenden stellte (2,4):[15] ‚Denn aus der Unterscheidung kommen alle Tugenden fort, sie behütet und lenkt sie‘. Sie bezeichnet die Behutsamkeit, die verhindert, dass man sich auf Irrwege begibt, sowie das Vermögen zur Unterscheidung, wodurch man den richtigen Weg erkennt. Dieser Terminus, den Gregor nahezu ausschließlich in Verbindung mit dem moralischen und geistlichen Leben

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[13] *De opificio Dei* 18,10: *(Deus) facultatem sibi reliquit docendi hominem futura per somnia. Nam et historiae saepe testantur extitisse somnia, quorum praesens et admirabilis fuit eventus, et responsa vatum nostrorum ex parte somniis constiterunt.*

[14] *Distantiam enim adventus malorum et bonorum possibile est scire, Domino praestante* (nach der ältesten lateinischen Übersetzung).

[15] 15 *Omnium namque virtutum generatrix, custos moderatrixque discretio est.*

sowie dem Benehmen des Menschen verwendet, ist für ihn auch bei
der richtigen Beurteilung der Träume wichtig. Wenn unser Geist nicht
vorsichtig vorgehe, könne der Geist des Betrugs uns irreführen. Dieser
trügerische Dämon liebe es anfangs wahre Prophezeiungen zu äußern,
um später um so besser sein Opfer in seinen Schlingen fangen zu kön-
nen.

   Dann erläutert Gregor diese letzte Bemerkung mit einem Beispiel
aus seiner eigenen Umgebung. Ein nicht näher präzisierter Bekannter,
der—trotz der biblischen Warnung—an der Erforschung der Träume
besonders interessiert gewesen sei, habe gemeint, so weit fortgeschrit-
ten zu sein, dass er die Wahrsagekunst beherrsche. Offenbar sei er
jedoch, wie Gregor sagt, von den Dämonen irregeführt worden (4,51):
,In einem Traum wurde ihm ein langes Leben versprochen. Als er sich
eine stattliche Summe zusammengespart hatte um die Unkosten zu
bestreiten, welche ein langes Leben mit sich bringt, traf ihn ein jäher
Tod. All das gesparte Geld ließ er unangerührt zurück, und da er keine
Almosen geschenkt hatte, konnte er nichts (d.h. keine Verdienste für
den Himmel) mit sich nehmen'.

Gregor und seine Vorgänger

Gregors Einteilung der Träume in sechs Kategorien scheint im lateini-
schen christlichen Schrifttum etwas Neues zu sein, obwohl es viele Ähn-
lichkeiten und Berührungspunkte mit Aussagen und Bemerkungen in
anderen Schriften gibt. Als erster unter den christlichen Schriftstellern
hat Tertullian sich in seinem Traktat *De anima* (45–49) mit den Träu-
men befasst.[16] Bei ihm wurde die Dreiteilung, wie die Stoiker sie vorge-
nommen hatten, christianisiert. Diese unterschieden in ihren Betrach-
tungen Träume, die von den Göttern herrührten, Träume, welche von
den (teils guten) Dämonen oder den unsterblichen Seelen verursacht
würden, und schließlich die Traumbilder, welche die Seele sich selber
schaffe. Dieselbe Dreiteilung der Träume findet sich bei Philo (*De som-
niis* 2,4) und Cicero (*De divinatione*: ,confirmat Posidonius'). Nach Cicero
ist Posidonius der Meinung, dass die Träume durch die Wirkung der
Götter (*adpulsu*) verursacht würden: Erstens sei die Seele mit den Göt-
tern verwandt, zweitens sei die Luft von unsterblichen Seelen erfüllt, in

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[16] Vgl. 45,1 *Tenemur hic de somniis quoque christianam sententiam promere* (Wir fühlen uns
genötigt, hier auch über die Träume die Meinung der Christen mitzuteilen).

denen deutliche Zeichen der Wahrheit sichtbar würden, drittens redeten die Götter selber mit den Schlafenden.

Welche Änderungen hat Tertullian hier vorgenommen? Selbstverständlich ist Gott in der christlichen Tradition an die Stelle der Götter getreten (47,2). Von ihm stammten die ehrbaren, reinen, voraussagenden, offenbarenden, erbaulichen und erweckenden Träume, deren Gabe sich auch über die Ungeweihten ausgieße (auch Nebukadnezar erhält ja von Gott einen Traum). Die meisten Träume würden jedoch von den Dämonen (hier den bösen Geistern nach der christlichen Bedeutung dieses Terminus) verursacht (47,1 ‚*a daemoniis plurimum incuti somnia*‘). Als letzte Gattung erwähnt Tertullian ‚jene Träume, die die Seele durch die Betrachtung der Umstände in sich selbst einzuführen scheint‘.[17] Diese letzte Art fehlt in Gregors Schema, kommt aber zum Beispiel bei dem christlichen Dichter Prudentius vor: ‚Die Seele bildet sich selber durch Nachahmung vielfaltige Vorstellungen‘.[18] Doch begegnet uns an einer anderen Stelle in Gregors Schriften eine verwandte Kategorie, nämlich in seiner Behandlung der vorhersagenden Visionen, wovon noch die Rede sein wird.

Dass man an erster Stelle zwischen den wahren und den täuschenden Träumen zu unterscheiden hat, war seit jeher die allgemeine Auffassung. In der profanen Tradition jedoch ist man geneigt, der Möglichkeit der Traumdeutung einen wichtigen Platz zu geben (Wahrsager, Zauberer, wissenschaftliche Traumdeutung) und somit mehr Träume als wahr zu erachten, als es bei den Christen der Fall ist. Die christlichen Schriftsteller, und so auch Gregor, verwenden dieselbe Unterscheidung. Sie betonen jedoch viel stärker, dass die meisten Träume die Menschen verwirren und in die Irre führen.

Die von Tertullian vorgenommene Dreiteilung der Träume findet sich bei den christlichen Schriftstellern des öfteren. Laktanz, der ein gutes Jahrhundert nach Tertullian in seinem *De opificio hominis* ebenfalls die Träume behandelt, gehört nicht zu Gregors Quellen. Er fragt sich, warum der Mensch in seinem Schlaf träume. Wir könnten gar nicht ruhen, wenn unser Geist nicht fortwährend mit wahrgenommenen Bildern beschäftigt sei.[19] Während der Geist sich in seine Gedan-

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[17] *De anima* 47,1: *Tertia species erunt somnia, quae sibimet ipsa anima videtur inducere ex intentione circumstantiarum.*

[18] *Cathemerinon* 6,37 ff.: *Imitata multiformes facies sibi ipsa fingit.*

[19] *De opificio hominis* 18,4: *Nam requiescere nullo pacto possumus, nisi mens visionum imaginibus occupata teneatur.*

ken vertiefe, beschleiche ihn plötzlich der Schlaf, und die Gedanken
gingen allmählich in die dazu gehörigen Bilder über. So fange der Geist
an, auch zu sehen, was er vor Augen habe. Dann gehe er weiter und
finde Ablenkung („*sibi avocamenta invenit*'), um so die heilsame körper-
liche Ruhe nicht zu unterbrechen. Die Träume gehörten zum Schlaf,
wie es für alle Lebewesen gelte,[20] aber Gott verwende beim Menschen
den Traum auch, um ihn die Zukunft zu lehren. Laktanz schließt mit
der allgemeinen Bemerkung, dass es sowohl wahre als auch unwahre
Träume gebe, wofür er auf Vergil verweist (*Aeneïs* 6,893, die zwei Pfor-
ten des Schlafgottes Somnus), im übrigen mit einer Christianisierung
des Textes: der mythologische Gott weicht der allgemeineren Bezeich-
nung ‚Träume'. Es fällt auf, dass Laktanz nur Quellen aus der profanen
Literatur benutzt (Lukrez, Cicero, Vergil) und keine biblischen Vorbil-
der hinzuzieht.

Prudentius (etwa 400) dagegen beruft sich, ebenso wie Gregor, in
seinem *Hymnus ante somnum* sehr wohl auf biblische Vorbilder: Joseph
habe dem Pharao seine Träume gedeutet, und der Apostel Johan-
nes sei würdig gewesen, eine erhabene Vision zu empfangen. Und
er fügt hinzu, dass wir sündige Menschen eine derartige Gunst zwar
nicht erwarten dürften, dass jedoch, wenn wir uns in einer richtigen
Gesinnung bekreuzigten, die schreckenerregenden, vom bösen Betrü-
ger (dem Teufel) herbeigeführten Träume uns nicht schaden würden:[21]
‚Ferne, bleibt ferne, scheußliche umherschweifende Träume. Ferne sei
der schlaue hartnäckige Betrüger. Du hinterlistige Schlange, die durch
tausend Mäander, durch Schwindel und Betrug die friedlichen Herzen
beunruhigst, geh hin, denn Christus ist hier'. Eine weitere Parallele zu
Gregor ist, dass auch für Prudentius die unwahren Träume zahlreicher
sind. Zwar werde, wenn unser Herz rein sei, dem Geist bisweilen ein
Blick in die Zukunft gewährt, aber die Trugbilder seien in der Über-
zahl.[22]

Von den zahlreichen Reflektionen über Träume bei Augustinus fin-
den wir bei Gregor keine Spuren. Die Parallelen sind ganz allgemeiner
Art. So weisen sowohl Augustinus als auch Gregor unter Berufung auf
biblische Vorbilder auf die Möglichkeit hin, dass Gott im Traum sei-

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[20] Ibid.: *Dormiendi ergo causa tributa est a Deo ratio somniandi et quidem in commune universis
animantibus.*

[21] *Cathemerinon* 6,136–144: *Procul, o procul vagantum / portenta somniorum. / Procul esto
pervicaci / praestigiator astu! / O tortuose serpens, / qui mille per meandros / fraudesque flexuosas /
agitas quieta corda, / discede, Christus hic est.*

[22] *Cathemerinon* 6,43–47: *plerumque … mendax imago … animos maestos ambage fallit atra.*

nen Willen kundtut. Beide lassen den Träumen gegenüber auch eine skeptische Haltung erkennen und betrachten die meisten Träume als Fälschung. Weniger klar als Augustinus unterscheidet Gregor zwischen den Offenbarungsträumen, die der *mens*/dem *animus* erscheinen, und den anderen Träumen, die sich in der *anima* ereignen.

Zu erwähnen ist hier noch, dass in der pseudo-augustinischen Schrift *De spiritu et anima* 25[23] eine Einteilung der Träume in fünf Arten vorkommt: *oraculum* (Warnung, Prophezeiung im Schlaf durch einen Heiligen, Priester oder Gott selbst), *visio* (man sieht etwas, das sich genau so ereignen wird), *somnium* (ein Traum ist ohne Deutung nicht zu verstehen), *insomnium* (man sieht im Schlafe etwas, womit man beschäftigt war oder worüber man sich eben Gedanken machte) und *phantasma* (ein Phantasiegebilde mit meist drohenden Gestalten, das sich ereignet, wenn man kaum eingeschlafen ist und noch wach zu sein glaubt).

Die Beschreibung der Visionen bei Gregor

Die Grenzlinie zwischen Traumgesicht und Vision wird von Gregor nicht immer scharf gezogen. Allerdings gibt es auch Visionen, die mit offenen Augen (*apertis oculis*) und bei wachem Zustand gesehen werden. Sie werden nicht jedem zuteil. Des öfteren beschreibt Gregor, dass ein Sterbender eine Erscheinung von Dämonen oder Engeln sehe, die nicht von den Umstehenden wahrgenommen werde (vgl. 4,36,3). Als der Teufel vor den körperlichen Augen (*corporalibus oculis*) des Benedikt erschienen sei (2,8,12), hätten die anderen Brüder ihn zwar gehört, aber nicht gesehen. Entgegengesetztes (eine teuflische Illusion) beschreibt Gregor in 2,10,1–2: Der Teufel täuscht den Brüdern vor, durch ein hingeworfenes Götterbildchen brenne die Klosterküche lichterloh. Dem zugeeilten Benedikt, der mit seinen eigenen Augen kein Feuer sieht, wird sofort klar, dass es sich um eine vom Teufel den Mönchen vorgetäuschte Wahnidee gehandelt habe.

In seiner Zeit waren Gregor zufolge die Visionen und Offenbarungen zahlreicher geworden, weil das Ende der Zeiten näher gekommen sei (4,43,1–2). Die Menschheit befinde sich gleichsam in dem Augenblick, wo die Finsternis dem Tageslicht zu weichen anfange. ‚Wir schauen gleichsam in einer Dämmerung des Geistes, vor dem Auf-

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[23] *Patrol. Lat.* 40,798 (nach Macrobius, *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis*).

gehen der Sonne'. Es ist nicht auszuschließen, dass Gregor hier eine
Analogie zu dem alten Glauben, dass sich die meisten wahren Träume
gegen Ende der Nacht ereignen, bilden wollte. Diese Auffassung fin-
den wir zum Beispiel bei Horaz und Ovid belegt. Der erste sagt: ,Nach
Mitternacht, wenn die Träume wahr sind' (*Saturae* 1,10,31). Und letzte-
rer: ,Vor der Morgendämmerung, wenn die Lampe schon schläft, zur
Zeit, da man gewöhnlich wahre Träume schaut' (*Heroides* 19,195). Auch
Tertullian kannte diese Meinung: ,Man behauptet, die Träume seien
am Ende der Nacht sicherer und reiner, weil da die Kraft der Seele
wieder auftaucht, nachdem der Schlummer lange angehalten hat' (*De
anima* 48,1).

Die vorhersagenden Visionen

Die meisten Visionen werden den Menschen zuteil, wenn die Stunde
des Sterbens nahe ist. In 4,27 unterscheidet Gregor drei Arten der
vorhersagenden Visionen. Erstens habe die Seele selber wegen ihrer
subtilen Substanz das Vermögen, durch ihre eigene Kraft bisweilen die
Zukunft zu kennen.[24] Zweitens würden insbesondere den Menschen,
denen ihre Sterbensstunde nahe sei, Offenbarungen über das vergönnt,
was sie zu erwarten hätten (,*per revelationem ventura cognoscunt*'). Und
schließlich: ,Es ereignet sich auch', sagt Gregor, ,dass die Seele, wenn
der Augenblick, in dem man den Körper verlassen wird, nahe ist,
von Gottes wegen beseelt (*divinitus afflatae*), einen unkörperlichen Blick
des Geistes (*incorporeum oculum mentis*) auf die himmlischen Geheimnisse
wirft' (4,27,1). Für alle drei Arten führt Gregor Belege an. So ließe die
Vorhersage eines sehr weltlich gesinnten Rechtsanwaltes sich nur durch
die Kraft und Subtilität seiner Seele erklären. Von einer göttlichen
Offenbarung könne ja bei ihm nicht die Rede sein (4,27,3). Anlässlich
Gregors Einteilung der Träume ist schon bemerkt worden, dass er dort
eine Kategorie der Träume, welche die Seele aus sich selbst bildet,
nicht aufgenommen hat.

   Die zweite Art wird mit einer nächtlichen Vision des schwer kranken
Mönches Gerontius erläutert, der Männer in einem strahlend weißen
Gewande aus höheren Regionen zu sich hinuntersteigen gesehen habe.
Sie hätten die Namen einiger Mönche aus seinem Kloster genannt, die

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[24] *Ipsa aliquando animarum vis subtilitate sua aliquid providet.*

bald sterben würden. Und tatsächlich seien die Genannten gestorben, überdies in der Reihenfolge, in der sie genannt worden seien (4,27,4–5).

Die letzte Art betrifft Seelen, denen, wenn sie im Begriff sind, den Körper zu verlassen, ein kleiner Vorgeschmack der heiligen Geheimnisse geschenkt wird, nicht im Traum, sondern bei wachem Zustand.[25] Der Diener Armentarius, ein aufrichtiger Mensch, wurde Gregor zufolge plötzlich aus dieser Welt weggerafft, als er während der Pestseuche dieser Krankheit zum Opfer fiel (‚*subito sublatus a praesentibus*‘). Wieder zu sich gekommen, habe er seinem Meister gesagt: ‚Ich war im Himmel und weiß, dass die und die hier in diesem Haus bald sterben werden. Zum Beweis habe ich die Gabe empfangen, alle Sprachen zu reden‘.[26] Es habe sich herausgestellt, bemerkt Gregor, dass er die Wahrheit sprach.

Über die Visionen, die Heilige bisweilen auf ihrem Sterbebette zur Ermutigung erhalten, bemerkt Gregor (4,12,5): Es ereignet sich, dass Rechtfertige bei ihrem Tode Visionen erhalten von Heiligen, die ihnen vorgegangen sind (‚*sanctorum praecedentium visiones*‘). Es ist ein Zeichen, dass sie keine Strafe zu fürchten haben. Indem ihrem Geist die Gemeinschaft der Himmelsbürger gezeigt wird, können sie ohne erschöpfende Gefühle von Schmerz oder Furcht aus den Banden des Fleisches befreit werden. Andere, die weniger gut gelebt hätten, würden von höllischen Gestalten bedroht. Auf seinem Sterbebett habe ein Mönch gesehen, wie er einem Drachen ausgeliefert sei, der ihn zu verschlingen drohe. Gregor meint, es stehe außer Zweifel, dass dieser Mönch eine derartige Vision nur zum Nutzen seiner Zuhörer gesehen habe: er habe zwar erzählt, welchem Feind er ausgeliefert gewesen sei, habe ihm aber nicht entwischen können (4,40,11–12).

Stereotype Motive

In den christlichen Visionen, Traumbildern und Wundererzählungen leben nicht selten alte Motive weiter. Es ist charakteristisch für diese volkstümliche literarische Gattung der anekdotischen Erzählung, dass traditionelle Themen immer wieder in Varianten auftreten. In 1,4,1 beschreibt Gregor, wie dem Equitius, als dieser zu Gott gebetet habe, ihn von seinen sinnlichen Versuchungen zu erlösen, nachts ein Engel

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[25] 4,2,9: *mysteria caelestia non per somnium, sed vigilando praelibare.*
[26] 4,27,10–12.

mit einer eisernen Lanzette erschienen sei, um ihn zu kastrieren. Bereits während der Vision sei ihm klar geworden, dass der Engel jede Bewegung aus seinen Geschlechtsorganen weggeschnitten hätte. Seitdem sei er von jeder körperlichen Versuchung befreit.

Eine ferne Parallele—selbstverständlich nicht die unmittelbare Quelle—bilden die Wunderberichte aus der Asklepiusheilstätte von Epidaurus. Während des Tempelschlafes erschien der Gott selbst den Heilsuchenden im Traum, wobei er in den meisten Fällen eine ärztliche Handlung vollzog. So lesen wir im Wunderbericht auf einer Stele, wie Asclepius einer Patientin bei wachem Zustand erschienen sei. Sie habe gesehen, wie der Gott eine Operation an ihr vornahm, die ihrem Bericht zufolge ihr Gesundung gebracht habe.[27] Ein anderes Beispiel wurde oben schon in einem anderen Zusammenhang erwähnt. Während einer schweren Krankheit erschienen dem Mönch Gerontius in einer nächtlichen Vision (‚*in visione nocturna*‘) Männer in weißen Gewändern. Die Namen von acht Mitbrüdern wurden ihm vorgelesen, zuletzt hörte er seinen eigenen Namen. Alle starben tatsächlich am nächsten Tag, und zwar in der Reihenfolge, in der sie genannt wurden. Er selbst starb als letzter.[28] Vergleichbares findet man schon bei Cicero.[29] Dieser beruft sich auf Posidonius um zu zeigen, dass Sterbende bisweilen das Vermögen hätten, die Zukunft vorherzusagen (‚*morientes divinare*‘). Ein Sterbender hätte nach Posidonius sechs Altersgenossen genannt und vorhergesagt, wer von ihnen als erster, wer als zweiter usw. sterben würde.

Vision und Traumgesicht. Bemerkungen über den Wortgebrauch

Des öfteren verwendet Gregor bei der Erwähnung einer Vision nur allgemeine Verben (vor allem *videre* und *apparere*, daneben auch *aspicere*, *respicere* und *adsistere*). In dem Maße, wie die Beschreibung jedoch ausführlicher ist, tritt auch der Unterschied zwischen Vision und nächtlicher Traumerscheinung klarer hervor. Bei einer Vision (fast immer begegnet die Bezeichnung *visio*; einmal findet sich *visum*: 2,1,6; nahezu synonym werden *speculatio*: 2,35,3; *revelatio*: 2,1,6, verwendet) ist wesentlich, dass sie vom Geist (*animus, mens*), der wach geblieben ist (*vigilare*),

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[27] Herzog 1931, 144.
[28] 4,27,4–5.
[29] *De divinatione* 1,30,64.

wahrgenommen wird. Sie erscheint den Augen des Geistes (*mentis oculis; menti ostenditur*). Meistens handelt es sich um eine Offenbarung durch einen Engel oder eine erhabene Person.

So wird in 3,38,2 beschrieben, wie der Märtyrer Juticus dem Bischof Redemptus von Ferentis erscheine. Auf einer Visitationsreise habe dieser sich beim Grab des Märtyrers ein Bett aufstellen lassen und sich zur Ruhe gelegt. Mitten in der Nacht habe er nicht geschlafen, aber auch nicht ganz wachgelegen (,*nec dormiebat, nec perfecte vigilare poterat*'). Wie das des öfteren zu geschehen pflegt, bemerkt Gregor, habe gleichsam ein bleiernes Gewicht seinen Geist niedergedrückt, der jedoch wach geblieben sei.[30] Als der ihm erscheinende Märtyrer ihn gefragt habe, ,Bist du wach?' (,*vigilas?*'), habe der Bischof die Frage bejaht. Dreimal sei dann die warnende Offenbarung erklungen: ,Das Ende kommt für alles Fleisch'. Darauf sei die Vision geschwunden, die vor den Augen seines Geistes erschienen sei (,*quae eius mentis oculis apparebat*').

In ähnlichen Worten beschreibt Gregor, was dem schiffbrüchigen Varacca widerfahren sei (3,59,5). Erschöpft auf den Wellen treibend, habe auch jener zwischen Wachen und Schlafen geschwebt.[31] Dann sei ihm eine Person erschienen, die ihm Brot zur Erquickung gereicht habe.

In anderen Fällen bleibt die Beschreibung jedoch ganz allgemein. So beginnt 4,14,4 mit: „*Nocte quadam … vidit*'. Erst im abschließenden Satz wird hier ausdrücklich gesagt, dass es sich um eine Vision handele: ,*visio apostoli … ablata est*'. Nur in einigen Fällen ist *visio* durch ein Adjektiv näher bestimmt: *magnam illam ac terribilem visionem* (3,24,3, von dem Propheten Daniel geschaut); *de tanta visione* (3,25,2); *tantae visionis novitatem non ferens* (4,13,4); *in visione nocturna* (4,27,4); *per nocturnam visionem* (4,49,6; 4,50,1). Es handelt sich also bei den näheren Bestimmungen nur um zwei Kategorien: eindrucksvoll/erschreckend und nächtlich.

Mehrmals wird betont, dass eine Vision sich plötzlich (*subito*) ereigne, sie habe etwas Wunderbares. Auch bei den Wunderheilungen wird wiederholt betont, wie die Genesung plötzlich einsetze (vgl. 2,35,2 *subito … respiciens, vidit*; 3,59,5 *subito mentis pondere … gravatus*; 4,13,3 *subito aspexit*; 4,17,2 *subito sursum … respiciens … vidit*; 3,24,1 *repente … constitit*).

Obwohl Gregor in 4,50, wo er die Träume in sechs Kategorien einteilt, des öfteren die Bezeichnung *somnium* verwendet (10 mal, außerdem

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[30] *Depressus, ut solet, gravabatur quodam pondere vigilans animus.*
[31] *Subito mentis pondere sum gravatus, ita ut neque depressus somno essem, neque vigilare me crederem.*

in drei Bibelzitaten), finden wir *somnium* in den Dialogen weiter nur
äußerst selten (3,1,6 ‚*in somnio … vidi*'). Es fällt besonders auf, dass für
Gregor die nächtlichen Visionen mit den Traumbildern identisch sind.
Auf die Frage, ob die nächtlichen Visionen ernstzunehmen seien,[32] ant-
wortet er, dass die Traumbilder die Seele auf sechs Weisen berührten.[33]
Ein ähnlicher Übergang vom einen Wort zum andern findet sich in
4,50,5 (der Traum von Nebukadnezar, Daniel 2,29): die Vision deu-
tend (‚*visionem disserens*'); mit Ehrfurcht setzt Daniel auseinander, wie der
Traum sich erfüllen werde (‚*somnium … inplendum reverenter insinuat*').

Doppeltraum und Doppelvision

Einmal beschreibt Gregor einen Doppeltraum (2,22,2): Zwei Mönche
bekämen zur gleichen Zeit einen ähnlichen Traum, in dem sie sähen,
wie Benedikt ihnen erscheint, um den versprochenen Bauplan eines
Klosters zu zeigen und zu erklären. Ein derartiger Doppeltraum—der
Typus ist auch aus der Bibel bekannt; vgl. Apostelgeschichte 9,10–16:
Ananias/Saulus—dient zur Bestätigung und bildet somit eine Parallele
zur Wiederholung von Orakeln und prophezeienden Aussagen.

Eine Doppelvision bestätigt die Vorhersagung des Benedikt, die sei-
nen eigenen Tod betrifft. Im Jahr, in dem er sterben würde, sage
er einigen Brüdern den Tag seines Todes voraus (2,37,1). Er verbiete
ihnen, darüber zu reden, und zeige jenen, die abwesend sein wür-
den, durch welches Zeichen (*signum*) ihnen sein Tod offenbart werden
würde. Tatsächlich sähen später zwei Brüder—der eine im Kloster, der
andere in einiger Entfernung—eine vollkommen ähnliche Vision:[34] Vor
ihren Augen erscheint ein mit Lampen erleuchteter und mit Teppichen
belegter Weg, der zum Himmel führe. Die Doppelvision dient dazu, die
Wahrheit der Prophezeiung besonders zu betonen (vgl. auch Apostel-
geschichte 10,1—11,8 Cornelius/Petrus). In 4,52,2 (*rursus admonitus*) wird
eine Vision wiederholt, weil der bei der ersten Erscheinung gegebene
Auftrag nicht ausgeführt wurde.

Gregors Aufgliederung der Träume (*sex causae*) weicht von der Dreitei-
lung ab, die sich seit Tertullian bei mehreren lateinischen christlichen

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[32] 4,50,1: *si hoc quod per nocturnas visiones ostenditur, debeat observari.*
[33] 4,50,2: *sex modis tangunt animam imagines somniorum.*
[34] 2,37,2: *duobus de eo fratribus … revelatio unius atque indissimilis visionis apparuit.*

Schriftstellern findet (Christianisierung eines profanen Schemas). Für die von ihm angeführten physischen Ursachen (*plenitudo, inanitas*) dürfte die Behandlung der *discretio* in Cassianus' *Collationes* seine Quelle sein. Die Einteilung in wahre und unwahre Träume—bei Gregor mit biblischen Texten und Vorbildern belegt—ist auch in der profanen Literatur traditionell, ebenso die Bemerkung, dass die unwahren Träume in der Überzahl sind. Der Unterschied zwischen Traum und Vision verwischt sich manchmal bei Gregor, der *somnium* und *visio* bisweilen nahezu als Synonyme verwendet und nicht nur *visio* bevorzugt, sondern selbst *somnium* zu meiden scheint.

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PART II

CLASSICAL DRAMA

AESCHYLUS AND THE LAST ACT OF SALAMIS

H.T. Wallinga

Aeschylus' evocation of the battle of Salamis in the *Persae* and Herodotus' report on that event are generally considered as trustworthy and largely compatible testimonies regarding the development of the battle. Accordingly, most modern analyses of the hostilities use elements taken from both. Whether Herodotus actually knew Aeschylus' account is debated. In my view some marked differences—to be discussed in the following pages—plead against it and the similarities can, and indeed must, be explained on the assumption that hundreds, if not thousands, of Athenian eyewitnesses could tell Herodotus more or less the same story as Aeschylus and, inspired by their memories of the tragedy's premiere, often enough may have quoted from the *Persians*.[1] Aeschylus' presence on Salamis at the time of the battle is more than likely: he was about 45 years old in 480 and there is no reason to suppose that he was exempted from service when the *pandêmei* mobilization was proclaimed. The allegation by Ion of Chios (FGH 392F7) that he was present *en tois Salaminiakois* may be taken as confirmation, though it is not proof, and being present does not necessarily make him an eyewitness of each and every incident. As Jacoby rightly emphasizes, we do not even know whether he fought on the fleet or was stationed on land.[2]

Yet I am convinced that there is a clue in Aeschylus' own work as to which of Jacoby's alternatives is the more probable and this makes the poet doubly interesting as a witness to the events of late September 480. Whatever the similarities may be between his report of the

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[1] If Athenian prisoners of war in Syracuse could recite Euripidean lyrics (Plut. *Nic.* 29), we may expect that their grandfathers peppered their war memories with Aeschylean verses. As an explanation of the few incontestable Aeschylean echoes in Herodotus (e.g. 8.68g, cf. *P.* 728), I consider this more probable than direct quotation. The honorand of this volume has expressed a contrary opinion (Kessels 1994, 277 and n. 28).

[2] Jacoby's comment (at FGH 392F7 n. 62) 'Faktisch wissen wir nicht einmal, ob Aeschylos bei Salamis auf der flotte oder als hoplit gefochten hat …' must be taken in the sense given to it in my text (it is for that matter hardly conceivable that Aeschylus served as a hoplite-marine, cf. the Decree of Themistocles in Meiggs & Lewis 1969, nr. 23 line 25).

battle of Salamis and that of Herodotus, there is conspicuous difference in his treatment of two episodes, one of which is entirely omitted by Herodotus, whereas the other receives no more than average attention. The latter episode is the destruction of the Persian contingent ordered—so both authors aver—to occupy the island of Psyttaleia (now Psittália, also called Lipsokoutála) in the night before the battle and during the battle to rescue shipwrecked Persians and to destroy their Greek counterparts. What is entirely omitted by Herodotus is an equivalent to Aeschylus' characterization of the final stage of the naval battle as a tunny catch (*P.* 420–428) and the tactical implications of this characterization.

Regarding the Persian occupants of Psyttaleia both authors share the explanation of that occupation as a 'rescue and destroy' operation. All the same, this must in my view be considered a Greek fantasy, thought up because the Greeks knew nothing about the Persian intentions. There was no reason whatsoever to expect that the battle would take place around or even near the island,[3] and even then the killing of drowning men would not make military sense, nor certainly be a suitable job for members of the Persian elite who, according to Aeschylus, constituted the occupying force. Still, that force was there, on the orders of the king. For want of an alternative explanation in our sources we have no choice but to try and infer what its task was from the Persian plan of attack. As the Greeks had no access to authentic Persian information on this score, we must settle for indirect indications, one of which regards Psyttaleia. Herodotus makes its occupation one of the measures taken by Xerxes in reaction to Themistocles' famous message that the Greeks were about to break camp and to run away in all directions (*P.* 356–360; Hdt. 8.76.1); the other measure consisted in the regrouping of the Persian battle order, two detachments now being ordered to close off the escape routes from Salamis (the city: in its harbour the Greek fleet had its base) to the open sea (*P.* 368–367; Hdt. 8.76.1). The rest of the Persian fleet, including an assault squadron of 207 triremes (*P.* 342–343, 366), prepared for the attack on the Greek position.[4]

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[3] Unless one follows Beloch and Hammond, who identify Psyttaleia with the island immediately north of Salamis city now called Áyios Yeóryios (1916, 122 and 1956, 43 respectively). This very wrong-headed idea has been convincingly swept aside by Wallace 1969.

[4] On the Persian plan for the elimination of the Greek naval forces see Wallinga 2005, ch. 5.

This plan makes absolutely clear that in organizing the attack on the Greek fleet in this way Xerxes pursued a very specific goal, viz. the comprehensive annihilation or capture of all the Greek triremes, not merely the elimination of the Greek fleet as a military factor (which could mean leaving alone parts of it that had taken to flight). This goal is already expressly noticed by Herodotus in his report on the operations at Artemision: the Persian commanders are instructed there not to attack the Greek fleet in order to forestall such a flight (8.6). This is only too understandable. Greek naval power had always been a threat to the Persian position in the whole of the Mediterranean littoral, especially in Asia Minor and Egypt; even smaller fleets were dangerous now that the units were triremes instead of the smaller types in use before 483.[5] For this reason the Persians had to prevent at all costs that Aeginetans or Athenians (or others) would get the chance to take their families on board and to start freebooting and pillaging from bases outside Persian reach, like the Phocaeans had done in the years after 546 and on a smaller scale after the battle of Lade, now a mere fourteen years back. Hence not only the blocking of the escape routes east and west of Salamis: troops were held ready to be ferried across to Salamis island as soon as the Greek fleet would be fully engaged by the numerically superior attackers and dispensable Persian ships could be detailed to do the ferrying. On Salamis these troops had to stifle all attempts to take families on board and flee.

The occupation of Psyttaleia is the only part of the last-named measure that is explicitly mentioned by our sources,[6] but in Herodotus' account of the annihilation of the occupiers of Psyttaleia (8.95) it is implied that the Greek, or in any case the Athenian, command reckoned with landings on Salamis. The Athenian hoplites, who according to Herodotus were taken across to Psyttaleia by Aristides during the sea-battle and who destroyed the Persian soldiers there, had been lined up along the shore of Salamis, evidently to repulse landings, as Macan has seen (at 8.95). As already said, such landings required ships: that they failed to materialize makes it likely that no detachments were singled out for this task, but that ships which had been assigned other primary tasks in Xerxes' modified plan of attack had been ordered to do

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[5] Thuc. 1.14. For the interpretation of chs. 13 and 14 of Thucydides' First Book see Wallinga 1993, ch. 2.

[6] There is no reason to doubt that Persian troops were stationed on the northern shore of the Salamis narrows where the king himself had his throne.

this work. The detachment for example that blocked the escape route between Psyttaleia and Salamis island (at Kynosura as Herodotus has it: 8.76.1) would be well placed to do the ferrying from Psyttaleia. The reason that nothing came of this part of Xerxes' scheme must be that his fleet failed to overmaster the Greek opponents and that all the Persian ships were kept in their original positions on the battlefield. As a result the troops on Psyttaleia found themselves isolated and in the end were abandoned to their fate.

However important their task may have been in Xerxes' plan of attack (and the Greeks certainly knew nothing specific about it), this does not explain the two peculiarities that distinguish Aeschylus' account of the episode from its Herodotean counterpart, viz. his specification of the occupiers as members of the Persian aristocracy,[7] and above all his assertion that for the king their annihilation was at least twice as disastrous as the defeat in the sea-battle (*P.* 436–437). Aeschylus for that matter is the only one of all our authorities to emphasize the social status of the soldiers. Diodorus ignores the whole affair, Pausanias simply calls them barbarians (1.36.2) and Plutarch speaks of enemies and barbarians and suggests that some at least were nobles (*Arist.* 9.1).[8]

The question therefore arises what may have caused Aeschylus thus to highlight this otherwise marginal episode. Here it is important to distinguish between on the one hand what he could and probably did base on eyewitness reports, if not autopsy, namely the elevated status of the Persian soldiers which could be inferred from their attire and equipment; and on the other Xerxes' reaction to the slaying of his men, which Aeschylus himself had not seen and for which he most probably had no eyewitnesses. Not a few commentators play down the matter as simply being exaggeration on Aeschylus' part without trying to explain his motives. A woeful example of this kind of scepticism is to be found in Broadhead's comments: first he suggests that the occupation of Psyttaleia could have been an aspect of the Persian strategy (without however elucidating that sensible point of view); then he gives credit to Aeschylus' testimony that the occupants belonged to the Persian elite and affirms that this circumstance presented 'such

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[7] The terms of Aeschylus *P.* 441–443: ψυχήν τ' ἄριστοι κεὐγένειαν ἐκπρεπεῖς correspond with those Herodotus employs in his characterization of the royal bodyguard of the Thousand: Περσέων οἱ ἄριστοί τε καὶ γενναιότατοι (7.41.1).

[8] Plutarch's account is deviant and very improbable: it dates the episode before the sea-battle and mentions elite survivors, among them three nephews of the king.

excellent dramatic material' that it was 'worthy of separate treatment, which would heighten the effect and deepen the impression'; but still assumes with How (1928, 336) 'that Aeschylus has exaggerated the importance of Aristides' exploit and has adorned the tale with some embellishment'; and finally comes to the lame conclusion that 'there seems to be no good ground for doubting that Persian troops [not such excellent dramatic material!] were landed on the island and were subsequently destroyed'.[9]

Doubt is also thrown on the elite status of the Persian soldiers by Edith Hall in her recent commentary on the *Persae* (at lines 441–443). She maintains that Aeschylus is construing throughout the play a 'status-conscious psyche', which he attributes to the barbarians, by introducing into his account 'details emphasizing the quality, rather than the quantity, of lives lost'. This interpretation, for which she does not give parallels, does not seem a very probable hypothesis: a drama which almost exclusively features royalty and high aristocracy can easily give that impression.

The historicity of Aeschylus' details is impugned from another side by those who like Hignett think that the poet 'wanted the hoplites to have their share in the glory of the Greek triumph'.[10] However, it has been justly pointed out by Suzanne Said that though hoplites were included in Aeschylus' Greek attackers the whole force was rather a motley crowd: at the beginning of the attack stones are thrown, then arrows are shot, and only then hoplites do their bloody work (1992/3, 53–69). Hall's assertion at *P.* 240 that 'Despite its focus on the naval encounter at Salamis, the play does give a degree of emphasis to the achievements of *the* hoplites and marines in the encounter of Psyttaleia' has no basis in Aeschylus' text.[11]

Of course, these interpretations of the peculiar details in Aeschylus' account of the Salamis operations would, if valid, lessen their employability for the reconstruction of the events. If, however, they are not valid, it becomes possible to take these details as essential historical evidence and to consider both the description of the action on Psyttaleia and that of the tunny catch (which, as far as I know, has been ignored by

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[9] Broadhead 1960, 331 in his Appendix on the battle of Salamis.

[10] Hignett 1963, 238; cf. Hall at *P.* 447–471: 'A. is certainly anxious not to overlook the contribution made by the infantry'.

[11] Hall 1996, 128 (my emphasis). Marines certainly are not mentioned by him, nor in Herodotus' version of the episode. The suggestion that they had a part in the affair is far-fetched.

modern critics) like the account of the sea-battle itself as following the events very closely. This is only to be expected: as Conacher has forcefully argued, the poet of contemporary history 'must present events in such a way that they are acceptable to those familiar with the actual happenings', for 'if the reader or member of the audience is so irritated by a distortion of events with which he is familiar that he cannot attend to the new event (what the poet makes of his historical material), then the poet has lost credibility in more senses than one'.[12] Aeschylus had to reckon with the susceptibilities of the thousands of eyewitnesses in his first audience, especially of those fighters who had been in the tunny catch and in the bloodbath on Psyttaleia.

All things considered one must indeed conclude that Aeschylus' details are in no way improbable and more of an enrichment of the record. His specification of the Greek landing force for instance and the way the attack developed compares favourably with Herodotus' meagre account of the action.[13] His report that the attack was begun by stone-throwers (to herd the Persian soldiers together), continued by archers (who had more chance to hit in a crowd) and finished by the heavily-armed (with a rush on the last survivors) is entirely convincing. The same can be said of his depiction of the Persian occupiers as aristocrats, for this is a detail that can be plausibly explained. The Persians no doubt expected the sea-battle to finish the campaign as a whole: the loss of the fleet would rob the Greeks of all further chances to resist, since the victorious Persian fleet would be able to turn all possible defensive positions. This meant that the operations around Salamis, including the landings, afforded the last opportunity for Persian soldiers to distinguish themselves in the presence of their king. The extreme desire 'to do some service before the eyes of the king' that led the second line of the Persian battle array to cause chaos in it by pushing forward too hard (8.89.2) must have been shared by all ranks, especially the (younger?) aristocrats in the army. In all probability these men were not employable as marines: therefore they will have clamoured for a part in the landings.

If Aeschylus' treatment of the action on Psyttaleia may be taken as trustworthy from the point of view of the historian (with the exception

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[12] Conacher 1974, 144.

[13] Herodotus' silence regarding the stone-throwers and archers may well be due to his informants. If these men were hoplites, they may well have omitted any mention of their humble fellow-fighters.

of Xerxes' reaction), there is the more reason to take the other distinc-
tive feature of his account of Salamis—the tunny catch—seriously, far
more seriously indeed than has been done so far. In my view Aeschylus'
description of this carnage is important evidence for the reconstruc-
tion of the battle because it illustrates the configuration in which the
two fleets finally confronted each other. Tunny fishers use very long
nets, one end having the form of a loop. This loop is the trap (called
'chamber of death'—*camera della morte*—in Italian technical jargon) into
which the fish are driven to be slaughtered with boathooks and such
gear.[14] Clearly the implication is that the Greek fleet somehow formed
such a chamber of death that enclosed a confused huddle of enemy
ships. However, in Aeschylus' account the Greek attack is notably not
directed at the enemy ships,[15] but against shipwrecked men. And what
is even more surprising, the attackers clearly are not the marines of the
Greek triremes: the weapons they used were broken oars and pieces of
wreckage. The marines of course had standard weapons and, posted
on the high decks of the trireme,[16] they would have needed unbroken
oars to hit an enemy in the water.[17] The attackers in other words were
irregular fighters who operated from boats with a low freeboard and
evidently set out without arms, so that they had to use any sizable piece
of wreckage that came in handy. Considering that the Athenian citizens
of military age must have been regularly mobilized practically without
exception and, insofar as they were not rowers, must have been armed
with standard weapons, I conclude that these fighters were men who
had remained outside the mobilization, i.e. mainly very young men
who had thus been forced to remain onlookers, and as soon as it was
clear that the gods definitely favoured the Greek cause took every boat
available and squeezed in between the triremes to claim their share of
the victory.

It is evident that neither episode in the hostilities Aeschylus com-
memorates was a weighty contribution to the Greek victory. It is also

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[14] See for ancient tunny-fishing the excellent treatment by Höppener (1931, 120ff.).

[15] As one would expect, since the losses in the battle are consistently described by
Herodotus as ships sunk (Aeschylus implies the same).

[16] In the reconstruction of the ancient trireme proposed by Morrison, Coates and
Rankov (2000, 198 fig. 56) the fighting deck is about two and a half metres above the
water.

[17] Broadhead has seen the problem (see his comments on *P.* 426–428), but in putting
the height of the trireme decks at 'some sixteen feet above the water-line' he mistakes
Mark Antony's big *polyereis* for fifth-century triremes.

evident that in Herodotus' time the fleet and the hoplites had become the sole instruments of that victory and this had shoved the other fighters to the margin and the tunny catch even over it. That Aeschylus on the contrary has chosen emphatically to evoke the memory of these minor feats asks for an explanation other than the possibility to read in his account an ideological or dramaturgical twist. To be sure, this is possible in the case of Psyttaleia, but only regarding Xerxes' reaction, not the warlike feat itself. My explanation is that Aeschylus had a personal bond of solidarity with the fighters concerned: as already hinted at, he may have been one of the hoplites mobilized on Salamis and among those stationed along the coast. These soldiers and other men as yet unarmed had been forced to stand by doing nothing during the long hours the battle raged. For these men the call of Aristides to do something about the occupiers of Psyttaleia must have come as a godsend and when at some (later?) moment it seemed possible to contribute to the discomfiture of the enemy fleet they jumped in, weapons or no weapons.

The way Herodotus reports and does not report their deeds suggests that their successes were soon treated as *quantité négligeable* by the men of the fleet and the hoplites. That being so, what would be more natural than that someone associated with them, even if not personally involved in their exploits, would want to preserve the glorious memory of them? In so doing, he would also set the record straight for later generations. I cannot pretend that my case is proven, but that Aeschylus did in fact do this is a real possibility and one that is, in my view, more likely than the interpretations offered so far. There is in any case every reason to take his version of the last act of Salamis very seriously indeed.

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DUBIOUS ADVICE: THE PAEDAGOGUS IN SOPHOCLES' *ELECTRA*

ANDRÉ P.M.H. LARDINOIS

There are few things dearer to the heart of Ton Kessels, the honorand of this volume, than teaching. Throughout his career he has emphasized the importance of teaching and propagated the positive influence a good teacher may have on his students. In Greek tragedy the teaching profession is represented, in several plays, by the figure of the paedagogus. This character, however, in keeping with the expectations of the genre, can also exert an evil influence on his pupils, quite opposite to Ton's ideal. In this short essay I would like to take a look at the Paedagogus in Sophocles' *Electra*. I will focus on the precedents for his character and on the three scenes in which he appears: his opening speech (*El.* 1–22) with Orestes' response, the false message he delivers to Electra and Clytaemnestra in the second episode, and his intervention in the fourth episode. I will argue that the ambiguity of his character mirrors that of the revenge he helps to enact.

If scholars agree about one thing, it is that there is no agreement about the interpretation of Sophocles' *Electra*. In 1951, Cedric Whitman professed that 'Sophocles' drama of *Electra* has always been the great enigma', and the last five decades have brought no solution to this enigma, as the assessment of a more recent critic, Leona Macleod, indicates: *Electra* is 'the most controversial and difficult to interpret' of all Sophoclean plays.[1] There are roughly speaking two interpretations of Sophocles' *Electra*: one is the so-called orthodox interpretation, which believes that Sophocles presents the killing of Clytaemnestra as unproblematic, and the other the ironic interpretation, which detects hints and ambiguities in the text that question the righteousness of the children's revenge.[2] The orthodox interpretation was the standard view

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[1] Whitman 1951, 152; Macleod 2001, 1. Cf. Kells 1973, 1: '[T]his play has caused the greatest difficulty to critics'; and Winnington-Ingram 1980, 217: 'The *Electra* of Sophocles might be thought to prove the impossibility of objective literary criticism: so diverse are the interpretations to which it has given rise'.

[2] For an overview of opinions about the play, see Kells 1973, 2–5; Buxton 1995, 29;

throughout the nineteenth and most of the twentieth century, but with the publication of two articles by Johansen (1964) and Segal (1966) and the commentary of Kells (1973), the tide seemed to change. In recent years, however, the orthodox view has made a strong comeback.[3] My reading of the character of the Paedagogus supports the second, ironic interpretation.

Hugh Lloyd-Jones and Nigel Wilson have compared the Paedagogus to Eumaeus and Philoetius in the *Odyssey*, because of the help he provides to his master.[4] The Paedagogus indeed stands in a long line of characters who help other, more prominent characters accomplish their goals. He plays, in this respect, the same part as Pylades in Aeschylus' or Euripides' tragedies: that of a steadfast friend. His servile status, however, may have reminded Sophocles' audience of another type of attendant, namely the evil adviser.[5] This type of helper is best represented by the nurse in Euripides' *Medea* or the old servant in the *Ion*; the latter one also advises his mistress to commit a murder that is morally questionable. I will argue that Sophocles portrays the Paedagogus simultaneously as a faithful servant and an evil adviser and that the uncertainty about his moral stance reflects the uncertainty over the righteousness of the matricide. Orestes describes the Paedagogus in his opening speech as 'noble' and 'well-bred' (23–25), but he also remarks that the Paedagogus 'has not lost his spirit in awesome circumstances' (ἐν τοῖσι δεινοῖς θυμὸν οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν, 26). The word δεινός is a notoriously ambiguous word in Sophocles' plays, describing the dual nature of the tragic hero or his situation as both 'terrible' and 'great'.[6] In this case it can refer to the years Orestes and his servant have spent in exile but also to the task at hand: the murder of Clytaemnestra, which the Paedagogus 'urges' (ὀτρύνεις, 28) his pupil to commit.

The interpretation of the role of the Paedagogus depends, of course, in large part on how one views the killing of Clytaemnestra. It has

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Harder 1995, 27 with notes (from whom I have borrowed the terms 'orthodox' and 'ironic'); Ringer 1998, 128–130; Lefèvre 2001, 149–155; and Macleod 2001, 4–20.

[3] For example, three studies published in 2001 have come out in favor of the orthodox view: Lefèvre 2001, March 2001 and Macleod 2001.

[4] Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990b, 44.

[5] In an earlier essay (Lardinois 2003) I have referred to this character type as the bad adviser, but 'evil adviser' is a better designation, because other characters may offer bad advice, but this adviser figure willfully misinforms his interlocutor. Representatives of this character type outside of tragedy are Eurylochus in *Odyssey* 12 and Mardonius in Herodotus' *Histories*.

[6] Knox 1964, 23–23; Oudemans & Lardinois 1987, 129–131.

been argued, for example by Burnett (1998), that Sophocles does not question the justice of the matricide in this play, but such a view can only be maintained by ignoring innumerable hints and ambiguities in the text,[7] as well as the Attic tradition of the Orestes legend,[8] not to mention the intrinsic horror of killing a mother. Some of these ambiguities are already present in the Paedagogus' opening speech. Segal (1981, 268), for example, has drawn attention to the ominous description of the house of Pelops as 'rich in disasters' (πολύφθορον, 10). This epithet can refer to the terrible killings that have happened in the past, such as the slaughter of Thyestes' children or the murder of Agamemnon, but also, at the same time, to the murders Orestes is about to commit. Craig Smith has pointed to the ambiguity of the word *kairos* in the last line of the Paedagogus' speech, where he tells Orestes that it is no longer *kairos* to hesitate (οὐκέτ' ὀκνεῖν καιρός, 22). The Paedagogus may use the word here in the sense of 'right moment' (Lloyd-Jones 1994, 169 translates with 'occasion'), but if the other meaning of the word ('right' or 'proper action') also applies, is more questionable.[9] Finally, there is something disconcerting about the Paedagogus' comment that he 'saved' Orestes (κἀξέσωσα) as avenger of his father (13–14). This is not the kind of 'saving' prudent characters in Greek tragedy typically speak about, for example Chrysothemis when she urges Electra to 'preserve' caution (993–994) and not to risk her life by trying to kill Aegisthus. Instead, the Paedagogus has 'saved' Orestes and raised him to kill his mother and her lover.[10]

Orestes does not help their cause when he continues his speech by commenting on the 'tricks' (δόλοισι) he will use to 'stealthily accomplish' (κλέψαι) the murders (37); the false report he will spread about his own death (59–66); the oath (ὅρκον) he would like the Paedagogus to

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[7] See esp. Winnington-Ingram 1980, 217–247; and Blundell 1989, 178–183 with earlier bibliography.

[8] Thus Burnett argues that '[n]o continuing chain of retaliations is predicted' (1998, 139). Even without such a prediction, however, an Athenian audience that had seen the *Oresteia* and commemorated the arrival of polluted Orestes in their city every year during the Anthesteria (Eur. *IT* 947–960, cf. Burkert 1983, 222, 231) would have expected it. Sophocles would have had to deny explicitly any further retaliations in order to counter such a strong expectation, but he does not; on the contrary, he included several lines that can easily be understood as referring to the punishment of Orestes, including 1497–1498, on which see Roberts 1988, 185–186.

[9] Smith 1990, 342.

[10] See also Beare 1927 and Segal 1966, 491–493 on the possibly sinister connotations of lines 17–19.

swear with this false report (47); and the 'benefit' (κέρδος) that justifies any spoken word (61).[11] Jenny March (2001, 138) has recently argued against Segal (1966, 510–511) that Orestes' trickery is not problematic, because it is condoned by Apollo and used in defense of his honor, but she does not take account of the fact that Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra are repeatedly condemned in the play for their use of *dolos* in the murder of Agamemnon (124, 197, 279).[12] Orestes is therefore shown to be no better than those whom he kills. The ambiguity of his situation is well illustrated by line 37, in which the tricks he will employ to accomplish the murders are balanced by the 'just hand' (χειρὸς ἐνδίκου) he will use in the process.[13]

The most remarkable aspect of Orestes' opening speech, however, is the lack of emotion it shows. Orestes has been described as 'detached, confident, remorseless, rational, lucid',[14]—in short, everything Electra is not. The contrast between the two siblings is marked by the different registers in which they speak in the prologue: Orestes and the Paedagogus speak in regular iambic trimeters, while Electra, starting with her cry in line 77, sings in lyric anapaests.[15] This contrast carries over into the long delayed recognition scene between brother and sister (1098–1325). First, while Electra holds the urn and still believes that Orestes is dead, she bursts into a few short anapaests (1160–1162), reminiscent of her lamenting in the prologue, and later, after Orestes reveals himself, she sings out her joy 'in the traditionally excited iambodochmiac meter' (Scott 1996, 165). Orestes, throughout this scene, continues to speak in iambic trimeters.[16] As Kamerbeek remarks: '[T]he

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[11] On these and other questionable comments by Orestes in the prologue, see Kirkwood [1958] 1994, 142 n. 33; Johansen 1964, 12; Segal 1966, 483, 491 and 510–511; Kells 1973, 6 and 81–86; Winnington-Ingram 1980, 236; Blundell 1989, 173; Smith 1990; Dunn 1998; and Ringer 1998, 137–142. Batchelder (1995, 30) argues for reading ὄγκον instead of ὅρκον in line 47; cf. Kells 1973, ad loc.

[12] Segal 1966, 511; and Horseley 1980, 21, who also notes that Apollo's approval of Orestes' deed is no guarantee that it will be considered just. Cf. Eur. *El.* 1246, 1302; *Or.* 28, 76, 162–164 and 417.

[13] Reiner 1998, 137. I follow here the text of Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990a. Alternatively, according to the reading of the manuscripts, Orestes refers not to his hand but to the murders as ἐνδίκους, which yields a similar ambiguity. For a defense of the manuscript reading, see Macleod 2001, 30 n. 23.

[14] Woodard 1965, 211, quoted with approval by Burnett 1998, 121 n. 4. Cf. Reinhardt [1947] 1979, 139; Kirkwood [1958] 1994, 142; Segal 1966, 513; and Burnett 1998, 120–121, who also comment on the stark contrast with Electra.

[15] See Kamerbeek 1974, 9; and Scott 1996, 154.

[16] Orestes sings or, more likely, recites two half-lines (1276 and 1280), which are part

elation is entirely on the part of Electra, Orestes' trimeters are expressive of restraint throughout'.[17]

It has been argued, for example by Burnett, that Orestes changes fundamentally in his encounter with his sister and displays a 'new intention, generated by a vital passion' (Burnett 1998, 131). She bases this interpretation on Orestes' response in lines 1174–1201 to Electra's lament over the urn: he seems truly upset (1174–1175) and says that he now has a better understanding of his troubles (1185).[18] Orestes also says that he 'pities' Electra (ἐποικτίρω, 1199) and feels pain over her sorrows (1201). If these are genuine emotions—and we are given little reason to doubt them—they are short lived.[19] Neither the tenor of his iambic replies nor the content of his speech following the recognition in lines 1223–1224 shows him to be very affectionate toward Electra, and, more importantly, his feelings of sympathy do not extend to his mother. When Clytaemnestra asks him to 'pity' her (οἴκτιρε, 1411), he does not respond. Another significant moment is when Orestes enters the palace to go and murder his mother and addresses his friend Pylades for the first and last time (1372–1375), just as his counterpart in Aeschylus' *Choephori* does (899). Unlike his Aeschylean counterpart, however, this Orestes expresses no hesitation about killing his mother. Pylades' singular address is almost certainly meant to recall the Aeschylean passage in order to contrast this cool-hearted son with his Aeschylean antecedent.[20]

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of the meter Electra sings at this point: see Winnington-Ingram 1980, 229 n. 43; Scott 1996, 165.

[17] Kamerbeek 1974, 16. Cf. Woodard 1964, 192: 'Orestes therefore meets Electra's joyous outpourings with cold detachment'.

[18] This line is usually taken to mean that Orestes identifies his own misery with Electra's, but it could also signal a recognition of his previous error (τῶν ἐμῶν κακῶν) when he told the Paedagogus in the prologue that it would not hurt if he faked his own death (59–61); cf. Kamerbeek 1974, 16.

[19] Cf. Winnington-Ingram 1980, 229–230; Blundell 1989, 174; Kitzinger 1991, 323–324. The only reason to doubt the genuineness of Orestes' emotions is that he waits so long before identifying himself: a total of fifty lines after he first declares himself to be disturbed (1174–1175). One may contrast Odysseus' more rapid response to his father's (mistaken) lamenting in *Od.* 24.315–320. Reinhardt [1947] 1979, 155 ascribes this delay to Sophocles' desire to create suspense.

[20] Cf. Blundell 1989, 175. She points out that in Euripides' *Electra* Orestes is even more reluctant to proceed with the murder. If this play antedates Sophocles' *Electra*, as seems to be the prevailing view these days, Sophocles' portrayal of Orestes as a ruthless killer would stand out even more sharply. On the relative dating of the two *Electra* plays, see Harder 1995, 15 with footnote 2. Add Bremer 1991, 328–329 and March 2001, 20–22.

Orestes is, however, not the only one to blame for his stunted emotional responses. The 'sinister Paedagogus', as Kells (1973, 11) calls him, seems to control his pupil's emotions from the beginning of the play. In the first four lines of the play, he tells Orestes that he can now see 'what you were always eager [to see]' (ὧν πρόθυμος ἦσθ' ἀεί, 3), namely ancient Argos, 'which you longed for' (οὑπόθεις, 4). Even if these words are meant to describe his real emotions and are not subtle directions in what Orestes *should* feel, the Paedagogus must have taught him this desire for places which he has never seen (Kitzinger 1991, 303). It is not the case, then, that Orestes does not feel any emotions, but his emotions are directed at the stone structures of Argos, not the people who live in them. At the end of the scene, Orestes and the Paedagogus hear Electra cry (77–79). Orestes asks if they should stay and listen (80–81), a turn of events that could have lead to an early recognition scene as in Aeschylus' *Choephori* (Reiner 1998, 143). The Paedagogus counsels against it, however, and instead urges Orestes not to delay but to stay focused on the business at hand (82–85). As Winnington-Ingram remarks: 'If we accept the traditional attribution of lines 80f. to Orestes and 82–85 to the Paedagogus, we must say that it is the latter who refuses to allow the former to respond to human feelings'.[21]

The Paedagogus' interruption of the recognition scene in the fourth *epeisodion* (1326–1338) has much the same effect: he scolds Orestes and Electra for wasting their time with long speeches and with 'these insatiable cries of joy' (τῆς ἀπλήστου τῆσδε σὺν χαρᾷ βοῆς, 1336), a not so subtle dig at Electra's emotional reaction to her brother's unexpected appearance. He could have shown her a little more consideration, given that it was, after all, his false report that initially convinced her of Orestes' death. Similarly, when Electra, recognizing in him the old slave to whom she had entrusted Orestes, bursts out in joy and hails him as her 'father' (1361), the Paedagogus interrupts her by saying: 'I think that is enough … now it is time to act, now Clytaemnestra is alone' (1364–1368). No emotions, either those of Orestes or of Electra, are allowed to interfere with the business at hand.

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[21] Winnington-Ingram 1980, 229 n. 40. There is no reason to follow Sandbach's suggestion (1977), which won the support of Winnington-Ingram (o.c.), to attribute lines 80–81 to the Paedagogus and 82–85 to Orestes: see Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990b, 44. The lines are perfectly appropriate to the Paedagogus (cf. his earlier emphasis on action in line 22 and again in 1368).

In this scene (1326–1371), the Paedagogus again plays the role of adviser, now to both Orestes and Electra. He calls them to reason (1330, 1370), after accusing them both of being senseless (1326, 1328), and, just as in the prologue, he urges action (1368). He also provides Orestes with information about the situation inside the palace, but suppresses an important detail: when Orestes asks if the people in the palace were pleased to hear about his (false) death, the Paedagogus conceals the fact that his mother was initially despondent; instead, he says to Orestes that 'all is well with them now, even what is not well' (ὡς δὲ νῦν ἔχει / καλῶς τὰ κείνων πάντα, καὶ τὰ μὴ καλῶς, 1344–1345). This is a highly ambiguous phrase that may signal again to an attentive audience that all is not well with this planned murder of a mother.[22]

Electra is willing to listen to the Paedagogus because she has found him to be 'trustworthy' (πιστόν, 1352) in the past. Earlier, in the prologue, Orestes had compared him to a 'noble' (ἐσθλός) and 'well-bred' (εὐγενής) horse (24–25). These are qualities that Chrysothemis, according to Electra, lacks: in their first encounter, Electra accuses Chrysothemis of being 'bad' (κακή) and no longer the child 'of the noblest father' (πατρὸς / πάντων ἀρίστου), because she betrayed her family (365–368). It is one of the bitter ironies of this play that Electra is not willing to listen to the perhaps overly cautious but well-intentioned advice of her sister, who cares for her (1036), but instead puts her trust in a cold-hearted servant, who counsels her and Orestes on how to kill their mother. She should have learned not to trust him when he first brought her 'trustworthy proof' (πίστ' … τεκμήρια) of Orestes death.[23]

The messenger speech, delivered by the Paedagogus in lines 660 and following, has been much commented on,[24] and rightly so: it is the only messenger speech in extent tragedy that is a lie. It fulfills the demand Orestes laid on the Paedagogus in the prologue to tell the tale of how he died in the Pythian games. The Paedagogus, however, spins the tale

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[22] Blundell 1989, 176 n. 102 with reference to Sheppard 1927, 8 and Kirkwood [1958] 1994, 241 n. 22. Kells 1973, 213 argues that the phrase 'even what is not well' refers to Clytaemnestra's being 'grief-stricken for Orestes' and that the Paedagogus tries to keep from Orestes 'the reality' of his mother. This is probably an exaggeration: Clytaemnestra quickly recovers from the initial shock of Orestes' death and ultimately rejoices in his death. Still, it is significant that Clytaemnestra is allowed to show some feelings for Orestes, but that he is not allowed to hear about them, let alone to reciprocate.

[23] Soph. *El* 774. On this phrase and its reference to the Paedagogus' (false) messenger speech, see de Jong 1994.

[24] See most recently Macleod 2001, 112–127 with extensive bibliography.

much longer than Orestes demanded of him and its effect on Electra is 'cruel' and 'appalling': she is devastated by the news.[25] This messenger speech is filled again with ambiguities, primarily at the expense of Clytaemnestra but some of them cloud Orestes' enterprise as well. The Paedagogus starts by telling that he brings word from a *philos* man (φί-λου παρ' ἀνδρός, 667), whom he subsequently identifies as a guestfriend of Clytaemnestra and Aegisthus (670), but in reality his message comes of course from a *philos* in the sense of kinsman, both to Clytaemnestra and to Electra. Halfway the speech, before narrating the death of Orestes, the Paedagogus declares that 'when one of the gods does harm, not even a mighty man can escape' (ὅταν δέ τις θεῶν / βλάπτῃ, δύναιτ' ἂν οὐδ' ἂν ἰσχύων φυγεῖν, 696–697). He ostensibly applies this gnomic saying to the (fictitious) death of Orestes and may very well intend it to apply to Clytaemnestra as well (Macleod 2001, 118). But it pertains to Orestes in a deeper and non-fictitious way as well: he is harmed by the god Apollo, who ordered him to kill his own mother. Orestes himself raises doubt about the justice of the oracle when he tells Electra after Clytaemnestra's murder that 'all in the house is well, *if* Apollo prophesied well' (ἐν δόμοισι μὲν / καλῶς, Ἀπόλλων εἰ καλῶς ἐθέσπισεν, 1424–1425).[26] The role of the Paedagogus is an extension of Apollo's oracle: both urge Orestes to kill his mother without considering the full implications of this act or its consequences for Orestes.

Conclusion

In the previous paragraphs I have considered the role played by the Paedagogus in Sophocles' *Electra* and examined Orestes' reaction to his words. I have emphasized the darker aspects of their speeches and behavior in order to show that through the dubious advice of the Paedagogus the killing of Clytaemnestra is problematized in the play. The characters of Orestes and the Paedagogus are, however, not entirely without merit or without their own tragic dimensions. As Segal remarks with regard to Orestes' situation:

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[25] Reinhardt [1947] 1979, 151; Bowra 1944, 248.

[26] The emphasis is mine and not necessarily that of the actor playing Orestes, but Orestes' use of the conditional conjunction εἰ in this line raises questions about the righteousness of the oracle, even if he does not intend it that way: see Segal 1981, 463 n. 34 with earlier references; Winnington-Ingram 1980, 234–235 n. 60; Blundell 1989, 183; and Ringer 1998, 202. March 2001, 224 disagrees.

'For Orestes too there is a tragic "necessity" (see his ἀναγκαίας τύχης, 48) enforced upon him by the given character of the world into which he has come and in which he must act. For him the god-commanded duty to restore justice by lying and deceit (*doloisi klepsai*, 37) is the equivalent of the death-in-life inversion which Electra lives out'.[27]

Segal means by 'the death-in-life inversion' of Electra that 'she exists in a world where life, both physical and moral, has become death' (1966, 483). The same holds true, to a certain extent, for the Paedagogus: he does not face the prospect of having to kill his own mother, but his loyalty to his masters (both Orestes and Agamemnon) is tested in an endeavor that is inherently ambiguous. By suppressing, deliberately or not, the full meaning of his words and curtailing the emotional responses of both Orestes and Electra he shows the extreme to which he is willing to go. But he also helps Orestes to avenge his father and it could be argued—though he never makes the case—that suppressing the children's emotional responses is the only sure way to get them to kill their mother. Ultimately, the Paedagogus is caught, just like Electra or Orestes, 'in awesome circumstances' (ἐν τοῖσι δεινοῖς, 26).

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[27] Segal 1966, 484.

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FUTURE EXPECTATIONS IN SOPHOCLES

Gerry Wakker

'The future is not ours to see'. This line from a famous song of Doris Day expresses a feeling that is very wide spread. It is often found in Ancient Greek as well, also in the author that will be studied in this paper, Sophocles. An example is (1):

(1) πρὶν ἰδεῖν δ' οὐδεὶς μάντις
τῶν μελλόντων ὅ τι πράξει.

('but before he sees, no one is a presager of the things to come, how he will fare', Soph. *Aj.* 1419–1420)[1]

True as this saying may be, language users nevertheless make claims about the future. As to Ancient Greek all grammars and handbooks agree that the Greek future is not the only expression of the future time. There exist other expressions as well, among which μέλλω + infinitive is most often mentioned.[2] Compare, for instance, (2a) a sentence with μέλλω + infinitive with (2b)-(2c) which contain the future indicative:

(2a) **μέλλουσι** γάρ σ', εἰ τῶνδε μὴ λήξεις γόων,
ἐνταῦθα **πέμψειν** ἔνθα μήποθ' ἡλίου
φέγγος προσόψῃ

('For, if you don't stop these laments, they intend to send you there where you will never see the light of the sun', Soph. *El.* 379–381)

(2b) … ἀλλὰ καὶ σὲ δεῖ
στείχειν ἅμ' αὐτοῖς, ἢ βίᾳ **στελοῦσί** σε

('but you must also come along with it [i.e. your bow], or they will bring you by force', Soph. *Phil.* 982–983)[3]

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[1] Generally speaking, when no explicit reference is made to the source of my translations, the translations are mine. The text edition used is the edition in the Oxford Classical Texts Series of Lloyd-Jones & Wilson 1990 unless otherwise stated.

[2] Chantraine 1963, 307–309; Duhoux 2000, 161–163; Gildersleeve 1900., 94–95, 118–120; Goodwin 1889, 20–21; Humbert 1960, 154; Kühner-Gerth 1904, I.177–179; Magnien 1912, 99–119; Moorhouse 1982, 209; Rijksbaron 2002, 34–35 n. 3; Schwyzer-Debrunner 1950, I 811, II 291, 293; Stahl 1907, 147.

[3] Unfortunately, there are no examples of 3 plur. πέμψουσι in Sophocles. However, στελοῦσι may semantically and syntactically be considered comparable with πέμψουσι vs. μέλλουσι πέμψειν.

(2c) Πάριν μέν, ὃς τῶνδ’ αἴτιος κακῶν ἔφυ,
      τόξοισι τοῖς ἐμοῖσι **νοσφιεῖς** βίου,
      πέρσεις τε Τροίαν, σκῦλά τ’ εἰς μέλαθρα σὰ
      πέμψεις

('You will kill Paris, the author of these ills, with my bow, and you will sack Troy, and you will send the spoils to your home', Soph *Phil.* 1426–1429)

The claim has been made that in the classical period μέλλω is a *future auxiliary*. Thus Ruijgh argues (Ruijgh 1985, 324): 'le verbe sert exclusivement d'auxiliaire du futur (relatif)', and Basset 1979, 12 (cf. also 217–230) seems to say more or less the same: μέλλω + infinitive is, in his opinion, a periphrastic construction 'qui ne fonctionne que comme variante possible du futur normal en—σω.' This is said to hold notably for the (aspectually) neutral expression μέλλω with future infinitive (cf. 2a). At least two questions now arise:

1. May this periphrastic expression (μέλλω + infinitive) indeed be characterised as a periphrastic future, i.e. may μέλλω be characterised as a future auxiliary, or not?
2. What are the semantic and/or pragmatic differences between this expression and the synthetic Greek future?

In my paper I will try to answer these questions for Sophocles, in the hope that the answers will help us to better understand what Sophocles wants to convey. In another study (Wakker 2006) I have investigated these questions for the use of μέλλω in Plato.[4] The use of μέλλω in Plato and Sophocles, however, seems to be slightly different. First, in Plato 40 % of the examples belongs to the type: δεῖ q, εἰ μέλλει p ('q must be, if p is to be', cf. 3), whereas this type does not exist at all in Sophocles:

(3) ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν
      μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, **εἰ μέλλει** τις φρόνιμος **ἔσεσθαι**, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ αὖ δυνατὸν
      ἀμφότερα, **εἴ** τις αὖ **μέλλει** καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς **μεθέξειν**

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[4] In a nutshell, my conclusion was that μέλλω in Plato may be characterised as a *semi-auxiliary* which expresses *modal* notions (i.e. likelihood: 'to intend, to be intended to, to be about to') about the future realisation of a State of Affairs. There is in principle a semantic opposition with the simple future, the latter expressing, in a factual way, that a State of Affairs will be the case or will be realised at some future moment. Only in those cases where there is no opposition with the simple future because the future stem cannot be used in those circumstances, μέλλω may be characterised as a *semi-auxiliary* of the (relative) *future*.

('For it is impossible to learn the serious without the comic, or any one
of a pair of contraries without the other, if one is to be a wise man; but
to put both into practice is equally impossible if one is to share in even a
small measure of virtue', Pl. *Leg.* 816e1–3)

Second, μέλλω with the interpretation 'to delay' occurs much more
frequently in Sophocles (13 examples = 30% of all examples) than in
Plato (only 3 of 499 examples[5] = 0.6%). One may wonder whether
these differences in frequency correspond with a shift in function or
meaning, or whether they are purely accidental.

For these reasons I will study the 43 Sophoclean examples in detail.
I will first speak about the criteria for auxiliarisation in general (section
1), and then discuss the verb class to which μέλλω belongs (section 2)
and the semantic/pragmatic differences with the simple future (section
3), and I will finally present my conclusions (section 4).

1. *Criteria for auxiliarisation in general*

The definition of what is meant by 'auxiliary' is by no means uniform
and consistent. Criteria that are generally used in Indo-European lin-
guistics, such as the principle that the auxiliary is the only inflected
form, appear not to apply to all languages; in other language families
clitics, for instance, seem to function as auxiliaries as well (Ramat 1987,
3–7). Looking to Indo-European languages only, however, auxiliaries
are mostly defined more or less in the following way. An auxiliary verb
is defined as

(4) 'une forme verbale soumise à une contrainte morphologique, formant
avec une autre forme verbale lexicalement libre qu'elle régit une péri-
phrase dans laquelle les deux termes perdent leur autonomie. La forme
régissante, appelée auxiliant, porte l'information grammaticale, alors que
la forme régie, appelée l'auxilié, porte le contenu sémantique de l'ensem-
ble' (Létoublon 1984, 27).

From a grammatical point of view, then, auxiliaries lose the status of
an independent verb and form a unity with the dependent verb form,
the complement. As a consequence auxiliaries have some formal, syn-
tactic features in common. Some of them seem to be very language-
specific (such as the fact that auxiliaries in English may be negated or

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[5] Pl. *Hp. Mai.* 297e4 (elliptical), *Leg.* 712b3, 887c6.

put into a question without the support of the verb 'to do'),[6] others seem more general. In the literature the following auxiliary features are presented as holding generally in Indo-European languages. I will illustrate them where needed by English examples, and use them in the following sections to study μέλλω + infinitive. For the sake of comparison the auxiliary properties are contrasted with those of autonomous verbs.

(5) Features of auxiliary and autonomous verbs

Auxiliary verb with infinitive/participle	*Autonomous Verb (with infinitive)*
Semantic feature	*Semantic feature*
1. Expresses relations of tense, mood, aspect or voice	1. Semantic meaning of its own
2. no synonyms or substitutes (e.g. *he will go*)	2. (often) existence of synonyms or substitutes (e.g. *he hopes/wishes to go*)
Formal features	*Formal features*
1. paradigm is often defective (e.g. *can, will*)	1. Complete paradigm (e.g. *hope to, wish to*)
2. complement is – restricted in form (inf. or ptc.) – (in principle) obligatory (e.g. *he should see; *he should*) – not replaceable by e.g. anaphoric reference (e.g. **he can go home, but she cannot *it*)	2. complement is – not necessarily an inf./ptc. (*he hopes for peace/ he hopes to go home soon*) – may be replaced by e.g. anaphoric reference (*he wants to go home now, but she doesn't want* **it**)
3. auxiliary and complement share the same subject	3. verb and complement may have different subjects (e.g. **he** hopes **she** will go home now)
4. not the auxiliary, but the complement may impose semantic restrictions on the subject (*she will walk to town, *the house will walk to town*)	4. both verbal forms may impose semantic restrictions on their own subjects

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[6] Quirk et al. 1985, 121–127.

5. no restrictions on the dependent inf./ptc (*I will come, I will become ill, I will be hit*)

5. sometimes there are semantic restrictions on the complement (*to be able to + controllable inf.: I am able to come; *I am able to be hit*)

6. only the auxiliary may be negated (*I haven't done it, *I have done not it*)

6. both main verb and complement may be negated (*I didn't wish (not) to go there*)

7. usually adverbials are placed in a position where they relate to the verbal complex as a whole (*today I will go to the city; I will go to the city today; *I will today go to the city; he will often read a book*)

7. usually adverbials may be placed with the main verb or with the complement (*he often hopes to read a book; he hopes to often read a book*)

What all these features show is the fact that the periphrastic expression with an auxiliary forms a new unity with a meaning of its own (different from the sum of the meanings of its components).[7] All auxiliaries share the characteristic that they function as a modifying element of the complement verb form. As to their meaning we can discern auxiliaries expressing notions of mood (English *can, could*), tense (English *will*, French *avoir*), aspect (French *je viens d'arriver*), or voice (German *werden*, French *être*).[8] Of course, the distinction between auxiliary and independent verbs is not clear-cut; there are transitional groups and boundary cases. Therefore, often more refined distinctions are made. Thus, for French, it is customary to discern pure auxiliaries (*avoir* and *être*) from semi-auxiliaries with infinitive (*aller*).[9] English verbs are commonly said to be either modal verbs (always functioning as auxiliaries), full verbs (always functioning as main verbs) or primary verbs (i.e. the verbs *be, have, do*, functioning either as auxiliaries or as main verbs).[10] Sometimes an even more refined classification of verbs combined with non-finite clauses is presented:

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[7] It is exactly this characteristic by which they differ from other analytic verbal constructions, of which the meaning is the sum of the meanings of their constituents, cf. Olbertz 1989, 2.

[8] Basset 1979, 213; Greenbaum 1996, 278; Grevisse 1986, 1217; Létoublon 1984, 27–28; Luraghi 1998, 299–304; Ramat 1987, 3–19; Rutten 1991.

[9] Grevisse 1986, 1217, 1230–1231; Létoublon 1984, 37–39.

[10] Quirk et al. 1985, 64, 120–121; Greenbaum 1996, 153.

Classes of English verbs combined with non-finite clauses[11]

  – modals, e.g. *can, could, will; dare, ought to, used to*
  – modal idioms, e.g. *had better, be to*
  – semi-auxiliaries, e.g. *have to, be about to, be going to*
  – catenatives,[12] e.g. *appear to, happen to, seem to*
  – full verbs+non-finite clauses, e.g. *hope to+infinitive, begin+-ing*

Let us now turn to Sophoclean μέλλω, and try to answer the question to which verb class they belong, making use of the criteria mentioned in (5).

2. *μέλλω with infinitive: auxiliary or not?*

When we compare μέλλω+infinitive[13] with the *formal* features described above, it is easy to see that it has at least some of the formal features in common with pure auxiliaries:

Feature 1 (defectiveness): μέλλω is indeed defective. It is used in the present stem and the active voice only.[14]

Feature 2 (the infinitive is obligatory): of the 43 examples found with the help of the index of Ellendt and in the digital *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* (TLG) 21 examples (= 49%) are not combined with an infinitive. This

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[11] Quirk et al. 1985, 127–137; Westney 1995, 17.

[12] The term catenative alludes to the ability of these verbs to be concatenated in sequences of non-finite constructions, e.g. 'our team seems to manage to keep on getting beaten' (Quirk et al. 1985, 147). This term is, however, neither very felicitous nor very distinctive, since also semi-auxiliaries and main verbs followed by non-finite clauses may occur in such chain-like structures.

[13] For lack of space I will not extensively discuss the question about the factors determining the choice between present, aorist and future infinitive. On a whole, I agree with Ruijgh's description (1985, 328): a present infinitive denotes the immediate future (*to be about to*, inceptive interpretation) or it is continuative or of an iterative/general nature (type: ὀρθοῖς ἔμελλον ὄμμασιν τούτους ὁρᾶν; 'was I likely to see them with straight eyes?', Soph. *OT* 1385); a future infinitive lacks the notion of immediateness and denotes, in a neutral way, *I am intended to, it is likely that I will*; an aorist infinitive denotes, in a marked way: *ever, one unforeseeable day*, implying in most cases *never*. One can say, then, that if a speaker wants to express aspectual distinctions about the future time, he has to use μέλλω with an infinitive, rather than the simple future tense, the latter lacking any aspectual notion.

[14] There is one much disputed example with a passive present indicative, *OC* 219, for which see (10).

might seem to be a counter-argument against the claim that μέλλω is an
auxiliary. However, this infinitive can clearly be understood out of the
context.[15] Examples can be seen both in isolated cases like (6), where
εἶναι is easily supplied, and in more idiomatic expressions like (7a–b),
where ἔσεσθαι may easily be supplied:

(6) ΝΕ. Οὐκ εἶδον αὐτόν, ᾐσθόμην δ' ἔτ' ὄντα νιν.
    ΦΙ. Ἔμελλ' ἦ ἐπεὶ οὐδέν πω κακόν γ' ἀπώλετο

    ('Ne.: I haven't seen him, but I perceived that he was still there. Phil.:
    He had to be there; for nothing evil has ever perished', Soph. *Phil.* 445–
    446)[16]

(7a) Ἦ πᾶσ' ἀνάγκη τήνδε τὴν στέγην ἰδεῖν
     τά τ' ὄντα καὶ μέλλοντα Πελοπιδῶν κακά;

     ('Is it absolutely necessary that this dwelling sees all woes of Pelops' line,
     the existing ones and those to come?', Soph. *El.* 1497–1498)

(7b) ὡς ἔμοιγ' ὁ μέλλων βίος οὐ βιωτός.

     ([May I die.] 'For I cannot live the life that is to come [or: that must be
     mine (translation Jebb)]', Soph. *OC* 1691)[17]

A special category is constituted by the examples with μέλλω inter-
preted as 'to delay', cf. (8)

(8) ΞΟ. Καὶ δή σ' ἐρωτῶ. Τοῦ κασιγνήτου τί φής,
    ἥξοντος ἢ μέλλοντος; εἰδέναι θέλω.

    ('And see, I ask you. What do you say of my brother? That he will come
    or that he is delaying (sc. ἥξειν)? I want to know', Soph. *El.* 317–318)

The sense 'to delay', 'put off', may be explained out of a continuative-
iterative interpretation of μέλλω: 'to be always going to do' (without
ever doing it), implying: 'to delay',[18] as is illustrated by:

(9) μέλλων γὰρ αἰεὶ δρᾶν τι τὰς οὔσας τέ μου
    καὶ τὰς ἀπούσας ἐλπίδας διέφθορεν.

    ('For always being about to do something [but not doing it, i.e. always
    delaying to do something] he has ruined every hope that I could con-
    ceive', Soph. *El.* 305–306)

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[15] Cf. LSJ s.v. μέλλω; Ruijgh 1985, 326.

[16] Cf. Jebb ad loc.: 'it was his due'; and Kamerbeek ad loc.: 'He would'.

[17] In total, there are 8 cases of substantivised or adjectivally placed participles
referring to the future. In contrast to the situation in Plato, an infinitive is never added
(Plato 15 ex. with inf., 52 without inf.). The Sophoclean examples are: *Aj.* 1420 (= 1);
Ant. 361, 611, 1334; *El.* 1498 (= 7a); *OC* 1691 (= 7b); *Phil.* 1254; *Trach.* 1270.

[18] Cf. LSJ *s.v.*, Basset 1979, 13–14; Ruijgh 1985, 328.

As pointed out above in the introduction, this use of μέλλω is much more frequent in Sophocles (30% of the examples)[19] than in Plato (0,6%) and most examples in Sophocles (9 of the 13) are elliptical. Moreover, there are two examples with a remarkable syntax:

(10a) Μακρὰ μέλλεται· ἀλλὰ τάχυνε.

('the delay is long; come, hurry on', Soph. *OC* 219)

(10b) Τί δῆτα μέλλει μὴ οὐ παρουσίαν ἔχειν;

('why then is his coming delayed?', Soph. *Aj.* 540)

In (10a) the situation is as follows: Oedipus and Antigone have just been speaking together and now the chorus speaks these words. The manuscripts have μακρὰ μέλλετ᾽, ἀλλὰ ταχύνατε, Hermann has proposed to read μέλλετον, the chorus thus addressing both Oedipus and Antigone. Elmsley has proposed the correction τάχυνε, the chorus addressing Oedipus only. Another possibility is the rather unique μέλλεται, accepted by the OCT of Lloyd-Jones and Wilson. Since in Sophocles the use of μέλλω 'to delay' seems to differ also in other respects from μέλλω 'it is likely that I will, etc.', this seems to me acceptable.

(10b) is Ajax' reaction to Tecmessa's information that his son is close by, in charge of servants. Here τί μέλλει expresses a negative idea, the expression being equivalent to μὴ μελλέτω. As with other verbs expressing a negative idea, such as οὐκ ἀπέχομαι, the dependent infinitive is marked by μὴ οὐ, cf. e.g. Aesch. *PV.* 627, Eur. *Tro.* 797, Ar. *Ach.* 320. These peculiarities (infinitive frequently omitted, possible use of the passive voice, infinitive with μὴ οὐ) lead to the conclusion that μέλλω 'to delay' is developing into an autonomous verb and is losing the typical characteristics of auxiliaries. All in all, although in the case of μέλλω 'to delay' the infinitive tends to be omitted, we may conclude that the infinitive is the only possible complement and that it cannot be omitted except in some well-defined circumstances, when it can easily be understood out of the context.

Feature 3 (same subjects): μέλλω and infinitive always share the same subject, as all examples in this paper show.

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[19] *Aj.* 540 (= 10b); *Ant.* 499, *El.* 305 (= 9), 318 (= 8), 1337; *OC* 219 (= 10a), 1074, 1627; *OT* 678; *Phil.* 567, 1256, 1449; *Trach.* 75.

Feature 4 (no restrictions on the choice of the subject): μέλλω may have all kinds of subject the infinitive allows for. Thus we find persons (see (6)), concrete objects as in (11) and abstract notions such as κακά in (7a) as subject:

(11) οὐ δραπέτην τὸν κλῆρον ἐς μέσον καθείς,
      ὑγρᾶς ἀρούρας βῶλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὃς εὐλόφου
      κυνῆς ἔμελλε πρῶτος ἅλμα κουφιεῖν;

      ([Ajax confronted Hector in a single fight, by right of a ballot] 'casting in a lot which was not one to skulk behind, no lump of moist earth, but one that would be the first to leap lightly from the crested helm', *Aj.* 1285–287)

Feature 5 (no restrictions on the infinitive): Both controllable and uncontrollable infinitives are found (cf. 11 for an uncontrollable one). All infinitives, though, are active, but this seems purely accidental, since in elliptical cases a passive infinitive has to be understood in (12):

(12) ἄγομαι δὴ 'γὼ κοὐκέτι μέλλω.

      ('I am led away and I am no longer about to be led away', Soph. *Ant.* 939)

Moreover, we find infinitives in all tenses (present, aorist and future infinitives, cf. note 13), though the two aorist examples are sometimes considered dubious.[20]

We can say, then, that μέλλω behaves for the main part as an auxiliary with regard to the formal features 1–5. This holds for all uses of μέλλω except for μέλλω 'to delay', which seems to be developing into an autonomous verb. As to the features 6–7, μέλλω in all its senses seems to behave slightly different from full auxiliaries, as I will show now.

Feature 6 (position of the negation): In 11 examples (= 25,6%) a negation is found. In 9 cases the negation clearly belongs to μέλλω, cf. (12) above.[21] Ruijgh (1985, 326) even argues that the negation is always

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[20] In *Aj.* 1027 the manuscripts read ἔμελλέ σ᾽ Ἕκτωρ … ἀποφθίσειν (future). This has often been replaced by ἀποφθίσαι (epic reminiscence). This seems, however, unnecessary, given *Aj.* 925; *Ph.* 1083, where ἔμελλες/ἔμελλον 'you were to/I was to' is also found with a future infinitive. In *OT* 967 the manuscripts read ἐγὼ κτανεῖν ἔμελλον πατέρα τὸν ἐμόν. This is often altered in κτενεῖν. The question is whether it is necessary to do so: μέλλω in this sense is often found with an aorist infinitive in Homer and the connotation 'never' which is often conveyed by the aorist infinitive is fully adequate in this context.

[21] Cf. also *Ant.* 448, 458; *El.* 538; *Phil.* 483, 567, 1083, 1256, 1449.

placed before μέλλειν, but this statement must be refined. There are two examples in which the negation belongs to the infinitive, or at least to a part of the infinitival complement, as is shown by (13a–b). In (13a) μηδὲν clearly belongs to δίκαιον (ποεῖν), in (13b) μὴ οὐ belongs to ἔχειν.

(13a) Ἔξοιδα γάρ νιν παντὸς ἂν λόγου κακοῦ
γλώσσῃ θιγόντα καὶ πανουργίας ἀφ᾽ ἧς
μηδὲν δίκαιον ἐς τέλος μέλλοι ποεῖν.

('For I know that he would lend his tongue to every base word and villainy, if thereby he would finish to do something dishonest', Soph. *Phil.* 407–409)

(13b) = (10b) Τί δῆτα μέλλει **μὴ οὐ** παρουσίαν **ἔχειν**;

('Then wherefore is his coming delayed?', Soph. *Aj.* 540)

Feature 7: Adverbials of time/place, although there are only few examples, are also found with the infinitive (at least the examples may be interpreted in this way), not with μέλλω alone, cf. (11), where πρῶτος seems to be connected with ἅλμα κουφιεῖν rather than with ἔμελλε. Likewise in (14) χρόνῳ is to be taken with ἐξανύσειν:

(14) Ἔμελλες, τάλας, ἔμελλες **χρόνῳ**
στερεόφρων ἄρ᾽ **ἐξανύσσειν** κακὰν
μοῖραν ἀπειρεσίων πόνων

('You were fated, hapless, you were fated, then, with that unbending soul at last to work out an evil doom of woes untold', Soph. *Aj.* 925–927)

A factor usually not discussed in general literature is the word order, notably the possibility to separate μέλλω from its complement. In many languages auxiliaries cannot be separated from their complements. As to μέλλω this rule obviously does not hold true. In 90 % of the cases with an explicit infinitive the infinitive follows μέλλω, but μέλλω and the infinitive may be separated by one or more words, cf. e.g. (15a). In 10 % of the examples the word order is reversed, cf. (15b).

(15a) Τούτων ἐγὼ **οὐκ ἔμελλον**, ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς
φρόνημα δείσασ᾽, ἐν θεοῖσι τὴν δίκην
δώσειν

('I was not through dread of any human pride to be punished in the midst of the gods for these', Soph. *Ant.* 458–460)[22]

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[22] Cf. *Aj.* 540, 925, 1027, 1287; *El* 305, 360, 379, 538; *OT* 1385, *Phil.* 483, 1083; *Trach.* 756.

(15b) εἰ ζῶν Ἀχιλλεὺς τῶν ὅπλων τῶν ὦν πέρι
       κρίνειν ἔμελλε κράτος ἀριστείας τινί,
       οὐκ ἄν τις αὔτ᾽ ἔμαρψεν ἄλλος ἀντ᾽ ἐμοῦ.

   ('If Achilles lived and had been called to decree the first place in valour
   to any claimant of his arms, no one would have grasped them before
   me', Soph. *Aj.* 442–444)[23]

Features 6 and 7 and the relatively free word order bring me to the
conclusion that μέλλω in all its senses is not a full auxiliary like English
will, can etc, since it doesn't form a complete and inseparable unity with
the infinitive. However, since in its primary sense 'it is likely that I will,
etc.' it has many features in common with full auxiliaries, it may, in my
opinion, be characterised as a semi-auxiliary. The only real exception
is μέλλω meaning 'to delay'. This meaning seems to be on the verge of
developing into an autonomous verb of its own.

3. *Semantic/pragmatic differences with the simple future*[24]

Let us now turn from the formal features to the semantic features and
to the question whether μέλλω expresses modal or temporal, i.e. future,
notions. As pointed out in the introduction, Ruijgh (1985, 324) and Bas-
set (1979, 12, cf. also 217–230) argue that μέλλω expresses *future* notions
especially when combined with the future infinitive. With other scholars
I assume the general meaning of post-Homeric μέλλω to be: 'it is likely
that I will', more specifically 'I intend to', 'I am intended to', 'I am
going to', i.e. μέλλω expresses *future* realisation of *present* (or, with ἔμελ-
λον, *past*) intention or arrangement (cf. Rijksbaron 2002, 35). It inher-
ently unites, then, two different semantic notions: present intention or
arrangement and (relatively) future realisation. Of course, one of the
reasons to explicitly indicate that present *intention* or *arrangement* for the
future realisation of a State of Affairs (SoA) is expressed, is the fact

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[23] Cf. *OT* 967; *El.* 1486, the infinitives are placed before μέλλω because they provide
more salient information than μέλλω in the context in question. For the factor saliency
in Greek word order, see Dik 1997, Bakker 2005.

[24] It is a vexed question whether the future tense has a temporal or a modal value.
It is my view that the Greek future has a purely temporal value (the State of Affairs
will be realised in the future). Since, however, 'fact' and 'future' are, strictly speaking,
not compatible, the future tense is often, depending on the context and situation,
interpreted in a modal way. See for this view, e.g. Bakker 2000; Rijksbaron 2002, 33–34;
Wakker 2002, 113.

that often, as the context indicates, the future realisation is or can be interrupted, postponed or even prevented. We find such examples with μέλλω and with ἔμελλον, both with future infinitive and with present infinitive, cf. (16 a-b):

(16a) μέλλοντι δ' αὐτῷ πολυθύτους τεύχειν σφαγὰς
κῆρυξ ἀπ' οἴκων ἵκετ' οἰκεῖος Λίχας,
τὸ σὸν φέρων δώρημα, θανάσιμον πέπλον·
ὃν κεῖνος ἐνδύς, ὡς σὺ προὐξεφίεσο,
ταυροκτονεῖ μὲν δώδεκ' ἐντελεῖς ἔχων / … βοῦς·

('When he was about to celebrate a great sacrifice, his own herald Lichas came to him from home, bearing your gift, the deadly robe. He put this on, as you had enjoined beforehand, and then began his offering with twelve perfect bulls', Soph. *Trach.* 756–761)

(16b) … καὶ καταίνεσον
μήποτε προδώσειν τάσδ' ἑκών, τελεῖν δ' ὅσ' ἂν
μέλλῃς φρονῶν εὖ ξυμφέροντ' αὐταῖς ἀεί.

('and agree that you will never purposely betray them and that you will do all the things which in course of time you are/intend to do, wishing them well for their good always', Soph. *OC* 1633–635)

In (16a) it is explicitly indicated that the realisation of Heracles' intention, the offering, is interrupted but that he performs it afterwards, cf. ταυροκτονεῖ. In (16b) Oedipus is speaking about Theseus' intended actions in the future. Whether they will be performed or not depends on the future course of events.

In such cases it seems that the construction with μέλλω is in semantic opposition with the simple future, the latter expressing, in a factual way, that some SoA will be the case in the future,[25] without explicitly mentioning the possibility that something will prevent or postpone the realisation of the SoA in question. μέλλω, on the other hand, also in contexts like (16b) where the idea of prevention or interruption is not explicitly stated, has its own semantic meaning, expressing (an existing) intention for a future realisation, not future realisation itself.

One could say, with Basset (1979, 12), Ruijgh (1985, 330) and Rijksbaron (2002, 35), that μέλλω is in all these cases a marked variant of the simple future. But this does not automatically imply that it must be characterised as a *temporal*, i.e. a *future*, semi-auxiliary. It might equally well be characterised as a *modal* semi-auxiliary, since it expresses *present intention* or *arrangement* for some future realisation; in this respect it

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[25] Cf. Basset 1979, 30; Rijksbaron 2002, 34–35; Ruijgh 1985, 329–330.

is comparable with modals like θέλω and βούλομαι and with other verbs expressing intention like ἐν νῷ ἔχω, ἐπινοέω. In other words, in these cases the focus of its meaning is on the present intention or arrangement, not on its other semantic feature, the (relatively) future realisation. It is exactly this semantic characteristic in which it differs from the simple future. This seems to hold for all cases except for μέλλω in the meaning 'to delay'. In those cases the meaning has become thus specialized that it cannot be replaced anymore by a simple future.

Where I would claim, however, that μέλλω in its primary meaning 'it is likely that I will, etc' is a *future* auxiliary, is in all those cases where it expresses the relative future (a notion that cannot be expressed by the simple future) and fills in the gap of the non-existing future past indicative, optative or subjunctive, and is used to express the relative future in past (17a), counterfactual (17b) or potential (17c) situations. In all these cases, one could say, the focus of its meaning is not so much on the intention, but rather on the feature of the relative future. Here there are no alternatives, and μέλλω may be characterised as a *semi-auxiliary of the relative future*. Sometimes its full semantic meaning is still discernible (17a–c), but it is the feature of the relative future, inherent in all uses of μέλλω, that is dominating.

(17a)   AN. Ἤιδη· τί δ' οὐκ ἔμελλον; ἐμφανῆ γὰρ ἦν

('Yes, I knew it [= Creon's proclamation]. How was I not to know it? [or: of course I knew it]. For it was public', Soph. *Ant.* 448)

(17b)   = (15b) **εἰ** ζῶν Ἀχιλλεὺς τῶν ὅπλων τῶν ὧν πέρι
κρίνειν **ἔμελλε** κράτος ἀριστείας τινί,
οὐκ ἄν τις αὔτ' ἔμαρψεν ἄλλος ἀντ' ἐμοῦ.

('If Achilles lived and had been called to decree the first place in valour to any claimant of his arms, no one would have grasped them before me', Soph. *Aj.* 442–444)

(17c)   Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἄν ποτ', **οὐδ' εἴ** μοι τὰ σὰ
μέλλοι τις οἴσειν δῶρ', ἐφ' οἷσι νῦν χλιδᾷς,
τούτοις ὑπεικάθοιμι

([Electra to Chrysothemis: 'You live with the murderers of my father.] I, then, would never yield to them, not even if someone were to bring me the gifts which now make you proud.', Soph. *El.* 359–361, cf. Soph. *Phil.* 409)

(17a) clearly shows how there is a combination of a retrospective vision (Antigone claiming that she did not ignore Cleon's proclamation, Ἤιδη)

and a prospective vision which allows her to say that the past situation was such that ignorance was unlikely (ἐμφανῆ γὰρ ἦν), cf. Basset (1979, 176). In (17b) ἔμελλε explicitly focuses on the element of likelihood and stresses Achilles' intention, and thus emphasizes the fact that this SoA, which in the past was likely to have occurred later on, has been left unfulfilled. In (17c), likewise, εἰ μέλλοι stresses the hypothetical character of the conditional by explicitly focusing on its likely/intended nature.

In all other cases, in agreement with the observation that μέλλω is a more marked expression, and, hence, semantically differs from the simple future, it may be characterised as a modal semi-auxiliary. In this way we may also explain the differences between (2a)–(2c), printed above. In (2a) Chrysothemis chooses μέλλουσι πέμψειν, since she hopes that she will convince Electra to stop her laments and to prevent her from being sent away. In (2b) Odysseus tells Philoctetes that he has to come along with his bow, or else, that they will bring him by force. Odysseus is sure that this threat will be realised and therefore uses a future indicative, simply presenting the SoA as a future fact. In (2c), we are dealing with Heracles' predictions of the future, which are, of course, presented as future facts. In (2b) and (2c) it would be rhetorically ineffective to leave any doubts about the future course of events by using μέλλω + infinitive instead of a future indicative.

The semantic difference is often, as we have seen above, the reason for choosing μέλλω instead of the simple future, but there are some contexts of overlap in which it is very difficult—at least at first sight—to see in which respect they differ. In these cases[26] the semantic opposition seems (nearly) neutralised:

(18a) … ἐμβαλοῦ μ' ὅπῃ θέλεις ἄγων,
     εἰς ἀντλίαν, εἰς πρῷραν, εἰς πρύμναν, ὅποι
     ἥκιστα **μέλλω** τοὺς ξυνόντας **ἀλγυνεῖν**.

     ('take and thrust me where you like, in hold, in prow, in stern, wherever I will least annoy my shipmates', Soph. *Phil.* 481–483)

(18b) μέλλουσι γάρ σ', εἰ τῶνδε μὴ λήξεις γόων,
     ἐνταῦθα πέμψειν ἔνθα μήποθ' ἡλίου
     φέγγος **προσόψῃ**

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[26] In Plato there are more contexts of overlap than in Sophocles. Thus often τὸ μέλλον and τὸ ἐσομένον seem interchangeable as well. In Sophocles, however, τὸ ἐσομένον is not found at all, probably because of metrical constraints.

('For, if you don't stop these laments, they intend to send you there where
you will never see the light of the sun', Soph. *El.* 379–381)[27]

In both (18a) and (18b) we have a relative clause which specifies the
place mentioned in the main clause and expresses the purpose of the
subject of the main clause.[28] The relative clause has in both cases the
nuance 'this must happen', the only difference being that in (18a) this
nuance is explicitly expressed by μέλλω, whereas it is left implicit in
(18b).

In the same way we may compare (19a)–(19c):

(19a) Τί γὰρ βροτῶν ἂν σὺν κακοῖς μεμιγμένων
       θνῄσκειν ὁ μέλλων τοῦ χρόνου κέρδος φέροι;

       ('When mortals are in the meshes of fate, how can one who is to die
       profit from such respite?', Soph. *El.* 1485–486)

(19b) Ἀλλ' **οὑξελέγξων** νιν πάρεστιν

       ('But there is one to convict him', Soph. *OT* 297)

(19c) [Chorus to Ismene] Ἦν δέ του
       σπάνιν τιν' ἴσχῃς, ἔστ' ἔποικος **ὃς φράσει**.

       ('If you need something, there is a guardian of the place to direct you',
       Soph. *OC* 505–506)

All three examples convey the nuance 'one who is to …'. It is difficult to
discern any semantic difference. At most one can say that this nuance is
explicitly conveyed by (19a) and is more implicit in (19b)-(19c), and that
in (19b)-(19c) the focus is on the fact that the occurrence of the SoA in
question is presented as a fact in the future.

4. *Conclusion*

All in all, then, we may conclude that in Sophocles μέλλω seems to
be splitting up into two different uses. The first use we may discern is
that of μέλλω in its older sense 'it is likely that I will', 'I intend', 'I am
going to'. Μέλλω in this use denotes a *present* intention or arrangement
for the (relatively) *future* realisation of a SoA. In most cases it is the
element of the present intention or arrangement that is the dominant

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[27] Cf. *OC* 506; *Ph.* 1241.
[28] To be more precise, in (18a) it is the speaker who asks the addressee (= subject of
the main clause) to accept this purpose and to act with this purpose in mind.

semantic feature. In those cases μέλλω may be characterised as a semi-auxiliary which expresses modal notions (i.e. likelihood: 'to intend, to be intended to, to be about to') about the future realisation of a SoA; in all those cases there is in principle a semantic opposition with the simple future; the latter expresses, in a factual way, that a SoA will be the case or will be realised at some future moment, whereas semantically μέλλω rather resembles verbs like θέλω, βούλομαι, ἐπινοέω etc. and expresses present intention or arrangement. There appear to be a few contexts in which it is very difficult if not impossible to detect any semantic difference with the simple future. In these contexts the semantic opposition seems to be neutralised.

Only in those cases where there is no opposition with the simple future because the future stem cannot be used in those circumstances, it may be characterised as a semi-auxiliary of the (relative) future. Here the element of the future realisation, i.e. of the relative future, is dominating.

The second use we may discern is that of μέλλω in the sense 'to delay'. This sense has clearly developed out of a continuative-iterative interpretation of μέλλω 'to intend, to be about': 'to be always about to do something—without ever doing it' is equivalent to 'to delay'. However, μέλλω 'to delay' begins to show a slightly different syntactic behaviour than μέλλω 'to intend': in most contexts the infinitive is omitted, it is used once in the passive voice and its infinitival complement is once accompanied by μή οὐ. Therefore, μέλλω 'to delay' seems to be developing into an autonomous verb. For semantic reasons μέλλω 'to delay' cannot be replaced by a simple future.

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THE ΛΕΞΙΣ ΕΡΩΤΙΚΗ IN SOPHOCLES' SATYR PLAYS

Willeon Slenders

It is often stated that the language of satyr play, though never obscene, is less chaste than the language of tragedy.[1] The reason for this difference in style is that lewdness is one of the characteristics of satyrs.[2] Therefore, it is to be expected that this characteristic has its effect on the action and diction of (certain passages of) satyr plays. Thus, we might speak of a sexual diction, a λέξις ἐρωτική.

Comedy shows a very frequent use of this λέξις ἐρωτική:[3] there we find explicit, obscene designations of sexual organs and activities like πέος or βινέω, which do not occur in tragedy or in satyr play. In satyr plays the sexual component is never presented in a direct, vulgar way. Even Aeschylus, whom we primarily know as a serious, grave tragedian, makes use of ambiguous language as an expression of his taste for word-play in his satyr plays.[4] Other tragedians too show their taste for sexual innuendo in their satyr plays. In this article I will take a closer look at the λέξις ἐρωτική contained in the satyr plays of Sophocles. In order to describe Sophocles' use of the λέξις ἐρωτική, I will try to answer the following question: what instances of λέξις ἐρωτική occur in Sophoclean satyr plays?

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[1] Guggisberg 1947, 40–43; Sutton 1980, 142; Seaford 1984, 47–48; Seidensticker in KPS, 33 (KPS: Krumeich, Pechstein and Seidensticker 1999). This article is based on the research of my dissertation on language and style of the Greek satyr play under supervision of prof. dr. A.H.M. Kessels and prof. dr. A.P.M.H. Lardinois. For all fragments I used the edition by Radt 1998, for Euripides' *Cyclops* I used the edition by Kovacs 1994. All translations are mine, unless stated otherwise.

[2] KPS, 19; Voelke 2001, 211ff.

[3] See the comprehensive study by Henderson 1991.

[4] Slenders 1992.

1. *Definition*

Before we can investigate the use of this kind of diction, we have to define λέξις ἐρωτική more precisely. By λέξις ἐρωτική I mean the diction used to express sexual matters and actions; for an individual word or expression I use the term λόγος ἐρωτικός. There are several ways to refer to sex, explicitly as well as implicitly: we can call a spade a spade or we can use innuendo. In addition to this it matters greatly to determine within the λέξις ἐρωτική when we take a word or expression erotically and when we do not. Some words appear to be λόγοι ἐρωτικοί of their own accord: they are obscene expressions. A word like πέος ('cock') is always obscene, regardless of its context. Other words, which of their own accord do not refer to sexual matters or actions, can acquire a sexual meaning from their context.

This implies that one and the same expression one time falls under the λέξις ἐρωτική and another time it does not. It should be clear that a word like μαστός ('breast') is not a λόγος ἐρωτικός in a sentence like μαστῶν ἀποστὰς καὶ τροφῆς ἐμῆς ('withdrawn from my breasts and my nurture'),[5] whereas it is in ἵν' ἔστι τουτί τ' ὀρθὸν ἐξανιστάναι / μαστοῦ τε δραγμὸς καὶ †παρεσκευασμένου† ('in this state one can raise this one here upright, / one can grasp a breast and touch with his hands a prepared (?) meadow').[6] The context determines the connotation of the word. This applies *a fortiori* to metaphors: the word or expression χοῖρος ('pig') is not a λόγος ἐρωτικός until it is used in a sentence like νῦν γε χοῖρος φαίνεται. / ἀτὰρ ἐκτραφείς γε κύσθος ἔσται ('Now she looks like a piggy. / But when she's grown she will be a cunt')[7] in a obviously erotic context. If we continue this line of thought we reach the conclusion that certain expressions more than others depend on their respective contexts as to their identification as λόγοι ἐρωτικοί: obscene words like the above-mentioned κύσθος do not need a context to fall under the category of λέξις ἐρωτική. Furthermore, certain words as well as certain contexts are more explicitly erotic than others.

In order to map the use of λέξις ἐρωτική in Sophocles' satyr plays I distinguish three types. The first type of λέξις ἐρωτική is the most explicit one. Its erotic character is firmly established: in a direct way a

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[5] S. *Or.* 776.
[6] E. *Cyc.* 169–170.
[7] Ar. *Ach.* 781–782. See Henderson 1991, 131.

sexual matter or action is mentioned. This type has the advantage of leaving no room for doubt, but the disadvantage is that it is often less funny than indirect types of λέξις ἐρωτική. The expression ἀλλὰ βινεῖν βούλομαι ('but I want to fuck')[8] e.g. is both unambiguous and obscene, and indisputably not an example of delicate style.

The second type represents my definition of a *double entendre*. I use this term to indicate a (possible) interpretation of two layers: underneath an apparently unerotic text lies a secondary level with an erotic meaning. This type has the advantage that it can have a (more) comical effect because of the word-play. The disadvantage is a possible degree of uncertainty as to the detection and perception of sexual innuendo for the original audience and, *a fortiori*, for the modern interpreter. Euripides provides a nice example of this type in *Cyclops* 175–181. In this dialogue the chorus of satyrs question hero Odysseus about Troy but their interest concerns more specifically Helen:

Χο. ἄκου᾽, Ὀδυσσεῦ· διαλαλήσωμέν τι σοι.
Οδ. καὶ μὴν φίλοι γε προσφέρεσθε πρὸς φίλον.
Χο. ἐλάβετε Τροίαν τὴν Ἑλένην τε χειρίαν;
Οδ. καὶ πάντα γ᾽ οἶκον Πριαμιδῶν ἐπέρσαμεν.
Χο. οὔκουν, ἐπειδὴ τὴν νεᾶνιν εἵλετε,
    ἅπαντες αὐτὴν διεκροτήσατ᾽ ἐν μέρει,
    ἐπεί γε πολλοῖς ἥδεται γαμουμένη (…);

(Chorus:) Listen Odysseus, let's have a little chat with you.
(Odysseus:) Of course, because you are presenting yourselves as friends
    to a friend.
(Chorus:) Did you capture Troy and did you take Helen in hand?
(Odysseus:) Yes, we sacked the whole house of the sons of Priam.
(Chorus:) Once you had caught the girl, didn't you all bang her taking
    turns, since she likes to be the wife of many men (…)?

In this dialogue Odysseus keeps his tragic, heroic status. In line 177 the tone is set cleverly: the combination ἐλάβετε (…) τὴν Ἑλένην τε χειρίαν can be interpreted ambiguously in a sexual sense, especially if χειρίαν ('in hand') is taken as a pun. Then λαμβάνω can have a sexual meaning just like 'take' in English.[9] Odysseus, however, takes λαμβάνω only in the non-erotic sense ('capture') and gives a serious, affirmative answer even with a Homeric tone (178, οἶκον Πριαμιδῶν ἐπέρσαμεν). His lines operate on a non-erotic level, but the satyrs, who

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[8] Ar. *Lys.* 934.
[9] Henderson 1991, 65, 114, 156.

are interested in something else and ask whether Odysseus and his
men have 'pierced through' (180, διεκϱοτήσατε) Helen, 'taking turns'
(ἐν μέϱει) 'all of you' (ἅπαντες), talk on a second, erotic level. This
becomes evident in the lines 180–181 where their interest becomes more
explicit. For the fact that διακϱοτέω must have a secondary, obscene
sense here too, we can find proof in the next line which starts with
causal ἐπεί: 'since she likes to be the wife of many men'. The word
γαμουμένη is used ambiguously too, since active γαμέω can mean 'take
as a paramour, lover or concubine' or 'have sexual intercourse with'.[10]

The third type is even more doubtful and difficult to discern than
the second one. It consists of a sexual ring: a certain word evokes only
an association which, as regards content, is not related to (a secondary
layer in) the text, but stands by itself. This can have a funny effect,
but its detection is very insecure and subjective. We find a (possible)
example of this type in Euripides' *Cyclops* 1–2. Silenus enters from
Polyphemus' cave and apostrophizes absent Dionysus:

> ῏Ω Βϱόμιε, διὰ σὲ μυϱίους ἔχω πόνους
> νῦν χὤτ' ἐν ἥβῃ εὐσθένει δέμας·

> O Bromius, because of you I have had innumerable labors, now and
> when my body was flourishing in my youth.

This address of Dionysus is in itself innocent and may even contain a
subtle Homeric reminiscence in the words μυϱίους πόνους which echo
the μύϱι' (…) ἄλγεα of *Iliad* 1, 2 and πολλά… ἄλγεα of *Odyssey* 1, 4. The
second line can get an erotic ring by the words ἥβη and δέμας. ῞Ηβη can
refer to the sexual parts of both sexes[11] whereas δέμας can be used for
the male genitals.[12] If in these lines a λέξις ἐϱωτική of the second type
(possibly depending on appearance or actions of Silenus) is far-fetched,
the ring of the metaphorical meaning of ἥβη and δέμας contrasting with
the Homeric tone of line 1 might have had a comical effect.

Now we will focus on the fragments of satyr plays of Sophocles
in which we can detect one or more types of λέξις ἐϱωτική. These
fragments are presented in order of (most likely) type and probabil-
ity.

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[10] Slenders 1992, 154.
[11] Henderson 1991, 176, 115, 154.
[12] Ibid., 112, 115.

2. *Type I*

In my introduction I contend that satyr play does not contain explicit, obscene or vulgar expressions for sexual activities or organs. Nevertheless there are three passages of the *Ichneutai* which deserve to be discussed: the first one because even though it is not erotic it really is explicitly obscene,[13] the second one because of an explicit term for 'penis'. Two fragments of the satyr play *Momos* can be classified under this type as well. In *Ichneutai* F 314, 124–128 we find a nice example of word-play. The satyrs have found the footprints of the cattle which has been stolen by Hermes and to their surprise these footprints are reversed. All of a sudden the satyrs, frightened by the loud sound of a lyre, fall to the ground. That is why they now are carrying out a closer investigation while lying on their bellies, something Silenus does not understand at all. Consequently he demands an explanation:

> τίν' αὖ τέχνην σὺ τήν[δ' ἄρ' ἐξ]ηῦρες, τίν' αὖ,
> πρόσπαιον ὧδε κεκλιμ[ένος] κυνηγετεῖν
> πρὸς γῇ; τίς ὑμῶν ὁ τρόπος; οὐχὶ μανθάνω·
> [ἐ]χῖνος ὥς τις ἐν λόχμῃ κεῖσαι πεσών,
> [ἤ] τις πίθηκος κύβδ' ἀποθυμαίνεις τινί.

> What kind of a trick have you invented this time? What is it this time, all of a sudden hunting like that on your bellies on the ground? What kind of a behaviour of yours is this supposed to be? I really don't understand! Like hedgehog you lie on the ground, or like a monkey bent over, you let off at someone!

In lines 127–128 he compares a satyr (of the semichorus) to an ἐχῖνος (...) ἐν λόχμῃ ('hedgehog in a bush'). At first sight this comparison does not seem to be very funny, but it is given a comical effect if we assume an ambiguous expression for the satyr's anus, 'since ἐχῖνος was used of a wide-mouthed jar and of bodily cavities'.[14] Λόχμη is ambiguous too: it can be used of (male) pubic hair[15] and also of bodily hair, e.g. armpit hair.[16] Thus, the combination of ἐχῖνος ἐν λόχμῃ could be a description of the satyr's hairy anus. This pun is supported by the second comparison (πίθηκος): '(...) The monkey's arse is merely

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[13] I follow Henderson 1991, who discusses this kind of expressions too.
[14] Henderson 1987, 205. He thinks the name Ἐχινοῦντα (Ar. *Lys.* 1169) indicates Reconciliation's pubic hair or pubis.
[15] Henderson 1991, 136, 147, 155. Cf. Ar. *Lys.* 800; *Av.* 208.
[16] Cf. Ar. *Ec.* 61.

grotesque and ridiculous (…)'.[17] The word κύβδα ('bent over'), which occurs frequently in erotic contexts,[18] only enhances this image.

The verb ἀποθυμαίνω is unknown. Both Wilamowitz and Hunt suggest the meaning 'fart'.[19] This would make the passage very explicit (though not erotic) and a type I.

In lines 145–160 of the same play Silenus addresses the satyrs:

> τί μοι ψ[ό]φον; φοβ[…]. κα[.] δειμαίνετε
> μάλθης ἄναγνα σώ[μα]τ̣' ἐκμεμαγμένα
> κάκιστα θηρῶν ὀνθ[..]ν [π]ά̣σῃ σκιᾷ
> φόβον βλέποντες, πάν[τα] δειματούμενοι,
> ἄνευρα κἀκόμιστα κἀγε[λε]ύθερα
> διακονοῦντες, σώματ' εἰ[σ]ιδ[ε]ῖ̣ν μόνον
> κα̣[ὶ γ]λῶσσα κα[ὶ] φάλητες. εἰ δέ που δέῃ,
> πι̣στοὶ λόγοισιν ὄντες ἔργα φεύγετε,
> τοιοῦ[δ]ε πατρός, ὦ κάκιστα θηρίων,
> οὗ πόλλ' ἐφ' ἥβης μνήματ' ἀνδρείας ὕπο
> κ[ε]ῖται παρ' οἴκοις νυμφικοῖς ἠσκημένα,
> οὐκ εἰς φυγὴν κλίνοντος, οὐ δειλ[ο]υμένου,
> οὐδὲ ψόφοισι τῶν ὀρειτρόφων βοτῶν
> [π]τήσσοντος, ἀλλ' α[ἰχ]μαῖσιν ἐξει[ρ̣]γασμένου
> [ἃ] νῦν ὑφ' ὑμῶν λάμ[πρ̣' ἀ]π̣ο̣ρ̣ρυπαίνεται
> [ψ]όφῳ νεώρει κόλακ[ι] ποιμένων π[ο]θέν.

> What kind of noise? … are you afraid (of), you damned waxwork dummies, most evil of creatures, seeing terror in every shadow, frightened of everything, nerveless, slovenly and treacherous servants, bodies only to look at, and tongue and phalluses. In the event of a crisis you profess loyalty but fly from deeds, while you have this father here, you most evil of animals, of whom there are many trophies won by his manliness in the nymphs' abodes. He never gave way to flight, was never afraid, never crouched at noises made by cattle grazing on the hills, but has accomplished with his spear splendid things that now are being tarnished by you at some shepherd's latest flattering call from some place or another.

Silenus goes on at the satyrs who say they have heard terrible noises. He therefore blames them for being cowards who try to impress people but in reality are no more than σώματ' εἰ[σ]ιδ[ε]ῖ̣ν μόνον κα̣[ὶ γ]λῶσσα κα[ὶ] φάλητες ('bodies only to look at, and tongue and phalluses'). With these words Silenus characterises their cowardice. The satyrs do not use their bodies for action but only show off, quite a comical remark since the satyrs are anything but good-looking. With γλῶσσα ('tongue')

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[17] Olson 2002, 111 (in Ar. *Ach.* 120–121).
[18] Henderson 1991, 22, 169, 170.
[19] Wilamowitz and Hunt are quoted by Pearson 1917, 244.

he refers to their boasting: they say a lot but they fail to put their words into action, except perhaps when it comes to sex. Although, in that field they seem to perform better in talking than in action as well, whereas in his opinion he himself has a better record of service. This time he is the one bragging.

3. *Type II*

The second type of λέξις ἐρωτική offers possibilities for *double entendre*. The first passage which does so is also taken from the *Ichneutai* passage mentioned above. In lines 154–155 there is a possible ambiguity: (ἐφ') ἥβης may hide a sexual pun, since ἥβη can denote the pubis.[20] Silenus then sets the tone with ἀνδρείας, focusing on his manhood, and completes the ambiguity with παρ' οἴκοις νυμφικοῖς which brings an association of women (brides) or the female sexual organ to mind.[21] Silenus' martial exploits, emphasised once again in line 158 by αἰχμαῖσιν ('with the spear(s)') could have the same obscene meaning as ξίφος and δόρυ, designations of one's vigorous penis.[22] In this way Silenus polishes off the lack of the satyrs' decisiveness: on the primary level he boasts about his bravery and on the secondary level he shows that he is superior to the satyrs in the field of the φάλητες ('phalluses') as well.

In another passage (F 314, 366–368) we find another fine example of type II. Cyllene addresses the satyrs giving a description of their looks and behaviour.

> ἀλλ' αἰὲν εἶ σὺ παῖς· νέος γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ
> πώγωνι θάλλων ὡς τράγος κνηκῷ χλιδᾷς.
> παύου τὸ λεῖον φαλακρὸν ἡδονῇ πιτνάς.

> You have always been a child; for as a young man you live luxuriously blooming with your yellow beard like a goat. Stop merrily fluttering your smooth bald thing.[23]

It seems that τὸ λεῖον φαλακρόν (368) alludes to the satyr's penis. Lloyd-Jones[24] translates θάλλων ὡς τράγος (…) χλιδᾷς (367) with 'you are

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[20] See above, note 11.

[21] Schreurer and Bielfeldt in: KPS, 299–300, n. 34. A pun involving the clitoris is possible too: see L.S.J., s.v. νύμφη; Ruf. *Onom.* 112; Gal. *UP* 15, 3. See also Winkler 1996, 102–103.

[22] Henderson 1991, 120–124; KPS, loc.cit.

[23] Line 368: translation by Ibid., 245.

[24] Lloyd-Jones (1996), 173.

lascivious as a goat'. Therefore he chooses an explicit interpretation: 'Cease to expand your smooth phallus with delight'. He takes πίτνημι literally ('expand') instead of metaphorically ('flutter'). His translation leaves no room for ambiguity, whereas the translation of Henderson, quoted above, does.

We seem to find the same *double entendre* in Sophocles' *Dionysiskos* (F 171):

> ὅταν γὰρ αὐτῷ προσφέρω βρῶσιν διδούς,
> τὴν ῥῖνά μ' εὐθὺς ψηλαφᾷ κἄνω φέρει
> τὴν χεῖρα πρὸς ⟨τὸ⟩ φαλακρὸν ἡδὺ διαγελῶν

> For when I offer him food, he tickles my nose and brings up his hand to the bald surface, smiling sweetly.

Someone, probably the child Dionysus, is touching another person's nose (ῥίς) and something 'bald' (φαλακρόν), perhaps his head, but ῥίς can be a pun for penis.[25] Therefore, Henderson translates φαλακρόν with 'the bald thing'. We find a similar use of φαλακρόν in Aeschylus' *Diktyoulkoi*.[26]

The fourth instance of φαλακρόν is Euripides' *Cyclops* 224–227. Upon his arrival at the cave, Polyphemus describes what he sees.

> ὁρῶ γέ τοι τούσδ' ἄρνας ἐξ ἄντρων ἐμῶν
> στρεπταῖς λύγοισι σῶμα συμπεπλεγμένους,
> τεύχη τε τυρῶν συμμιγῆ, γέροντά τε
> πληγαῖς μέτωπον φαλακρὸν ἐξῳδηκότα.

> I do see these lambs here from my cave, their bodies bound together with twisted twigs, and cheese vessels all in a jumble, and an old man with his bald head swollen with blows.

He takes the satyrs for 'lambs' (ἄρνας) and Silenus for an 'old man' (γέροντα), 'with his bald head swollen with blows' (πληγαῖς μέτωπον φαλακρὸν ἐξῳδηκότα). At first sight this expression refers to Silenus' face or mask, but φαλακρὸν μέτωπον can also refer to the phallus of Silenus. According to Henderson it is swollen 'with "blows" alluding to masturbation'.[27] Perhaps this interpretation seems easily placed but at the very least it is striking that we find within the relatively small number of remaining lines of satyr plays no less than four passages,

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[25] Henderson 1991, 145, 147; Cf. Ar. *Nu.* 344.

[26] The situation in A. *Diktyoulkoi* 786–795 is almost the same as the one in the *Dionysiskos* fragment. Here it is the child Perseus who is probably playing with Silenus' 'attribute'. See Slenders 1992, 157–158.

[27] Henderson 1991, 245.

of which two in Sophocles, with the word φαλακρόν and that always in an ambiguous context. Two of these four cases are very convincing whereas the other two remain uncertain but become probable by the convincing ones.

Fragment 316 of the *Ichneutai* consists of only one word, handed down to us by Photius:

> ῥικνοῦσθαι
> τὸ διέλκεσθαι καὶ παντοδαπῶς διαστρέφεσθαι κατ' εἶδος. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ῥικνοῦσθαι τὶ καμπύλον γίγνεσθαι ἀσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ συνουσίαν καὶ ὄρχησιν κάμπτοντα τὴν ὀσφῦν. Σοφοκλῆς Ἰχνευταῖς.

> *bend unseemly*
> to stretch and distort oneself in all kinds of ways with regard to one's figure. Ῥικνοῦσθαι means also 'bend unseemly', when one bends his loin during sexual intercourse or dancing. Sophocles in the Ichneutae.

Photius[28] mentions the obscene meaning of this verb. It is, however, not clear how the word was used by Sophocles, either referring to sex or dancing. Anyway, ῥικνοῦσθαι surely offers possibilities for a *double entendre* or a sexual ring (type II or III). The same goes for two fragments of the satyr play *Momos*, each existing of only one word: ἀναστῦψαι ('get an erection', F 421) and ἀποσκόλυπτε ('strip off', F 423).[29] Both fragments can have an explicit sexual meaning, as Hesychius himself states about both fragments. On fragment 421 he[30] comments: ἐπᾶραι τὸ αἰδοῖον, ἢ στυγνάσαι ('raise the sexual organ, or have a gloomy look') and on fragment 423 Hesychius[31] states: ἀπολέπισον. καὶ ἀποκόλουε. φασὶ καὶ τὸν περιτετημένον τὸ αἰδοῖον ἀπεσκολυμμένον ('peel. Also cut short off. They call someone with his member circumcised also "stripped off"'). About the possibly explicit or ambiguous use or function of these words in this play (type I or II) nothing can be said for sure.

There are three more fragments of Sophoclean satyr plays that merit discussion as well: passages from the *Achilleos Erastai*, *Helenes Gamos* and *Pandora*. In the play *Achilleos Erastai* about the homoerotic relationships of Achilles an important role for the λέξις ἐρωτική can be expected:

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[28] Phot. 489, 1; Suda s.v. ῥικνοῦσθαι.

[29] This word occurs also in Archilochus F 39.

[30] Hsch. α 4620. Cf. Pollux 2, 176: τὸ μέντοι ἀνασπᾶσαι τὸ αἰδοῖον παρὰ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις κωμικοῖς (Adesp. F 766 PCG) ἀναστῦψαι καλεῖται ('draw back/up the member is called ἀναστῦψαι by the ancient comedians'). See also Schreurer and Bielfeldt in: KPS, 366, n. 12.

[31] Hsch. α 6632. Cf. *Synag.* 435, 24 (Bekker): ἀποσκολύψαι· ἀφελεῖν τὸ δέρμα. ἢ ἀπογυμνῶσαι ('remove the skin. Or bare').

the satyrs are Achilles' lovers.[32] Many possible allusions could find a place in this play. At first sight we do not find anything of the kind in fragment 149 but on closer inspection things turn out to be different.

> τὸ γὰρ νόσημα τοῦτ' ἐφίμερον κακόν·
> ἔχοιμ' ἂν αὐτὸ μὴ κακῶς ἀπεικάσαι.
> ὅταν πάγου φανέντος αἰθρίου χεροῖν
> κρύσταλλον ἁρπάσωσι παῖδες εὐπαγῆ,
> τὰ πρῶτ' ἔχουσιν ἡδονὰς ποταινίους·
> τέλος δ' ὁ θυμὸς οὔθ' ὅπως ἀφῇ θέλει
> οὔτ' ἐν χεροῖν τὸ κτῆμα σύμφορον μένειν.
> οὕτω δὲ τοὺς ἐρῶντας αὑτὸς ἵμερος
> δρᾶν καὶ τὸ μὴ δρᾶν πολλάκις προίεται

> For this disease is a delightful evil; I could express it by making not a bad comparison. When clear frost appears and boys seize the solid ice, at first they have new pleasures. But in the end, the mind does not want to let it go, neither is it convenient that their acquisition stays in their hands. In the same way desire drives lovers to act and often not to act.

According to this fragment love is a νόσημα ('disease'), which by means of an oxymoron is called a ἐφίμερον κακόν ('delightful evil'). Subsequently lovers (ἐρῶντας) are compared to boys (παῖδες),[33] who experience unheard pleasures (ἡδονὰς ποταινίους) when they seize solid ice. Then comes the *tertium comparationis*: the θυμός will not let go and it is not convenient that the κτῆμα ('acquisition') stays. The same ἵμερος ('desire'), an echo of ἐφίμερον (1), makes lovers often act and at the same time restrains them from acting. Although this fragment is explicitly about love, there is a possibility of ambiguity or reference to the physical, as shown by Craik.[34] According to her interpretation the solid ice is a metaphor for the penis and θυμός (6) for semen. Then, ἀφιέναι can be used of the emission of sexual fluids.[35] This passage is definitely a type III, if not a type II.

In fragment 181 of *Helenes Gamos* we find another possible λέξις ἐρωτική of the second type. This play, probably a satyr play,[36] is one

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[32] Conrad 1997, 161.

[33] Perhaps this is a pun to the satyrs.

[34] Craik 2003, 55–56.

[35] Ibid. (56), paraphrases: 'This is a tantalizing case: here is a good analogy. When bright midwinter frost appears and children grasp an icicle, the first new pleasure's unalloyed. But liquefaction can't be stopped, the hardness does not last for long. Lovers have the same desire: to show their love yet hold it back'.

[36] Heynen and Krumeich in KPS, 392.

of the three plays about Helen attributed to Sophocles. Not much is known about the content of this play.

> πέπων ἐρινὸς –‿– ἀχρεῖος ὢν
> ἐς βρῶσιν ἄλλους ἐξερινάζεις λόγῳ

> (You are) a ripe wild fig (…). Although you are useless for food, you impregnate others with your talk.

It is unclear who is addressed here as a 'ripe wild fig'. There is without doubt the use of a metaphor, as Athenaeus,[37] who quotes the fragment, explains: it is used for a woman or hetaera who is not that young any more and therefore has (only) the job to motivate others to eat at a symposium. The fact is that wild figs were not fit to eat, but were used for fertilisation or impregnation. Apparently the woman addressed no longer plays a role in the 'meal' herself.[38] If this is a metaphor for sex, since there are many metaphors with expressions for food and eating,[39] the passage constitutes a nice *double entendre*.

Although fragment 483 of *Pandora* about the myth of Pandora has some textual difficulties, it could contain a λέξις ἐρωτική type II:

> καὶ πλῆρες ἐκπιόντι χρύσεον κέρας
> τρίψει †γέμοντα† μαλθακῆς ὑπ' ὠλένης

> And when he has drunk off a full golden horn, she/he will massage him (while he is full) under his soft elbow.

Nothing can be made of these lines with certainty. Attempts to do so depart from an object to τρίψει to be found under †γέμοντα†. This could give some room for an explicit λέξις ἐρωτική, since τρίβω can have a sexual meaning.[40] Lloyd-Jones[41] has an even more explicit solution for the second line: τρίψει γέροντα μαλθακῆς χλαίνης ὕπο ('she will massage the old one (i.e. the penis) under the soft blanket').[42]

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[37] Ath. 3, 76c.
[38] Cf. Slings 1987, 41, about Archilochus' First Cologne Epode 17, where πέπειρα ('over-ripe') is used as a 'negative qualification of human physical beauty'.
[39] Henderson 1991, 47–48.
[40] Ibid., 27, 126, 176. Cf. A. *Theoroi* F 78a, 30.
[41] Lloyd-Jones 1996, 252–253.
[42] There is also a possible type II or III in βλιμάζειν ('feel (up)', *Pandora* F 484, 1). Erotian (F 16, 6) hands over this word, which normally means 'feel', because of its obscene meaning in this passage. Cf. Cratin. 302; Ar. *Lys.* 1164. It is not clear whether there is possibly a link to τρίψει in F 483.

4. *Type III*

Type III of λέξις ἐρωτική is not related to a secondary layer in the text but merely consists of a sexual ring or pun. The only fragment in Sophoclean satyr plays with the possibility of such a third type is fragment 198 of *Epi Tainaro*:

> τοιγὰρ †ἰωδὴ† φυλάξαι χοῖρον ὥστε δεσμίαν
>
> Therefore (…) (to) guard it like a bound pig.[43]

How this fragment should fit in a Heracles episode is hard to see.[44] The word χοῖρον contains a possible ambiguity, particularly in view of its female gender expressed by the adjective δεσμίαν. Just like its occurrences in other satyr plays[45] χοῖρος can refer to the female sexual organ or to a young woman.[46]

5. *Conclusion*

In this article we have seen that all three types of λέξις ἐρωτική occur in Sophoclean satyr plays. The first type, the explicit reference, is found indeed but not in a vulgar sense, as is well-known from comedy. The most striking kind of λέξις ἐρωτική is the second type, which shows some smart examples of *double entendre*. The third type, not attached to any context and not easily detected either, is hardly to be found in Sophoclean satyr plays except for one or two rather feeble instances.

The picture that we get of the λέξις ἐρωτική in Sophoclean satyr plays does not deviate from the picture we get of the λέξις ἐρωτική in Aeschylean and Euripidean satyr plays.[47] On the contrary, it confirms the opinion that the λέξις ἐρωτική is an essential characteristic of the classical satyr play. In comedy we find the λέξις ἐρωτική, and especially

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[43] If we read ἰωδή, the pig is called 'green' or 'rust-coloured'.

[44] According to Schreurer and Kansteiner (in KPS 264–265) it is likely that Heracles makes a sacrifice to Demeter before he descends into the underworld.

[45] Henderson 1991, 8, 9, 21, 60, 81, 131–132, 177. Cf. A. Fragm. inc. 309, 1; 310, 2; 311, 1.

[46] Schreurer and Kansteiner in: KPS, 264, n. 13.

[47] On the λέξις ἐρωτική in the satyr plays of Aeschylus and Euripides, see Slenders 1992 and 2005.

type I, abundantly and far more frequently than in satyr plays, whereas in tragedy it is almost completely absent. So we can speak of a *differentia* in satyr play with regard to this stylistic feature.

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PRAXITHEA: A PERFECT MOTHER?

ANNETTE HARDER

Presumably in the late 420's BC,[1] Euripides wrote his *Erechtheus*, one of the so-called patriotic plays, in which the wife of the Athenian king Erechtheus held a famous speech in which she offered one of her daughters to be sacrificed for the salvation of Athens. The plot of the play has been reconstructed by means of the fragments and testimonia and some other sources about the myth of Erechtheus[2] and is roughly as follows.[3] Eumolpus, the son of Poseidon and Chione, invaded Attica with an army of Thracians. The king of Athens was Erechtheus, who was married to Praxithea, the daughter of Cephisus. He went to Delphi when the army threatened to enter the town and consulted the oracle to find out what he should do to win the war. The oracle told him that before the fight began he should sacrifice his daughter.[4] Presumably Erechtheus was doubtful or even reluctant to perform this sacrifice, but his wife was all in favour of it. When the daughter was sacrificed her sisters killed themselves as well, because they had pledged an oath that if one of them were to die the others would kill themselves. Besides, Erechtheus, though he defeated the Thracians, died by means of Poseidon's trident and was swallowed by the earth. Then Poseidon destroyed the royal palace by an earthquake and Praxithea was utterly devastated by all these disasters. At the end of the play Athena explained to her

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[1] On the date see recently Cropp 1995, 155; Jouan-Van Looy 2000, 98f.; Kannicht 2004, 394. It may be added that the play's contents would fit the late 420's well, since the *Cresphontes* of 430–424 BC contains a similar longing for peace as in F 369 and F 453 (see also Di Benedetto 1971, 149f.) and also *Suppl.*488ff. and Aristophanes' *Pax* of 421 and *Georgoi* of 424 may be related. The focus on Athens is found also in the *Heraclidae* and *Supplices* from the 420's.

[2] For the evidence see Lycurg. *Leoc.* 98–101 (fourth century BC) and the other sources mentioned by the various editors of the fragments and most recently collected by Kannicht 2004, 391ff.

[3] For further discussion of the play's reconstruction see recently Cropp 1995, 148ff.; Jouan-Van Looy 2000, 100ff.

[4] F 360 presupposes that in the *Erechtheus* one daughter was to be sacrificed, but the mythographic evidence is by no means unanimous; see Cropp 1995,150; Jouan-Van Looy 2000,97.

that the family would play an important part in the Athenian cults: the daughters would be honoured as the Hyacinthides and turned into the Hyades by a catasterismus; Erechtheus would receive a cult as Poseidon Erechtheus; Praxithea would become the first priestess of Athena Polias. The enemy Eumolpus would become a priest in Eleusis.[5]

Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 98–101 (fourth century BC), who is our main source for the plot's outline, quotes the speech of Praxithea (F 360) with great approval, promising its readers: ὄψεσθε γὰϱ ἐν αὐτοῖς (sc. the lines spoken by Praxithea) μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ γενναιότητα ἀξίαν καὶ τῆς πόλεως καὶ τοῦ γενέσθαι Κηφισοῦ θυγατέϱα, while Plutarch, *Praecepta gerenda reipublica* 14, 809d εὐγενὲς καὶ φϱονήματος μεγάλου τὸ ἀναφωνῆσαι "φιλῶ τέκνα, ἀλλὰ πατϱίδ᾽ ἐμὴν μᾶλλον φιλῶ" (F 360a) probably is equally enthusiastic about Praxithea.[6] However, Lycurgus in the fourth century BC was eager to revive Athenian patriotism and after the battle of Chaeronea, when the survival of Athens was at stake, other orators too praised the sacrifice of Erechtheus. It is therefore conceivable that Lycurgus ignored the speech's context and that Euripides' treatment was not so unambiguously patriotic.[7] In fact the play's plot as well as Praxithea's speech invite questions. At a human level the plot, which leads to the destruction and demoralisation of the royal family, is grim and one may wonder whether the cultic practices announced by Athena were any compensation for the now widowed and childless Praxithea. The role of Praxithea is also problematic. The fact that the mother stimulates the girl's sacrifice is striking and even shocking, at least to us. The question whether the Athenians saw this differently and were more sensitive to the Athenian interests which were at stake and to the cultic compensation at the end of the play is not so easy to answer, but, as we now know thanks to the papyrus fragments in F 370, the end of the play suggests that Euripides certainly drew attention to the cruelty of Praxithea's fate and to her despair (cf. particularly F 370, 35 ff.).

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[5] It should be noted also that a sequence of a. messenger-speech about the daughter's sacrifice; b. report of the victory and death of Erechtheus and the death of the sisters; c. destruction of the palace by Poseidon would provide an attractive dramatic climax, as the sacrifice would give hope of the victory and was in fact a necessary condition for it, but should not be 'spoilt' immediately by the death of the other girls. This sequence would also fit in with the notion that the other girls had 'fallen' in F 370, 27 (see also Cropp 1995, 151).

[6] On the plausible attribution of this fragment, which is paraphrased by Lycurgus, to the *Erechtheus* see now Kannicht ad loc.

[7] For the idea that Lycurgus quotes the speech out of context see also O'Connor-Visser 1987, 156.

The play definitely did not end with an unequivocally happy patriotic mother enjoying her role in the salvation of Athens.

In the past the speech of Praxithea has been interpreted in various ways and a clear survey of the different points of view is offered by Cropp 1995, 154f. Scholars like O'Connor-Visser and Wilkins[8] seem to accept the speech at face value, which would imply that the play celebrated the Athenian ideology of a sacrificing royal family, living on in cult and setting an example. Also Parker 1987, 202 speaks about 'a work deeply imbued with the patriotic values of the funeral speeches' and regards Praxithea as an example for the Athenian citizens. A more balanced view is found in Cropp 1995, 148 and 155, who regards the events as 'a glorious, but costly moment' of Athenian history, which has a tragic dimension, because personal interests must be sacrificed for the sake of the community, and observes that 'Euripides has made the mythical event uneasy and problematic.' Other scholars are more or less critical of the speech itself. Thus Kamerbeek 1991, 112 speaks about the 'patriotisme dur, aveugle et exulté d'une mère'; Harder 1993, 175 about 'einem dem Wahnsinn nahen Anruf an die Stadt' at the end of the speech (see also Harder 1993, 339), and Jouan-Van Looy 2000, 110 describes Praxithea as 'une des ces implacables raisonneuses du theâtre d' Euripide' and on 112 mentions her 'patriotisme exalté', but of these scholars only Harder 1993 really discusses the consequences of her view for the play as a whole. Another group of scholars, like Di Benedetto 1971, 145ff. and Vellacott 1975, 194ff., offers an 'ironic' interpretation of the play and states that the fall of the family shows that the values adhered to were wrong and that Praxithea's speech was misguided, so that the play's message is in fact pacifistic.

Any interpretation should take into account that on the one hand the patriotic views expressed in the speech must be taken seriously within the context of the Peloponnesian War and the political situation in Athens in the 420's, which the Athenians could easily compare to the Thracian threats of Erechtheus' time. On the other hand it should also do justice to the feelings of unease to which Praxithea's speech could lead and to the sequence of events, which leaves her bereft and desperate at the end of the play. In this article I want to investigate what, if anything, an Athenian audience might have found disturbing in Praxithea's speech by first analyzing what Praxithea is saying and

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[8] See O'Connor-Visser 1987,169ff. and Wilkins 1990,189.

then comparing it with Euripides' treatment of the sacrifice of children in other plays and particularly with the arguments which his other characters, parents as well as children, are offering for or against the sacrifices. Thus one might get a little closer to the expectations the Athenians would have had of the proper reactions in such contexts and possibly find some clues which could help the interpretation of the speech.

The Speech of Praxithea

Euripides *Erechtheus* F 360 Kannicht:

τὰς χάριτας ὅστις εὐγενῶς χαρίζεται,
ἥδιον ἐν βροτοῖσιν· οἳ δὲ δρῶσι μέν,
χρόνωι δὲ δρῶσι, δυσγενέστερον ⟨ ⟩.
ἐγὼ δὲ δώσω παῖδα τὴν ἐμὴν κτανεῖν.
5 λογίζομαι δὲ πολλά· πρῶτα μὲν πόλιν
οὐκ ἄν τιν' ἄλλην τῆσδε βελτίω λαβεῖν
ἧι πρῶτα μὲν λεὼς οὐκ ἐπακτὸς ἄλλοθεν,
αὐτόχθονες δ' ἔφυμεν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι πόλεις
πεσσῶν ὁμοίως διαφοραῖς ἐκτισμέναι
10 ἄλλαι παρ' ἄλλων εἰσὶν εἰσαγώγιμοι.
ὅστις δ' ἀπ' ἄλλης πόλεος οἰκήσηι πόλιν,
ἁρμὸς πονηρὸς ὥσπερ ἐν ξύλωι παγείς,
λόγωι πολίτης ἐστί, τοῖς δ' ἔργοισιν οὔ.
ἔπειτα τέκνα τοῦδ' ἕκατι τίκτομεν,
15 ὡς θεῶν τε βωμοὺς πατρίδα τε ῥυώμεθα.
πόλεως δ' ἁπάσης τοὔνομ' ἕν, πολλοὶ δέ νιν
ναίουσι· τούτους πῶς διαφθεῖραί με χρὴ
ἐξὸν προπάντων μίαν ὑπερδοῦναι θανεῖν;
εἴπερ γὰρ ἀριθμὸν οἶδα καὶ τοὐλάσσονος
20 τὸ μεῖζον, † ἑνὸς † οἶκος οὐ πλέον σθένει
πταίσας ἁπάσης πόλεος οὐδ' ἴσον φέρει.
εἰ δ' ἦν ἐν οἴκοις ἀντὶ θηλειῶν στάχυς
ἄρσην, πόλιν δὲ πολεμία κατεῖχε φλόξ,
οὐκ ἄν νιν ἐξέπεμπον εἰς μάχην δορός,
25 θάνατον προταρβοῦσ'; ἀλλ' ἔμοιγ' εἴη τέκνα
⟨ἃ⟩ καὶ μάχοιτο καὶ μετ' ἀνδράσιν πρέποι,
μὴ σχήματ' ἄλλως ἐν πόλει πεφυκότα.
τὰ μητέρων δὲ δάκρυ' ὅταν πέμπηι τέκνα,
πολλοὺς ἐθήλυν' εἰς μάχην ὁρμωμένους.
30 μισῶ γυναῖκας αἵτινες πρὸ τοῦ καλοῦ
† ζῆν παῖδας εἵλοντο καὶ παρήινεσαν κακά.
καὶ μὴν θανόντες γ' ἐν μάχηι πολλῶν μέτα

τύμβον τε κοινὸν ἔλαχον εὔκλειάν τ᾽ ἴσην·
τῆμῆι δὲ παιδὶ στέφανος εἷς μιᾶι μόνηι
35 πόλεως θανούσηι τῆσδ᾽ ὑπερδοθήσεται,
καὶ τὴν τεκοῦσαν καὶ σὲ δύο θ᾽ ὁμοσπόρω
σώσει· τί τούτων οὐχὶ δέξασθαι καλόν;
τὴν οὐκ ἐμὴν ⟨ ⟩ πλὴν φύσει δώσω κόρην
θῦσαι πρὸ γαίας. εἰ γὰρ αἱρεθήσεται
40 πόλις, τί παίδων τῶν ἐμῶν μέτεστί μοι;
οὔκουν ἅπαντα τοὐν γ᾽ ἐμοὶ σωθήσεται;
† ἄρξουσί τ᾽ ἄλλοι, τήνδ᾽ ἐγὼ σώσω πόλιν.
ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ οὖ ⟨τὸ⟩ πλεῖστον ἐν κοινῶι μέρος,
οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ἑκούσης τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἄτερ
45 προγόνων παλαιὰ θέσμ᾽ ὅστις ἐκβαλεῖ·
οὐδ᾽ ἀντ᾽ ἐλαίας χρυσέας τε Γοργόνος
τρίαιναν ὀρθὴν στᾶσαν ἐν πόλεως βάθροις
Εὔμολπος οὐδὲ Θρῆιξ ἀναστέψει λεὼς
στεφάνοισι, Παλλὰς δ᾽ οὐδαμοῦ τιμήσεται.
50 χρῆσθ᾽, ὦ πολῖται, τοῖς ἐμοῖς λοχεύμασιν,
σώιζεσθε, νικᾶτ᾽· ἀντὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς μιᾶς
οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως οὐ τήνδ᾽ ἐγὼ σώσω πόλιν.
ὦ πατρίς, εἴθε πάντες οἳ ναίουσί σε
οὕτω φιλοῖεν ὡς ἐγώ· καὶ ῥαιδίως
55 οἰκοῖμεν ἄν σε κοὐδὲν ἂν πάσχοις κακόν.

When someone renders favours in the noble way, it is gratifying to others. When they act but do so slowly, ⟨this is⟩ ill-bred. I, then, shall give my daughter to be killed.

I take many things into account, and first of all, that I could not find any other city better than this. To begin with, we are an autochthonous people, not introduced from elsewhere; other communities, founded as it were through board-game moves, are imported, different ones from different places. Now someone who settles in one city from another is like a peg ill-fitted in a piece of wood—a citizen in name, but not in his actions.

Secondly, our very reason for bearing children is to safeguard the gods' altars and our homeland. The city as a whole has just a single name, but its inhabitants are many; how can it be right for me to destroy them when I can give one girl to die for all? If I can count and distinguish larger from smaller, † one person's † family does not lament more if it falls than a whole city, nor does it suffer an equal affliction.

If our family included a crop of male children instead of females, and the flame of war was gripping our city, would I be refusing to send them out to battle for fear of their deaths? No, give me sons who would not only fight but stand out amongst the men and not be mere figures raised in the city to no use. When mothers' tears send children on their way, they

soften many men as they leave for battle. I detest women who choose life rather than virtue for their sons, or exhort them to cowardice. And sons, if they die in battle, earn a common tomb and equal glory shared with many others; my daughter, though, will be awarded one crown for herself alone when she dies for this city, and will save her mother, and you, and her two sisters: which of these things is not a fine reward?

The girl, not mine in fact except through birth, I shall give to be sacrificed in defence of our land. If the city is captured, what share in my children have I then? Shall not the whole then be saved, so far as is in my power? (And others will govern, I shall save this city.) And as for the matter in which the public has the greatest stake: there is none who shall with my consent † … † cast out our ancestors' ancient institutions, nor in place of the olive and the golden Gorgon shall Eumolpus or his Thracian folk plant the trident in the city's foundations and crown it with garlands, and Pallas be not at all honoured.

Citizens, make use of the offspring of my womb, be saved, be victorious! To spare one life I shall surely not refuse to save our city. My homeland, I wish that all your inhabitants loved you as I do: then we would dwell in you untroubled, and you would never be subjected to harm (Translation: M.J. Cropp).

A brief survey of this speech shows that it contains a number of patriotic arguments, which are also familiar from funeral speeches.[9] In 1–4 Praxithea begins with an introduction, in which she states that one must be eager, not slow to offer one's services and that she is willing to sacrifice her child. In 5–13 she offers her first argument, the argument of the 'autochthony' of Athens, which was an important element of Athenian patriotic rhetoric in the fifth century BC. The fact that the Athenians had always lived in Attica was supposed to make them special and better than all other people and is mentioned also in e.g. Thucydides 2,36,1 in the funeral speech of Pericles.[10] In 14–21 Praxithea's second argument is that children must protect their country, and that the life of one child should not take away the lives of many others. Getting children, according to Praxithea, is a means to protect the altars and the country and the interests of one child and one family are subjected to the interests of the whole community. In 22–33 she adstructs this view by drawing attention to the fact that she would also send her sons to the war and that she would like to have children who were excelling in

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[9] See e.g. Schmitt 1921, 33; O'Connor-Visser 1987, 170; Harder 1993, 161ff. and 174f.; Jouan-Van Looy 2000, 111 with n. 41 and the references in the commentaries by Martinez Diez, Carrara and Cropp.

[10] See further Loraux 1986, *passim*; Rusten 1989 on Thuc. 2,36,1.

battle and were an asset to the town. She says that she despises women who keep their children for themselves and prevent their going into the war. In 34–37 she mentions the glory her daughter will acquire through the sacrifice and the fact that she will save her mother, her two sisters and Erechtheus. In 38–49 she continues that the girl does not really belong to her, but is hers only by birth and that therefore she will sacrifice her for the benefit of Athens. If the town is taken, children will be of no use to her anyway, and so she will do what she can to save the town and not allow the old institutions to be destroyed and the town to be taken by Eumolpus. The notion of the old institutions again recalls Pericles' funeral speech in Thucydides 2,37–38 and the notion that personal happiness is possible only when the community is thriving, so that personal survival is of less importance than the survival of the town, is mentioned by Pericles in Thucydides 2,60,2–4. At the end, in 50–55, Praxithea offers a final exhortation to the sacrifice, in which she repeatedly draws attention to her role as the town's saviour.

A few elements are particularly striking in this speech. First of all there is the strong emphasis on Praxithea's own role as the saviour of Athens and her exemplary behaviour in 1–4, 17–18, 38–42, 50–55, and her harsh judgment of women who think and feel otherwise in 28–31. Especially at the beginning and the end of the speech Praxithea presents herself as a wonderful example of patriotism and the repeated use of verbs of 'saving' and 'giving' to indicate her intentions seems to underline the altruistic view she wants to present of herself.[11] Secondly, her view of her daughter is limited to the girl as an instrument produced by her to save the town, particularly in 14f. and 38, while in 38 τὴν οὐκ ἐμὴν ⟨ ⟩ πλὴν φύσει δώσω κόρην the natural connection between parents and children seems to be treated as something not worth considering and in 50 χρῆσθε … τοῖς ἐμοῖς λοχεύμασιν and 51 ψυχῆς μιᾶς the girl is described in terms which seem to rob her of all individuality and status as a person.[12] In the third place Praxithea mentions all the right patriotic arguments, and what she says is ideologically correct and in line with the way in which the Athenians must have thought about themselves and their city.

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[11] Cf. 37 σώσει, 41 σωθήσεται, 42 σώσω, 51 σώιζεσθε and 55 σώσω; 4 and 38 δώσω, 18 δοῦναι and 35 δοθήσεται.

[12] See also O'Connor-Visser 1987,170 'the daughter of Praxithea is an impersonal object in this discourse'. The commentaries of Martinez Diez (1976) and Carrara (1977) do not discuss the implications of λοχεύμασιν, but only observe that the plural is used instead of the singular and refer to some examples of this usage.

For readers in the twentieth or twenty-first century an obvious first reaction may be to reject this speech as chilly and narcissistic and perhaps to regard Praxithea as an example of the 'pathological female saviour,' who pretends to be concerned about the salvation of the community, but in fact is only interested in her own glorious role and is unable to have normal feelings like love for her children.[13] An other tempting view may be to think that under the pressure of circumstances Praxithea is forcing herself to accept the sacrifice and therefore cheats herself into regarding it as noble and glorious. All this is somewhat impressionistic and hard to prove, but comparison with other passages may help us a little further.

Views on Sacrifices

In Euripides the theme of sacrificing children or young people during a crisis is popular and has received considerable scholarly attention already.[14] In this paper I have chosen for comparison the discussions about child-sacrifices in the *Heraclidae*, the *Phoenissae* and the *Iphigeneia in Aulis*.[15] Although of these plays only the *Heraclidae* of ca. 430 BC had been written before the *Erechtheus* and was also set in an Athenian context, one may assume that the feelings on child-sacrifice in all three plays were familiar enough to a fifth century BC audience to serve as a background against which to read the speech of Praxithea. Besides, as Wilkins 1990,178 observed, the *Heraclidae* may have set the pattern. In all plays more or less 'responsible' senior persons, Iolaus and Demophon, Creon, and Agamemnon, Menelaus and Clytaemnestra

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[13] See e.g. Webster 1967, 130, who observes that 'to the modern ear' Praxithea's speech is 'unforgivable'; Harder 1993, 338 n. 24 'diese Aussagen stehen im schärfsten Gegensatz zur Mutterliebe'.

[14] See Harder 1986, 32 n. 20 and for subsequent treatments e.g. O'Connor-Visser 1987; Wilkins 1990.

[15] The *Hecuba* has been left out of consideration, because for Hecabe there is no clash of interests between a common cause for which she feels a certain amount of responsibility and her daughter's life. As observed by Wilkins 1990,189 there is also a difference between the Athenian *Heraclidae* and *Erechtheus* on the one hand and the *Phoenissae* and *Iphigeneia in Aulis* on the other hand. In these latter plays the setting is Thebes and Aulis and the behaviour of rulers like Eteocles and Agamemnon creates a more ambiguous context for the sacrifice. Even so, an investigation of the arguments of the parents *qua* parent seems profitable.

respectively, react to the sacrifice of the younger persons, 'Macaria', Menoeceus and Iphigeneia.

The first reactions of the senior persons in the *Heraclidae* and *Phoenissae* are very much alike. In *Heraclidae* 410ff. the Athenian king Demophon explicitly rejects the demand to sacrifice his daughter: he states that he will not do this and will not ask it from one of his citizens either. In 411, παῖδα δ' οὔτ' ἐμὴν κτενῶ may be contrasted with Praxithea's offer in F 360, 4 ἐγὼ δὲ δώσω παῖδα τὴν ἐμὴν κτανεῖν. In 413f., Demophon wonders quite emphatically ἑκὼν δὲ τίς κακῶς οὕτω φρονεῖ, | ὅστις τὰ φίλτατ' ἐκ χερῶν δώσει τέκνα, thus drawing attention to the normal feelings of parents towards their children and rejecting the notion of 'giving' them away which is so prominent in Praxithea's speech. In 435ff., Iolaus agrees with him and in 453ff. he even offers himself for sacrifice so that the children will be saved ἔμ' ἔκδος Ἀργείοισιν ἀντὶ τῶνδ', ἄναξ, | καὶ μήτε κινδύνευε σωθήτω τέ μοι | τέκνα. In 539ff., when 'Macaria' has offered to die, Iolaus expresses his feelings of sadness and both he and Demophon praise her courage. Thus the girl is presented as a distinct personality, who arouses feelings of love and respect in those around her, and the feelings of sadness and reluctance in Iolaus and Demophon form the background against which her heroic decision is displayed. In *Phoenissae* 915ff. Creon reacts in a similar way when Teiresias tells him that his son Menoeceus must be sacrificed in order to save Thebes: he does not want to know about it and prefers the fall of Thebes to the death of his son. In 962ff. he offers arguments for his decision, stating that sons are an important part of one's life and that οὐδ' ἂν τὸν αὐτοῦ παῖδά τις δοίη κτανεῖν (966). Again the contrast with F 360,4 is striking and in view of the sentiments expressed in Praxithea's speech it is also significant that Creon declares that he does not want to acquire fame because of killing his child, but would prefer to be killed himself (967ff.). At the end of his speech in 470ff. he urges Menoeceus to leave the town and 475 ἔστι τοι σωτηρία shows once again that his child's survival is what he cares about, again in contrast with Praxithea's epilogue in F 360, 50ff. Both plays thus show us a man who is primarily guided by love and respect for the child which is in danger of being sacrificed and is revolted by the notion of killing the child. To a certain extent this rejection of the sacrifice must of course be part of the rhetoric of the play in which the unselfish heroism of 'Macaria' and Menoeceus is set off against the attitude of their elders. Even so, for Athenian parents the reactions of Demophon, Iolaus and Creon, though less patriotic than those of the young victims, were probably easy to identify with.

In the *Iphigeneia in Aulis* the situation is more complex, since Aga-
memnon's attitude towards the sacrifice is ambivalent. In 87 ff. it is told
how at first he did not want to sacrifice his daughter, but that Menelaus
convinced him to do it and that later he regretted his decision and
decided not to kill Iphigeneia. Menelaus, on the other hand, in 358 ff.
emphasizes that Agamemnon was only too glad to sacrifice his daugh-
ter when the opportunity was offered to him. Altogether Agamemnon
is presented as weak and vacillating and eventually he is forced to a
decision because he cannot control his own army (Eur. *IA* 1255 ff.). Even
so, however, he shows that he loves his daughter and speaks about her
as a precious individual, whose loss will make him very sad (e.g. 460 ff.,
677 ff. and 744 f. κἀπὶ τοῖσι φιλτάτοις | τέχνας πορίζω). Clytaemnestra
on her part declares Agamemnon mad (873 ff.) and expresses her feel-
ings with great emphasis in e.g. 1171 ff., visualizing the empty space left
in the palace at Argos after Iphigeneia's death.

Although the details differ and the situation in the *Iphigeneia in Aulis* is
somewhat different because, unlike the other plays, it does not feature
a town which is threatened with destruction, this survey does show the
kind of feelings that parents in tragedy usually express when confronted
with the demand to sacrifice a child.[16] Their first impulse is to reject
the child's death and they all show signs of love and respect for the
child as an individual human being.[17] The difference with the speech of
Praxithea is obvious.

Also Praxithea's description of her attitude in F 360a φιλῶ τέκν᾽,
ἀλλὰ πατρίδ᾽ ἐμὴν μᾶλλον φιλῶ, which was admired by Lycurgus and
Plutarch, may be compared with passages in other plays by Euripides.
In *Hercules Furens* 280 ἐγὼ φιλῶ μὲν τέκνα· πῶς γὰρ οὐ φιλῶ | ἅτικτον,
ἀμόχθησα Megara speaks thus when she accepts that she and her
children must die and that there is no way to escape their fate, but
she leaves no doubt about her feelings for her children and the strong

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[16] More examples of the 'normal' attitude of parents towards their children's death
may also be found in e.g. *HF* 454 ff., where Megara, expecting to die soon together
with her sons, describes the children and the plans she and Heracles had for their
future and expresses her sorrow; *Med.* 1019 ff., where Medea in spite of her intent to
kill her children reveals her affection for them and her sadness at their loss (see also
Vellacott 1975, 196).

[17] An exception is perhaps *Phoen.* 1060 f. γενοίμεθ᾽ ὧδε ματέρες | γενοίμεθ᾽ εὔτεκνοι,
spoken by the chorus, which has just expressed its admiration for Menoeceus, who
made the town victorious in spite of bringing sadness to his father. However, the
implication could be that the chorus would just like to have children like Menoeceus,
not necessarily to sacrifice them.

bond created by their birth. In *Iphigeneia in Aulis* 1256 φιλῶ τ᾽ ἐμαυτοῦ τέκνα· μαινοίμην γὰϱ ἄν Agamemnon uses the phrase to introduce the speech in which he explains that in spite of his love for her he must sacrifice Iphigeneia because of the pressure of the army. For Megara and Agamemnon real or imagined necessities overrule the love for their children and their natural impulse to protect them, whereas F 360a suggests that Praxithea rather coldly declared that another love was greater than the love for her children. Because we do not have the context of F 360a it cannot be established whether the phrase was perhaps presented in a somewhat less harsh light in the play, but in any case the contrast with the other parents is striking and fits in with the evidence from F 360.

If the parents' arguments may be contrasted with those of Praxithea, the young people who sacrifice themselves in their turn offer arguments which are very similar to those mentioned by Praxithea.[18] Thus we find the notion that one life should not stand in the way of the general good in *Iphigeneia in Aulis* 1390 ἡ δ᾽ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ μί᾽ οὖσα πάντα κωλύσει τάδε, which recalls particularly F 360, 17f. and 51 ἀντί … ψυχῆς μιᾶς. The idea that others also exert themselves and that therefore one should contribute something as well is found in Heraclidae 503–506 (where 'Macaria' states that as the Athenians exert themselves on behalf of the Heraclids, she ought to do something in return).[19] The idea that a child does not belong to its mother is expressed by Iphigeneia in *Iphigeneia in Aulis* 1386 πᾶσι γάρ μ᾽ Ἕλλησι κοινὸν ἔτεκες, οὐχὶ σοὶ μόνηι.[20] The claim of his own virtue is made by Menoeceus in the *Phoenissae* in terms which strongly recall the end of Praxithea's speech in F 360, 53–55.[21] The urge to victory which Praxithea expresses in F 360, 51 νιϰᾶτε resembles *Heraclidae* 530 νιϰᾶτε δ᾽ ἐχθϱούς near the end of 'Macaria's' speech and the frequent use of the notions of 'giving' one's life and 'saving' the community in the speeches of the young victims also recalls Praxithea's speech.[22]

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[18] For a survey see Schmitt 1921, 28–41.

[19] Cf. also *Phoen.* 999–1005; *IA* 1387–1390.

[20] Cf. *Phoen.* 1015–1018 εἰ γὰρ λαβὼν ἕκαστος ὅτι δύναιτό τις | χρηστὸν διέλθοι τοῦτο κεἰς κοινὸν φέϱοι | πατϱίδι, κακῶν ἂν αἱ πόλεις ἐλασσόνων | πειρώμεναι τὸ λοιπὸν εὐτυχοῖεν ἄν. Cf. for this notion also Dem. 18,205, adduced by e.g. Stockert 1992 on *IA* 1386.

[21] Another reminder of the myth of Erechtheus may be found in *Phoen.* 852–857, where Teiresias tells Creon that he has just arrived Ἐϱεχθειδῶν ἄπο (852), where he helped the Athenians to a victory over Eumolpus.

[22] Cf. for the idea of 'giving' *Heracl.* 550f. τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχὴν ἐγὼ | δίδωμ᾽; 579f.; *Phoen.*

Thus we see that in the *Erechtheus* Praxithea is using arguments which are elsewhere used by the children who give their own life. While not showing the expected reaction of a parent, she seems to assume the role of the child, disposing of its life as if it really were hers to give and claiming its status as a saviour. In this way she not only denies herself her role as a mother, who is expected to protect and cherish her child, but also deprives the girl of her individuality and the opportunity to display her heroism like the other victims. Thus she virtually 'kills' her by means of her speech even before the actual sacrifice.[23]

Within the *Erechtheus* Praxithea's view probably was not the only view expressed. It has been argued that presumably Erechtheus expressed the opposite view when he came back from the oracle in Delphi and told Praxithea its message.[24] Thus the pattern in which person A (usually the parent or another senior person) is against the sacrifice and person B (usually the child) declares him- or herself willing would here be transposed to the royal couple. It is not clear whether the girl, who had to agree to the sacrifice to make it effective,[25] was also allowed to say much on the proceedings, but F 358 οὐκ ἔστι μητρὸς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τέκνοις· | ἐρᾶτε μητρός, παῖδες, ὡς οὐκ ἔστ' ἔρως | τοιοῦτος ἄλλος ὅστις ἡδίων ἐρᾶν suggests that the girls were addressed by Erechtheus or another character and that the normal relations between mothers and children were mentioned in the play, perhaps as a foil for Praxithea's speech.

At the end of the play Praxithea herself seems to realize the impact of what she has done.[26] In a lament in F 370, 23 ff., from a column

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998 ψυχήν τε δώσω τῆσδ' ὑπερθανὼν χθονός, which particularly recalls F 360, 18; *IA* 1397; for the idea of 'saving' *Heracl.* 506 παρόν σφε σῶσαι; 577; 588; *Phoen.*997.

[23] For a somewhat different approach see Harder 1993, 175 and 339 ff., who thinks that Praxithea is using arguments from the world of men, which do not suit her as a woman, and that therefore she can find no consolation in the ultimate salvation of the town when her family is lost. However, the evidence from the other plays suggests that the arguments for and against the sacrifice of children cannot be arranged so neatly according to expectations based on the speaker's gender.

[24] See e.g. O'Connor-Visser 1987, 156; Jouan-Van Looy 2000, 103.

[25] See Harder 1986, 26 with further references in n. 20; Cropp 1995, 151; Jouan-Van Looy 2000, 104 f.

[26] After the *editio princeps* by Austin 1967 early discussions of the fragments, like those by Van Looy 1970 and Kamerbeek 1970, focused on the text, whereas Treu 1971 discussed the fragments in their political and religious context, but did not consider their impact for the interpretation of Praxithea's speech. O'Connor-Visser 1987, 174 did address this issue, but regarded the end of the play simply as patriotic, without considering the implications of the text in detail. The fragments' interpretation might

of which little is left, she mentions her daughters in 25 ἐμὰς κόρας. In the better preserved sequel in 36 ff. she wonders whether she must direct herself towards her country or her daughters first, but focuses on the latter αἰαῖ· τίν' ἐπὶ πρῶτον, ἢ σὲ τὰν πάτραν ἢ σὲ τὰν φίλαν | παρθένων †δραμωνφρ[...]μανει τάφωι | .ακ..α μέλεα προσεῖδον. In these lines the audience may be reminded of F 360a, where Praxithea said that she loved her country more than her children, and observe how her lament now tells a different tale. The use of φίλαν suggests that she now expresses her maternal feelings and 40 f. σὲ τὰν πρὸ πόλεως | τὸν ἀνίερον ἀνίερον ὅσιον ἀνόσιον suggests a more complex view of the sacrifice and what it implied. It is only Athena as *deus ex machina* now who refers to Praxithea as a saviour in the plausibly supplied 63 ὦ χθονὸς [σώτειρα Κηφισοῦ] κόρη and in 95 σοι ..., ἢ πόλεως τῆςδ' ἐξανώρθωσας βάθρα, whereas the last remaining bits of text in 114 ff. (Athena:) ἀλλ' ἴσχε.[| οἰκτρὰς ἀυ[τ | καὶ ταπε[| (Praxithea:) δέσποινα .[| ο]ἰκτροὶ με[suggest that Praxithea is still fully aware of the sadness of the situation.

Conclusion

The analysis of Praxithea's speech and the comparison with other sacrifice-scenes in Euripides suggest that the speech in a subtle way denies Praxithea her role as a mother and the daughter her role as a child and an individual. On this account it may well have been disturbing for an Athenian audience, and this, in fact, fits in with the end of the play, where Praxithea herself also seems to realize the full impact of what has happened and finds that her rigid patriotic attitude has destroyed her family and herself even though it has led to the salvation of Athens. Concerning the play as a whole these results must be a warning against taking the speech at face value as just an admirable display of patriotism. They confirm the observation of Cropp 1995, 155: 'There remains … an impression that Euripides has made the mythical event uneasy and problematic, shading the public and historical imperatives of Athenian ideology with a recognition of their human cost to individuals'. Within the larger framework of the play Praxithea's speech is, at a micro-level, emblematic of precisely this dilemma.

well profit from further careful analysis of the text, e.g. in passages like F 370, 41 f., where Cropp's comments indicate the extent and implications of the uncertainties.

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[27] For a more extensive bibliography see Cropp 1995,148; Jouan-Van Looy 2000,113f.

PHAEDRA'S DECLARATION OF LOVE
TO HIPPOLYTUS (SENECA, *PHAEDRA* 589–719)

MARC VAN DER POEL

On April 1, 2004 the Nijmegen Classics Department organized a workshop for postgraduate students on Seneca's *Phaedra*. Ton Kessels and I spoke at this meeting for an audience of Ph.D. students from Dutch universities about the character Phaedra in the plays of Euripides and Seneca, more specifically Phaedra's *rhesis* in Euripides (vs. 373–430) and Phaedra's declaration of love to Hippolytus in Seneca (vs. 589–719). Contributions by other colleagues dealt with the reception of Seneca's plays in early modern Europe and the adaptation of Seneca's *Phaedra* by the Flemish author and playwright Hugo Claus.

The article that follows is a revised version of my lecture. Our workshop was an interesting meeting—such as there are too few in contemporary university education—in which teaching and research linked up with each other beautifully. I hope that this contribution will help Ton to remember not only his own fine lecture on this day, but also the lively discussions and, of course, the good company and drinks after the conclusion of the official part of the day.

Seneca's prose works clearly show his profound interest in drama, and tragedy in particular.[1] Note, for instance, in the following text his awareness that the imitation of emotion was an important characteristic of good theatrical art:

> '*Orator*' inquit '*iratus aliquando melior est.*' *Immo imitatus iratum; nam et histriones in pronuntiando non irati populum mouent, sed iratum bene agentes.* (*De ira* 2.17.1)

> 'The orator', you say, 'at times does better when he is angry'. Not so, but when he pretends to be angry. For the actor likewise stirs an audience by his declamation not when he is angry, but when he plays well the rôle of the angry man. (transl. J. Basore, Loeb)

Seneca's interest in this important characteristic of Roman drama need not to surprise us. The study of the *affectus* indisputably forms common ground between the philosophical works and the tragedies. In both

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[1] Rozelaar 1976, 522–523.

parts of Seneca's work human emotions and the ways in which they can become a destructive force in our lives are important topics.

In Seneca's version of the Phaedra myth the inner struggle between the main character's *furor* and her *ratio* is the central theme. From her first appearance on the stage Phaedra shows herself to be an unhappy figure, not only because she lives in a foreign country and is married to her kin's enemy—and to make things worse, her husband has left her for the underworld to seek, as she sees it, illicit love[2]—, but also because she herself fosters a terrible, unnatural love for her stepson, who, moreover, will never be able to answer this love (85–128). In the course of the play Seneca continuously shows how Phaedra's inner conflict, that is, the knowledge that her love is forbidden and unattainable (*ratio*) against her inability and in some cases maybe her unwillingness to resist this love (*furor*), expresses itself in her word choice and behaviour until, at the very end of the play,[3] she is ruined by it and commits suicide. Given the philosophical background of the author, the Phaedra character can be seen as an *exemplum* of human behaviour (Lefèvre) or even as a pathological case history (Leeman), but in my view it goes too far to claim, as Lefèvre does, that Seneca is merely interested in tragedy as a means to teach his philosophy without any regard for drama as an art form, or as Leeman does, that Seneca was not interested in the tragic characters as individuals, but merely saw them as expressions of attitudes and mental states.[4] On the contrary, Seneca brings Phaedra's passion to the stage in such a lifelike manner, that in my view it is easy for the reader or spectator[5] to empathize with her. The play would have lacked this quality if Seneca had only had a theoretical, philosophical interest in Phaedra's inner life, and if drama and stagecraft had not interested him for their own sake. In this contribution, I aim to show that the struggle between reason and emotion within the Phaedra character is portrayed consistently by Seneca with a clear eye for the human tragedy of a fatal love. Supposed incongruities or contradictions in the portrayal of her character should, in my view, be explained as expressions of her inner conflict, rather

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[2] Theseus had gone to the underworld with his friend Pirithous to assist him in abducting Proserpina.

[3] In Euripides' surviving play *Hippolytus* Phaedra commits suicide already at the end of the second episode.

[4] Lefèvre 1969, esp. 132–133; Leeman 1985, esp. 278.

[5] Whether or not the play was indeed staged in Seneca's time is not relevant in this context.

than be simply dismissed as evidence of Seneca's incompetence as a dramatist or his lack of interest in the genre.

Seneca's Phaedra knows that a passion rages within her, yet is powerless to control it; this passion will cause destruction, not only in her own life but also in that of her loved ones. When she first appears, Phaedra makes it clear that she realizes that her love for her stepson is not only forbidden, but also unattainable. Nevertheless, she will seek fulfilment of her love. This resolve will turn out to be fatal, for the reaction of her stepson—who is, unlike Euripides' Hippolytus, not manisfestly mysogynous from the beginning of the play—to her declaration of love will cause both his own death and hers. This is a striking difference with Euripides' play, in which Phaedra's love for Hippolytus is a punishment from the goddess Venus, occasioned by Hippolytus' distaste for her. Phaedra vainly tries to stand up to this divine punishment and chooses for death as a way out. In Euripides' view, her guilt must be traced back to the goddess, not, as in Seneca, to her own failure to bring her emotions in harmony with reason. In Seneca's play, the nurse plays a conspicuously more active role in her relationship with Phaedra than in Euripides' version. She causes Phaedra, in her emotionally unstable and therefore impressionable condition, to behave in a way that will prove to be fatal for both herself and Hippolytus. For it is she who inspires Phaedra to reveal her feelings to Hippolytus and, when he predictably responds in a negative way, it is she who devises the plot to pass the buck to Hippolytus. She thus shares Phaedra's responsibility for his death.

My observations will mainly concern Phaedra's declaration of love to Hippolytus in the second act (589–671),[6] together with Hippolytus' reaction (671–718). This scene does not appear in the surviving play by Euripides. It is conceivable that Seneca was the first to stage Phaedra's assault on Hippolytus and that this scene was the reason why Seneca wrote this play.[7] In my view, this scene proves Seneca's mastery as a playwright. It represents the climax of Phaedra's inner struggle, which makes her fatal situation irreversible. Seneca shows that Phaedra knows that Hippolytus, given his attitude to life, will never be able to answer her love, but still she tries desperately and with passion, spurred on by

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[6] My references in the text and the notes are to the Oxford text of Zwierlein (Zwierlein 1986).

[7] Mayer 1990, note at 671. It is possible that Phaedra's approach to Hippolytus is inspired on a similar scene in Euripides' first *Hippolytus*, which is lost (Barrett 1964, 37).

the nurse, to persuade him. Far from reaching her goal, she does not even succeed in making Hippolytus understand her for a long time, and when it finally gets through to him that she loves him, he reacts so violently that Phaedra's downfall (and his own, due to the nurse's plot) becomes inevitable.

But first let us take a look at what precedes. In her first appearance, immediately after the prologue (85 ff.), Phaedra recognizes in her desire for hunting her love for her stepson, which she compares with the unnatural, monstrous love that her mother Pasiphae felt for a beautiful bull. She considers herself to be more unhappy than her mother, because at least the love of her mother was reciprocated (119 *sed amabat aliquid*). Phaedra is aware that her love is scandalous (115 *infandum malum*, 126–127 *probris nefandis*, 128 *nefas*), but she does not announce that she wants to resist it. The nurse, shocked by this attitude, strongly appeals to Phaedra not to give in to her shameful desire (165 *amor impius*). She points out Phaedra's responsibility towards her husband and impresses on her that her scandalous affair will not remain hidden and unpunished. And even if it would, so the nurse pleads, Phaedra would never have a clear conscience if she were to succumb to her passion. Phaedra answers that she knows that the nurse is right, but that madness forces her to follow an evil course (177–178 *sed furor cogit sequi /peiora*). In the ensuing discussion Phaedra counters the nurse's arguments: she believes that Theseus will not return from the underworld and, without being able to motivate it, she counts on his clemency in the event that he should return unexpectedly. Against her better judgement, she moreover assumes that she will be able to seduce Hippolytus. After a short plea by the nurse, Phaedra suddenly senses that her feelings are scandalous: now she wants to salvage her good name and she contemplates suicide as her only way out (262–263). As Mayer notes, this sudden change of heart is a dramatic necessity to secure the cooperation of the nurse,[8] but it is also a natural indication of Phaedra's inner conflict, which will prove fatal. Phaedra is rationally aware that her love is impious, but her emotions force her to seek its fulfilment, or else to choose death. This abrupt change is part of the realistic portrayal of the conflict that rages within Phaedra's heart, not merely a mark of rhetorical interest on the part of the author, as Tarrant suggests.[9] The nurse is shocked by Phaedra's reaction and immediately

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[8] Mayer 1990, note at 250.
[9] Tarrant 1976, 230, note at 307.

tries to deflect her from her impulse to commit suicide. When Phaedra shows her determination to die, the nurse desperately incites her to forget about her reputation, and she charges herself with the duty to try to convince Hippolytus to answer Phaedra's feelings (267–273).

The immediately following first choral piece sings of the power of love. It thus picks up the main theme of the first act, but also prepares the second act. Phaedra is in the palace, in her unstable mood she has allowed herself to be persuaded by the nurse; she is consumed by her passionate love for Hippolytus. The nurse describes the effects of her passion on her physical appearance (360–383). Her poignant description is supplemented by a short appearance of Phaedra on the stage, lying on a couch or sitting in a chair. She orders her servants to take away her regal dress and bring out hunting clothes: dressed in this outfit, she will go to the woods (403 *talis in silvis ferar*). With these words, she implicitly states that she intends to join Hippolytus.

The distribution of the following lines varies in the manuscripts and has given rise to much discussion. Mayer attributes 404–405 to the nurse and allots to Phaedra the prayer to Diana (406–422), followed by the address to Hippolytus, who appears on the stage (423–426).[10] After Phaedra has left the stage, the nurse speaks again (427–430), mustering courage before her unavailing attempt to persuade Hippolytus to answer Phaedra's love (435–579). Other editors, among whom Leo (1878–1879), Van Wageningen (1918), Miller (1917), Herrmann (1925), Grimal (1965), Giancotti (1986), Zwierlein (1986) and Chaumartin (1996), assume that Phaedra leaves the stage after 403; they give 404–405 to the choral leader (who probably addresses these words to the nurse) and the following prayer to Diana and the address of Hippolytus to the nurse, who speaks until line 430. In my opinion, this division is better in view of Phaedra's subsequent appearance on stage in 583. After the unsuccessful attempt of the nurse to persuade Hippolytus, Phaedra returns in a frenzy, announced in an aside by the nurse (580–586), who describes how Phaedra, after rushing onto the stage and seeing Hippolytus, suddenly turns pale as death and falls down. The nurse then urges her to lift up her head and speak to Hippolytus (587–588).

Mayer notes that Phaedra's return in 583 is impatient but unmotivated.[11] He believes that it is intended to resolve the impasse that has been reached at 582, which he sees as the end of the nurse's aside.

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[10] Mayer 1990, following Friedrich 1933, 24 ff., supported by Vretska 1968, 152 ff.
[11] Mayer 1990, note at 580–582.

Phaedra's sudden emotion, her impatience is indeed hard to under-
stand if we accept Mayer's division of lines 404ff. We then have to
assume that Phaedra is calmed by the nurse in 404–405, then tranquilly
pronounces her prayer to Diana, sees Hippolytus appear on the stage,
after which she urges the nurse to speak to him. But if we take it, with
the other above-mentioned editors, that Phaedra has left the stage after
her brief appearance illustrating her strong emotion (387–403),[12] her
sudden emotional reappearance at 583 does not have to seem incon-
gruous. During the discussion between the nurse and Hippolytus her
passionate desire to join Hippolytus has persisted. Now she is no longer
able to control herself (583 *impatiens morae*), rushes onto the stage to fall
down gasping for breath as soon as she sees him. Before Phaedra is seen
to fall down in despair, the nurse, frustrated by her failed attempt to
persuade Hippolytus, asks herself, with anxious foreboding, how things
will end with Phaedra (584 *Quo se dabit fortuna? Quo verget furor?* Where
will her fate lead her? What will be the upshot of her madness; tr. Fitch
2002[13]). Hippolytus, who fails to understand what is going on, rushes
to his stepmother's aid. The nurse sees in this gesture a fresh opportu-
nity and speaks astutely to Phaedra: 588 *tuus en alumna, temet Hippolytus
tenet.* This is a striking line because of the alliteration of 't', which Boyle
characterizes as 'nervous' (meaning that we are to visualize the nurse
as stumbling over her words). The ambiguity of 'tuus' heightens the
dramatic force of the passage: Phaedra takes it to mean 'your love',
because in Phaedra's ears it has the ring of 'beloved' (perhaps she even
interprets it as an indication that the nurse has been successful with
Hippolytus), while Hippolytus can only hear in the notion 'tuus' a ref-
erence to his kinship with Phaedra.[14] In the following dialogue between
Phaedra and Hippolytus it does not come home to him until the very
last moment that she refers to her sexual love for him.

When she is brought to, Phaedra is initially disturbed, but when she
realizes it is Hippolytus who is holding her and asking why she does
not want to live (589–591), she encourages herself in an aside (592–
599) and then begins to speak to Hippolytus to declare her love to
him.[15] In the preamble to the declaration of love, Phaedra summons

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[12] I see no compelling reason why this representation would be eccentric, as Frie-
drich 1933, 36 ('eine scurrile Vorstellung') states.

[13] Boyle's (1988) translation of *Quo se dabit fortuna?* by *What will happen?* is trite.

[14] It is unclear to me why 'tuus' is too warm for the relationship between stepmother
and stepson, as Mayer 1990, note at 588, would have it.

[15] Asides are a normal part of postclassical drama (Tarrant 1978, 242–246). There

courage: 592 *Aude, anime, tempta, perage mandatum tuum* and 599 *en, incipe, anime*. Van Wageningen,[16] following Leo, takes the address of the *animus* as a Homeric reminiscence.[17] However, it is useful to read *animus* also against the background of the well-known letter to Lucilius about style, in which Seneca formulates in a sententious manner that the *animus* is either our king or tyrant:

> *Animus noster modo rex est, modo tyrannus. Rex, cum honesta intuetur, salutem commissi sibi corporis curat et illi nihil imperat turpe, nihil sordidum. Ubi vero inpotens, cupidus, delicatus est, transit in nomen detestabile ac dirum et fit tyrannus; tunc illum excipiunt adfectus impotentes et instant, …* (*Ep.* 114,25)

> Our soul is at one time king, at another a tyrant. The king, in that he respects things honorable, watches over the welfare of the body which is entrusted to its charge, and gives that body no base, no ignoble commands. But an uncontrolled, passionate and effeminate soul changes kingship into that most dread and detestable quality—tyranny; then it becomes a prey to the uncontrolled emotions, which dog its steps, … (transl. R. Gummere, Loeb)

This passage helps to understand Phaedra's situation as Seneca sees it: the moment she is ready to reveal her love to Hippolytus, she appeals to her heart as if it were a king to her, but her confession betrays that her heart is in fact controlled by a fatal *affectus* that makes her blind to reality, hence forces her to act irrationally and, in the end, leads her to her own destruction. That Phaedra deludes herself is also clear in 597, where she draws hope from the illusory thought that marriage with Hippolytus is possible because Theseus will not come back.[18]

In the first part of the dialogue with Hippolytus (599–608) Phaedra's inner conflict is manifest, especially in 603–605 *Vis magna vocem mittit et maior tenet. / Vos testor omnis, caelites, hoc quod volo /me nolle* and 607 *Curae leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent*. Although she has just encouraged herself to confess her love to Hippolytus, she declares here that although her love for Hippolytus is strong (*vis magna*), her desire to save her honour is even stronger (*vis maior*). The sentence *Vos testor omnis, hoc quod volo* (604),

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does not seem to be a good reason to assume that this particular aside would have harmed the dramatic force of the passage in the experience of the Roman reader or spectator, as Mayer 1990 remarks, note at 592–599.

[16] Van Wageningen 1918, note at 592.

[17] Also in Euripides, e.g. Alc. 837. The address to the *animus* is found regularly in Seneca's plays, e.g. Tr. 613, 662; Med. 41, 976; Ag. 192; Thy. 192.

[18] See Grimal 1965, note at 592. According to Roman family law any relationship between Phaedra and Hippolytus would be incestuous, even in the event of Phaedra's marriage with Theseus ending for whatever reason (Mommsen 1899, 686).

followed by *me nolle* (605) is problematic. Some recent scholars, defying the manuscript tradition, consider 605 *me nolle* a deliberately unfinished line.[19] But in my view Zintzen is right when he dismisses *me nolle* as an addition by an incompetent interpolator.[20] He observes correctly that the effect of 604 (an aposiopesis) lies in the fact that Phaedra begins to speak with self-assurance, but quickly loses it altogether, which justifies Hippolytus' question in 606 *Animusne cupiens aliquid effari nequit?* It should be added that Phaedra's pithy answer 607 *curae leves loquuntur ingentes stupent* derives its expressiveness from the interrupted sentence in 604. This *sententia* concludes the first part of the dialogue and aptly summarizes Phaedra's inner conflict. Its dramatic function is to preserve the mental and emotional strain for the dialogue that follows (609–671), at the conclusion of which Hippolytus will finally understand that Phaedra is trying to declare her love to him.

This dialogue forms the central part of the declaration of love; it has a clear, tripartite structure leading to a climax; the end of each part is marked by the verb *miserere* followed by an object that summarizes the point Phaedra has made in the preceding verses:[21]

   a: 609–623a (miserere viduae)
   b: 623b–636 (miserere, tacitae mentis exaudi preces)
   c: 637–671a (miserere amantis)

In the dialogue, Seneca shows in a realistic way how Phaedra tries to get through to Hippolytus something that he cannot and will not understand. Here we see not only the expression of Phaedra's inner conflict, but also the dramatic confrontation of two people who are bound to fail completely to attain a point of mutual sympathy and understanding. In each part of the dialogue, this inevitable failure is highlighted by means of words that are interpreted differently by each

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[19] Zwierlein 1986, Boyle 1987, who adds that the truncated line enhances to the rhetorical force of the passage, Mayer 1990 and Chaumartin 1996. In the manuscripts of both the A and E class the words *me nolle* do not form a separate line. In the Sigma-group (manuscripts derived from an apograph of the codex Etruscus which had been contaminated with a text belonging to the A-tradition) these words are erased.

[20] Zintzen 1960, 70 ('ein Zusatz eines pedantischen Interpolators'). Van Wageningen 1918, Herrmann 1925 en Giomini 1955 bracket *me nolle* as an interpolation in their texts. The discussion about the question of whether or not *me nolle* is part of the text goes back to the humanists; see, e.g. Farnabius 1632 and the Variorum-edition of Gronovius (1661).

[21] See Zintzen 1960, 75.

interlocutor, until finally the penny drops for Hippolytus. This section clearly demonstrates Seneca's ability to write good, convincing drama.

609–623a: Phaedra declares to Hippolytus that her feelings (610 *affectus*) urge her to be his servant instead of his mother; she will accept any kind of servitude (612 *omne servitium*). In the following lines she offers the sceptre to Hippolytus as heir to the throne (621 *paterno imperio*), adding that women are not supposed to reign (617–623). She concludes with the request that he take her in his arms and protect her, with compassion for a widow (*miserere viduae*). Hippolytus takes this passage as a request to him to act as a regent till the return of Theseus,[22] but the reader/spectator knows by virtue of Phaedra's words in 597 that she in fact expresses her wish to be joined in matrimony with Hippolytus. Hippolytus is totally unaware of this implied meaning. Thus Phaedra is unsuccessful, Hippolytus remains completely innocent, and the psychological tension is maintained for the next part of the discussion.

623b–636: This part comprises a dialogue between Phaedra and Hippolytus about the question of whether Theseus will return or not. The words *thalamus* (627) and *amor* (628) are clear signs for the reader/spectator of what Phaedra has in mind, but Hippolytus, lacking any clue, remains in the dark as to the real purport of her words. She makes no progress in revealing the truth to Hippolytus and the tension is not diminished for the reader/spectator. The communication failure is aptly underscored by the concluding words of this part *miserere, tacitae*[23] *mentis exaudi preces*. The reference to Pluto and the abduction of Proserpina in 628 (*nisi forte amori placidus et Pluton sedet*) may well be just a mythological sophistication (Mayer 1990), but if we take *placidus amori* to mean not 'indulgent to love' (Hermann 1961, Fitch 2002) but 'indifferent to love' (Van Wageningen 1918, Giomini 1955), it is, as Giomini 1955 remarks, a biting ironical remark that emphasizes Hippolytus' naïveté.[24]

Lines 629 ff. form the transition to the third part. Hippolytus does not understand Phaedra's insinuations nor her sarcastic remark, because he firmly believes that his father will return. In his innocence he promises to fill in his father's post until his return. Phaedra, made

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[22] 'Vidua' can be used for a woman who lives alone while her husband is away, e.g. Plautus, *Stichus* 4.

[23] Axelson's *pavidae* (Zwierlein 1986) is not only unnecessary but in fact harmful to the dramatic force of the passage; see also Mayer 1990, note at 636.

[24] Farnabius 1632 also notes that *placidus amori* may be ironical. Compare Phaedra's remark in 119 *sed amabat aliquid* (see above p. 163), which has a very sarcastic ring.

desperate by the conflict between her guilty conscience and her love, hopes that he has understood the hidden meaning of her words. The aside in 634–635 beautifully displays her infatuation: *O spes amantum credula, o fallax amor! / satisne dixi? Precibus admotis agam*, followed by the concluding line of this part, addressed to Hippolytus: *Miserere, tacitae mentis exaudi preces*. I don't think that Phaedra here lays an ambush to catch Hippolytus,[25] but that she shows her blindness and despair.

637–671a The final part of the declaration of love begins yet again with a rendition of Phaedra's inner conflict, when she utters words the purport of which Hippolytus cannot possibly understand: 637 *Libet loqui pigetque*, and, answering Hippolytus' question what *malum* (637) it is that hit Phaedra: 638 *quod in novercam cadere vix credas malum*. At this moment Hippolytus is at his wit's end and urges Phaedra finally to speak out clear language at last (639–640). To mark this important step in the scene, line 639 *ambigua voce verba perplexa jacis* is very expressive: the chiasmus expresses the riddle with which Hippolytus is faced. The hesitant voice (also an internal stage direction) aptly expresses Phaedra's passion.[26]

In reply to Hippolytus' plea for clear language (640 *effare aperte*), Phaedra speaks about her love in a seemingly concrete manner, but in fact her words are riddled. The dramatic tension is now about to reach its climax for the reader/spectator. Phaedra reveals that she is madly in love (640–644 *Pectus insanum vapor / amorque torret* etc.). Hippolytus, still completely unaware, assumes that she refers to her chaste love for Theseus: 645 *Amore nempe Thesei casto furis?* Phaedra's answer is plain and simple: 646 *sic est*.[27] These two verses play a key role in Phaedra's fatal revelation. According to Mayer, Hippolytus' remark is dramatically weak because Phaedra did not describe a chaste love in operation.[28] In my view, Hippolytus' reaction can be interpreted in a different way, which makes it dramatically very strong. Hippolytus still suspects nothing and in his innocence can only think of chaste love. He is therefore bound to suppose that Phaedra is speaking about her love for Theseus and voices his assumption in the form of a rhetorical question: 645 *Amore nempe Thesei casto furis?* This is the opening Phaedra

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[25] Mayer 1990, note at 633.

[26] Cp. Sen. *De ira* 3.4.3, where a hesitant voice is mentioned among the physical symptoms of strong passion.

[27] The expression is colloquial (Mayer 1990, note at 646–656); also common in Plautus and Terence.

[28] Mayer 1990, note at 645.

needs to disclose the real state of her feelings. She confirms that she means Theseus (646 *sic est*), and then explains that she loves the face of the young Theseus, a face that approximates Hippolytus' beauty (646–662). She then throws herself at his feet (666), states that she now finally sacrifices her honour to him and concludes with the plea to have compassion with a woman in love (671 *miserere amantis*). These words make Hippolytus realize at last what Phaedra has wanted to tell him all along. Seneca makes a substantial contribution to the dramatic force of the entire scene by not making him express this understanding in words, but leaving it to the reader to draw this conclusion from the emotional outburst that follows immediately.

According to Mayer, 'Hippolytus' ranting reply to Phaedra's appeal is an exaggerated attempt at sublimity'.[29] As I see it, Seneca effectively describes the natural response of a person whose entire world literally collapses: the hunter Hippolytus, as portrayed in the prologue, is on the whole a pure lover of nature. Psychologically, it is quite convincing that he first reproaches himself for the catastrophe that strikes him, and Phaedra only at a later stage: he has evidently lost his bearings. Phaedra, fully aware that she is no longer in possession of herself (699 *mei non sum potens*), again throws herself at his feet (703); in reaction, Hippolytus, filled with loathing of her, raises his sword to kill her. When Phaedra says that this is exactly what she wants, he runs away, unwilling to comply with her wish and leaving her completely broken-hearted and unable to react.

Seneca moves swiftly through the remaining part of the story, confirming the impression that Phaedra's declaration of love forms the main part of the play or even that it is the play's raison d'être.[30] After Phaedra's collapse, it is once more the nurse who takes the initiative. Since their crime is now revealed (719 *deprensa culpa est*),[31] she decides to shift the responsibility to Hippolytus by accusing him of rape (719–735). Upon leaving the stage, she urges Phaedra to pull herself together. Phaedra recovers during the ensuing choral song, which sings of the dangers which Hippolytus' good looks have brought him. At the end of the song, it is announced that Phaedra wil take part in the conspiracy

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[29] Mayer 1990, note at 671–683.

[30] Mayer 1990, note at 671 and literature cited there.

[31] Fitch 2002 translates *her* (=Phaedra's) *guilt*; Van Wageningen's *ons misdrijf = our crime* seems better to me, because the nurse is implicated (she persuaded Phaedra to approach Hippolytus) and is now acting as an accomplice in the crime.

to accuse Hippolytus falsely of rape (824–828). The crime is executed by Phaedra in the third act: she pretends before Theseus that she wants to commit suicide to erase the stain on her reputation by the alleged rape (893), the sword left by Hipolytus unmistakably points to him as the offender. Therefore, Theseus pronounces a curse over him. After a brief choral song about the inconstancy of *fortuna* (959–988), Hippolytus' violent death is narrated by the messenger and parts of his body are brought on the stage (1110ff.). The final choral piece (1123–1153) is also devoted to the fickleness of fortune. The final acts begins with Phaedra seeing the parts of Hippolytus' body. Again she despairs, but realizing fully that she is responsible for his death, she is repentant.[32] Faced with the consequences of her immoderate passion, suicide is the only way for her to make up for her crime (1196–1198 *Recipe iam mores tuos* etc.).

   After Phaedra's suicide, both her body and that of Hippolytus are on the stage. After Theseus' lament for Hippolytus (1201–1243) preparations are made to bury both bodies. This part of the final act has been criticized severely.[33] Zwierlein, who argues in his monograph that Seneca's plays were not written for the stage, contends that there is an unacceptable inconsistency between the preparations for Hippolytus' funeral at the end of the fourth act and the burial ritual in the final act. His conclusion is that these sections cannot be staged.[34] The problem Zwierlein discusses is the following: at the end of the fourth act the messenger announces that Hippolytus' body parts are being collected for the last rites (1113–1114 *passim ad supremos ille colligitur rogos / et funeri confertur*). Theseus, however, does not at all respond to this remark and at the beginning of the last act, he asks Phaedra, who has Hippolytus' body at her feet, why she is upset. This conduct is absurd if we assume that Theseus has seen the body parts being brought on the stage, as Zwierlein takes it. However, in a detailed review of Zwierlein's work, Rieks has in my view convincingly refuted Zwierlein's objections.[35] Rieks sees an answer to the problem in 1154, in which it is mentioned that the roof of the palace on which Phaedra stands is tall

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[32] This point is rightly made by Van Wageningen 1918, Introduction, XIV.
[33] Coffey 1990, Introduction, 17: 'The final scene of *Phaedra* … has occasioned ridicule from Seneca's detractors'; Mayer 1990, 187, Introductory note to Act V: 'the impression of a flagging invention is hard to escape'.
[34] Zwierlein 1966, 13–24.
[35] Rieks 1967, 568.

(*altis tectis*). This means that Phaedra is standing on an elevation of the
stage, the body parts close to her. The spectator can see everything, but
Theseus cannot, because he is on the stage, too close for a view of the
elevation. Hence his question why Phaedra is so upset is not absurd.
The fact that Phaedra is standing on the elevation, in other words out
of Theseus' reach, also explains why he does not try to take away the
sword from her, and why he asks in 1247–1248 that Hippolytus' body
be brought to him.[36] If we picture the situation on the stage thus, it
is obvious that Seneca literally shows the complete disaster resulting
from Phaedra's passion in its full dimensions: first Phaedra's lament
and suicide when she sees Hippolytus' body, then the plaint of Theseus,
who perhaps feels co-responsible for the death of his son and, indirectly,
that of his wife,[37] finally the preparations for the burial of the two
bodies.

It is difficult to understand why the collecting of Hippolytus' body
parts should be dull or comical, as Mayer states.[38] This act is not
only macabre (and thus, we may assume, attractive to the Roman
audience), but also necessary in view of the burial; Enk cites a pas-
sage from Apuleius (Met. 7.26) to confirm this.[39] Jonkers has devel-
oped this point and suggested that Seneca was inspired for this pas-
sage by the passion plays that were common at the mysteries of Isis,
and which were gaining popularity in Seneca's time.[40] Jonkers states,
in my view correctly, that collecting of the body parts must have made
a deep impression on he Roman audience. Moreover, this scene not
only probably reflects an aspect of Roman life, but it may also have
a literary debt, because a similar *constitutio membrorum* was performed
on the stage by Agave in a lost part at the end of Euripides' *Bac-
chae*.[41]

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[36] Mayer 1990, note at 1157 and at 1158, mentions these points as absurdities.
[37] The figure of Theseus seems to play a subordinate role in Seneca's outlook on the
story.
[38] Mayer 1990, note at 256–261.
[39] Enk 1957, 305 (also referred to by Mayer 1990); also Enk 1943, 119.
[40] Jonkers 1944, 26.
[41] Dodds 1960, 232 (note at line 1300), Roux 1972, 613 (note at line 1300), Seaford
1997, 249–250 (note at lines 1300–1301).

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ALFRED DÖBLIN AND ANTIGONE

A. Maria van Erp Taalman Kip

In 1937 Alfred Döblin, author of the famous novel *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929), started work on a vast *Erzählwerk* about the aftermath of the First World War. He himself had served in that war as a doctor and in the decade that followed he had played an important role in German literary life. But then he saw that his country was again losing its way and he found the germs of this derailment in the terrible year which followed the armistice of 1918.

Döblin left Germany in 1933, the day after the Reichstag fire. Because of his known aversion to the Nazis, he ran the risk of being arrested; moreover he was Jewish. After six months in Switzerland he settled in Paris, where he continued his writing. Between then and 1939, no fewer than seven books from his hand were published by the Dutch publishing house Querido. The seventh of them was the first part of his *Erzählwerk*: *Bürger und Soldaten*. The completed manuscript of the second part (*Heimkehr der Fronttruppen*) went with him when he was once again forced to flee from the Germans. After a difficult journey he reached Lisbon and from there he sailed to the United States, arriving in September 1940. He lived in straitened circumstances in Los Angeles until the end of the war. In November 1941 he converted to Catholicism, a step which was the formal conclusion of a spiritual process lasting many years. It was not a conversion from Judaism to Christianity; he had never practised the Jewish faith.

Unlike Thomas Mann, Döblin had no possibilities to publish his work in the United States. Nevertheless, he carried on writing and completed the third part of his *Erzählwerk* (*Karl und Rosa*) in 1943. The second part was eventually published in Germany, in 1948 and 1949, and the third part in 1950. The work as a whole is entitled *November 1918*.[1]

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[1] Directly after the war the work could not be published as a whole, since the censorship of the French occupying army (Döblin's own employer at the time!) had banned a reprint of the Querido edition. Consequently the author was forced to transfer certain indispensable information from Part one to Part two. Finally, however,

The number of dramatis personae in *November 1918* is quite over-whelming. Many of them are historical characters, including Noske, Ebert, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. Of the fictional charac-ters, one is by far the most important and we follow him from 1918 until his death at the end of Part three, some ten years later. He is Friedrich Becker, a classicist. Severely wounded in the war, he spends many months in a hospital in Alsace. After the armistice he returns to Berlin, where he lives with his mother. Physically, he slowly recov-ers, but mentally he is shattered. He is tortured by feelings of guilt. He cannot understand why he and countless others obeyed the orders of the state to fight this war, without ever asking themselves whether that order was acceptable, without ever speaking up. After a violent crisis and a suicide attempt, his mental balance is temporarily restored by his conversion to Christianity, to the Protestantism of his youth, which long ago he had left behind.

It is during this period of relative calm that the principal of his former school asks him to substitute for a teacher who is in hospital. And so, after an absence of more than four years, Becker reenters the classroom. The principal introduces him to the boys of the *Prima*, stirring their enthousiasm by mentioning that he has returned from the war as a bearer of the Iron Cross. Obviously Becker does not welcome this introduction, and as soon as the principal leaves, he hastens to start his lesson. It is only then (III,190) that we learn that the subject will be Sophocles' *Antigone*. The pupils have already read the text, and he is expected to discuss the overall interpretation of the tragedy.

This is not the first time that *Antigone* crops up in *November 1918*. In Part one (158) Becker quotes part of the first stasimon to a friend in order to illustrate how he lived and how he felt before the war.[2] He impressed upon his pupils 'wie erhaben der Mensch ist'; he was sure of himself, he was cheerful, a child of fortune. Later on, the first lines of the stasimon recur in the narrator text: 'Der Mensch, von dem man sagt, er sei das Gewaltigste in der Welt, ist es nur manchmal, zwischendurch. Sonst ist er etwas ganz anderes' (II/1,149).

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the unity of the *Erzählwerk* was restored. It comprises four volumes, since the size of Part two made a fourth volume necessary. But to indicate that Döblin meant it to be a trilogy, the numbers of the volumes are: I, II/1 (*Verratenes Volk*), II/2 (*Heimkehr der Fronttruppen*), III.

   [2] He quotes the translation of J.J.C. Donner (1839), who renders δεινά with 'gewal-tig'. He disregards the ambiguity of the adjective.

And ultimately Becker, at the moment of his attempted suicide, cries out scornfully: 'Vieles Gewaltige lebt, doch nichts ist gewaltiger als der Mensch, als der Mensch' (II/2,253). The first stasimon belongs to Becker's past, a past that he now rejects.

I shall now try to summarize what is said, both by Becker and by the boys, during the three hours that they are together. For the sake of clarity I shall confine myself to the central views voiced during the discussion. This summary will be followed by my comments.

Becker begins by asking the pupils to compare Antigone with Sophocles' plays on Oedipus. A red-haired boy—we learn later that his name is Neumann, but Döblin usually refers to him as 'der Rotharige'—is the first to respond. However, he does not go into the question, but points out that 'das Mädchen' (he does not mention her name) is acting contrary to the laws of the State and, moreover, she is doing so in wartime and for strictly personal reasons. Therefore she only gets what she deserves ('demnach geschehe ihr ganz recht'). The fact that Haemon hangs himself because of her is 'geradezu jämmerlich'.[3] He adds that the play is brimmming with sentimentality (III,190).

Most of the boys concur, especially Schröter, the arrogant *Primus* of the class, who throughout the discussion vehemently criticizes the behaviour of Antigone. One must, he finally says, clearly understand what the state stands for and what the citizens owe to it. 'Es besteht heute kein Bedarf an Spiritismus. Die Nation braucht einzig Männer, die sich ihrer annehmen' (III,225–226). By 'Spiritismus' he means the unwritten laws Antigone appeals to.

There are, however, other voices. A quiet boy called Hans Riedel apparently does not suscribe to these aggressive views and Schramm, who is a socialist, defends Antigone. She represents, in his view, the political rights of the oppressed against the tyrant; Sophocles' play is about political freedom, like Schiller's *Wilhelm Tell* (III,198).

Becker, for his part, raises the subject of Fate, which he equates with hereditary guilt. He brings up Oedipus' grandfather, who failed to heed a divine warning about a 'gewisse Ehe' (III,193).[4] He says the children do not realize that they are under a curse, and they ultimately destroy

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[3] Haemon, of course, does not hang but stabs himself. I do not assume that this detail is intended to ridicule the boy; it is rather simply an error on the part of the author himself.

[4] I assume that Döblin's memory was playing tricks on him here. It was, according to Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* and Euripides' *Phoenician Women* Oedipus' father Laius (and not his grandfather Labdacus) who received a warning from Apollo. And Laius

themselves. Later on he argues that, before Christianity, people did not have a clear notion of their own personality, their own 'Ich'. 'Darum ist es auch mit dem Handeln eines antiken Helden etwas Besonderes. Die antiken Helden ringen förmlich darum, handeln zu können. Aber es gelingt ihnen nicht. Es gelingt ihnen nicht, ihr Ich zu erhaschen und seine Tat zu tun'(III,197). Antigone, however, does act and 'begeht … wirklich eine Tat in unserm Sinn'. She becomes guilty by violating the law of the state, 'das Staatsgesetz' (III,197). But she believes herself to be an instrument of divine law, which she serves unquestioningly. 'Und damit leitet sie, ohne es zu wissen, auch die Auflösung des schrecklichen Erbfluches ein. Sie unterwirft sich dem göttlichen Gebot' (III,199).

That is what Becker says about hereditary guilt. He points out to Schramm that Antigone is certainly not a revolutionary. In fact, it is Creon who should be seen in this role, since he rebels against Antigone's unwritten laws, which live in the hearts of all men. But most of the boys are adamant in their repudiation of the tragedy and Becker's explanations. The *Primus* maintains: 'Für uns Deutsche ist und bleibt und soll bleiben das Vaterland das höchste Gebot, und zwar absolut und durchaus. Und da werden keine Kompromisse zuge-lassen'(III,222). It is after these words that Becker broaches a subject that he has thusfar avoided, despite the boys' requests to tell them about it: the war. But now he does speak about the war, although not in the way they expected. He speaks of the unquestioning obedience that drove the soldiers into the war and into their death. He quotes Hebrews 10.31: 'Es ist ein fürchtbares Ding, in die Hand des Lebenden Gottes zu fallen'. And he concludes: 'Wir alle, jung oder alt, die leben, die vor dem Krieg gelebt haben und am Krieg teilnahmen, hüben und drüben, sind schuldig. Das Ganze ging in den Krieg, das Volk, und wurde bestraft' (III,223).

Becker's final words on *Antigone* have to do with death. He argues that the real theme of the tragedy is: 'Wie hat sich die Welt der Leben-den zur Welt der Toten zu verhalten?' (III,223). He talks about the changes in the worldview of mankind, about the theory of evolution, which reduces the human mind to a mere instrument, so that the death of a human being is of little importance. But Antigone knows that her brother has not disappeared, but has entered another existence. Death is not simply the end, not simply nothingness. And he hopes that the

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was not warned not to marry, but not to beget children. However, even this warning is absent from Sophocles' plays and, consequently, irrelevant to their interpretation.

class will rethink the whole matter in the light of these thoughts about death (III.224–225). Some of the boys are impressed by his words, but not the Primus. He affirms once again that the state is all-important.

The above is quite a unique piece of reception history. A fictional character teaches *Antigone* to fictional boys against the background of historical crisis and personal trauma. Moreover, up to a point, this fictional character may be seen as the writer's alter ego, as Döblin himself confirms. In *Epilog* he wrote, in connection with his work in an Alsatian hospital: 'Und es trat mir bald der Mann, als Kranker entgegen, den ich formte und bestimmte, seine Last (und meine) in die Erzählung zu tragen'. And elsewhere he says: 'Ich selber wurde, könnte man sagen, in eine Romanfigur verwandelt'.[5] According to Kiesel, the author of a well known book about Döblin's Spätwerk, this explains the absence of irony and humorous interruptions in all the passages on Becker.[6]

How did Döblin first become acquainted with *Antigone*? Clearly, the tragedies of Sophocles would have been part of the curriculum at Döblin's gymnasium, and this is confirmed by passing remarks in his work.[7] *Antigone* was probably among the tragedies he read, although he does not mention the work by name. We know from a letter written in 1904—he was 26 then—that Sophocles remained a companion for some time: his work was on the table in a room Döblin rented in Freiburg, alongside volumes of Kleist and Shakespeare.[8] However, in the period that followed, he lost interest in Sophocles. In *Erlebnis zweier Kräfte* (1922) he says that the initial delight he took in his work was merely aesthetic and soon ebbed away.[9] In 1924 he even wrote: 'Plato, Sophokles, die Klassizität sind chronische Übel, die kein Salvaran heilt'.[10] It was no doubt Kierkegaard, whose work he read during his stay in Paris, who brought him back to Sophocles, especially to *Antigone*. He must have realized by then that the play was relevant to his own moral preoccupations.

Döblin knew the work of Hegel and he must have been familiar with Hegel's Antigone interpretation, which was, especially in Germany,

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[5] For the first quotation see *Schriften zu Leben und Werk*, 316; for the second one *November 1918* I, 18, note 1.

[6] Kiesel 1986, 428.

[7] Döblin/Loerke 1928, 89; *Schriften zu Leben und Werk*, 40.

[8] *Briefe*, 25.

[9] *Schriften zu Leben und Werk*, 40.

[10] *Schriften zur Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur*, 169.

quite dominant. It clearly found its way to the schools, on occasion in a somewhat popularized fashion, judging by the complaint of the classical scholar Karl Lehrs: 'Wir mussten beweisen dass der armen Antigone ganz recht geschehe'.[11] It is curious that the red-haired boy uses exactly the same words: 'demnach geschehe ihr ganz recht'. This is probably sheer coincidence, but the comparison is nevertheless illuminating. In Döblin it is the pupil who believes that Antigone gets what she deserves, but, unlike Lehrs' teacher, he does not present this as an interpretation of the play. He does not suppose for a moment that Sophocles meant it this way. It is his own hostile reaction to the tragedy, a sneering comment on what he regards as objectionable and ridiculous. The response of most of the other boys is essentially the same. They have been poisoned by years of war propaganda, they are frustrated by the unexpected defeat and indignant about the looming revolution.[12] And as Steiner puts it: 'In words which ring with the notes of the National Socialist idiom to come, the head of the class brutally rejects Becker's views'.[13] And indeed, when Döblin wrote this, he had become all too familiar with that idiom.

It will be clear that Becker's interpretation of the play does not agree with that of Hegel. He may say that Antigone violates 'das Staatsgesetz'—which in effect is only an ad hoc decree—and therefore becomes guilty (197), but later on this notion of guilt is clearly absent and in any case there is in his view no even balance—as Hegel will have it—between Staatsgesetz and Antigone's unwritten laws. Her laws are far more important and it is actually Creon who is culpable for breaking them. The notion of Creon as a revolutionary is referred to by Steiner as an 'echo of Maurras',[14] but the word 'echo' must be a slip of the pen, since the tract of Maurras appeared in 1948, while Döblin completed his *Karl und Rosa* in 1943. He cannot have read Maurras and Maurras cannot have read him, in view of the year *Karl und Rosa* was published.

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[11] Quoted by Müller 1967, 10. The quotation is from *Populäre Aufsätze aus dem Altertum*, Leipzig 1875, 468.

[12] On p. 196 the *Primus* uses a comparison to illustrate his view. Polyneices, he says, 'war ein Verräter, der gegen seine Heimat eine grosse feindliche Armee mobilisierte. Das ist so, als wenn heute Spartakisten Frankreich einladen würden, Truppen hier-herzuschicken, damit sie Deutschland unterkriegen'.

[13] Steiner 1984, 190.

[14] Steiner 1984, 188. The tract by Charles Maurras was entitled: *Antigone vierge-mère de l'ordre*.

The concept of Fate plays an important role in Becker's interpretation. He identifies it with hereditary guilt, a guilt that explains what happens to Oedipus and to Antigone. As mentioned in note 4, Döblin must have been mistaken about Oedipus' grandfather, but he also fails to distinguish—like other authors in the past—between the various tragic versions of the myth. In Aeschylus and Euripides, Laius received a warning not to beget children, but in Sophocles' *Oedipus* there is no such warning; Laius is only told what will happen. Fate may play a role in *Oedipus Tyrannus* (although it is rather Apollo than an abstract conception of Fate), but hereditary guilt does not. One could say that Oedipus and his children are under a curse, but there is no clear origin of that curse. Becker's final assertion that Antigone, without knowing it herself, puts an end to the curse I find somewhat strange. It is nowhere said or even suggested in the play. Moreover, Sophocles' heroes may often be ignorant, but in the end they do know.

It is generally agreed that part of the above bears the stamp of Kierkegaard, whose work Döblin started to read in 1935; that reading also marked the starting point of his eventual conversion. And indeed, to a reader of Kierkegaard's *The Ancient Tragical Motif as reflected in the Modern* it will be quite obvious that he was, to some extent, Döblin's source of inspiration. In his essay we find the same stress on Fate and hereditary guilt, but he does not go into detail. Döblin's remark about Oedipus' grandfather does not come from Kierkegaard, nor his assertion that Antigone puts an end to the curse. But Kierkegaard does point out that 'self-conscious, reflexive subjectivity'[15] is absent in antiquity, so that in Greek tragedy action not only stems from the character's inner nature, but also has an element of suffering. Or, as he also puts it, action 'has an epic moment; it is event as much as action'.[16] Becker (or rather Döblin) echoes this on p. 197 (see above) when he speaks of Antigone's deed as 'eine Tat in unserm Sinn', but there seems to be some confusion when, on the same page, he says of the classical heroes: 'es gelingt ihnen nicht ihr Ich zu erhaschen und seine Tat zu tun'. In this way he suggests that they take no action at all.

No doubt Döblin does not stress the matter of hereditary guilt simply because he found it in Kierkegaard. It is a theme that also occurs in his earlier work,[17] but here it is transferred to a whole generation. As

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[15] Steiner 1984, 55; these words are his rendering of Kierkegaard's terminology.
[16] Kierkegaard, 155 in the Dutch translation.
[17] See Kiesel 1986, 61–63.

Becker discusses the subject in relation to Oedipus and Antigone, we learn his unspoken thoughts about the boys: 'Sie waren die Kinder, die Erben, herangewachsen, während man draussen im Krieg lag. Sie übernahmen die Schuld der Älteren—und sie wussten nichts' (III,193). It is not without reason that Döblin called this third book of Part three *Antigone und die Schuld der Ahnen*.

The influence of Kierkegaard is restricted. Becker discusses several aspects of the play that Kierkegaard does not even mention, since they are not important for his argument. And here, too, we find the immediate relevance to his own life. Antigone's unwritten laws, which take precedence over the State, are clearly related to his own feelings of guilt. He, too, should have questioned the orders of the State. This is a subject he does bring up in class, as we have seen. The quotation from Hebrews ('Es ist ein furchtbares Ding, in die Hand des lebenden Gottes zu fallen') appears also in Kierkegaard, but in another connection. Kierkegaard sees these words, despite their biblical provenance, as an apt illustration of the position of men in Greek tragedy.[18] However, Becker does not use them in this context, but rather to describe his own predicament. When he says that all the people will be punished and the boys ask about the nature of the guilt, he answers: 'Da haben sie die dunkle Frage. Das Unglück liegt auf der Hand. Untersuchen Sie, es hat keiner eine greifbare Schuld. So wenig Ödipus eine hatte. Aber irgend etwas, etwas über uns, fällt sein Verdikt'(III,223). The comparison with Oedipus seems a little strained, but apparently he means that both Oedipus and the men of 1914 sinned without realizing it. However, I do not quite understand why Becker does not see this guilt as 'greifbar', since his self-reproach seems well-defined. The 'irgend etwas, etwas über uns' must be a reference to his own Christian God, but he does not speak to the boys about his hard won Christian faith.

Finally there is Becker's conviction that the most essential question in *Antigone* is: 'Wie hat sich die Welt der Lebenden zur Welt der Toten zu verhalten?' (III,223). This question, too, has a direct bearing on his own life, but again he does not say so aloud. On p. 224 we learn what he is thinking: 'So wie Antigone sich ihres einen toten Bruders annimmt, habe ich mich vieler Gefallenen anzunehmen, vieler zu früh Gestorbener und bewusstlos Dahingegangener. Ich weiss es, ich diene ihnen, ich vergesse sie nicht'.

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[18] Kierkegaard, 161 in the Dutch translation.

As noted above, Döblin considered Becker his alter ego. But how exactly were they similar? To begin with, they both served in the First World War, and Döblin, who worked as a doctor in Alsace, situated the hospital where Becker was taken to in the same region. They both converted to Christianity, and adhered fervently to their faith in a manner quite unusual among intellectuals of the time.[19] However, it is noteworthy that Döblin described Becker's conversion before he himself took the decisive step. On his flight to the south of France, he regularly visited the cathedral of Mende. He would sit there, looking at the cross, but he was not yet able to surrender himself, a struggle that he describes in *Schicksalsreise*. In that same work he relates how, in late 1940, he reread Part two of *November 1918*. It was the first time he had done so, since finishing it May 16 of that year. He discovered that Becker's crisis, which culminated in his conversion, foreshadowed his own. He adds: 'Aber dieser Held, der Friedrich Becker, ist doch viel weiter als ich' (269).[20] When he wrote *Karl und Rosa*, this was no longer true. His own conversion was by then a fact.

Becker's mental crisis as a result of the First War is not a reflection of Döblin's own state of mind during the twenties. He may have felt that he had initially been caught in the snares of nationalism, but he never says so explicitly. However, Becker's feelings of guilt after the First World War reflect those of Döblin with respect to the Second World War. In a letter to Thomas Mann he wrote: 'Ich finde (ich nehme mich nicht aus): wir haben unsere Pflicht versäumt. Man hat mich hier neulich aufgefordert, zum 10. Mai, Tag des "verbrannten Buchs", irgendwo zu sprechen; ich lehnte ab mit der Begründung: jedenfalls meine Bücher sind mit Recht verbrannt'. He admits that writing was the only thing they could do. 'Aber vielleicht kann man doch mehr, auf geistige, moralische Weise, seine Politik in der Schrift unterbringen, schärfer härter offener als früher'.[21] That is what he was trying to do in *November 1918*.

However, this is not all. In the United States Döblin was initially reticent about his conversion, but on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday in 1943 he broke his silence. His fellow writers had organized

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[19] See Kiesel 1986, 429: 'Vor allem aber war er (sc. Döblin) in seinen religiösen bzw. theologischen Anschauungen unmodern. An traditionellen christlischen Vorstellungen hielt er fest, auch wenn die Moderne sie längst verabschiedet hatte'.

[20] Döblin wrote the first half of *Schicksalsreise* soon after his arrival in the USA, the second half after the war.

[21] 23-5-1935. *Briefe* 206–207.

a festive meeting; Thomas Mann and Bertolt Brecht were there and Heinrich Mann spoke a laudatio. In his reply Döblin spoke out against moral relativism, argued in favour of literature that was anchored in religion, and maintained that he and many other authors were guilty of the rise of the Nazis. But why was he guilty? His answer was: 'weil ich nicht Gott suchte'.[22] Brecht, and not only he, was perplexed, as one may well imagine. Döblin himself mentions the occasion in *Schicksalsreise* (274): 'Ich nahm mich und uns alle von dem grossen Gericht nicht aus, das sich an der Welt entlud. Man lehnte mich schweigend ab. Es war keine Rede für eine Geburtstagfeier'.

And finally there is the world of the dead, important to Becker and to Döblin himself. In *Schicksalsreise* he says: 'Nur ein Bruchteil, ein minimaler, der Menschheit lebt. Die ungeheure Masse, die die vergangenen Jahrtausende bevölkert hat, ist tot. Aber erst das Ganze, das sich durch die Zeit bewegt und sich in ihr entfaltet, ist der Mensch, der Adam. Grösser an Zahl und an Bedeutung sind die Toten, die wir tot nennen, weil unser Verstand und unsere Sinnesorgane sie nicht erfassen' (359). When he wrote this, the war was over. He was old by then and in *Journal 1952/1953* he commemorates his own dead.[23] First of all there was his son Wolfgang, who committed suicide in 1940 because, as a French soldier and a Jew, he did not want to fall into German hands.[24] There was also his sister Meta, who was killed by a stray shell fragment when, in 1919, the government troops overran the Berlin district of Lichtenberg; his brother Kurt, who died in Auschwitz, and there were many others.

I shall close with a brief account of the dramatic events that take place outside Becker's classroom, but which nevertheless are connected with *Antigone*. During Becker's days at the school he learns that the principal has an erotic relationship with the boy Riedel; the parents of the pupils fuel the scandal, as do the *Primus* and several other boys. Becker tries to prevent the scandal from becoming public. He prevails on the principal to break off the relationship, and to go on temporary sick leave; he confers with Riedel and his parents and they decide

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[22] Kiesel 1986, 188–189. The story is told by Brecht in his *Arbeitsjournal*; Thomas Mann refers to it in a letter.

[23] *Autobiografische Schriften*, 462–481.

[24] When Döblin wrote *Karl und Rosa* he did not know this. He heard it only after the war.

that the boy should transfer to another school. Things have seemingly calmed down and it it is not until 146 pages later that we return to Becker.

At that point only a few days have passed. Becker is told that he will not be permitted to resume his lessons, since he was never officially appointed as a substitute teacher. However, this is not the real reason. He learns from a colleague that the parents have complained. They resent Becker's concern for the principal, which they see as a white-wash of his behaviour. They also resent what he has told their boys during his lessons about *Antigone*. Meanwhile, the principal leaves his sanatorium and returns to Berlin, where he rents a room in a hotel. He writes a letter to Riedel, asking him to come to see him. But it falls into the hands of the boy's father, and it is he who goes to the hotel. He gives the principal such a severe beating that he dies a few days later. He is close to death when Becker sees him for the last time.

The body of the principal is taken to the municipal morgue and Becker discovers that, since his only brother cannot be reached, there are plans to bury him secretly. However, he personally sees to it that the principal is given a decent burial and he is present at the ceremony, although the parents' committee did their utmost best to keep him from attending. He is accompanied by one colleague, his mother and the boy Riedel. Their photograph appears in a journal, which further annoys the authorities. Afterwards he is reprimanded by the school inspector for his part in the whole affair and his presence at the funeral. Becker does not deny that the principal acted improperly, but he argues that that no longer matters. He payed for it and now he is dead. And the dead should be honoured, no matter what they did during their lifetime.

The chapters about the funeral and about the school inspector are called *Auf den Spuren der Antigone* and *König Kreon*. During his lessons Becker tried in vain to explain why Antigone had to do what she did. By now he himself has done what she did. The principal was his Polyneices, the school inspector his Creon.

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PART III

THE RECEPTION OF HOMER

WHAT DO WE DO WITH HOMER? LITERARY CRITICISM IN THE HELLENISTIC AGE

D.M. Schenkeveld

The subject of literary criticism in the Hellenistic Age, a subject dear to the heart of the *honorandus* of this volume, immediately forces a choice on me, because a thorough treatment of all its aspects would have taken up this whole volume.[1] The subject is broad because it involves discussing poetics and historiography, aspects that already have been addressed in many different studies with various results. For example, the criticism that Polybius brings to bear upon his predecessors in historiography has a great deal to do with prevailing opinions about the aim of writing in general, even though it focuses on a special branch of literature in this period. Asianism also emerged in this period, raising the question of what it is a writer should try to achieve in his orations. In order to answer this question a scholar must include Peripatetic and Stoic works in his study, while he also should not forget Philodemus' *Volumina Rhetorica*.

But even if one limits the subject to only judgments of poetry, it requires a choice. From the above-mentioned Philodemus we possess fragments from a short work about poetry.[2] From these we learn about the very interesting theory of the *kritikoi*, who stressed the acoustic merits of poetry and paid less notice to its contents. Here we also find traces of the poetics of Neoptolemus, which was used by Horace in his *Ars Poetica*. In addition to Philodemus, the fragments of the Stoa and the Peripatetic school are of interest, because of, among other things, the views they express about tragedy and comedy, and the origin

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[1] Due to illness I was unable to write a whole new contribution for this collection of essays in honour of Ton Kessels. At the request of the editors I have therefore submitted an article which was first published in Dutch (Schenkeveld 1988). I thank André Lardinois and Heather van Tress who translated the article into English for me. For the texts of Callimachus, Theocritus and Apollonius Rhodius I have used the editions of Pfeiffer (1949–1953), Gow (1952), and Fränkel (1961), respectively, and for the Homeric scholia the edition of Erbse (1969–1988). Translations are freely based on those of the Loeb editions.

[2] [We know a lot more about the contents of this work of Philodemus since the publication of the complete Herculaneum papyrus by Janko 2000, eds.].

of poetry and prose. We see a reflection of this in the first book of Strabo's *Geographica*. It would also be desirable to include the Hellenistic epigrams in this study because they too pass judgments about poets and other writers. Finally, the other poetry of this period should be looked at in order to trace poetic principles. In short, even the limitation of our subject to poetics requires a choice. This choice I will make and for the rest I refer the reader to Grube's *Greek and Roman Critics* and to a few other books and articles I have listed in the bibliography.[3]

My subject is the reception of the Homeric epics and hymns in Alexandrian poetry and philology. This choice offers the opportunity to discuss explicit and implicit statements about Homer's poetry, and, at the same time, to trace the reception of Homer by some of the poets in their own work. In this way we can not only reveal the opinions of the Alexandrians concerning Homeric poetry, but also discover some of the poets' own ideals.

Explicit statements made by the poets

I begin with a short epigram of Callimachus, in which he establishes the disputed authorship of the (now lost) epic Οἰχαλίας ἅλωσις, and bitingly adds that the actual author, Kreophylos, believes it an honour that his poem is attributed to Homer. As it happens there was a tradition that out of gratitude for a hospitable reception Homer had given this epic to Kreophylos. Callimachus, however, chooses an alternative version according to which Kreophylos had published his own poem under the name of Homer. Just as in the *Pinakes*, his catalogue of Greek literature, Callimachus indicates who the author of the work is, what its subject matter is (Heracles captures the town Oechalia from king Eurytos and takes his daughter, Iole, with him), and what its title. But then comes the punch-line: instead of Οἰχαλίας ἅλωσις, we read the words Ὁμήρειον γράμμα and that Kreophylos considers this an achievement! The poem reads:

> Τοῦ Σαμίου πόνος εἰμὶ δόμωι ποτὲ θεῖον ἀοιδόν
> δεξαμένου, κλείω δ' Εὔρυτον ὅσσ' ἔπαθεν.
> καὶ ξανθὴν Ἰόλειαν, Ὁμήρειον δὲ καλεῦμαι
> γράμμα· Κρεωφύλωι, Ζεῦ φίλε, τοῦτο μέγα.

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[3] Grube 1965, esp. Chs. 7–9.

> I am the work of the Samian, who once received
> the divine singer in his house. I celebrate what Eurytos
> suffered, and blond Iole. A Homeric work
> I am called; for Kreophylos, dear Zeus, that is important (Ep. 6 Pf.).

Does Callimachus also reject Homer with this epigram? That is im-probable given the adjective θεῖος ('divine') in the first line. This adjec-tive is often used to honour Homer.[4] But if Homer is not rejected, why does Ὁμήρειον γράμμα have a negative connotation for Callimachus? Is it so bad to imitate Homer? Imitation of Hesiod is positive—witness Epigram 27, in which Callimachus jubilantly greets the *Phaenomena* of Aratus and starts with the words: Ἡσιόδου τό τ᾽ ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος ('Of Hesiod is the theme and the manner').[5]

Why then not write poetry à la Homer? The question so posed is incorrect, or at least incomplete. For Callimachus this rejection primar-ily concerned epics that sometimes were attributed to Homer but oth-erwise deviated from them: I am referring here, of course, to the *Cyclic Epics*, which Aristotle (*Poet.* 23) already had denounced as inferior to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and which were gradually being designated by the name 'cyclic'.[6] Callimachus rejected this kind of epic poetry, as we can see from the first lines of *Epigram* 28:

> Ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθωι
> χαίρω, τίς πολλοὺς ὧδε καὶ ὧδε φέρει·

> I hate the cyclic poem and take no pleasure in
> the path that brings the many this way and that.

In the second line he speaks about the well-worn path and its associa-tion with the word κύκλος is clear.[7]

Callimachus'objections against the cyclic epics and against other poems written in that style thus have become a little clearer. More light is shed on it from a very different source: Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*. It is interesting to see how the poet openly discusses principles of poetics

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[4] Skiadas 1965, 64 ff.

[5] The rest of the epigram still poses difficulties. See the interpretations of van Groningin 1953, 80 ff. and Fraser 1972, 2.840 n. 303. The work of Reinsch-Werner (1976) discusses Callimachus' imitation of Hesiod, but she sees rather too many similar-ities, as Mineur (1984, 54) rightly remarks.

[6] See Pfeiffer 1968, 230 f.

[7] Cf. Horace, *Ars Poetica* 132: *vilem patulumque orbem*. In the second century AD, Pollianus varies the epigram: Τοὺς κυκλίους τούτους τοὺς αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα λέγοντας / μισῶ, λωποδύτας ἀλλοτρίων ἐπέων … / Οἱ δ᾽ οὕτως τὸν Ὅμηρον ἀναιδῶς λωποδυτοῦσιν, / ὥστε γράφειν ἤδη ʼμῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά'.

in a quasi-religious hymn.[8] In lines 97–104 of this hymn, Callimachus discusses the origin of the cry ἰὴ ἰὴ παιῆον, and alludes, we assume, to his previous work, the *Aitia*. This *Aetia* had caused a great deal of criticism,[9] and in reference to this Callimachus continues in lines 105–113:

> ὁ Φθόνος Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπ’ οὔατα λάθριος εἶπεν·
> ‘οὐκ ἄγαμαι τὸν ἀοιδὸν ὃς οὐδ’ ὅσα πόντος ἀείδει’.
> τὸν Φθόνον ὡπόλλων ποδί τ’ ἤλασεν ὧδέ τ’ ἔειπεν·
> ‘Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλά
> λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἐφ’ ὕδατι συρφετὸν ἕλκει.
> Δηοῖ δ’ οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ὕδωρ φορέουσι μέλισσαι,
> ἀλλ’ ἥτις καθαρή τε καὶ ἀχράαντος ἀνέρπει
> πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβὰς ἄκρον ἄωτον’.
> Χαῖρε, ἄναξ· ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἵν’ ὁ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο.

> Envy whispered treacherously in Apollo’s ear:
> ‘I don’t admire the singer whose song is not as great as the sea’.
> And Apollo drove Envy away with his foot and said:
> ‘Great is the stream of the Assyrian river, but it carries mud
> and refuse in its water. The bees bring Demeter water,
> not from anywhere, but only a small drop that is pure and
> uncontaminated, from a gushing holy source, the finest quality’.
> Hail, o Lord, but Blame, let him go where Envy lives.[10]

F. Williams has shown well in his commentary that the three entities are measured by two criteria here, dimension and purity: the sea is vast and pure, the Assyrian River is vast and dirty, the fountain is small and pure. Envy judges the sea as good, just as Apollo does implicitly, but while Envy rejects the poet who cannot compare to the dimensions of his good example, Apollo condemns the vast but dirty river and praises the small but pure spring. Homer, whose verses about Oceanus from which all rivers flow (*Iliad* 21.195 ff.) were applied to himself in Hellenistic times, is denoted by the sea. From Apollo’s answer it follows that length itself does not guarantee that a poem is Homeric—an echo of Callimachus’ reproach against the cyclic epics. No, the fine and

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[8] Fraser 1972, 1.785 ff. is too convinced of the sincerity of Callimachus’ religious statements.

[9] This can be seen, for example, in the prologue of the *Aitia*. Callimachus fought back more often, as shown by his *Iambi* I fr. 191; XIII frs. 194 and 203.

[10] In lines 110–112, Callimachus puts Aristotle’s statement, *Hist. Anim.* 596b18, into meter, that ‘the bees prefer to take their water from where the water gushes forth clearly’. In addition he alludes to the name of ‘bees’ for the priestesses of Demeter, and finally to the habit of poets comparing themselves to bees: see Williams 1978, ad 1.

subtle poetry of limited size is more suitable to imitate and recreate Homer.

A comparable statement can be found in the seventh *Idyll* of The-ocritus, lines 45 ff. Here one of the protagonists, Simichidas, says that he cannot surpass the great poets Asclepiades and Philetas, to which the other protagonist, Lycidas, replies with ironic praise of his sincerity and continues:

> ὥς μοι καὶ τέκτων μέγ᾽ ἀπέχθεται, ὅστις ἐρευνῆι
> ἶσον ὄρευς κορυφᾶι τελέσαι δόμον Ὠρομέδοντος,
> καὶ Μοισᾶν ὄρνιχες, ὅσοι ποτὶ Χῖον ἀοιδόν
> ἀντία κοκκύζοντες ἐτώσια μοχθίζοντι.

> Just as I hate the builder who tries to raise his house as high
> as mount Oromedon and the birds of the Muses which
> labour in vain while cuckooing against the singer from Chios.

The conclusion is clear: it is both impossible and undesirable to write the same sort of poetry Homer wrote, and if one tries to do it any way, the result is bad: just look at the cyclic epics.[11]

The practice of the Alexandrian poets

What should one do then? Does the poetry of Homer remain out of view? That is not the case, but imitation becomes more subtle, on a small scale, and very refined, so that the connoisseurs can enjoy the erudition and subtlety of it. Here I come to the second point of my subject, the practice, and thus the implicit poetics, of the Alexandrians and their imitation of Homer. It would be wrong to pretend that these poets only imitated Homer, because the entire field of earlier Greek lit-erature, such as Hesiod, the lyric poets and the tragedians, was their hunting ground.[12] But the Homeric epics occupied a prominent posi-tion, even though the Alexandrian poets reworked them in their own way. This is shown, for example, by their use of *epitheta ornantia*. Milman Parry already had shown how varied and deliberate their use of these

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[11] The *Aitia* is not a true epic and therefore does not constitute a counter example, but the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius is. It is therefore understandable that the tradition speaks of a quarrel between Callimachus and Apollonius, but it is uncertain if such a quarrel really existed: see Pfeiffer 1968, 143 f.

[12] See for example, Mineur 1968, 19 ff. concerning the different categories of words used in the fourth hymn. See also Bulloch 1985, 83 ff. who provides a good reading.

epithets were in comparison with Homer. Variation was certainly a criterion for them. This is clear, for example, when we examine how Callimachus introduces passages with direct discourse.[13] In line 121 of his *Hymn to Delos*, Callimachus writes: τὴν δ᾽ ἄρα καὶ Πηνειὸς ἀμείβετο δάκρυα λείβων. Here he combines the Homeric formula τὸν (τὴν) δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ (…) ἀπαμείβετο with *Od.* 24.280 τὸν δ᾽ ἠμείβετ᾽ ἔπειτα πατὴρ κατὰ δάκρυα εἴβων and with the verse ending δάκρυα λείβων, which is Homeric but does not occur in speech formulae. In line 162 of the same hymn (ἀλλά ἑ παιδὸς ἔρυκεν ἔπος τόδε 'μὴ σύ γε, μῆτερ, / κτλ.), the singular ἔρυκεν is used where Homer would have employed κατέρυκεν in similar circumstances, and, unlike the Homeric practice, the subject of ἔρυκεν is non personal and the direct discourse begins halfway in the verse.

The imitation of Homer is even more evident when we look at the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius. In the bibliography I have listed two studies, one by Kasseger (1967) and one by Campbell (1981), each of which provides a very useful, though slightly mind-numbing, list of thousands of places where the text of Apollonius reminds the scholar of Homer.[14] What strikes the reader of these studies is that Apollonius not only varies the Homeric texts but does so in a very creative manner. He creates new forms by analogy with Homer, such as κύδηνε from κυδαίνω or ἐρίδηνε from ἐριδαίνω (A.R. 1.89), where Homer has ἐριδήσασθαι (*Il.* 23.792). So too does Apollonius form a present tense ἀπαμείρω (3.186) from ἄμερσε (*Od.* 68.64), next to the Homeric ἀμέρδω, perhaps using the pair ἔκερσε—κείρω as an example. An incorrect explanation of a Homeric word prompts him to new usage, such as ἄρσετε, which he employs in the meaning of 'to cover', because he (or a predecessor) had interpreted the verb ἄρσον in *Od.* 2.353 in this way.[15] Apollonius interpreted ἐπὶ κλῆισιν καθῖζον (*Od.* 2.145, etc) to mean 'to go sit at the banks of oars', and therefore he can use the word κλῆιδας in 1.395–396, when writing about the division of crewmembers to the oar banks of the Argo.[16]

We also get a better understanding of Apollonius' composition of large portions of poetry when we consider the Homeric epics as his example. Herman Fränkel (1968) has noted several differences, for ex-

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[13] Mineur 1984, 26 ff.

[14] Campbell 1981 gives a few hundred parallels to the *Homeric Hymns* and only about twenty parallels to later epics. But this picture is probably biased given that our knowledge of the latter group is very fragmentary.

[15] Merxer 1935, 55 f.

[16] Idem 59.

ample in the construction of scenes: in the old epic a prelude typically preceded an *aristeia*, but Apollonius begins his *aristeia* without an introductory debate, or he includes an arming scene without a subsequent battle (e.g. 4.1053–1057) with a notable exception at 3.1246–1264. The description of wounds usually is not included, death is described in a businesslike and dry fashion, unless it is a special case, when, for example, a superhuman person is killed from afar by magic (4.1660–1688). The appearance of children and nameless characters also occurs more often than in the Homeric epics, and the heroes are seldom 'heroic': they are constantly overcome by ἀμηχανία. Finally, the entire description of Medea's reactions to catching sight of Jason and the subject of falling in love are clearly un-Homeric in spite of the garb of Homeric *lexis* in which they are cast.

The hymns of Callimachus also contain some clear examples of creative *imitatio* in their use of motifs, scenes, etc. Herter (1929) has devoted a very nice article, which looks at the *Hymn to Artemis*, to this subject. Callimachus in this hymn not only varies but turns entire Homeric scenes on their head, so that an entirely new hymn is created with a childish Artemis as its central figure. Callimachus begins impressively:

> Ἄρτεμιν (οὐ γὰρ ἐλαφρὸν ἀειδόντεσσι λαθέσθαι)[17]
> ὑμνέομεν, τῆι τόξα λαγωβολίαι τε μέλονται
> καὶ χορὸς ἀμφιλαφὴς καὶ ἐν οὔρεσιν ἐψιάασθαι.

> Artemis (for the singer to forget her is not easy)
> we will hymn you, to whom the bow and the shooting of hares belong
> and the wide-flung dance and sport upon the mountains.

Callimachus here uses the word λαγωβολίαι (the shooting of hares) in a play on the traditional cult name ἐλαφηβόλος, and with the words οὔρεσιν ἐψιάασθαι, which refer to Artemis' playing, he varies line 18 of the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*: καὶ γὰρ τῆι ἅδε τόξα καὶ οὔρεσι θῆρας ἐναίρειν / φόρμιγγές τε χοροί τε κτλ. Line 4 of Callimachus' hymn begins with ἀρχμενοι, suggesting that a story about the glorious deeds of Artemis will begin, but instead the reader is presented with a scene in which the child Artemis sits on her father's lap and asks for all kinds of gifts: ὡς ὅτε πατρὸς ἐφεζομένη γονάτεσσι / παῖς ἔτι κουρίζουσα τάδε προσέειπε γονῆα ('beginning with the time when Artemis, sitting on her father's lap, still a small child, said this to her parent').[18] These

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[17] The use of parenthetic clauses is typical of Callimachus. See Bulloch 1985, 86–87 and Mineur 1984, 94.

[18] The text of this line is uncertain according to Bornmann 1968, ad loc.

gifts are the goddess' honorary names and powers, with which on
the one hand Callimachus stays within the realm of more traditional
hymns (aretalogy), but on the other hand steps outside this realm by
having little Artemis ask for the gifts and emphasizing her greed and
her jealousy of her brother Apollo: 7 (δὸς) καὶ πολυωνυμίην, ἵνα μή
μοι Φοῖβος ἐρίζηι … (13) δὸς δέ μοι ἑξήκοντα χορτίδας Ὠκεανίνας …
(18) δὸς δέ μοι οὔρεα πάντα ('give me also an abundance of titles, so
that Phoebus cannnot compare himself to me … and give me sixty
Oceanids for my chorus, … and give me all the mountains'). After
little Artemis has expressed her desires, she tries to grasp the beard
of her father but cannot reach it. Zeus laughs and says that she will
get all that she desires, and that 'father shall give her still more and
greater gifts' (32). Herter (1975) compares this scene with that of the
supplication of Zeus by Thetis, who sitting at the feet of Zeus in
a gesture of supplication holds his chin and requests satisfaction for
Achilles (*Il.* 1.500–502). Much in the first one hundred lines of the hymn
shows that Callimachus' retelling is 'ein Spiel seines eigenen Geistes'
and that he was 'ein Homeriker wie keiner …, aber alles weniger als
ein Nachahmer Homers'. Callimachus has transposed a serious scene
among adults from Homer's *Iliad* into a domestic setting and created
an 'Idylle der Kleinwelt'.[19]

Homer and the Alexandrian philologists

The Alexandrian poets were often also philologists. Thus, we know that
Apollonius Rhodius was the head of the library in Alexandria and that
Callimachus wrote the *Pinakes*, an extensive catalogue, for the library.
But there were also philologists whom we recognize only as such. The
well-know trio, Zenodotus of Ephesus, Aristophanes of Byzantium and
Aristarchus of Samothrace, springs to mind. We know most about the
work of Aristarchus (ca. 216–ca. 144 B.C.), because the scholia to the
Iliad, which are our main source of knowledge about these scholars,
tells us most about the latest one, Aristarchus, who summarized the
work of his predecessors and overshadowed them.

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[19] Herter 1929, 372 and 374. Theocritus similarly transformed the meeting of Odys-
seus and Eumaeus with Melantheus in that of Lycidas and Simichidas in his seventh
idyll.

I have written about Aristarchus elsewhere, including about his appreciation of Homer.[20] Central to his assessement of the poet was his belief that Homer composed the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, but not the other epics which were ascribed to him. He also believed that Homer had used as guiding principle in the composition of his epics the consistency between the different parts. In addition to this, Homer would have employed functionality as another principle. For Aristarchus these two principles were the criteria with which he assessed the epics, chose between variant readings he found in book scrolls, and reacted to the suggestions of his predecessors. In addition and in keeping with this, Aristarchus provides much commentary about the language and the style of the epics, from which it appears that he knew the texts exceptionally well and he continually compared verses in different places.

In order not to repeat myself, I shall offer here different examples of Aristachus' method than I discussed in my previous two articles. The first concerns the depiction of Nestor, whom Homer, according to Aristarchus, consistently portrays as a valuable and commendable hero. For example, at *Iliad* 10.532 Nestor is the first to hear Odysseus and Diomedes returning from their scouting expedition, and at 637 he effortlessly picks up a full drinking bowl. At this point the scholion notes: (δεῖ) νοεῖν ὅτι καὶ ταῦτο τῶν ἐπαίνων λεγομένων Νέστορός ἐστι, καθάπερ καὶ τό (10.532).[21] At *Iliad* 23.616, during the funeral games of Patroclus, Achilles gives Nestor a drinking cup 'outside the competition because you wrestle no longer … the burdens of the years weigh you down'. Aristarchus explains this gesture of Achilles by commenting that from the viewpoint of the composition of the entire story Nestor had to refrain from participating in the games; otherwise he would have lost and this would have damaged his reputation: ὅτι οἰκονομικῶς ὑπολείπεται ἔπαθλον, ἵνα μὴ ὁ Νέστωρ ἄτιμος γένηται ἐν τῶι ἐπὶ Πατρόκλῳ ἄγωνι.[22]

If a violation of this consistency of portrayal occurs in the text, Aristarchus either declares the text unauthentic or explains the inconsistency away and so preserves the text. With this I come to my next example of Aristarchus' methodology. Following Aristophanes, Aristar-

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[20] Schenkeveld 1970 and 1976.
[21] Schol. ad *Il.* 11.636a.
[22] Schol. ad *Il.* 23.616a.

chus athetizes lines 11.767–785 of the *Iliad*. At line 765 Nestor reminds
Patroclus of the command his father, Menoitios, gave him when he
sent him to Troy. In the disputed lines following Nestor tells how
Odysseus and he arrived in Phthia; how they met Menoitios, Patro-
clus, and Achilles during a sacrifice performed by Peleus; how Achilles
welcomed them; and finally how Peleus instructed Achilles with the
famous words 'always to be bravest and preeminent above all' (αἰὲν
ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων). These words, however, do not
agree with the much more detailed instructions Peleus gave Achilles
according to Odysseus in book 9.254 ff. Moreover, Peleus' behaviour
in these lines is contrary to the established norm of hosts receiving
guests: Peleus does not welcome his guests but instead continues sac-
rificing. These are the main points of criticism voiced against the pas-
sage in Schol. A at 11.767: ἀθετοῦνται δὲ ἀπὸ τούτου στίχοι ἐννεακαί-
δεκα ἕως τοῦ (785), ὅτι ἡ σύνθεσις αὐτῶν πεζή ('prosiac'), καὶ διαφω-
νεῖ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς Λιταῖς ταῦτα (783). ἐκεῖ γὰρ ὁ Πηλεύς φησι (9.254–255)
καὶ ὅτι ἃ Πηλεῖ ἐπέβαλλε ποιεῖν (his task was), ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πράσσει,
αὐτὸς δὲ ὡς εἴδωλον σπένδει (778–779). ὁ δὲ Πελεὺς οὐδ' εἰ πάρεισι
προσποιεῖται. Inconsistencies also occur in the arming scenes, but in
these instances Aristarchus has the tendency to ascribe the discrepan-
cies to poetic license. Thus he explains the difference between *Iliad*
2.45 and 11.29, where Agamemnon's sword is, respectively, described
as silver-studded and gold-studded with the aid of this principle in
Schol. A ad 2.45a: τὰ τοιαῦτα δὲ κυρίως οὐ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἔστι
ποιητικῆς ἀρεσκείας ('such things are said not correctly, but in a burst
of poetic license'). Finally, Aristarchus discusses a case of inconsis-
tency that turns out to be correct. At *Iliad* 3.423 ff., Zenodotus had
altered the text because it said that the goddess Aphrodite fetched a
chair for Helena. Such an action, according to Zenodotus, is incon-
sistent with the proper behaviour of a goddess (ἀπρεπές). Aristarchus
disagrees, however, because Aphrodite at this point had taken on the
guise of an old woman (3.385–387) and her getting a chair does befit
such a character, as he says in Schol. A ad 3.423: (Zenodotus) ἐπιλέ-
ληται δὲ ὅτι γραῒ εἴκασται καὶ ταύτῃ τῇ μορφῇ τὰ προσήκοντα ἐπιτη-
δεύει.

The principle of consistency is therefore applied in various, subtle
ways. We can discern from the scholia that Aristarchus regularly differ-
entiates between Homer the narrator (τὸ ἴδιον πρόσωπον) and the char-
acters in his narration (τὸ ἡρωϊκὸν πρόσωπον), and that he also exam-
ines if pronouncements are made by the same or by different charac-

ters. In doing so he anticipates the narratological concepts of 'points of view' and 'focalization'.[23] A very simple example is his observation that Homer designates the rising of the sun with ἐξ Ὠκεανοῦ ἀνίσχειν, while one of his characters, Nestor, uses the phrase ἠέλιος φαέθων ὑπερέσχεθε γαίης (schol. A ad 11.735). In the scholion to *Iliad* 6.265, Aristarchus points to the apparent contradiction between Herctor's pronouncement in line 6.265 that wine weakens a man, and Hecuba's remark, four lines earlier, that wine would strengthen him. Aristarchus points out that different characters are voicing here their own different opinions: ἔστι δὲ διάφορα τὰ λέγοντα πρόσωπα, καὶ ἑκατέρον πρός τι εἴρηται.

The idea of the functionality of passages is applied, among other things, to the outline of the story, and the concommitant question whether or not a certain detail is important for the development of the story. For example, Aristarchus argues that we should not with Zenodotus eliminate the verse ἂν δ' αὐτὴν Χρυσηΐδα καλλιπάρῃον βήσομεν at *Iliad* 1.143, because it provides essential information about Chryseis, who is the root cause of the plague.[24] Within this notion of functionality I also include Aristarchus' argumentation concerning the effectivity, or lack thereof, of certain passages. *Iliad* 8.385–387 contains the same verses as 5.734–736, both passages dealing with Athena, but in the fifth book the lines are followed by an important action of Athena, whereas in the eighth book they do not. Aristarchus, who is always suspicious when the same lines appear elsewhere, now has an argument why the lines in the eighth book should be excised: ἐνταῦθα δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναλαμβάνει τὴν παντευχίαν (schol. A ad *Il.* 8.385–387). It is sometimes said that Aristarchus excised these and other repeated lines out of a love of brevity, but the text of the scholion suggests a different reason. Aristarchus' alleged love of brief desciptions is also contradicted by the fact that he wants to preserve the entire description of the shield in the eighteenth book (483–608), while Zenodotus had proposed to athetize it. Aristarchus' argument is that a description of the bellows in Hephaestus' forge precedes these verses and that an excision of the shield passage would leave this description hanging in

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[23] [See on this topic more recently Nünlist 2003, eds.]

[24] See Nickau 1977, 98ff. for a good explanation of Zenodotus' rejection of this line.

the air and remove its purpose: Ὅμηρος δὲ οὐκ ἂν προετραγῴδησεν τὰ κατὰ τὰς φύσας εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν τῆς ποικιλίας κατασκευὴν ἔμελλε διατίθε-σθαι.[25]

Alexandrian philologists?

How Alexandrian is Aristarchus' point of view? With the answer to this question I will bring this contribution to a close. In the first place we have to recognize that we are dealing with Aristarchus' own poetics. This poetics may very well, in many cases, coincide with the oral poetics we seem to find in Homer's epics, but in some important ways it differs from it as well. For example, Aristarchus' concept of functionality ignores an important principle of oral poetry, which allows for verse repetitions in many more circumstances. Also the notion that Homer very consciously thought about and composed every line is not always compatible with the oral composition of the ancient epics, not even with the idea of a post-oral authorship.

But is Aristarchus' way of thinking typically Alexandrian? Sometimes Aristarchus returns to older opinions of, for example, Aristotle, but one can nevertheless in general answer this question affirmatively. The idea of the consciously composing writer who maintains complete control over his composition, resembles the practice of the Alexandrian poets, certainly when the idea is raised to a principle of explanation and thus made part of an explicit poetics. Aristarchus is certainly aware of the difference between his own time and the time of Homer, and he would therefore not expect Homer to write exactly as, for example, Callimachus does, but he does expect Homer to compose consciously, consistently, and with an eye to effect.

Another similarity between Aristarchus and the Alexandrian poets is the apparent lack of a moralizing stance. We find such a stance regularly in the later scholia (such as the so-called bT scholia), which repeatedly tell us that Homer wants to provide us with lessons in ethics and therefore composed his verses in a particular way. This viewpoint is entirely lacking in Aristarchus' comments, as well as in the poetics of Callimachus and his associates. In this respect too, then, one could fit the scholarship of Aristarchus in the framework of Alexandrian poetics,

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[25] Schol. A ad *Il.* 18.483a.

but one should be careful: Aristotle in his *Poetics* does not adopt the ethical viewpoints of the later commentators either. So we run the risk of declaring perhaps too soon similarities between Aristarchus and the Alexandrian poets as exclusively Alexandrian, while they may actually represent schools of thought that were present throughout antiquity or in different periods of it.[26]

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[26] For more concerning this issue, see the dissertation of Meijering 1987. She argues, contrary to Pfeiffer (1968, 67), for an Aristotelian influence upon the Alexandrian poets.

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HOMER, APOLLONIUS, CALLIMACHUS
AND THE CONCEPT OF ΔΙΗΝΕΚΗΣ

Heather van Tress

In the prologue to the *Aetia* Callimachus delineates his poetic program using a series of contrasts: the continuous or long poem versus the short poem (Fr. 1.3–5); the short versus the long poems of Mimnermus and Philetas (Fr. 1.10–12); short versus long poems in general (Fr. 1.13–18); fat versus slender (Fr. 1.23–24); the well-worn path versus narrow, unworn ones (Fr. 1.25–29); and the clear voice of the cicada versus the braying of asses (Fr. 1.29–34).[1] In another study I have examined the use of two of the key programmatic phrases in this prologue, i.e. λεπτόν ('slender' or 'small-scale', Fr. 1.11) or τὴ]ν Μοῦσαν … λεπταλέην ('the slender Muse', Fr. 1.24) and ἓν ἄεισμα διηνεκές ('one continuous poem', Fr. 1.24), because the precise meaning of the two adjectives, λεπτόν and διηνεκής, has been the subject of much discussion and debate over the years.[2] In this paper I would like to re-examine one of these programmatic phrases in more depth, ἓν ἄεισμα διηνεκές (Fr. 1.24), focusing particularly upon the use of the modifier διηνεκής in the work of Homer and Apollonius of Rhodes, and how the connotations of the word in the texts of these poets might help us better understand Callimachus' ἓν ἄεισμα διηνεκές.[3]

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[1] In this paper the text of Callimachus is that of Pfeiffer 1949–1953, the text of Apollonius of Rhodes is that of Vian and Delage 1974, that of Hesiod's *Theogony* is Solmsen, Merkelbach and West 1990, the text of the *Odyssey* is that of Stanford 1947, the *Iliad* that of West 1998–2000, the text of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* is that of Allen, Halliday, and Sikes 1936, second ed., and the text of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* is that of Page 1972. All translations in this article are mine (unless noted otherwise).

[2] Van Tress 2004, 24–71. This book was the culmination of research done under the supervision of Dr. A.H.M. Kessels, who spent hours helping this author. This article stems from the book and is meant as a tribute to him.

[3] The meanings assigned to the words 'denotation' and 'connotation' are derived both from the dictionary definitions and the meanings given to them by literary theorists. 'Denotation' is the 'direct, explicit meaning or reference of a word or term' (*Webster's New World Dictionary*), or 'what a sign (i.e. a word) stands for' (Eagleton 1983, 101). 'Connotation' is the 'idea suggested by or associated with a word, phrase, etc. in addition to its explicit meaning, or denotation' (*Webster's New World Dictionary*), or 'other signs or words associated with a sign' (i.e. a word) (Eagleton 1983, 101).

The correspondences of theme, composition, style and phraseology between Apollonius' and Callimachus' work are clear, as is the Homeric nature of Apollonius' *Argonautica*.[4] We can perhaps presume a physically or intellectually close working relationship between the two Hellenistic poets,[5] and we should assume that both were steeped in Homer's poetry in general and were well aware of the various uses of this particular modifier in these texts. The examination of the following passages of poetry, which focuses on the Homeric and Apollonian epics, suggests that, in place of the traditional notion that Callimachus disavowed writing the ἄεισμα διηνεκές, the 'long', 'continous', or 'epic' poem, we should consider a more nuanced reading of Callimachus' programmatic διηνεκής, a reading that embraces not only the denotation of the modifier, but its various connotations as well.

The adjective διηνεκής probably originated from the combination of δια and the root ἐνεκ-, which in turn is derived from ἐνεγκεῖν (the secondary aorist infinitive of φέρειν—'to carry').[6] Based on this information we might then conclude that Callimachus' ἓν ἄεισμα διηνεκές means one poem that is 'carried through', or as the lexicon suggests,[7] one 'long' or 'continous' poem, especially given that this phrase clearly contrasts with ἔπος … τυτθὸν ('short tale'; Fr. 1.5). If there were no lacunae in the two subsequent lines of the *Aetia* prologue (Fr. 1.4–5), the precise meaning of διηνεκές would probably be clearer and of less interest. Seeing that these lacunae exist, we are left attempting to recover what Callimachus' use of the word might mean. What sort of poem did his critics supposedly want him to write?

If we examine the contexts of the adjectival forms of διηνεκής in poets prior to the Hellenistic period we see, that in addition to its denotation, its connotation comes to be something like 'Homeric' or 'heroic'. It occurs in the adjectival form most often in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Thereafter it appears in similarly epic poetry, and its uses in these texts seem to be allusions to the Homeric usage. In the Homeric epics it occurs in two formulaic passages describing the larger portions of sacrificial meat allotted to the heroes Ajax (νώτοισιν δ' Αἴαντα διηνεκέεσσι γέραιρεν; 'he honored Ajax with the long pieces of the chine'

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[4] See Bulloch 1989, 47 and Campbell 1981.
[5] Bulloch 1989, 46.
[6] Chantraine 1968, 282.
[7] See LSJ s.v. διηνεκής.

Il. 7.321) and Odysseus (νώτοισιν δ' Ὀδυσῆα διηνεκέεσσι γέραιρεν: 'he honored Odysseus with the long pieces of the chine' *Od.* 14.437).[8] In the *Iliad* it is used in the description of the golden strips or wires encircling Sarpedon's shield and holding the layers of its leather together (ἔντοσθεν δὲ βοείας ῥάψε θαμειάς / χρυσείης ῥάβδοισι διηνεκέσιν περὶ κύκλον; 'and inside he sewed the numerous oxhides with continous strips (or threads) of gold around the rim' *Il.* 12.297),[9] and for the roots of a tree, which is half of a simile in which two warriors are compared to two oak trees (τε δρύες … / … /ῥίζῃσιν μεγάλῃσι διηνεκέεσσ' ἀραρυῖαι; 'two oak trees … gripping with their great, continuous roots' *Il.* 12.134). It is also used in the depiction of the unfamiliar landscape Odysseus sees when he finally returns to Ithaca (ἀτραπιτοί τε διηνεκέες λιμένες τε πάνορμοι …; 'the continuous roads and the harbors where all could anchor …' *Od.* 13.195), and to describe a furrow in a field Odysseus, in the disguise of the beggar, boasts he can plow (εἰ ὦλκα διηνεκέα προταμοίμην; 'If I could plow a continuous furrow' *Od.* 18.375). In the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* διηνεκές appears twice in the description of the 'far-reaching foundations' the god erects (ὣς εἰπὼν διέθηκε θεμείλια Φοῖβος Ἀπολλων / εὐρέα καὶ μάλα μακρὰ διηνεκές; 'Speaking thus, Phoebus Apollo laid out all the foundations throughout, wide and very long' 255, 295). In a metaphor reminiscent of *Od.* 12.134, Hesiod uses the adjective to compare the roots of a tree to a bronze threshold (Ἔνθα δὲ μαρμάρεαί τε πύλαι καὶ χάλκεος οὐδὸς / ἀστεμφής, ῥίζῃσι διηνεκέεσσιν ἀρηρώς; 'And there are gleaming gates and an unmoved bronze threshold, constructed with continuous foundations' *Th.* 812). The denotation of all these occurrences of the adjective may be translated using the words 'long' or 'continuous', but two other connotations are 'heroic' and 'epic'.

When we turn to the work of Apollonius, whose references to Homer are often more evident than Callimachus', we see that at *Argo.* 4.1247 the poet makes interesting use of the word when he inserts what at first glance appears to be the adjectival form, διηνεκές. In fact, it is the neuter form of the adjective used as an adverb:

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[8] Further underscoring the heroic connotation is Leaf's comment (1960, 320) that Herodotus (6.56) tells of one of the privileges of the Spartan *kings* was this portion of the animal (emphasis mine). Virgil alludes to this Homeric formula in *Aen.* 8.182–183, *vescitur Aeneas … perpetui tergo bovis.*

[9] See Leaf 1960, 546.

οἱ δ' ἀπὸ νηὸς ὄρουσαν, ἄχος δ' ἕλεν εἰσορόωντας
ἠέρα καὶ μεγάλης νῶτα χθονὸς ἠέρι ἶσα,
τηλοῦ ὑπερτείνοντα διηνεκές·

And they hastened from the ship, and sorrow seized them when they
looked upon the mist and the level plains of the vast land, laying contin-
uously over the land far into the distance.

In terms of its morphology, the neuter form recalls the neuter adjective
that modifies the noun, ἄεισμα, in Callimachus' *Aetia*. Campbell points
the reader in the direction of the Homeric use of the adjectival forms,
Il. 7.321 and *Od.* 14. 437. Livrea indicates a more fruitful direction,
however, when he points out that Apollonius uses the neuter singular
of the adjective as an adverb only here and that this is not Homeric
practice.[10] This sort of allusion and creation of new forms by analogy
to Homeric texts is common practice for Apollonius.[11] Perhaps more
interesting in terms of allusion is that Apollonius' use of the modifier in
this context recalls *Od.* 13.194–196:

τοὔνεκ' ἄρ' ἀλλοειδέ' ἐφαίνετο πάντα ἄνακτι,
ἀτραπιτοί τε διηνεκέες λιμένες τε πάνορμοι
πέτραι τ' ἠλίβατοι καὶ δένδρεα τηλεθάοντα.

As a result everything seemed unfamiliar to the lord, the long paths and
the harbors always fit for landing in and the steep rocks and the green
trees.

The correspondences between the two passages are general but strik-
ing: bearing many gifts, both Odysseus and the Argonauts leave the
Phaeacians, and make landfall. The Argonauts expect to reach Greece
but must endure more adventures before going home, while after years
of traveling Odysseus finally reaches home only to be disappointed by
what he sees. The Argonauts reach the shore of Libya, bitterly dis-
appointed not only because it is not their homeland, but because it
appears to be a hostile and inescapable land.

It seems likely that the poets examined thus far were cognizant of
Homer's use of διηνεκής, and that their use of this modifier is, in
the case of Hesiod and the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, the (re)use of epic
language, while in the case of Apollonius an allusion to Homer. We
know that Callimachus and Apollonius in particular were extremely
well-versed in Homer's poetry and both frequently allude to it.[12] If

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[10] Campbell 1981, 83 and Livrea 1973, 352–353.
[11] See Schenkeveld 1988, 104.
[12] Bulloch 1989, 9–30 and 46–58.

so, then Apollonius' and Callimachus' use of διηνεκής could very well
be an allusion to Homer. We could return to the traditional notion
that according to the *Aetia* prologue some critized Callimachus because
he did not write one 'long' or 'continuous' poem. However, as we
have just seen, these English translations do not capture the Home-
ric connotations present in passages examined above. To the estab-
lished translation we should add this undertone of Homericism or hero-
ism, and so some may have criticized Callimachus because he did not
write a long or continuous 'heroic' or 'Homeric' poem. While this
interpretation enhances the reader's understanding of the adjectival
form, the modifier possesses still more connotations that point to a
more nuanced reading of the programmatic phrase in the *Aetia* pro-
logue.

The adverbial forms of the adjective, διηνεκέως and διηνεκῶς, appear
several times in the context of story-telling in poetry pre-dating or con-
temporaneous with Callimachus, each time accompanied by a verb of
speaking and signifying 'fully', 'uninterrupted' or 'continuously'. When
we focus upon the use of the adverb in the poetry of Homer, we see that
the word becomes bound to a wide array of notions that are not usu-
ally associated with poetry, but it is associated with speech in Homer.
Richard Martin defines the word μῦθος in Homer as 'a speech-act indi-
cating authority, performed at length, usually in public, with a focus
on full attention to every detail', and demonstrates that there is good
formulaic authority for the association of μῦθος and ἀγορεύειν, which
is usually defined 'to speak in public'.[13] Homeric speech-acts are often
begun in an assembly, μύθων ἦρχε ('he began a speech'; *Il.* 2.433; *Il.*
5.420), or simply begun, ἦρχ' ἀγορεύειν ('he began to speak'; *Il.* 1.571;
Il. 7.347). In the *Odyssey* phrases using both words function as formu-
laic complements. For example, ἦρχ' ἀγορεύειν at the end of a verse
(*Od.* 2.15; *Od.*16.345) is interchangeable with ἄρχετο μύθων (*Od.* 1.367;
Od. 15.166).[14] This would suggest that the verb ἀγορεύειν implies a pub-
lic audience, and with the addition of the adverb διηνεκέως, it would
mean speaking with full attention to detail.

In the *Odyssey* Homer employs the adverbial form of διηνεκές to-
gether with forms of ἀγορεύειν on three occasions: 4.836, 7.241, and
12.56. At 4.836, concerned about the welfare of Penelope, Athena sends
a phantom of her sister, Iphthime, in a dream to comfort her. After

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[13] Martin 1989, 12.
[14] Martin 1989, 37.

reassuring her sister about the fate of Telemachus, the phantom refuses to answer Penelope's questions about Odysseus. The phantom says (*Od.* 4.836–837):

Οὐ μέν τοι κεῖνόν γε διηνεκέως ἀγορεύσω,
ζώει ὅ γ' ἦ τέθνηκε· Κακὸν δ' ἀνεμώλια βάζειν.

As for that other one, I will not tell you in detail whether he lives or has died. It is bad to talk words of the wind.

Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth tell us that here the normal meaning is 'continuously, from beginning to end', but that 'here it must be something like "positively, explicitly"', and that it is 'a familiar formula' that 'has been carelessly used'.[15] This interpretation conforms to the lexicon's suggestions and, admittedly, the adverb does not occur in a public forum, as is usual when this formula is used. Still, it is debatable that Homer uses the adverb carelessly here. The poet himself tells the reader that Penelope is more worried about the fate of her inexperienced son than that of her husband (*Od.* 4.817–820). Only after the phantom has reassured her of her son's fate does Penelope identify the phantom as a god and request information about Odysseus. Stanford seems to point the reader in a more promising direction when he suggests that in not telling Penelope 'fully', or 'all the details', as the adverb here probably means, she is kept in suspense and thus the poet heightens the pathos of her situation.[16] Homer has already made it clear that Odysseus will return, so the reader is not in Penelope's position, but now wants to know not *if*, but *when* and *how* the hero will return. From the standpoint of the connotation of the adverb in these verses, the reader notes that though Penelope wants a full account of her missing husband, the phantom's words emphasize the undesirability of telling everything at this point in the narrative.

The adverb is also used when Odysseus encounters the queen of the Phaeacians, Arete. The queen asks who he is, where he has come from, who has given him his clothing, and whether he had told them he had come to them via the sea. First gathering and editing his thoughts, the master story-teller, Odysseus, replies to some of the queen's questions. Odysseus begins by saying (*Od.* 7.241–242):

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[15] Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth 1980, 244, which appears to be based on the definition found in LSJ.

[16] Stanford 1947, 290–291.

ἀργαλέον, βασίλεια, διηνεκέως ἀγορεῦσαι
κήδε᾽, ἐπεί μοι πολλὰ δόσαν θεοὶ οὐρανίωνες.

It is a difficult thing, Queen, to tell you all my troubles in detail, since the gods of the sky have given me many.

In the speech that follows Odysseus answers one of Arete's questions, where he came from, or rather, where he was before arriving on their shores. He does not reveal his name or all his ordeals; these come in the following books after a good night's sleep. Why then does Odysseus use this adverb here? De Jong has pointed out that the use of the adverb here may function as a rhetorical device—it whets the audience's appetite.[17] It is indeed important to remember that this is a sort of proem to Odysseus' tales and that, as such, it serves as a means of preparing the audience for the tales to come in the subsequent books. On the other hand, Odysseus does not give Queen Arete an answer to all her questions, and the question he does address he addresses only briefly. In terms of the function of διηνεκέως in its immediate context in the passage, Odysseus uses it simply because he is not prepared to tell his story with all the details at this moment. That story follows in the books to come, and so, the reader discerns once more a connotation of undesirability of telling a tale with all the details that surrounds the adverb. The adverb in this particular context has interesting implications for the *Aetia* prologue. We remember that Odysseus is the man of many resources and in many instances, this moment with the Phaeacians being one, he parallels the role of the bard himself.[18] For this reason the reader should be sceptical of the veracity of his tales and just which and how many details he will reveal to his audience. We know that in most instances of him encountering other people Odysseus judiciously edits and tells 'his story'. The reader's only source for many of Odysseus' travels is the hero himself, and, therefore, he should be wary of whether or not the story is told 'fully' and 'with all the details'. Also, once again it is striking that Odysseus, like the phantom which appears to Penelope, emphasizes how difficult and, therefore undesirable, it would be to tell his story 'fully' or with 'all the details'. The reader may then not only question the hero's accounts, but once again he reads the undesirability of a tale with all the details. If we pause and consider the impact of these connotations on the *Aetia* prologue, we

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[17] De Jong 2001, 186.
[18] Ford 1992, 13–56.

begin to see that perhaps with the use of διηνεκές Callimachus is poking fun at some of his critics; even in the Homeric epics it was not always considered proper to tell a tale 'fully' or with 'all the details'.

The third occurrence demands another explanation. Circe, instructing Odysseus before he sets out from her island, says (*Od.* 12.55–58):

> Αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν δὴ τάς γε παρὲξ ἐλάσωσιν ἑταῖροι,
> ἔνθα τοι οὐκέτ' ἔπειτα διηνεκέως ἀγορεύσω
> ὁπποτέρῃ δή τοι ὁδὸς ἔσσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸς
> θυμῷ βουλεύειν·

> Then, for the time when your companions have driven past, for that time
> I will no longer tell you in detail which way of the two your course lies,
> but you yourself must consider this in your own mind.

Circe then tells Odysseus that he may choose to travel through the Planctae (12.59–72) or via Scylla and Charybdis (12.73–110). At first glance it may seem odd that Circe uses διηνεκέως, given that she does indeed tell Odysseus in some detail about the two dangers that lie before him. The answer lies in verses 57–58: but you yourself must consider this in your own time. Circe does not tell the hero 'fully' which of the two routes he should take, because that is his decision to make; she does, however, seem to assume at verses 81–82 that he will choose the route that leads him to Scylla and Charybdis.[19] What Circe is unwilling to tell fully or in detail, is which route the hero should choose and, thus, once more we find that the adverb occurs in a context that suggests that it is undesirable to speak 'fully' or including 'all the details'.

When we turn to Hesiod and Aeschylus we find two poets who employ the adverb in contexts that suggest that a story told in detail is preferable. The adverb appears at *Theogony* 627, when Hesiod's Gaia tells the gods about the outcome of their conflict with the Titans: αὐτὴ γάρ σφιν ἅπαντα διηνεκέως κατέλεξε ('for she herself recounted all things fully to the gods'). Here the Homeric formula is retained, but we depart from the Homeric notion that it is undesirable to tell a narrative fully, with all the details. It appears that Gaia recounting all things fully and with all the details is a positive thing, especially for the gods. In Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (319), the chorus asks Clytemnestra to tell them more fully about the Greek victory at Troy:

> λόγους δ' ἀκοῦσαι τούσδε κἀποθαυμάσαι
> διηνεκῶς θέλοιμ' ἄν, ὡς λέγοις, πάλιν.

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[19] As de Jong 2001, 299 points out.

> But I want to wonder much and to hear the report in detail; thus tell us your news again.

Once again, telling something fully is seemingly positive. We should remember, however, that Clytemnestra does not give the chorus (or the audience) a full account of the Trojan war or the fall of the city, but pictures of the fall of the city drawn from her own imagination.

Within the *Argonautica* of Callimachus' contemporary we detect a return to the Homeric context and connotation. In fact, all four occurrences of διηνεκῶς are allusions to Homer. Three of the four occupy the same metrical *sedes*, all occurrences are Homeric formulae, and all occur at a point at which the character addresses a public audience. Likewise, there is a return to the more negative connotation of the adverb as seen in Homer. At 1.649 the poem's narrator, catching himself in a digression, speaks directly to the audience, rejecting the notion of recounting a tale 'fully' or with 'all the details'. The use of the adverb here has interesting implications when we consider that the 'speaker' is the poet's persona and the 'audience' or 'public' being addressed is the reader (1.648–649): ἀλλὰ τί μύθους / Αἰθαλίδεω χρείω με διηνεκέως ἀγορεύειν; (But why do I want to tell the story of Aethalides fully?).

Though Apollonius, like Homer, uses invocation and questions that intrude the narrating *ego* into the narrative, generally speaking in his *Argonautica* there is a 'far greater prominence of the poet's person' than we see in Homer's epics.[20] Beye considers the type of rhetorical question seen above as the poet's display that makes clear that he, the poet, is in control of the narrative, that he is creating the storyline.[21] I would continue and add that here, and in the passages which follow this one, Apollonius redeploys the Homeric formulae in a seemingly similar situation, that of a character believing the telling of a tale 'fully', with 'all the details' to be undesirable. But Apollonius' allusion to Homer also authorizes his poetic stance that one should not tell a story 'fully' or with 'all the details', for even Homer did not allow his characters to speak in such a manner.

Apollonius uses διηνεκέως in describing Jason's report of the invitation Hypsipyle extends to the Argonauts. Notice that while Jason is addressing the entire crew, he is speaking in a public forum, and that, though the hero tells his tale from beginning to end, the poet does not.

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[20] See Hunter 1993, 101–119, esp. 106.
[21] Beye 1982, 15.

Again, the implication is that telling a tale with all the details is not desirable (1.847–848):

> μῦθον ὅτ᾽ ἤδη πάντα διηνεκέως ἀγόρευσεν,
> τόν ῥα καλεσσαμένη διεπέφραδεν Ὑψιπύλεια …
>
> and when he had reported the entire speech fully that Hypsipyle had plainly told when she had summoned him …

At *Argo.* 3.401, once again in a public setting, the reader gets the impression that Jason seems to prefer telling stories fully. Perhaps more important for the characterization of the tyrant is King Aeetes' reply to Jason's request for the golden fleece: Ξεῖνε, τί κεν τὰ ἕκαστα διηνεκέως ἀγορεύοις ('Guest, why should you tell everything from beginning to end?'). Naturally the king is jealous of his property and is impatient to cut to the heart of the matter. But the reader immediately recognizes the Homeric formula Apollonius uses in all of these passages.[22] The poet not only borrows the Homeric formula, but alludes to its connotation in the Homeric contexts as well.[23] Just as in the *Odyssey*, Apollonius uses διηνεκέως to stress the uninterrupted nature of a narrative: the narrator speaking at length about a tale only loosely connected to the one he tells; Jason using the power of words to persuade his men to accept Hypsipyle's hospitality; King Aeetes's impatient response to Jason's request.[24]

Using another form of this modifier, Apollonius characterizes Phineus, the prophet, who warns the Argonauts of the dangers that lie ahead, much as Homer characterizes Circe in the *Odyssey*. The formulaic line has been altered, but the basic meaning of Homer's διηνεκέως ἀγορεύειν is evident. Note too that the character of Phineus believes it a *sin* to tell his prophecy fully (*Argo.* 2.390–391):

> ἀλλὰ τίη με πάλιν χρειὼ ἀλιτέσθαι
> μαντοσύνῃ τὰ ἕκαστα διηνεκὲς ἐξενέποντα.
>
> But why do I need to sin again by telling you in detail all with my gift of divination?

Phineus' knowledge is seemingly without limit, nevertheless he appears unable or unwilling to give the Argonauts a full or detailed account. Of course, lexical similarities to *Od.* 12.55–58 should remind the reader

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[22] Many have studied Apollonius' allusions to Homer; e.g. Hunter 1993 and Campbell 1981.

[23] Newman 1974, 355.

[24] For the adverbial usage of this word, Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth 1988, 244.

that the blind Phineus functions for the Argonauts as Circe and Tiresias does for Odysseus in the *Od.* 10–12.[25] It is my contention that Apollonius uses this particular Homeric formula not only to infuse his poem with epic flavor, to alternatively bind his own epic to and contrast it with Homer's, but in these specific passages the poet makes a statement about narrative. A story told fully or with all the details is not desirable, and the poet draws from the master himself to support his case.

Admittedly Callimachus does not use the adverbial, but the adjectival form, of διηνεκές, still this examination of the use of the adverbial forms in the poetry of two poets whose work had an impact on Callimachus' has interesting implications. Homer's own narratives seem, explicitly or implicitly, to reject a story told 'fully' or with 'all the details'. Callimachus' contemporary, Apollonius, employs the same Homeric formula and alludes to the Homeric passages, thereby also rejecting a story told with all the details and, by means of his allusions to Homer, authorizing his stance. Because Callimachus was extremely familiar with the poetry of Homer and Apollonius, it is logical to assume that he was aware of their use of the adverbial form of the modifier, and that his use of the adjective might borrow from the connotations that it possesses in the poetry of Homer and Apollonius. That is to say that Callimachus' critics supposedly censured him because he didn't write a poem 'fully' or with 'all the details'.

The use of forms of διηνεκής in the extant poetry prior to and contemporaneous with Callimachus demonstrates that the poet most likely uses the adjective to denote more than simply a 'long' or 'continuous' poem. Callimachus is also drawing upon the connotation of 'Homeric' or 'heroic' inherent in contexts of the adjectival use of the modifier in the work of his predecessors, as well as the connotations of a full or detailed narrative that even Homer disavowed. If Callimachus' use of διηνεκής is indeed an allusion to Homer, an allusion that draws upon all of the notions associated with it as examined in this paper, then this portion of his poetic manifesto is rather amusing. If some criticized his work because it was not long, continuous, Homeric, heroic, or detailed, then it would seem that the critics themselves do not know what the master himself, Homer, recommended.

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[25] See also Hunter 1993, 91–95 and Beye 1982, 44–45.

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ON THE SUMMARY OF THE ADVENTURES
OF ODYSSEUS IN PROPERTIUS 3.12

J.H. Brouwers

Like many other Roman poets Propertius frequently refers to Homer and both of his epics in his work. He does this very explicitly when he mentions the author's name or one of his two famous poems, e.g. in *El.* 3.1.37, in which he addresses Troy with the words *ille tui casus memorator Homerus* or in *El.* 2.1.14, in which he describes his intention to write long poems for Cynthia as *longas condimus Iliadas*.[1] Much more often, however, the reference is made in an indirect or implicit way, for instance when the reader is unmistakenly reminded of the work of Homer by the use of a certain expression, a combination of words, or a characterization of a person that appears in the work of the great Greek epic poet. Consider, for example, the designation of the daybreak as *Eous roseus* in *El.* 3.24.7, the characterization of Nireus as the outstanding example of beauty (*facies*) in *El.* 3.18.27, or the observation in *El.* 2.13. 46 that Nestor only saw death after three generations (*post tria saecula*). These are examples which we easily recognize as similar to descriptions and observations in Homer.[2] In addition to these and similar examples, such as when Paris, Hector, and Helen are mentioned,[3] Propertius goes back to Homer in order to compose a certain motif, a certain theme, or a typical scene.[4] Just how important Homer is as a source of inspiration for Propertius can be seen with a quick glance at Berthet's extensive list of *loci similes*, which refers to the *Iliad* practically as much as to the *Odyssey*.[5]

Now and then however Propertius is not satisfied with giving a brief reference to or a characterization of one of the Homeric figures, but, when the name of a Homeric hero appears, he seizes the opportunity to give a somewhat more detailed description of his actions. In such

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[1] See also Prop. *El.* 1.7.3; 1.9.11; 2.1.21; 2.1.49; 2.34.45 and 66.
[2] See e.g. Hom. *Il.* 1.477; 2.673f.; 1.250ff.; *Od.* 3.245.
[3] See a.o. Berthet 1980, 146f.
[4] See e.g. Dalzell 1980, 29ff. and Evans 1971, 51ff. (on *El.* 4.8).
[5] Berthet 1980, 154f.

cases, a sort of brief summary of the Homeric poem is given, in which the hero in question plays a central role.[6] In this way at *El.* 2.8.29–38, when the poet compares himself, the abandoned *amator*, to Achilles who mourns because Briseïs has been taken away from him (*abrepta coniuge*), Propertius gives an overview of a number of important episodes from the *Iliad*, in which Achilles plays a prominent role. We find a similar summary of the most famous episodes of the *Odyssey* in *El.* 3.12, more specifically in lines 23–37, in which a certain Postumus is compared to Odysseus; this comparison leads to a summary of Odysseus' adventures.

In the following pages I intend to examine this passage closely, using the existing commentaries and studies and partly adding to them, with emphasis on the relation of the passage to the rest of the poem and the constructions and formulations that are characteristic for Propertius, such as the question to what extent the poet's renditions of the events of the Homeric epic and his use of words consciously coincide or diverge from those of Homer. Furthermore, a comparison of a corresponding passage in the so-called *Panegyricus Messallae* will be part of this discussion.

I am convinced that this is an approach that will find favour with the man to whom this volume is dedicated, since I have been able to observe, in the course of a long-term and enjoyable cooperation, that his interest and expertise reach further than Greek literature and that they particularly involve Latin literature and the mutual relationship between the two classical languages and their respective literatures.

The text of El. 3.12.23–37

As is the case in many of Propertius' elegies and portions of elegies, for this passage too several changes to the extant text have been proposed over the years.[7] The guiding principle for interpretation dictates, however, that one remains as closely as possible to the reading of the (best) manuscripts and that one avoids conjectures as much as possible. Among the text editions, the Oxford text by Barber stands out, because the point of departure in this edition is almost always the (main repre-

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[6] See a.o. Boucher 1965, 274 ff. and Berthet 1980, 143 ff.

[7] See esp. Smyth 1970, 107 and Fedeli 1994, 179 f. (*app. criticus*).

sentatives of the) manuscript tradition. Therefore the text that is pre-
sented here is taken from this edition:[8]

> 23 *Postumus alter erit miranda coniuge Ulixes:*
>   *non illi longae tot nocuere morae,*
> 25 *castra decem annorum, et Ciconum mons Ismara, Calpe,*
>   *exustaeque tuae mox, Polypheme, genae,*
>   *et Circae fraudes, lotosque herbaeque tenaces,*
>   *Scyllaque et alternas scissa Charybdis aquas,*
>   *Lampeties Ithacis veribus mugisse iuvencos*
> 30   *(paverat hos Phoebo filia Lampetie),*
>   *et thalamum Aeaeae flentis fugisse puellae,*
>   *totque hiemis noctes totque natasse dies,*
>   *nigrantisque domos animarum intrasse silentum,*
>   *Sirenum surdo remige adisse lacus,*
> 35 *et veteres arcus leto renovasse procorum,*
>   *errorisque sui sic statuisse modum.*
>   *nec frustra, quia casta domi persederat uxor.*

Relation to the rest of Elegy 3.12 (lines 1–22; 38)

In the line with which this passage opens a connection is made with
what has been discussed in the preceding lines (1–22). Here Propertius
first of all addresses a certain Postumus and reproaches him for his
choice of taking part in one of Augustus' military expeditions (line 2:
Augusti fortia signa sequi) against the Parthians in 22 B.C., despite the
fact that his beloved Galla urgently begged him not to do this (line 4:
ne faceres Galla multa rogante tua). The extent to which in the beginning
of the poem Propertius displays his indignation concerning Postumus'
intended participation in the military expedition, is, in a poem that is
actually a *propemptikon*, very striking.[9] In this portion of the poem the
poet's attention and sympathy go first and foremost to Galla, who has
been left lonely in Rome. Full of admiration, he praises her for her
exemplary behaviour: she will not let herself be distracted by the *munera*
that are abundantly offered to her in Rome, reputed as *magistra luxuriae*
(line 18). The poet emphasizes to Postumus that she will faithfully await
him, although the day of his safe return is uncertain (line 21: *quocumque
die salvum te fata remittent*). Because of this attitude she especially earns,
as the poet stresses, qualifications such as *casta* (line 14) and *pudica* (line

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   [8] Barber 1960.
   [9] See e.g. Cairns 1972, 197ff.

22), and he compares her with Penelope, who also was a paragon of fidelity and whom he therefore calls *pia* elsewhere (*El.* 3.13.24).[10] In the concluding line of the poem Propertius goes so far as to state that Galla even surpasses Penelope in fidelity: *vincit Penelopes Aelia Galla fidem* (line 38). Here the telling position of *fides* in the pentameter gives the concept still more emphasis.

The comparison of Galla with Penelope calls forth the comparison of Postumus with Odysseus. Once the name of the Homeric hero has appeared, the poet finds this a convenient opportunity to demonstrate his knowledge of the *Odyssey* in a display of all the best-known of the hero's adventures, even though the deprivations and dangers which, according to the poet's imagination, Postumus should expect during his stay in the East (lines 7–14) are of a very different nature from those the hero endured in the Homeric epic. The reason advanced for the introduction of an overview of Odysseus' adventures seems strange at first sight, but is comparable to the one adduced in the *Panegyricus Messallae*. The anonymous author of this poem uses a comparison between the *facundia* of Tibullus' *patronus* and that of the hero from Ithaca, which allows him to include the story of the *errores Ulixis* in his *laudatio* on the deeds of Tibullus' *patronus*, Messalla (*Corp. Tibull.* 3.7.45–81), although obviously a real mutual relationship between eloquence and the reported adventures is out of the question. The situation that is illustrated in Ovid's *Epist. ex Ponto* 4.10 (lines 1ff.) seems somewhat different. Here the poet who was banned from Rome draws a comparison between the hardships that he, far from home, *Cimmerio in litore*, must endure and those which Odysseus *per duo lustra* must endure, while he is hurled hither and thither upon the 'untrustworthy sea' (*dubio mari*) (line 9f.). In this case, there is in fact a somewhat comparable situation.

A few general features of the passage

Just as one might expect in a short overview such as the one presented by Propertius, not all of Odysseus' adventures are reported, but only a selection. It seems that the adventures related by Odysseus during his stay at the court of King Alcinous of the Phaeacians are chosen as the starting point (*Od.* 9–12), as well as the passage in *Od.* 23 (lines 310–

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[10] See also *El.* 2.9.3–8 and Fedeli 1985, 405.

341), in which Odysseus briefly summarizes for Penelope what he has gone through in the years of his absence. It is no coincidence that these very scenes are frequently depicted in the contemporary paintings by which Propertius, as seen in other passages of his work, quite often was inspired.[11] Furthermore, adding his own touch to the story, Propertius has deliberately left out some of the adventures mentioned above. For instance, the episodes of Aeolus, the Laestrygones, the Cimmerians, and the Phaeacians are missing, though these can be found in the *Panegyricus Messallae*. Especially the absence of Odysseus' adventure on the island of the Phaeacians is striking, because this adventure has contributed to a considerable degree to the *longae morae* mentioned in line 24, and also because Propertius was, as shown by his remarks about the proverbial *munera Alcinoi* in *El.* 1.14.24 and the *Phaeacae silvae* in *El.* 3.2.13, very well acquainted with this sizable episode in Homer's *Odyssey*.

With regard to the chronology there are several deliberate divergences from the order of events as presented by Homer (which for instance the author of the *Panegyricus Messallae* follows closely). The story of the Lotus Eaters as told by Propertius, for example, is mentioned after the fight with Polyphemus (lines 26 f.), whereas in Homer this episode occurs first. On the other hand we see the perilous adventure of Scylla and Charybdis already in line 28, while in Homer this takes place after the passing of the Sirens, which is described in line 34.

Except by a desire to add his own touch to the story, this change in the order of events may also have been inspired by Propertius' striving to attain more thematic cohesion here and there. Thus, two examples in which magical power plays a role (line 27) are placed beside each other as a result of this rearrangement. In addition, the fact that in this way Propertius could more easily apply one of his preferred stylistic devices, i.e. a variation of the employed construction, may have played a role. Thus, we see that in the passage under consideration the examples of *morae* (line 24) in lines 25 ff. include the use of substantives (*castra, mons Ismara, Calpe, fraudes, lotos, herbae, Scylla*), alternating with combinations of substantive and participle (*exustae genae; scissa Charybdis*), and no less than seven infinitives (*mugisse, fugisse, natasse, intrasse, adisse, renovasse, statuisse*). In a similar way we find in *El.* 3.1.25 ff. in the description of a few salient episodes from the *Iliad*—likewise a summary—successively, as objects of *nosceret*, the participial construction *arces pulsas*, the infini-

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[11] See e.g. Boucher 1965, 41 ff.; Berthet 1987, 59.

tives *isse* and *maculasse*, and then a number of names of warriors. We see something similar in the report (in *El.* 2.8.29ff.) of what Achilles had to deal with in the battle for Troy: *stratos Achivos*, *fervere castra*, *Patroclon porrectum* and *sparsas comas* occur one after the other as objects of *viderat.*

Because this variation in the construction determines to a high degree the build-up of this passage, it speaks for itself to keep this variation in mind when we look at some striking aspects of individual lines. Thus, two large parts can be distinguished after the introductory distich (lines 23–24): lines 25–28 and 29–37. In this last part, line 37 stands more or less by itself as an ending and a conclusion of the section.

Lines 23 and 24

In this distich the careful placement of the words *miranda coniuge* (between *Postumus* and *Ulixes*) is especially noteworthy. Propertius thus emphasizes that Postumus is entitled to the honourable appellation of *alter Ulixes* only because of the admirable behaviour of Galla (one worthy of Penelope), and not because of some heroism he displayed or some series of adventures he has experienced, which would put him on a par with the Greek hero in question. In this respect there is a clear difference with Horace's characterization of Ennius as *alter Homerus* (*Epist.* 2.1.50) or with Vergil's designation of Turnus as *alius Achilles* (*A.* 6.89). In addition, it is remarkable that in line 24 *illi* is used to refer back to Odysseus, who has been just mentioned. The opinion of Rothstein, 'dass mit *illi* Odysseus gemeint ist, ist nicht ohne weiteres klar',[12] is implausible, since the concrete examples of the *morae*, which are mentioned in lines 25ff. and of which it is said that they have not been to the disadvantage of the person whom it concerns (*non illi nocuere*), all refer to Odysseus. At the same time, however, the implications of what is mentioned in line 24 concern Postumus likewise.[13] For in the first portion of the poem it is alleged that Postumus' stay in the Far East will do him no harm either, considering both the soothing words *securus eas* (line 18) that are addressed to him, and the prospect that Galla will welcome him home very warmly (line 22: *pendebit collo Galla pudica tuo).*

The use of *morae* in line 24 deserves special attention, since the plural effectively shows that this is not only about a long-term absence

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[12] Rothstein 1966, ad loc.
[13] See Schmidt 1987, 134.

as such, but also about a great many adventures that, each in itself, continuously cause delays. At the same time the choice of this term (and not of a general word such as *absentia*) clearly indicates that Odysseus is seen as being partially responsible himself for the long duration of his absence (compare, in a similar context, *placidae morae* in Ovid, *Epist. ex P.* 4.10.12). It is therefore no wonder that the poet feels the need to particularly emphasize, by using a spondaic rhythm in the beginning of the line, that nevertheless all of this did not harm the Homeric hero.

Lines 25–28

It is obvious that for an allusion to the battle for the city of Troy a description is chosen which emphasizes the longevity of the experience (*castra decem annorum*), since the poet here for the first time exemplifies the aforementioned *tot longae morae*. On the other hand, this particular reference (and not for example a more general one, such as Vergil's *tot annis, A.* 2.14), seems to be a reminiscence of what is said at *Iliad* 2.329 concerning the capture of Troy 'in the tenth year' (τῷ δεκάτῳ). Subsequently, with the words *Ciconum mons Ismara* Propertius refers to the violent clash with the Cicones, the first of Odysseus' adventures after his departure from Troy (about which we read in *Od.* 9.39ff. and 23.310).

   There is no need to doubt the traditional reading *mons* and to amend it to *mors* or *manus*, as some editors do.[14] The latter is possibly suggested by the use of *Ciconumque manus* in a similar context in the already mentioned *Panegyricus Messallae* (line 54). For indeed, it is quite possible that Propertius was not only inspired by the story as told by Homer, who uses Ismaros as the name of the city of the Cicones (*Od.* 9.39–41; 165; 196ff.), but also by the fact that Lucretius (5.31) as well as Vergil (*Ge.* 2.37), when talking about a mountainous area in the same region, use the name *Ismara* (neuter plural). As it happens we also see in other places that Propertius borrows an element from Homer and transforms it somewhat by adding an element from a Roman poet, Vergil for example. Thus we recognize in the words he places in the mouth of his friend Tullus, in the form of the question—*qualis et unde genus, qui sint mihi Penates (El.* 1.22.1), elements of both the well-known formula that

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[14] See e.g. Goold 1999; Fedeli 1994 (*app. criticus*); Smyth 1970, 107.

repeatedly occurs in Homer, τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἠδὲ τοκῆες; and of Vergil's, *qui genus? unde domo*?[15] Similarly, we may assume that when at *El.* 3.1.25, in the context of the 'summary' of the *Iliad*, the Trojan horse is referred to as *equus abiegnus*, this is also a reminiscence of Vergil *A.* 2.16 (*sectaque intexunt abiete costas*).

The reading *Calpe* in line 25 can be defended in a similar way. In this case, too, we may assume that Propertius does not exclusively base his description on Homer, in whose work *Calpe* does not appear, but that he also uses the work of later authors. In this case for example there are good arguments, as among others Butler/Barber and Rothstein have shown convincingly, to assume that Propertius follows the view, reported by Strabo for instance, that the dreadful storm to which Odysseus was subjected for nine days after the battle against the Cicones blew him past the Pillars of Hercules. Calpe was the name of one of these 'pillars' (στῆλαι).[16] An emendation of the traditional Calpe, for instance to *capta*,[17] is therefore not necessary.

Regarding the description of Odysseus' battle with the Cyclops Polyphemus in line 26, the matter is completely different. Here, it is likely that Propertius did in fact follow Homer exclusively, for the choice of a word like *exustae* ('burned-out') is a clear reference to Homer's use of words like πῦρ and θερμαίνω in his description of the blinding of Polyphemus in *Od.* 9.375 ff. So, considering the context, there can be no doubt that *genae* in this line is meant as an equivalent of ὀφθαλμός in Homer (for example, at *Od.* 9.383) and that—in contrast to Paganelli's translation 'les joues' (cheeks)[18]—this must be interpreted as *oculi (oculus)*, as is often the case in Latin poetry.[19] A case in point is Propertius' description of the vicious behaviour of a *lena* as *eruit ungue genas (ut posset caecare):* 'she tore out with her nails the eyes (so as to be able to blind)' (*El.* 4.5.15 f.). The use of the plural form in our passage is scarcely surprising, considering the poetic practice, just as is the use of the plural form *arcus* in line 38.[20]

Circae fraudes in the following line (27) refers to the cunning magic of the sorceress, living on the island of Aia, who is characterized by Homer as δολόεσσα (*Od.* 9.317), δολοφρονέουσα (*Od.* 10.339) and as

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[15] See e.g. Hom. *Od.* 19.104 f.; 24.298; Verg. *A.* 8.114; Berthet 1980, 150.

[16] See Butler-Barber 1933, ad loc.; Rothstein 1966, ad loc.; Fedeli 1985, ad loc.

[17] See e.g. Camps 1966, ad loc. and Goold 1999, ad loc.

[18] Paganelli 1964, ad loc.

[19] See e.g. Ov. *Epist. ex P.* 2.866; *Her.* 20.206; Stat. *Th.* 2.232; 10.689; 11.673 f.

[20] See e.g. Kühner-Stegmann 1962, 77 ff.

someone who makes use of δόλοι and φάρμακα κακά / λύγρα (*Od.* 10.210ff.; 236) to change Odysseus' men into pigs. Then, almost in one breath, the poet points to the Homeric account preceding that of Circe—Odysseus' encounter with the Lotus-eaters (*Od.* 9.83–104), although these people, as Homer strongly emphasizes, had no bad intentions (*Od.* 10.92) and so a term such as *fraudes* can not be applied to them. Instead, by using the adjunct *tenaces*, Propertius accurately captures the particular characteristic of the food consumed by this people (*lotus herbaeque*), for Homer stresses that Odysseus' men, after eating this food, wanted to stay (*Od.* 10.97: μένεμεν); thus, this is a typical example of the *morae* mentioned earlier.

In line 28 Propertius alludes to the risky journey along the δύω σκόπελοι, about which Circe warns Odysseus at *Od.* 12.73ff. The description of the event in this line focuses on the aspects of Charybdis. On the one hand, with *alternas aquas* the poet points to the relentless ebb and flow of the tide, such as in *El.* 2.26.53f.: *nec umquam / alternante vacans vasta Charybdis aqua* ('and awful Charybdis, who never ceases from her ebb and flow'). On the other hand, the word *scissa* indicates that the waves sometimes split, engulfing ships in the depths that are thus formed. This phenomenon is described in a striking way by Vergil at *A.* 1.106f., when he depicts the results of a heavy storm: *unda dehiscens / terram inter fluctus aperit* ('the yawning sea shows ground beneath the waves'), or at *A.* 3.422, when he describes Charybdis: *sorbet in abruptum fluctus* ('she sucks the waves into the abyss').[21]

Lines 29–37

Within the limited scope of a summary Propertius, in lines 29–30, devotes proportionally a great deal of attention to the story that Odysseus tells at the court of Alcinous, the Phaeacian king (in *Od.* 12.263ff., especially 325ff. and 340ff.), about his companions who, driven mad with hunger and provoked by Eurylochus, misappropriated the cattle of Helios despite his warnings. This is an important theme in the *Odyssey* given that even in the *prooemium* (*Od.* 1.7–9) Homer hints at this rash act and its fatal consequences for the νόστιμον ἦμαρ. To what degree Propertius has let his word choice be inspired by Homer is clear in

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[21] See also the use of ἀναρροιβδεῖ and ἀναροίβδησε in Hom. *Od.* 12.104 and 236.

the graphic description that we see in line 29, where he writes that 'the cattle still groaned, even after that had been speared on the spits by the men from Ithaca' (*Ithacis veribus mugisse iuvencos).* Here we easily recognize the formula of 'the meat that groaned on the spits' (κϱέα δ' ἀμφ' ὀβελοῖσι μεμύκει, *Od.* 12.395); the poet here seems to have consciously chosen the verb *mugisse* because it shares its stem with the Greek μυκάομαι.

But Propertius does add his own touch by not writing *iuvenci Solis,* but *Lampeties … iuvencos* instead. This makes a more detailed explanation inevitable, which we find in the pentameter (line 30), which refers to the fact that Lampetie, as daughter of the god of the sun Phoebus, acts as cowherdess of her father's cattle: *paverat hos Phoebo filia Lampetie;* just as Homer, for that matter, refers to Lampetie and her sister Phaethousa as θεαὶ ποιμένες (*Od.* 12.131f.). Furthermore, it may be noticed that with the placement and the repetition of the sonorous name of this daughter of Helios, the distich is emphatically represented as an unity, a feature that in the genre of elegy Roman poets preferably strived for, as can be frequently seen elsewhere.[22] Moreover, line 30 contains an example of a typical hallmark of Propertius' usage of language, i.e. the use of a past perfect (*paverat*) in the place of an imperfect (*pascebat*).[23]

In the enumeration of events that begin at line 31, Odysseus himself is the subject of the infinitives that follow. First of all, we read that he—and considering the use of *fugisse* in a less than pleasant manner according to the poet[24]—brought an end to his years-long stay with Calypso, whose enticements, as *thalamum* indicates, Odysseus had not been able to resist. That *flentis puellae* refers to Calypso is clear if we compare *El.* 1.15.9ff., where the intense grief that this nymph felt when Odysseus left her, is evoked as follows: *Ithaci digressu mota Calypso / … fleverat … / multos illa dies incomptis maesta capillis / sederat* ('Calypso affected by the Ithacan's departure ….swept …. for many days she sat disconsolately with unkempt tresses').[25] The use of *Aeaeae* as adjective with *puellae* seems indeed to indicate that not Calypso but Circe is meant, because in Homer Aia is mentioned as the abode of the latter (*Od.* 10.135f.). However, Circe has already been mentioned in line 27

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[22] See e.g. Brouwers 1977, 125; Boucher 1965, 407f.

[23] See e.g. Butler-Barber 1933, on Prop. *El.* 1.8.36; Platnauer 1951, 112.

[24] See also Prop. *El.* 2.21.13: *a Dulichio iuvenest elusa Calypso* ('Calypso was cheated by the Dulichian hero').

[25] See also Berthet 1987, 55; Fedeli 1985, ad loc.

and in antiquity Aia/Aeaea was sometimes considered to be Calypso's island, as is clear, for instance, from Pomponius Mela (2.10), who writes: *Aeae quam Calypso habitasse dicitur.*[26] It is very likely that here, once again, we chance upon an example of Propertius' tendency, which we have noticed before, to utilize not only Homer but also later sources.

Following the account of Homer (in *Od.* 5) in line 32 of his summary, Propertius mentions a storm (*hiemis*) in which Odysseus was ravaged for several days and nights (*totque noctes totque dies*) after his departure from the island of Calypso (which strengthens our argument that *puella* in the previous line refers to this nymph). This line also alludes to the fact that he finally was able to reach the coast of the island of the Phaeacians by swimming (*natasse*). The use of *tot* seems to be greatly exaggerated if we compare this with the fact that Homer speaks of 'the third day' as the day when the winds ceased and the day of rescue (*Od.* 5.390). Therefore it is not impossible that Propertius here also comments, in a more general sense, upon the many storms which ravaged Odysseus on his journeys, just as he speaks directly to the winds at *El.* 2.26.37 with the words: *quicumque et venti miserum vexastis Ulixem* ('all ye winds that tormented luckless Odysseus').

The line in which the descent to the underworld (described in *Od.* 11) is referred to (line 33), is marked by a precise, chiastic construction (aABb), an ideal construction which often occurs in Latin poetry.[27] In this case both nominal groups *domos nigrantis* and *animarum silentum* ('the dark halls of the silent dead') enclose the verb (*intrasse*). As characterization of the home of the shades in the underworld Propertius has chosen the same word, *domos*, as Homer, who writes about the δόμος Ἀίδεω (e.g. *Od.* 10.512 and 23.322). However, this is not the case for the defining adjective: in contrast to Homeric εὐρώεις (e.g. *Od.* 23.322.), which in terms of connotation is comparable to *sentus* that occurs in Vergil's *loca senta situ* (*A.* 6.562), we see that Propertius uses the relatively rare form *nigrans*, which does, however, occur already in Lucretius as a synonym for *niger* (2.733) and which we also encounter elsewhere in Latin poetry as a modifier for Hades.[28] The form *silentum* instead of *silentium* is very common, as many similar passages show.[29] In *El.* 2.1.19f. Propertius demonstrates his close acquaintance with precisely

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[26] See Rothstein 1966, ad loc.; Butler-Barber 1933, ad loc.; Fedeli 1985, ad loc.
[27] See e.g. Herescu 1960, 82ff.
[28] See Tränkle 1960, 42f.
[29] See e.g. Fedeli 1985, ad loc.

the eleventh book of Homer's *Odyssey* in his rendition of a story which often appears in Roman poetry, namely the battle between the giants Otos and Ephialtes. Here he takes two lines from this book of the epic (*Od.* 11.315–316) as a starting point.[30]

As imitations by Juvenal and Claudian demonstrate,[31] line 34 of Propertius is very effective, by its use of the combination of the words *surdo remige*, in its succinct description of how Odysseus cunningly lets his men sail very close to the Sirens (*adisse*), who knew how to tempt the passing sailors to the rocks of their island and the sea surrounding it with their singing. For indeed, there can be no doubt that the plural form of *lacus* is used here in the more general meaning of (part of the) sea/water.[32] It may be noted that through the alliteration and juxtaposition in *Sirenum surdo* both notions are especially emphasized.

In line 35 the reader is led by the poet to Ithaca and the events that take place there after Odysseus' return, especially the μνηστηροφονία, described in *Od.* 22, alluded to by *leto procorum* ('with the killing of the suitors').[33] The Homeric account demonstrates that *arcus* is, like *genae* in line 26 a poetic plural, since Homer uses several times the singular to refer to Odysseus' (old) bow (for example, βιός at *Od.* 22.2 and τόξον at *Od.* 21.279).[34] Both the account of Homer just mentioned and the addition of *veteres* by Propertius make it clear that *renovare (renovasse)* in the line under discussion has the meaning of 'to put into use once more', just as is the case in comparable expressions like *tela (re)novare*.[35]

Line 36, which relates to the fact that Odysseus put an end to his wanderings in the manner described in the preceding line, is just as line 36 characterized by the stylistic device of alliteration. This line is remarkable to the extent that the poet—through use of the conjunction *que* and the continuation of the series of infinitives with *statuisse*— makes us believe that this *erroris statuisse modum* ('putting an end to his wanderings') may be classified under *longae morae* in the same way as the activities that are mentioned in the previous infinitives, which is obviously not the case in the actual sentence.

Finally, when we compare the last portion of our passage (the description of the end of the *error*) with the corresponding passage in

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[30] See esp. Müller 1952, 17 ff.
[31] Juv. *Sat.* 9.150; Claud. *Laus Serenae* 22; Rothstein 1966, ad loc.
[32] See Rothstein 1966, ad loc. and Fedeli 1985, ad loc.
[33] For *proci* as an equivalent of the Homeric μνηστῆρες, see esp. Fedeli 1985, ad loc.
[34] See also Kühner-Stegmann 1962, 84.
[35] See Camps 1966, ad loc. and Shackleton Bailey 1956, 177.

the *Panegyricus Messallae*, repeatedly referred to above, we see a clear difference. While in the latter poem (line 78) the arrival on *Phaeacia tellus* is marked as the *finis erroris*, Propertius especially wants to express, in concordance with the tenor of the elegy as a whole, how important it is that Odysseus finally returns to his wife Penelope. For she, as is indicated in line 37, had waited for her husband as a *casta uxor* at home (*domi*) in Ithaca for years, just as Galla does in Rome. In the verbal form *persederat* the poet once more indirectly emphasizes the long duration of Odysseus' absence and so reminds the reader of the *longae morae* of line 24. Furthermore, with the words *nec frustra* at the beginning of the final line we are sent back to the *non nocuere* in that same introductory distich (23–24). So the poet convincingly presents the passage about Odysseus' experiences as an organic unity.

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'THERE IS A TRIPLE SIGHT IN BLINDNESS KEEN'
REPRESENTATIONS OF
HOMER IN MODERN TIMES II

Eric M. Moormann

To Homer

Standing aloof in giant ignorance
Of thee I hear and of the Cyclads.
As one who sits ashore and longs perchance
To visit dolphin-coral in deep seas.
So wast thou blind;—but then the veil was rent,
For Jove uncurtain'd heaven to let thee live,
And Neptune made for thee a spumy tent.
And Pan made sing for thee his forest-hive.
Aye on the shores of darkness there is light,
And precipices show untrodden green.
There is a budding morrow in midnight,
There is a triple sight in blindness keen;
Such seeing hadst thou, as it once befell
To Dian, Queen of Earth, and Heaven, and Hell.

John Keats[1]

Homer became a subject of representation in the arts in the course of the Renaissance.[2] The first Greek poet became an inspiring figure for his own sake, being the oldest poet, a wise blind man, aged and grey,

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[1] Stillinger 1978, 264. The poem was written in 1818, but published as late as 1848 (p. 604). On Homer and the English romantics, see T. Webb, Homer and the Romantics, in: Fowler 2004, 287–310. I am much indebted to Bram Kempers (University of Amsterdam) and David Rijser (Amsterdam) for their critical comments on this article. A number of illustrations could be found thanks to the help with electronical data bases by Wieneke Weusten (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen). Heather van Tress (Nijmegen) was so kind to correct my English text.

As the 'II' after the sub-title makes clear, this contribution has a counterpart: E.M. Moormann, 'The man who made the song was blind'. Representations of Homer in modern times I, in: Proceedings of a congress organised at the Dutch Institute at Athens, November 2004, on 'Rewriting Homer from the Renaissance to the present', *Pharos* 12 (2004) 130–150. Inevitably, there will be some repetition in the two papers.

[2] To my knowledge, there are almost no overviews concerning portraits of Homer after antiquity. See P. Betthausen in *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 171–174.

and teacher of all poets after him. He was an example of knowledge, wisdom and the definition of ancient culture in one single person. Several episodes from his Life, as told in the *Vitae* of the Roman period inspired painters and sculptors, next to the numerous figurative scenes of the episodes in *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

Various categories of representation can be distinguished. From around 1500 onwards Homer is present as a member of the divine circle on the *Parnassus*, together with other famous men, while he is also seen with 'colleagues' in the decorative programs of *studioli* and libraries.[3] In the 17th century the first narrating scenes, based on the *Vitae*, were made as well as single portraits of the poet, mostly relying upon busts from antiquity. The last group contains portraits of modern people—mostly scholars and travellers to the Mediterranean—with a bust of Homer. In this article I focus on the narrating scenes and the single portraits, including those on portraits of modern people.

Rembrandt's Homers

The Dutch painter Rembrandt van Rhijn portrayed Homer several times. He possessed a plaster bust of the Farnese Homer[4] and used it for all the portraits of the poet. The curly hair, the beard and the ribbon bound around the head are always present. The main difference is that

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[3] This category is discussed in my other study on Homer representations (see note 1).

[4] Broos 1993, 274–275 with note 201; van den Boogert 1999, 119, 149 no. 163 (inventory: 'op de kunstcaemer', in the art room). For the antique bust see e.g. P. Zanker, in: *Ulisse* 1996, 26–27 cat. 1.3 (copy Musei Capitolini, Rome, seen by Orsini and many others and copied in gypsum for Goethe). The bust had been interpreted for the first time as a Homer by Fulvio Orsini in his highly influential *Imagines et elogia virorum illustrium* (Rome 1570). See on the head and its fortune L. Buccino, in: Fusconi 2001, 297–299, commenting upon the copy in the Musei Capitolini. Joachim Sandrart made an impressive drawing of this Homer type around 1640 for a series of writers' busts in Palazzo Giustiniani (Fusconi 2001, 298; S. Ebert-Schifferer, in: *Caravaggio e i Giustiniani*, exhibition catalogue, Rome 2001, 372–373 cat. F4.1). Rubens sketched a Homer in profile 'from a coin' with the text '*apud Ursinum*' and the legenda OMHPOC (Paris, Musée du Louvre). There are previous drawings of this bust (or another copy of the same model), made without knowing the subject, e.g. by Raphael 1509–1511 ('Pink' sketchbook, Lille). Andrea del Sarto used a sketch of the bust (1520, Berlin, Kupferstichkabinett) for the head of the kneeling man on 'The Tribute to Caesar' in the *salone* of the Medici Villa at Poggio a Caiano (1521): Shear 1965, 87.

Rembrandt's Homers have the head covered with the rim of their cloak or with a scarf like his priests in biblical scenes.

In 1652 he drew 'Homer reciting his verses' in the *album amicorum* of an Amsterdam Maecenas and intellectual friend, Jan Six. In the open air, Homer seems to have just risen from the large chair that is standing behind him and with a gesture of his hand to begin speaking. He is surrounded by an audience among whom is a scribe. At the right side people are peeping through two trees. It has been said that the drawing, intimate and learned at the same time, recalls the composition of Raphael's 'Parnassus' or the engraving after this work by Marcantonio Raimondi. Rembrandt possessed a copy of that print and Six, who had made a *grand tour* to Italy in 1641, might have inspired him on the basis of Six's examination of the Raphael fresco. The resemblance of the composition is not very strong and it lacks the group of Apollo and the Muses. The only immediate parallel detail is the standing figure of Homer.[5]

A unique combination is Rembrandt's 'Aristotle with a bust of Homer' in the Metropolitan Museum at New York (fig. 1). The famous philosopher puts his hand on top of the marble bust as if he is seeking personal contact and inspiration by the Greek bard. The painting was made on commission for the Sicilian nobleman Antonio Ruffo in 1653, later followed by an 'Alexander the Great' (1655, Glasgow, City Art Gallery and Museum) and the Mauritshuis 'Homer dictates' (fig. 2; see infra).[6] The three form a set in the sense of the contents and the shape. According to Jan Emmens, in his study about Rembrandt and art theories, Aristotle combines three specific capacities, worked out in the counterparts: philosophical *disciplina* (Aristotle), poetical *ingenium* (Homer) and active *exercitatio* (Alexander, present in a medallion in the golden chain Aristotle is wearing). It is not clear whether Rembrandt was the inventor of this programme, as has been supposed by Emmens, or by some other like Jan Six, as was argued by Ben Broos. Plutarch made the connection between the three persons in his *Life of Alexander*: 'And since he thought and called the *Iliad* a viaticum of the military art, he took with him Aristotle's edition of the poem, called

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[5] The so-called Pandora album, property of the Six family at Amsterdam. See, i.a., Broos 1993, 274, fig. 4.

[6] Broos 1993, 269–278, with a good overview of scholarship and exhaustive bibliography. See Giltaij 1999 on Rembrandt and Ruffo.

Figure 1. Rembrandt: 'Aristotle with the bust of Homer'.
Oil on canvas, 1653, 138.5 x 133.4 cm. New York, The
Metropolitan Museum of Arts, inv. 61.198 (photo author).

the Iliad of the Casket …'[7] The choice of Aristotle was explained by Emmens as opposed to Plato and other philosophers: 'Instead of these [Plato etc.] we possess Rembrandt's portrait of the official philosopher of Dutch Calvinism, whose opinions threatened to be pushed in the third quarter of the 17th century by the philosophy of Descartes, or had to establish a fusion with it'.[8] Julius S. Held regarded the work as a personal expression of the painter's ideas about the senses.[9] Walter Liedtke accepted the greater part of this classical reading of this masterpiece, but doubted the personal interest Rembrandt could have had, especially because the work was explicitly the result of a commission. The notion of *ut pictura poesis* might be true. The doubt Ruffo had about the Aristotle illustrates the confusion.[10] Emmens might be right with the first aspect, referring to Plutarch, but it is a matter of doubt whether the Calvinistic theology had anything to do with this work, being commissioned by an Italian catholic nobleman.

The second work Rembrandt made for Ruffo is the 'Homer dictates' from 1661–1663 at The Hague (fig. 2). It was heavily damaged by a fire and misses the boys, apart from a hand in the right lower corner, having been cut off the right half of the canvas, but its scheme is known from a drawing in Stockholm.[11] The current title 'Homer dictates [to scribes, to a scribe]' is not correct, as it suggests that the poet is composing his poems, whereas children (the persons on the canvases are very young) get lessons from the schoolmaster, viz. Homer. The theme represented is the school founded by Homer on Chios, as recorded by Pseudo-Herodotus:

> Χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος δεηθεὶς τοῦ Χίου πορεῦσαι αὐτὸν ἐς τὴν Χίον ἀπίκετο ἐς τὴν πόλιν· καὶ διδασκαλεῖον κατασκευσάμενος ἐδίδασκε παῖδας τὰ ἔπεα. καὶ κάρτα δεξιὸς κατεδόκεεν εἶναι τοῖς Χίοις, καὶ πολλοὶ θωυμασταὶ αὐτοῦ καθειστήκεσαν.

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[7] Plut., *Vita Alexandri* 7, here quoted in the Loeb translation, London/Cambridge Mass. 1919, 242–243. See Emmens 1979, 245–250, who pointed at this passage. The same detail is reported in Arrian, *Anabasis Alexandrou* 1.12.

[8] Emmens 1979, 245, 248 (my translation): 'In plaats daarvan bezitten wij van Rembrandt het portret van de officiële filosoof van het Nederlands calvinisme, wiens opvattingen in het derde kwart van de 17de eeuw dreigden te worden verdrongen, of er een fusie mee hadden aan te gaan'.

[9] Held 1969.

[10] The canvas has also been interpreted as a portrait of Albertus Magnus: Liedtke 2004.

[11] Broos 1993, 269–278, with extensive bibliography; drawing p. 274 fig. 6; Giltaij 1999, 66–76, figs. 17–18 (painting and drawing).

Figure 2. Rembrandt: 'Homer dictates'. Oil on
canvas, 1661–1663, 107x81.1 cm. The Hague, Royal
Picture Gallery Mauritshuis, inv. 584 (© Museum).

> Some time later Homer asked the Chians to convey him to Chios, and he arrived in the city. He set up a school and began teaching boys his poems. He struck the Chians as very clever, and many became his firm admirers.[12]

The subject of the painting parallels an episode that occurred immediately before that of the Chian school and regarded the children of Glaucus,[13] for which Rembrandt might have eternalised even Glaucus' family. The word 'clever' is the translation of δεξιός and refers to the poet's *ars*.

Jeroen Giltaij reconstructed the exchange of orders and works between Antonio Ruffo from Messina and Rembrandt. Both the Aristotle and the Homer originally were somewhat larger and had their dimensions adapted to the measures requested for Ruffo's gallery. He observes that Homer looks like a living person who communicates with Aristotle.[14] According to this scholar the Alexander the Great can no longer be retraced; the two options—Glasgow[15] and Lisbon—have to be rejected.[16] The lost work was from 1660/1661 and came simultaneously with the Homer to Messina. The last work also was reworked in 1663 and showed originally at least two pupils, as we know from the drawing in Stockholm. The arch under which Homer is sitting on the drawing is a non-meaningful but often used device in portraits.

What did Rembrandt know about Homer and how he came to the choice of portraying this poet? Amy Golahny recently reconstructed Rembrandt's reading habits and argued that, all in all, Rembrandt could have known a lot about Homer's life from the Dutch translation by Dirck Volkertz Coornhert from 1561.[17] In my opinion, we cannot be sure about Rembrandt's knowledge regarding the original texts of the antique poet, but he must have read the Dutch translations of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* as well as the *Vitae* by Coornhert. Prints and plaster casts gave him the idea of how to shape the old and wise poet and the ideas might have come from the commissioners of the works. Six could have made him acquainted with the topic when they spoke together and Rembrandt invented the drawing.

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[12] Ps.-Hdt. 25, here cited in the translation by West (2003, 382–383).
[13] Ps.-Hdt. 24.
[14] Giltaij 1999, 45–50 with fig. 10 on the Aristotle, esp. p. 49 on the bust.
[15] Also mentioned and illustrated in Broos 1993, 269 fig. 2.
[16] Giltaij 1999, 55–66. On the double order Giltaij 1999, 50–55.
[17] Golahny 2003, 122–129.

Other 17th-century Homer depictions

The theme of the school at Chios was also painted by Rembrandt's pupil Arent de Gelder around 1700–1710 (Boston, Museum of Fine Arts: fig. 3). His composition reflects a mirror image of that of his master.[18] A school class with at least four boys is writing. Homer's head is not modelled after the Farnese bust, but after the living model of an old man with a cap.[19] His seating resembles Hellenistic portraits of philosophers, but it is not sure that De Gelder made use of these examples known from engravings or drawings.

The Italian artist Pier Francesco Mola painted Homer dictating his poem to a boy, while playing a *viola da gamba* in the years 1663/1666. He is leaning against a curtain and the background shows a landscape with trees.[20] Homer wears contemporary dress, whereas the face with its open mouth might be a reminiscence of the Laocoon like the Homer in Raphael's 'Parnassus'.[21] This 'dictating' might even be seen as an abbreviated form of Homer's teaching.

There are several copies of another Homer playing the violin by Mola, now without company. Homer has his head tilted back, the eyes are closed and the hair is crowned by a laurel wreath. The mantle is edged with fur. The artist again used Raphael's 'Parnassus' as a source for his representation of the poet as a musician. Instead of Apollo the poet is playing the *lira da braccio*. The original apparently is the canvas in the Galleria dell'Accademia at Venice.[22] Unfortunately, we do not know whether the painting belonged to a series of famous ancient men

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[18] Von Moltke 1994, 95 cat. 76, pl. 76 and colour pl. XXXII. In his description he says: 'The setting resembles a classroom'—he apparently does not understand the very theme. Von Moltke 1994, 95 and Giltaij 1999, 74–75 reconsider the 'mirror image' and suggest that De Gelder had seen Rembrandt's Homer in his studio. See also Broos 1993, 274, fig. 7 and, most recently, M. de Winkel in Bijker 1998, 216–219 cat. 41.

[19] De Winkel (see note 18) observes that De Gelder does do so more frequently.

[20] Now Rome, Galleria Corsini. Cocke 1972, 42, 55–56 cat. 43, plate 138; Genty 1979, 151. Genty reports a study at London, Denis Mahon Collection.

[21] Giltaij 1999, 76 on the Mola's. A presumed influence by Rembrandt cannot be substantiated (cf. Cocke 1972, 55–56). Cocke 1972, 65 cat. R.11 (Chicago, Art Institute): this and another piece (Moscow, Rumentroff Gallery) might be by Giovane, 1666–1669. The Dresden copy is dismissed by Cocke (1972, 66 cat. R.17).

[22] Fowler 2004 has this portrait as the frontispiece, but here the work is attributed to Mattia Preti.

Figure 3. Arent de Gelder: 'Homer teaching'. Oil on canvas, ca. 1700–1710, 100.2×127 cm. Boston, Museum of Fine Arts, inv. 39.45 (photo author).

Figure 4. Anton von Maron, 'Johann Joachim Winckelmann'. Oil on canvas, 1767–1768, 136×99 cm. Weimar, Schloßmuseum (© Museum).

or had a specific meaning. It apparently was a popular work, being reproduced several instances by the artist and others.[23]

Late 18th- and early 19th-century neo-classicist works

The late 18th century saw an increasing interest in the works of Homer. This had to do with a re-evaluation of his work by learned people like Diderot and Winckelmann (fig. 4) and new translations, especially those into German. The studies by Friedrich August Wolff about the poet and the composition of his works were read throughout Europe. More-over, Homer's works still (and even more) formed sources of inspiration for neo-classicist history painters, to begin with the French Salons and the Académie des Beaux-Arts.[24]

Jacques-Louis David, the leading French representative of this new art direction, made a drawing of Homer, when he was imprisoned in the Luxembourg at Paris in 1794–1795. 'Homère récitant ses verses' shows a seated poet, leaning against the façade of what looks like the Luxembourg prison. He is bearded (the sketch is too vague to allow a comparison with the Farnese head) and has a lyre. His feet have no shoes. Summarily rendered bystanders are listening. This sketch was the preparatory study for a large canvas David wanted to make and the artist even obtained a permission to have models seated for this study in his prison. Nevertheless, no historical painting with this theme ever quitted his studio, presumably because the project of the Sabine Women painting (finished 1799) would take all his working energy for the next time. Another sketch made in prison represents a sleeping Homer.[25]

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[23] E.g. Musée Fesch at Ajaccio (Genty 1979, 145). Cocke 1972, 71 cat. R.56 dismisses this painting.

[24] See *Wiedergeburt* 1999; Vogt-Spira 2000.

[25] Both drawings are in Paris, Musée du Louvre, Cabinet des Dessins. See Whiteley 1974, pls. 40–43, 18–19; Schnapper 1980, 171–172, fig. 100; *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 178 cat. VI.7 (sleeping Homer). Whiteley 1974, 40 quotes a letter from the Luxembourg, in which David says: '… Je brûle de le mettre sur la toile, parce que je sens intérieurement qu'il fera un pas de plus à l'art'.

I leave out of the discussion two neo-classicist drawings of the same period. François Gérard destroyed his 'Homère' from 1814, but there is a drawing after it in the Louvre (Whiteley 1974, 43, pl. 24). The blind bard is gesticulating and shouting in the manner of the antique Laocoon, whereas a young shepherd, Glaucus, tries to calm him. Apparently, Gérard chose the same scene as Clodion (see infra). Jean-Bruno

The Schleswig painter Asmus Jakob Carstens also belongs to the feverish German admirers of Homer around 1800. His last grand composition, from 1796, was 'Homer singing to the Greeks', only worked out in the form of a large pencil drawing. This is lost, but there are his sketches, prints and a copy by Berthel Thorvaldsen.[26] Carstens had depicted several classical literary themes, among which some taken from Homer. Homer was 'his' source of inspiration, capable of bringing both the Greeks and modern mankind on a high spiritual level: art acts as means of educating the citizens of the modern times.[27] Homer is led by a young boy standing next to him. He raises his right hand, apparently to ask attention and holds a *chelys* (a lyre with the tortoise shell as case) under his left arm. A group of older and younger men are listening in great concentration, both seated and standing on a square amidst buildings like a Pantheon-like rotunda on the right and a Ionic temple on the left. A seated boy writes down the verses he hears. The latter group might have been inspired by Raphael's 'Parnassus', whereas the composition as a whole follows Raphael's tapestry 'Saint Paul Preaching at Athens'. The poet's head is modelled after the Farnese bust. Evidently, Carstens chose this theme out of his profound admiration of Greek civilization, and fellow painters from France like David may have influenced him.[28]

Carsten's drawing was a study for a painting that had to show the utopia of liberty he and other artists were looking for. It was a pendant

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Gassies made a Homer crossing to Chios in a tempest, an episode invented by Gassies according to his explanation of his 1819 Salon painting (Whiteley 1974, 42).

Similarly I do not discuss small statuettes like the terracotta figurine by Philippe Laurent Roland, 'Homère chantant s'accompagnant de la lyre', showing an old man seated, surrounded by books and paper scrolls (ca. 1800, Valenciennes, Musée des Beaux-Arts) and the 'Homère aveugle', a 44 cm biscuit statuette by Charles-Antoine Callamard (1807–1812; Sèvres, Musée National de Céramique). This sort of objects served as adornments in private house like the busts of Goethe and Beethoven in numerous variations. Roland's version of a Homer in heroic nudity has a big, marble counterpart in the Louvre: Scherf 1993, 58, fig. 4.

[26] U. Peters, in: *Thorvaldsen* 1992, 414–415 cat. 3.3. F. Büttner, in: Schulze 1994, 354–357 cat. 223–227, from which the first sentence of this paragraph is a paraphrase. He presents five large red drawings in the Kunstsammlungen at Weimar. See also *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 177–178 cat. VI.6. Thorvaldsen's sketch is also illustrated in *Thorvaldsen* 1992, 414–417 cat. 3.4 (ibid. cat. 3.3: Carsten's drawing); Hagen 2003, 45 fig. 30 (now Thorvaldsen Museum, Copenhagen).

[27] F. Büttner in Schulze 1994, 354–355, with quotations from Carstens.

[28] The sections 'Neue Energie unter David' and 'Weimarer Kunstpolitik' in Schulze 1994 illustrate the cultural climate very clearly. Goethe commented upon Carstens as both follower of Homer and Raphael (quotations in the items mentioned at note 26).

to Joseph Anton Koch's watercolour 'Apollo and the Shepherds' (Berlin, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin). Following the Winckelmann notion of Greek freedom and democracy as the agents of civilisation and freedom, the painters' choices of these themes were apt to illustrate their wishes. The project was never realised.

A striking example of 'Bildnisangleichung' forms a drawing by the Viennese painter Friedrich Heinrich Füger. His own traits are recognizable in the 'Homer vortragend': Homer sings to a moved audience (before 1798; fig. 5). The drawing was no preparatory study for a painting but had to serve for prints.[29] The painter was a great admirer of the Greek poet and apparently wanted to imitate (or even emulate) him with his work, but now transferred into singing. The audience is composed of soldiers (one with a sword, the other with a helmet), a priest (with veiled head), old and young men and women and a child. This mix of all ages and classes among the bystanders was also present in Carstens' drawing and will be a fixed element in the French historical paintings of the next generations. It probably illustrates both the vast range of persons included in Homer's works and the universal audience of those poems.

On Philippe Auguste Hennequin's drawing 'Homère chante l'Iliade' (1796, Paris, Musée du Louvre) Homer is standing in a ruin landscape surrounded by rustic people; a seated nude man can be seen on the front side. The subject is similar to Carstens' cartoon and will be taken over by Guillaume G. Lethière. In 1816, he made a large canvas with Homer singing to bystanders of several ages, while Glaucus sits next to him. The poet is modelled after a seated philosopher and the setting is a graveyard near the city gates of what might look like Athens (Hephaisteion, Lykabettos, Kerameikos …).[30]

This is also true for the five versions of 'Homère chantant l'Odyssee à l'entrée d'une bourgeade de Grèce' by Jean-Pierre Saint-Ours, a painter from Geneva.[31] They date from 1793 and later and apparently

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[29] Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 14667: Hagen 2003, 41, fig. 29; 108–109 cat. 29. Cf. Füger's self-portrait, made shortly after 1800: ibid. p. 31 fig. 18 (in colour), now in the Gemäldegalerie der Akademie der Bildenden Künste, Vienna.

[30] From 1816. Now Nottingham, City of Nottingham Art Gallery. Whiteley 1974, 43, pl. 26. From the same year salon is Benjamin Rollands 'Homère chantant son Iliade' (Paris, Musée du Louvre, inv. 7.704D, now in Sens, Musée des Beaux-Arts, about which I could not find any information in recent catalogues but the record in Compin/Roquebert 1986, V, 330).

[31] One of these is in the Musée d'art et d'histoire at Geneva, the other four are in Swiss private collections. See Koller 1995, 59–94, figs. 4–6.

Figure 5. Friedrich Heinrich Füger: 'Homer vortragend'. Drawing, end 18th century. Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 14667 (© Museum).

were made on commission. One of these clients was the local magistrate Jean-François Thellusson who ordered the image of an example of humanity. The man presented himself as a 'new Homer', doing his public duties with great care of the weaker people in society. The constant element is the blind singer, sitting next to a herm of Athena with the boy Glaucus, whereas the number of hearers varies from three to five. In her thorough analysis, Mylène Koller points at the gender contrast between the two (weak) women who might be Homer's daughters and the (strong) young soldier on the first version. The other versions have more persons, sometimes of opposing ages, and comprise more soldiers. Only the 'first' Glaucus is writing, on the other versions he listens like the other people. The landscape varies from an idyllic setting with a tomb and an Athena statue to a cityscape with a Pantheon-like temple. Homer gradually becomes the poor singer, not respected in society despite his enormous talents.

Claude Michel dit Clodion made a 61 cm high terracotta statue, representing 'Homère mordu par les chiens' in 1809, shown in the salon of 1810 and purchased for the Musée du Louvre in 1992. A superb bronze cast can be seen in the Museum of Art at Toledo, Ohio (fig. 6).[32] Two dogs attack the old singer, supported by a nude young man. The scene represents a moment in Homer's life told by Pseudo-Herodotus that precedes his lessons to Chian boys (see above):[33]

> Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἀναστὰς Ὅμηρος ἐπορεύετο κατὰ φωνήν τινα αἰγῶν νεμομένων. ὡς δὲ ὑλάκτεον αὐτὸν οἱ κύνες, ἀνέκραγεν· ὁ δὲ Γλαῦκος ὡς ἤκουσε τῆς φωνῆς (ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο ὄνομα τῶι νέμοντι τὰς αἶγας), ἐπέδραμεν ὀτραλέως, τούς τε κύνας ἀνεκαλεῖτο καὶ ἀπεσόβησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου. ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον ἐν θωύματι ἦν, ὅκως τυφλὸς ἐὼν μόνος ἀπίκοιτο ἐς τοιούτους χώρους, καὶ ὅτι θέλων.

> Homer got up from there [from Pitys, §20—EMM] and went on his way, following a bleating of goats at pasture. When the dogs barked at him, he shouted, and Glaucus, hearing his voice—this was the name of the goatherd—ran up hastily, called the dogs back, and shooed them away from Homer. For a long time he was in wonderment at how a blind man had found his way to such a place all alone, and what he wanted.

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[32] Paris, Musée du Louvre. inv. RF4392: Poulet & Scherf 1992, 71, 311, 336, 361 and fig. 43 at p. 71; Scherf 1993. Cast in Toledo, Ohio, Toledo Museum of Art (*Toledo Museum of Art Museum News* 19.2–3 (1976) 71, ill.); Scherf 1993, 57, fig. 5–6. I owe this information to Sandra Knudsen from the Toledo Museum, who was so kind to send me a photograph.

[33] Ps.-Hdt. 24 (translation West 2003, 378–379).

Figure 6. Claude Michel, called Clodion: ,The Blind
Homer'. Bronze, 1810, Height 58.7 cm. Toledo, Ohio,
The Toledo Museum of Art, inv. 1976.2 (© Museum).

Clodion could have known the story from Madame Dacier's translations of which a new edition had come out in 1802. According to her, the scene equalled the return of Odysseus to Ithaca.[34] The poet's head is that of a Greek philosopher and does not follow the usual Farnese model, but at the same time it recalls the open-mouthed Laocoon, expressing his pain. The boy, the goatherd Glaucus from Chios, remains serene and is shown in a classical Greek ideal nudity, which contrasts with the representation of the poet who, here, has to be helped by a youngster. Jean-Pierre Granger painted the same episode in 1807: Homer is at loss by an attack of a huge dog and has lost (?) his lyre. His head is modelled after the Farnese type. Glaucus defends the old man.[35]

In this and other French works made in the first decades of the 19th century Homer suffers from his old age and is not always well understood by the Greek bystanders. Whiteley sees these works as expressions of the fears and sufferings people had coped with after the Terror. Homer is an example of a noble, guiltless artist. This idea is supported by a remark of Ingres: 'Les grandes hommes sont persécutés comme s'ils avaient mérité le supplice des coupables par les Furies, précisément parce qu'ils sont de grands hommes'.[36]

After the adventure with the dogs, Glaucus housed the poet and fed him. Tommaso Minardi painted this 'Omero cieco in casa del pastore Glauco' on a very large, neoclassicist canvas in 1810.[37] Homer gets light from the window in the right wall of the simple house which has bare walls and roughly worked wooden doors, window and ceiling beams. The table carries a dish, a jar and a white towel of linen. To Homer's left a lyre is standing on the ground. Homer's head is that of the Farnese Homer and his attitude reflects a Hellenistic seated philosopher like the well-known Chrysippus:[38] the cloak covers the old body in the same way, the back is curved and the left hand is stretched forward. Even the leather sandals are similar to those of this and

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[34] Mme Dacier, *Supplément à l'Homère de Madame Dacier, contenant la Vie d'Homère, par Madame Dacier*, Amsterdam 1731, 12 (quoted in Scherf 1993, 56).

[35] Dijon, Musée des Beaux-Arts: Whiteley 1974, 43, pl. 23; Scherf 1993, 57.

[36] Cited in Whitley 1974, 47. Scherf 1993 endorses Whitley's conclusions.

[37] Rome, Galleria Nazionale d'Arte Moderna: G. Capitelli, in: *Maestà di Roma. Universale ed Eterna Capitale delle Arti*, exhibition catalogue Rome, Rome 2003, 143 cat. IV.5. The author mentions a drawing at Forlì with the same theme.

[38] Von den Hoff 1994, 96–111; Schefold 1997, 254–255; Zanker 1995, 98–102, fig. 54–56.

other philosophers. Minardi apparently either knew the model itself or was inspired by other seated philosophers in Roman collections.[39] Glaucus is richly clad and has a wooden staff like the Athenian citizens on Greek pottery images.[40] There are no traces of the children who would become Homer's pupils, painted by Rembrandt (see above). The painter concentrated on the relationship between teacher and pupil.

Etienne-Jean Delécluze (1781–1863) painted six roundels in the Salon Doré of the Château of Malmaison et Bois-Préau, among which 'Homère secouru par les bergers'. It is a 1 m diameter wide roundel on canvas. A girl and a boy are milking a goat, while the old Homer sits and drinks from a small nap. His lyre is lying next to him. The title reminds us of the dogs' aggression in which Glaucus happily interfered, but the representation is a mere idyllic scene and, as a matter of fact, the episode is lined with five scenes from Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* pastoral novel. In the end, Homer has himself become a pastoral motif.

The famous French yearly Salons had exhibitions showing prize-winning paintings. These represented a prescribed theme, mostly taken from Antiquity or the Bible. Another instance was the contest of the Prix de Rome for young artists.[41] Therefore, it were especially French artists who painted exciting examples of the most remote themes of ancient literature and history, extracted by learned jury members from the works of authors like Plutarch, Livy and Homer. The candidates first presented sketches of freely chosen themes. After having been selected, some twenty of them made a small painting, and ten were finally invited to make a larger canvas within some ten weeks. Most of the preparatory material has been lost and even the final works are frequently missing.

As to our Homer theme, the Prix de Rome jury of 1834 and 1855 prescribed 'Homère récitant ses poèmes'. In 1834 the jury gave the following description [including some misspellings]: 'homére devenu aveugle, parcourant les villes de la Grèce, chantait Ses poésies en S'accompagnant de la lyre. La beauté de Ses vus excitait l'attention et l'admiration des peuples'.[42]

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[39] E.g. Zanker 1995, fig. 57 (Palazzo Spada), 64 (Florence), 75 (Vatican Museums).

[40] Because of this richness one might ask whether Glaucus' boss may be meant, who will ask Homer to give lessons (Ps.-Hdt. 24, West 2003, 380–383).

[41] Grunchec 1983; Grunchec 1984.

[42] Cited in Grunchec 1983, 350 note 23. Cf. Whiteley 1974, 48–49: other artists are mentioned.

It was Paul Jourdy, a pupil of Lethière and Ingres, who won the 1834 Prix de Rome with a painting showing Homer in a landscape.[43] In the background a temple on a hill and a higher mountain behind suggest the choice of the Hephaisteion and the Lykabettos instead of the Acropolis of Athens. Homer is sitting and playing a lyre. Young and old shepherds and a soldier are listening. This combination recalls Carstens' study that could have been known by the Thorvaldsen replica. Other works with the same theme are by Louis-Victor Lavoine (formerly Soissons, destroyed during the Second World War) and Jean-Baptiste-Auguste Leloir (1809–1882; painting as early as 1841 purchased for the Musée du Louvre). Leloir's image shows the poet sitting in front of a temple, surrounded by shepherds and peasants.[44]

In 1855, a section of *L'aveugle*, a long poem by André Chenier, written before his guillotine execution in 1794 and very popular in France after the publication of his works in 1819, served as the starting point for the contest of the oil sketches (verses 4–11), entitled 'Homère demande l'hospitalité':[45]

> C'est ainsi qu'achevait l'aveugle en soupirant,
> Et près des bois marchait, faible, et sur une pierre
> S'asseyait. Trois pasteurs, enfants de cette terre,
> Le suivaient, accourus aux abois turbulents
> Des molosses, gardiens de leurs troupeaux bêlants.
> Ils avaient, retenant leur fureur indiscrète,
> Protégé du vieillard la faiblesse inquiète.
> Ils l'écoutaient de loin en s'approchant de lui.

In what follows, the shepherds speak with the great poet who tells his story. Now Louis-Hector Leroux and Clément-Amédée Bidot won the prizes.[46] They show the poet, lead by Glaucus, singing to girls in the setting of a temple.

Artistically more interesting is the version of Camille Corot, who had also been inspired by Chenier's poem, when he painted 'Homère et les bergers' in 1845 (now Saint-Lô, Musée des Beaux-Arts). Three

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[43] Grunchec 1983, 31 (illustration); Grunchec 1984, 144–145 with colour plate. The painting is in the Ecole nationale supérieure des Beaux-Arts at Paris. On this year Grunchec 1983, 216–217 and Grunchec 1984, 124–125.

[44] Whiteley 1974, 49; Grunchec 1984, II, 124–125; Compin/Roquebert 1986, IV, 46. The Lavoine is not even known from a photo.

[45] Chéniers poem was the first example of representing Homer as a blind beggar (Whiteley 1974, 41).

[46] Grunchec 1986, I, 114–115 (both works in the École des Beaux-Arts. Archive documents in Grunchec 1986, II, 97).

boys stand next to a seated Homer who is playing the lyre and looking upwards, singing towards heaven. He is clad in Greek dress leaving free the left shoulder and his attitude follows that of philosophers' portraits of the Hellenistic period. The background shows a block of stone (a tomb?), trees and a path leading to a city, on which three men are walking.

As a matter of fact, the painter depicts the solitude of the poet in his blindness. Critics were divided in their estimation: Théophile Gautier disliked it, whereas Charles Baudelaire praised the canvas. The painter had a lot of success in this period, in which he produced several historical paintings. One might ask whether Corot, normally not taking over material from others, had followed predecessors.[47]

William Adolphe Bougereau's 'Homère et son guide' shows an old, blind man guided by Glaucus.[48] At their feet is a dog, whereas two more dogs and two other shepherds are in the background. The young boy has a stone in his hand, which he might throw in case of danger to protect the blind poet, who here has the well-known Farnese head. His lyre is on his back, held by a band that runs over the breast. The work shows the same theme as Clodion's statue. Bougereau was a French *académicien* who became very popular in the United States for his genre paintings of children, mothers, young girls and the like. Emile Zola criticized the canvas when it was exposed on the Salon of 1875 for its sentimental sweetness.

Homer the teacher in 19th-century settings

In 1863, Pierre Puvis de Chavannes (1824–1898) established his name as a painter of large-format mural decorations on canvas in the series now at Amiens, Musée de Picardie. 'Le repos' shows the old poet sitting among not working harvesters and blacksmiths with an anvil on the right. In the left corner, background, some women present a child to

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[47] All these reflections on Corot are based on Pantazzi 1996, 266–267 cat. 90 (general remarks on Corot in this period pp. 195–206). Some preparatory sketches are mentioned. I was not able to find some canvases recorded; the listed Aligny painting at Detroit shows a landscape near Tivoli and no Homer. Corot is shortly mentioned by Whiteley 1974, 49.

[48] Now Layton Art Collection, Milwaukee Art Museum, Milwaukee. See Wissman 1996 [non vidi]; *Bougereau* 1984, 63 cat. 62. In the catalogue the enormous popularity of the painter in the USA is highlighted.

a sitting man. The combination of this work with other large paintings gave it a programmatic value, when they were acquired by the French government and given to Amiens: The set of canvases hails the bounty of Picardy and Homer is the instructor of the people.[49]

A similar didactic programme including Homer was planned as the never executed mural decoration for the Musée des Beaux-Arts at Lyon, proposed by Paul Chenavard in the 1880s. Puvis de Chavannes would execute the paintings after his proposal in 1883. A 'summary' of history, seen from a post-1848 perspective had to be installed and the three sketches made represented Past, Present and Future. These three works would have formed the largest wall decoration by one studio ever.[50]

'L'Avenir' contains a synthesis of old and new cultures like India, Egypt and Greece. In the right hand lower corner a couple of men represent Aristotle (left) and Homer (right), 'source de toute poésie et philosophie permanente'.[51] The right man look likes a fisherman in his short tunic, Phrygian cap and young physic (sturdy legs and smooth cheeks). The lyre he holds on his back is the only clue for an interpretation as singer or poet. A sleeping dog lies near his feet. These features never appear in Homer's portraits. The not bearded 'Aristotle' is clad in toga and makes an oratory gesture with his right hand. Like the Homer, he has nothing of the Greek philosopher, but more of a Roman orator. The two figures might represent (Greek) poetry and (Latin) prose, be it historical or rhetorical. As to the poet, the most likely figure is Orpheus, accompanied by a dog. It is not clear which figures exactly should be portrayed, but from an iconographical point of view the two are hardly appropriate figures.

Wilhelm von Kaulbach depicted a similar laudatory painting in the monumental staircase of the Neues Museum in Berlin in 1859–1866: 'Homer und die Griechen'.[52] A singing Homer, with a laurel wreath on his head and playing a lyre, arrives at a crowded shore

[49] A small version on canvas is in the National Gallery of Art, Washington D.C. The phenomenon of monumental mural painting in France in the 19th century and Puvis de Chavannes' position are extensively studied by Germer 1988, esp. 400–431 (museum at Lyon, unfortunately the Amiens scenes have not been studied in this contribution).

[50] Germer 1988, 333. A description follows at pp. 334–346, figs. 84–87. As to Puvis de Chavannes, see Germer 1988, 400–431.

[51] Thus the art critic Bertrand, cited by Germer 1988, 342, who doubts the identification of the Aristotle and proposes Augustus.

[52] Wagner 1989, 126–163; *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 180–181 cat. VI.10 with bibliography (copper print after the fresco by Eduard Eichens). The exhibition catalogue *Berlin und*

with a large temple. He stands on a ship that also carries the Sibyl of Cumae, while Thetis with the ashes of Achilles rises behind them from the waves of the see. The setting should be Salamis in 480 BC, after the victory over the Persians, but the anachronistic set of figures rather evokes the Acropolis of Athens. Homer acts like a prophet or a Christian preacher, raising his left hand in the act of preaching. Homer functions as the teacher of everything, not only as a poet. He is the alpha and omega of Greek culture and his word is mighty. Around him famous writers, artists, and politicians are sitting. The temple, probably the Parthenon,[53] in front of which Phidias is sculpting an Athena statue, forms the background on the left. Apollo and the Muses precede Zeus, Hera and Athena in heaven, sitting on clouds above the Greeks. The painting belongs to a cycle—destroyed during the Second World War—representing the cultural history of mankind. Greece of course forms an elementary aspect of civilization. Other themes were the 'Tower of Babel', the 'Destruction of Jerusalem by Titus' (left and right of the Homer that forms a moment of peace), the 'Huns' Battle', the 'Crusaders at Jerusalem' and the 'Reformation'.[54]

Strange encounters

Some artists introduced Homer in a setting that is neither antique nor associated with the poet in other obvious ways. I mention them, although I cannot give much information about them.

Jean-Louis Hamon (1821–1874) painted a 'Comédie humaine' (1852, Salon 1852; Paris, Musée d'Orsay) on which the puppet theatre, labelled 'Théâtre Guignol', gives a show. Among the onlookers we see of course many children, but at the sides famous persons are recognizable. At the left Diogenes with his lantern and his barrel stands next to

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die Antike (Berlin 1979, 137 cat. 204) gives partly different names of the represented people, but that is not important in our discussion of Homer's images.

   [53] The long side has 17 columns, whereas the metopes on the front show at least two of the Elgin marbles, featuring the centauromachy. In the background a second Doric temple is being constructed.

   [54] Wagner 1989, 211, 292: other Homeric themes in 19th-century school buildings. 'Die Zeit Homers' was depicted in the aula of the Königliches Gymnasium at Dresden by Leonard Gey as pendant of 'Die Zeit Caesars'. Both were destroyed during the Second World War.

Socrates. At the right side Homer, with a lyre on his back, has as neighbours Virgil and Dante.[55]

The Russian artist C.M. Korgiev-Ciuvelev made the triptych 'The Communists' between 1980 an 1985 (S. Petersburg, State Russian Museum). The left wing of the triptych shows 'The workshop of the people'. A man is standing next to a classical Greek bust of Homer. The right wing has 'The Conversation' in which Lenin stands next to Homer.

Homer in single portraits

As we have seen, the interest for Homer increased in the late 18th century. Simultaneously, the Scandinavian Hyperboreans invented a 'Nordic' Homer, who got his own fortune in the arts: Ossian. A peculiar example of literary parallelism is Abilgaard's double portrait of Homer and Ossian (now in Copenhagen): the highly praised Ossian is put onto the same level as the oldest Greek poet.[56]

Johann Heinrich Wilhelm Tischbein, another keen reader of Homer, composed a large series of illustrations to scenes from *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The first issue of this multi-volume work, *Homer nach Antiken gezeichnet*, printed at Göttingen in 1801, contains images of Homer: (1) Homer's head, (2) Homer gets instruction from the Muses, (3) Homer's apotheosis.[57] The portrait (1) is that of the Farnese bust that Tischbein had

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[55] Compin/Roquebet 1986, III, 301 (still in the Louvre); Rosenblum 1989, inv. 5279bis. Also mentioned by Whiteley 1974, 49, who connects it thematically with Auguste Glaize's 'Le Pilori' of 1855, in which Homer and other writers, artists and learned men who suffered from mankind's stupidities were represented (Marseille, Musée des Beaux-Arts). The latter also made a lithography after his work. The poet has become a 'symbol for the isolation of the artist'.

[56] Ossian was seen as the Nordic counterpart of Homer and depicted in a similar way. See e.g. Nicolai Abraham Abilgaard, Ossian sings his swan's song from about 1785 (Copenhagen, Statens Museum for Kunst: P. Maisak in Schulze 1994, 258–259 cat. 184). Tutsch 1995, 165–166, fig. 23 discusses a double portrait of Johann Heinrich Füßli and Johann Jakob Bodmer, debating in front of a large bust of Ossian by Füßli (Zurich, Kunsthaus). P. Betthausen in *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 172 and 176 sees that bust as a Homer. Although Ossian fascinated especially English and German writers and artists, we might also recall the canvas by Ingres, showing Ossian's dream from 1813 (Montauban, Musée Ingres: Vigne 1995, 105–106 fig. 78).

[57] See the thorough study on the relationship between antique artifacts and Tischbein's prints by Beate Grubert 1975. The author stresses Tischbein's lifelong love for the poet (pp. 49–50). See also *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 182 cat. VI.12 (Homer and Muses); 183 cat. VI.14 (apotheosis).

studied personally at Naples.[58] Homer's lesson (2) is modelled after an antique relief finger ring on which five Greek actors with masks are talking.[59] The print shows Homer, seated on a stone with a papyrus roll on his lap and looking at and listening to three Muses, two having masks in their hands and representing poetry. The woman on the left is Tragedy, seated like Homer and studying a mask that has the face of Homer: the poet instructs her through his mask. The apotheosis, finally (3), is a reproduction of a silver goblet in Naples.[60]

King Ludwig I of Bavaria had a bust of Homer in his study, as we know from an epigram he wrote, in which the freedom of Greece is hailed as a liberation of the Greeks' minds:[61] 'An Homer, dessen Brustbild in einer meiner Arbeitsstuben steht'

> Freue dich, alter Homer, denn frey ist wieder dein Hellas;
> Nicht mehr liest der Sklav', einzig der Freye dich nun.

Portraits of Men with a Bust of Homer

The famous translator of Homer into English, Alexander Pope, was portrayed with a bust of Homer around 1713–1715 on a canvas attributed to Charles Jervas.[62]

The first portraits of grand-tourists and learned men (I do not know examples of women) with a bust of Homer (mostly the Farnese bust), are two of three immediately famous works depicting the celebrated antiquarian Winckelmann. Angelika Kauffmann,[63] Anton Raphael Mengs and Anton von Maron—important and successful portrait painters in the Rome of their time—were eager to eternalise their friend Winckelmann, who was much honoured by these artists and by

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[58] Grubert 1975, 105–107, figs. 27–28. His idea about the Homer illustration originated from his drawing the antique vases from the collection of Sir William Hamilton, the English ambassador.

[59] Grubert 1975, 92–95, figs. 19–20; *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 182 cat. VI.12.

[60] Grubert 1975, 169–170, figs. 62–64; *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 183 cat. VI.14. Buonaventura Genelli used the same scheme for his Homer apotheosis, in which Oikoumene bestows wreathes to personifications of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* (*Wiedergeburt* 1999, 184 cat. VI.15). The illustrations stimulated count Peter Friedrich Ludwig von Holstein-Gottorp to invite Tischbein at Oldenburg, where the artist decorated the 'Homer-Zimmer' (see *Wiedergeburt* 1999, 159–162).

[61] Ludwig I, König von Bayern, *Gedichte des Königs Ludwig von Bayern*, II, Munich ²1829, 12.

[62] London, National Portrait Gallery, inv. 112.

[63] Zurich, Kunsthaus, from 1764 (no bust). See Tutsch 1995, 169–176, fig. 5.

travellers despite his humble social status. The portraits were so-called *Freundschaftsbilder*, made for an admirer of the sitter and the portraits could be brought home as an attractive souvenir. Mengs portrayed the scholar with a bust of Homer in 1761.[64] Maron painted the archaeologist in 1767–1768, clad in a precious furred red mantle, writing and looking to the spectator (fig. 4). A bust of the Farnese type stands at the right hand side and is turned in profile to the author as if he were whispering to him.[65] This *Freundschaftsbild* was made on bequest of Heinrich Wilhelm Muzel-Stosch, a friend of the sitter. Winckelmann's affection for Homer was sincere: he often quoted the poet in his letters and in his publications and saw him as the beginning of Greek culture. Homer was one of his main sources of knowledge, one of his teachers regarding the understanding of antiquity. He inspired Winckelmann to carry out his research and to become a teacher to modern man.[66] The bust of Homer is not the only antique object shown: in the background, left, there is a Hermes Psychopompos; in the foreground we see a print of the Antinous relief in the Villa Albani at Rome. With the Homer bust they represent the three stadiums of age.[67]

Other Rome-made portraits with a bust of Homer are known from Pompeo Batoni, another foremost portrait painter at Rome during the acme of the *grand tour*. Many of his sitters, mostly English gentry, were depicted in the presence of antique objects like the Antinous relief in the Villa Albani, the Athena Giustiniani, the Sleeping Ariadne in the Vatican, the Roma at the Capitol Hill and the like. The Homer bust of the Farnese type (probably that in the Capitoline Museums) can be seen on portraits of Robert Clemens, 1st Earl of Leitrim (1753–1754), Arthur Hill-Trevor (1764), and Thomas Estcourt (1772).[68]

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[64] New York, Metropolitan Museum of Arts.

[65] Weimar, Schlossmuseum. Tutsch 1995, 18–22, fig. 1.The bust is that from the Albani collection, now in the Musée du Louvre (Tutsch 1995, 21). There is copy by Maron himself at Halle, Staatliche Galerie Moritzburg, and Otto Gehrke made a copy as late as 1956 for the Winckelmann-Museum at Stendal (*Wiedergeburt* 1999, 176–177 cat. VI.4, with colour plate p. 346).

[66] Tutsch 1995, 115–121, 165.

[67] Tusch 1995, 185. Tutsch also discusses at length the two other objects of art.

[68] Clarke 1985, cat. 174 fig. 162 (private collection Ireland), cat. 277 fig. 253 (private collection, Wales) and cat. 346 fig. 317 (Brown University, Stairwell Gallery). P. Betthausen (*Wiedergeburt* 1999, 176) also lists these examples. As to the replica used, see Clarke 1985, 258.

Friedrich Schiller was portrayed by Ludowike Simanowiz (Marbach) in 1793: the bust of Homer refers to the new translation of Homer's poems by Johann Heinrich Voß in the same year, frequently recited by Schiller to his friends.

Conclusion

Very few representations of Homer discussed in this contribution can be analysed in the context for which they were made. Frescoes and other wall and ceiling decorations are the only depictions about which conclusions may be drawn from the context.

In Corot's and Kaulbach's paintings Homer is the summa of Greek culture, a culture that forms the base of all following cultures. He represents the education we should obtain in order to become good people and to gain the heavenly paradise. Homer's is a task like Saint Peter's: he gives the key with which man passes the gate of heaven. The surrounding panels stress this idea. The presence in national (and nationalistic) museums is congruent to the function of these edifices, seen as temples of education and not 'simply' as *pinacothecae*. The wall paintings, applied in the entrances and/or staircases, prepare the visitor for his tour along the works of art in the museum.

The narrative scenes of the neo-classicist period reflect the popularity of the ancient poet and turn him into an exemplary human being, rather than just a perfect poet. The suffering in several French works might reflect the period of the Terror in the years after the French Revolution. Some scenes are meticulous, figural translations of passages in the *vitae*, chosen by the learned members of the selection commissions of the Salons and the Prix de Rome. These apparently had a more general effect. The publication of Chenier's Homer poem in the early 19th century enhanced this human image of Homer.

Busts of the poet on portraits emphasize the education of the sitters and their esteem of the classics—be it true or feigned. In some cases particular associations can be made, especially in the case of the writers Pope, Winckelmann and Schiller. The narrative scenes, finally, show a Homer that moves the viewer by his weakness, suffering and old age, although these awkward properties had not prevented him of singing and writing the most beautiful poems on earth.

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PART IV

GREEK LITERATURE

ISOCRATES ON BEING RELIGIOUS
AND MORAL CONDUCT

Jeroen A.E. Bons

Isocrates' concern with the appropriate moral conduet of the citizens of the *polis* is well documented.[1] His *philosophia* or education of the sound-thinking and well-mannered citizen was based on the idea that students should strive for this aim by being repeatedly confronted with exemplary conduct.[2] Thus, in a process of habituation (ἐθίζειν),[3] the desired character traits and patterns of behaviour would develop as permanent qualities of the citizen-to-be. It is less well documented that besides the study of the appropriate exemplary figures as they were represented in the literary tradition and of the wisdom-poets like Theognis and Phocylides, the inculcation of 'being religious' (εὐσέβεια) was an important complementary part of Isocrates' programme of education.

When taking a closer look at passages in Isocrates' works where he expresses himself on the subject of *eusebeia*, one finds quite frequently statements that, not surprisingly, suggest a traditionalist attitude in religious matters. As an example, in the description of the idealized 'constitution of the fathers' (πάτριος πολιτεία) in his *Areopagiticus*, Isocrates writes:

> First of all, as for matters regarding the gods (τὰ περὶ τοὺς θεούς)—for it is right to begin with this—they did not worship or perform the celebrations inconsistently or erratically. They did not dispatch three hundred oxen whenever they felt like it, nor did they arbitrarily omit the ancestral sacrifices. (…) They made certain of only one thing, that they did not destroy any ancestral custom, or add anything beyond what was customary. They did not think that piety (εὐσέβεια) was a matter of great expense, but rather of not changing anything (μηδὲν κινεῖν) their

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[1] This short essay in honour of my friend and teacher Ton Kessels is a first attempt on my part to address an issue (Isocrates' view on *eusebeia*) largely neglected in the more recent research on Isocrates. Publications on the subject I have consulted include Burk 1923, Steidle 1952, Mikkola 1954, Cloché 1963, Too 1995, Poulakos 1997, Livingstone 2001, Sajonz 2002. In my opinion, of these Burk 1923 remains the most useful.

[2] On this topic see Burk 1923, Steidle 1952, Johnson 1959, Livingstone 1998.

[3] Cf. *To Philip* 118, *To Demonicus* 15, *Nicocles* 29.

> ancestors had handed down to them. Moreover, they received gifts from
> the gods not unsteadily or randomly, but at the right moment for working
> the land and harvesting the crops. (*Areopagiticus*, 29–30)[4]

It is important to note that this passage constitutes the first compo-
nent in the description of the way in which the citizens of the ancestral
constitution carried out their daily affairs (c. 28–35). Their way of life,
characterized as just and lawful, consists of two components: their atti-
tude towards the gods (c. 29–30) and their relationships among them-
selves (τὰ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς, c. 31–35). To begin with, 'matters regard-
ing the gods' reflects the importance generally attributed to this issue.
Not only is it more than likely that it was the first issue to be treated in
meetings of the Ecclesia,[5] also the phrase used by Isocrates seems tra-
ditional and might have an origin in ritual.[6] In political life, therefore,
being religious seems to have precedence over relationships amongst
citizens themselves, but both are essential. Secondly, and still in accor-
dance with convention, Isocrates stresses the requirement of a sense of
tradition and continuity in the execution of religious ceremonies. *Euse-
beia* as 'being religious' entails being pious, god-fearing and scrupulous
in honouring the gods, especially by manifesting a strong loyalty and
obsequiousness to the rites handed down by the forefathers.[7] The gods,
in their turn, reciprocated by granting a steady, continuous and timely
flow of gifts such as a never failing agricultural produce, thereby safe-
guarding life for the *polis*. This aspect is common to Athenian religious
feeling, which is characterized as being scrupulous in honouring the
gods: 'Man offered sacrifices and festivities to the gods, and claimed
divine help and protection in return, reminding them of their debt in
his prayers'.[8] There is, however, also an additional element present: it
is predominantly the religious behaviour in accordance with tradition
that marks real *eusebeia*, not excessive generosity in expenses on rites

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[4] Translations of longer passages are taken from *Isocrates I* (2000) and *Isocrates II*
(2004), in the series *The Oratory of Classical Greece*, Michael Gagarin (ed.), University of
Texas Press, Austin.

[5] Cf. Anaximes, *Ars Rhetorica* 1423 a 21 ff., where the sequence of deliberative top-
ics is: religious matters, legislature, constitutional matters, foreign affairs, war, peace,
financial and economic affairs.

[6] The phrase ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον resembles a formula: cf. Alcm. fr. 2 B,
Theoc. XVII, 1 and Aratus *Phaen.* 1.

[7] For the μηδὲν κινεῖν or μηδὲν καινοτομεῖν with respect to ritual see also Pl. *Epin.*
985 c; *Symp.* 193 a-d and *Resp.* 615 c.

[8] Dover 1974, 247; on the religion and religious feeling of the ordinary Greek see
the excellent treatment of Dodds 1973.

and sacrifices or their frequency, quantity and inventiveness in form. Here Isocrates seems to depart somewhat from the conventional notion of being religious, as it is exemplified by, e.g., Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue named after him: Socrates summarizes Euthyphro's understanding of what holiness (τὸ ὅσιον) is as 'the science of asking from and giving to the gods' (14 d 11), and later he characterizes it as 'a kind of art of commerce' (ἐμπορική τις τέχνη), to which Euthyphro agrees (14 e 8). To Isocrates, being religious has its crucial quality in the possesion of a clear sense of appropriateness and respect towards the duties of religious conduct handed down by tradition.

This particular aspect can also be found in a passage of *To Nicocles*, the protreptic collection of points of wisdom and advice directed at the young prince Nicocles with a future ahead of him as a leader of the community:

> With regard to the gods, do as your ancestors showed; and regard it the finest sacrifice and the greatest service to show yourself as the best and the most just possible. There is more hope (ἐλπίς) that such men will gain some benefit from the gods than those who discharge many sacrifices. (*Ad Nicoclem* 20)

We see the same thought as in the *Areopagiticus*, but now more concisely put: not quantity is what matters in procuring the goodwill of the gods, but a right attitude and moral conduct. That is the prerequisite condition to reach the situation that blessing from the gods can be hoped for. It is noteworthy that Isocrates points out that divine blessing is not an automatic consequence of piety. To him, apparently, the relationship between man and the divine is not one where mankind can claim (see above) help and protection as if it were a debt. Divine blessing is a thing to hope for (ἐλπίς),[9] based on the conviction that it is up to humankind to fulfill its prerequisite of moral conduct first.[10] This point will return below.

The paradoxical encomium *Busiris* offers passages with some different aspects of Isocrates' views of being religious.[11] This work is con-

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[9] If one takes *elpis* as 'expectation' the statement might be stronger in its purport, but still the divine blessing is not regarded as a certainty.

[10] On Isocrates' view that the gods are the ultimate providers of earthly goods (as they uphold the order of the world in which humankind lives) and that they provide them as blessings, see *On the peace* 59, *Antid.* 282, *Nicocles* 2.

[11] For detailed treatment of the following passages see now the excellent commentary by Livingstone 2001.

ceived as a corrective reply to the encomium on the notorious and
abject tyrant of Egypt known from mythology, Busiris, as it was pro-
duced by Polycrates. According to Isocrates, Polycrates had failed mis-
erably in composing a paradoxical encomium. He now offers a new
one, intended as a corrective replacement showing Polycrates how to
produce such a type of rhetorical praise correctly. The task at hand,
therefore, is to achieve a kind of mission impossible: persuasively prais-
ing a tyrant. Part of Isocrates' encomium is a treatment of Egyptian
religion, with the special focus on how Busiris contributed to the devel-
opment of the extraordinary piety of the Egyptians. In his description
Isocrates exaggerates and at the same time makes use of the strange
aspects of Egyptian religious life, known to his audience through, e.g.,
the works of Herodotus. It is interesting to see in what way he manages
to extract from the stories about Egypt and about Busiris a praisewor-
thy picture of the tyrant:

> It is especially worthwhile to praise and admire the piety (εὐσέβεια) of the
> Egyptians and their service to the gods. Those who dress themselves up
> more than is justified pretending to have wisdom or any other virtue, do
> harm to those they deceive (ἐξαπατᾶν). But those who have been such
> effective leaders in religious matters that the rewards and punishments of
> the gods appear greater than they really are, these people benefit human
> life most. Indeed, by instilling in us a fear (φόβος) of the gods from the
> beginning, they cause us not to act like beasts toward one another. (…)
> Busiris established many different kinds of religious practice for them. He
> even enacted laws to revere and honor animals that are despising to us. (
> …) He thought it necessary to accustom the crowd (ἐθίζειν … τὸν ὄχλον)
> to abide by all the instructions of the magistrates, and at the same time
> he wanted to test through visible means what conviction (διάνοια) they
> had concerning invisible matters. (…) (*Bus.* 24–27)

In this version Busiris is transformed into a functionalist or pragmatist
type of religious leader: someone who puts fear of the gods into use
to civilize the community and enforce civic obedience, and curb crime
by installing the conviction that the gods will punish crime and that
crime will not remain undetected. The implied deceit of the Egyptians
by Busiris turns into a kind of 'noble lie', given the circumstances
of comparison with unjustified deceivers (such as sophists, one would
imagine Isocrates to imply) and given the outcome of Egypt's admirable
religious life. Relatively speaking and given Egyptian circumstances—
not Athenian—Busiris deserves praise. Thus, the praise of Egyptian
piety can not be taken as a source for Isocrates' own views on the
importance of being religious.

It seems likely that in the background of this passage an anthropo-logical theory of religion as entertained by certain sophists is opera-tive. The theory formulated by the title character Sisyphus in the frag-ment of a play sometimes attributed to Critias or Euripides seems to be alluded here: humankind rose from an original bestial state to a first stage of civilized life by the invention of law and punishment of crime, but undetected crime persisted; then a wise man invented the fear of the gods and let humankind believe that the gods hear and see every-thing, and will make sure in time that crime is punished.[12] That the sophistic and rationalistic criticism of the gods and religion is indeed on Isocrates' mind seems to be confirmed later on at c. 38, where he attacks Polycrates for having followed in his praise of Busiris the 'insults of the poets, who describe the offspring of the immortal gods doing and suffering more terrible things than the offspring of the most unholy humans'. With an unmistakable reference to the well-known lines by Xenophanes bestowing ridicule on anthropomorphic representations of the gods (21 B 11 DK), and maybe even referring to Plato's moralizing criticisms of conventional poetic ways of representing the gods in myth (*Resp.* 377e–391e), Isocrates distances himself from such a rationalizing attitude. Instead, he offers the following view of his own:

> I believe (ἐγὼ … ἡγοῦμαι) that neither the gods nor their offspring share in evil. They have all the virtues by nature and have become leaders and teachers of the finest conduct (κάλλιστα ἐπιτηδεύματα) for the rest of us. (*Bus.* 41)

With this strong statement Isocrates presents what one might tentatively call a positive 'theology', in the sense of a reflection upon the nature of the divine: the gods are good and as such they are the cause of good things, a conviction also to be found in his *Panathenaicus* 206. Their particular role is to be exemplary in the finest, i.e., moral conduct for humankind. Again we find confirmation of Isocrates' opinion on what significance 'being religious' has for moral conduct and the education towards it.[13]

Even if with this last statement Isocrates seems to be firmly in accor-dance with conventional Greek religion and even averse to intellectual-istic criticism of the traditional belief in the gods, he does reflect some aspects of the critical attitude of his day. An interesting example occurs

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[12] On the so-called Sisyphus-fragment (Critias 88 B 25 DK) see Kahn 1997.

[13] Note Thgn. 145–148, where *eusebeia* is equivalent to living righteously: as one of the wisdom-poets Theognis is a preferred source for Isocrates (see *To Nicocles* 3 and 43).

in the beginning of his programmatic work *Contra sophistas*, where he argues that humankind lacks knowledge of the future:

> I think it clear to all that it is not in our nature to know in advance what is going to happen. We fall so far short of this intelligence that Homer—who enjoys the highest reputation for wisdom (σοφία)—has written that the gods sometimes deliberate (βουλεύεσθαι) about the future: not because he knows (οἶδα) their thoughts but because he wants to show (ἐνδείξασθαι) us that this one thing (i.e. knowledge of the future) is impossible for human beings. (*C. Soph.* 2)

In the sophistic tradition Isocrates makes use of Homer to argue a point: an *a fortiori* argument to warrant his statement about the condition of human knowledge. But he is also subtle in his use of Homer: he takes him to be a wise poet who does not claim to have knowledge about the gods, but who makes use of stories about the gods in his poetry to communicate a certain point. Again, he shows himself to hold views different from both the sophists and from Plato.

Of particular interest in this respect are the closing words of Isocrates' *apologia pro vita sua*, the speech entitled *Antidosis*. He claims to have used discourse, both in the works published during his lifetime and in the argument he has just now presented, righteously (or more precisely: in a way sanctioned by divine law) and justly (ὁσίως καὶ δικαίως) with regard to the city, ancestors and the gods. Then he states:

> Thus if the gods are in fact concerned with human affairs, I don't think they will overlook anything that has happened to me. For that reason, I do not fear anything you may do to me; instead, I am encouraged and have great hope (ἐλπίς) of reaching the end of my life whenever it is best for me. I take it as a sign that I have lived my life until this day as is fitting for men who are righteous and dear to the gods (εὐσεβής, θεοφιλής). (*Antid.* 321–322)

We see here how Isocrates takes a very cautious position: he has no certainty whether or not the gods concern themselves with human affairs, but he has strong hope that if he fulfills the requirement placed on humankind to live in accordance with divine law and to act morally, he will receive the blessing of the gods.[14] Knowledge about what the gods think is beyond a mortal's capacity. See in comparison what he says in *To Demonicus*:

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[14] Cf. *On the peace*, 34–35: 'Those who live piously and justly, however, lead a safe life in the present and have sweeter hopes for the future. If this does not happen in all cases, at least in most cases, things turn out like this'.

> If a mortal must take a guess (στοχάσασθαι) at the thought of the gods,
> I believe (ἡγοῦμαι) that they have made very clear (…) how they feel
> toward base and honourable humans. (*To Demonicus*, 50)

These passages have been taken to indicate that Isocrates expresses
agnosticism and that his position is similar to the famous fragment of
Protagoras: 'About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist
or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the factors preventing
knowledge are many: the obscurity (of the subject), and the shortness
of human life' (Prt. 81 B 4 DK, transl. K. Freeman). It would be
incorrect, however, to group Isocrates with the supposed atheism of the
sophist, nor to align him with the agnosticism of Protagoras. It should
be pointed out that Isocrates' avowal of uncertainty regards acquiring
knowledge about what the gods think, not whether they exist or not.[15]

   To conclude, the passages cited above strongly suggest that *eusebeia* in
the sense of 'being religious' was considered crucial to members of the
polis who were about to take a leading role in the life of the community.
Moreover, being religious is taken by him to be a dynamic principle of
moral conduct: it complements and underpins morality. As a part of
being educated, citizens will learn to accept that following tradition in
the rules of cult and festivities, as well as having confidence in the future
blessings bestowed by the gods, is a prerequisite of the type of attitude
and conduct that is desirable for the *polis*.

   The question remains how much of these views are to be contributed
to an outward religiousness, and how much reflects an inward belief.
This must remain an unanswered question, given the state of evidence
available.[16] One passage, however, is worth quoting in this respect,
taken from *On the peace*:

> I am amazed if anyone thinks that those who cultivate piety (εὐσέβεια)
> and justice (δικαιοσύνη) persist and persevere in them from a hope that
> they will have less than the wicked rather than with the thought that
> both among the gods and humans they will gain more than others. I
> am persuaded that these alone gain the advantage as they should, while
> others gain only what is worse, for I see that those who prefer injustice
> and who think that taking others' property is the greatest good suffer a
> fate similar to animals trapped with bait: at first they enjoy what they

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[15] I therefore can not follow Mikkola 1954 and Cloché 1963 in their argument that
Isocrates was agnostic.

[16] In this essay there was no room for the treatment of Isocrates' views on myth
and mythology, or on the mysteries. I aim to include these issues in a more elaborate
contribution at a later date.

have taken, but a little later they find themselves in the greatest trouble. Those who live piously and justly, however, lead a safe life in the present and have sweeter hope (ἐλπίς) for the future. (*On the peace*, 33–34, transl. with few adaptations)

It is tempting to read this passage as an indication that the man who wrote these words was indeed religious. With more confidence than I am capable of having, Aimé-Marie Gaspard, Duke of Clermont-Tonnerre (1779–1865) and translator of Isocrates wrote in 1862, acknowledging Isocrates as being religious and even coming close to claiming that he possesed an *anima naturaliter Christiana*: 'Isocrate a la gloire insigne d'être, parmis les écrivains de l'antiquité, celui dont les vues morales se sont peut-être le plus rapprochées de la lumière de l'Évangile'.[17]

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[17] *Oeuvres complêtes d'Isocrate. Traduction nouvelle avec texte en regard*, par le Duc de Clermont-Tonnere, Paris 1862, Avant-propos p. vi.

ASKLEPIADES AND POSEIDIPPOS

J.M. Bremer[1]

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- - - - - - - - ]Μοῦσαι φίλαι, ἐστὶ τὸ γράμμα
              τ]ῶν ἐπέων σοφίηι
              τὸ]ν ἄνδρα—καί ἐστί [μ]οι ὥσπερ ἀδελφός
              ]ν κάλ᾿ ἐπισταμεν[ .]ν
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2 ῥεῖα δ᾿ ἀρίγνωτον] edd.pr. 4 τῶ]ν κάλ᾿ ἐπισταμέν[ω]ν edd.pr.

More than a century ago Grenfell, Hunt, and Smily published *P.Tebt.* I 3, a papyrus written early 1st century B.C. which contains the line-endings of four epigrams of various authors; perhaps we are dealing with the scanty remains of an anthology of epigrammatic poetry.[2] For the first two epigrams no attribution to an author has been preserved, but the second one of them has been recognized as *Anth.Pal.* ix 588, a product of a Hellenistic poet called Alkaios of Messene (xvii in Gow & Page 1965, hereafter referred to as G&P). What is legible of the third epigram is printed above; the papyrus attributes it to]ππου, the remains of a name which is usually filled in as Ποσειδί]ππου. It is printed as epigram XXIV of Poseidippos by G&P. The fourth epigram is attributed to]ιαδου, probably Asklepiades.[3]

If the supplements of these two names are correct, we have here together in one and the same papyrus poems of Asklepiades and Poseidippos. Especially the epigram by Poseidippos raises our interest: there is talk of a γράμμα, a specific piece of text (probably poetic text) which is distinguished by σοφίηι, the skill of its author; this author is for Poseidippos ὥσπερ ἀδελφός, like a friend. The epigram becomes much more

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[1] My attempt to establish a link of professional proximity and friendship between two poets of the same generation is meant to be 'iconic' for the relation between the honorand of this volume and the author of these lines.

[2] *P.Tebt.* I 3 came from a mummy-cartonnage: the papyrus with other pieces, had been used by local people of the Fayum to wrap around the mummy of a crocodile! For other early anthologies of Hellenistic epigrams see Cameron 1993, 1–19.

[3] Gow&Page 1965, II 151 observe that other supplements for both names are possible: Dos]iadas and Hegesi]ppos. But these two are fairly obscure poets, and, as Gow notes, the juxtapositions in the *Anthology* of poems by Asklepiades and Poseidippus make it probable that they were the authors of the two epigrams on *P.Tebt.* I 3.

striking if one accepts Austin's supplements in lines 1, 3 (τόνδε had already been suggested earlier by Barigazzi), and 4. In the *editio minor* of Poseidippos' poems,[4] Austin suggests that the epigram may have run as follows:

> Τοῦτ' Ἀσκληπιάδου,] Μοῦσαι φίλαι, ἐστὶ τὸ γράμμα,
>   ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίγνωτον τ]ῶν ἐπέων σοφίηι.
> ἀνθ' ὧν τόνδε τὸ]ν ἄνδρα—καί ἐστί [μ]οι ὥσπερ ἀδελφός—
>   ὡς ἕνα δεῖ τιμᾶν τῶ]ν κάλ' ἐπισταμέν[ω]ν.

> O my dear Muses, this piece of writing is from the hand of Asklepiades,
>   easily recognizable as such because of its poetic skill.
> Therefore we should honour this man—he is like a brother to me—
>   as one of the experts in producing things of beauty. (117 A&B)

In this paper I want to explore the relation between Poseidippos and Asklepiades.[5] For this undertaking the epigram as printed above might seem to be a fairly speculative basis, as Asklepiades' name is no more than Austin's educated guess. But we should not underestimate the quality and breadth of this education. I mean to say that he paired these two poets with good reason. The arguments presented by Cameron show that there are several sound reasons to link these two poets.[6]

1. *Fouilles de Delphes* III 3,192, an inscription of 276/5 or 273/2 BC, informs us that Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν … Ποσειδίππωι … Ἀσκληπιάδηι … αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐκγόνοις προξενίαν. 'The people of Delphi have granted the privilege of *proxeny* to Poseidippos, Asklepiades and their offspring.' Sceptics might object that these two names do not necessarily refer to poets, but this scepticism melts away if one takes into account that in the Aetolian sanctuary of Thermon in 263/2 BC *proxeny* was given 'to Poseidippos the maker of epigrams', Ποσειδίππωι τῶι ἐπιγραμματοποιῶι, *IG* IX 1–2 i 17A.

2. In *Anth.Pal* iv 1, the list of poets assembled in the *Garland*, Poseidippos' epigrams, qualified in line 45 as 'wild flowers of the cornfield'—poppies? are followed in line 46 by Asklepiades', qualified as 'flowers, raised in the wind'—anemones?

3. In the preface of his *Aitia* Kallimachos refers to invidious contempo-

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[4] Austin & Bastianini 2002, hereafter referred to as A&B.

[5] Shortly after I had composed this paper, a new book on Poseidippos came out, *Posidippo e gli altri*, ed. M. di Marco, B. Palumbo, E. Lelli, Roma 2005. I feared to discover that my paper would be outdated even before its publication. But this volume, in which the relation between Poseidippos and several other poets is explored, fortunately does not contain a paper on Poseidippos and Asklepiades.

[6] Cameron 1993, 369–371.

rary critics as 'Telchines'. The Schol.Flor. comments that by 'Telchines' the poet means Asklepiades and Poseidippos (fr. 1 Pfeiffer). In fact, both Asklepiades (XXXII G&P) and Poseidippos (IX G&P = 140 in A& B) praise Antimachus' *Lyde*, a poem that Kallimachos disliked very much (fr. 398 Pfeiffer).

4. In the Meleagrian sequences of the *Anthologia Palatina*, epigrams by Asklepiades and Poseidippos either directly follow each other or are separated only by contributions from Meleager himself. No other pair of poets is linked so frequently.

5. There are indications that Asklepiades may have been somewhere between 10 and 20 years older than Poseidippos. The two poets will have known each other well, since they both worked in Alexandria.[7] For Poseidippos that is evident from the newly discovered body of poetry; for arguments supporting Asklepiades' presence in Alexandria I refer to Fraser 1972, I 559.

6. Six epigrams attributed to Asklepiades (XXXIV–XXXIX G&P) bear an alternative ascription to Poseidippos.

7. Poseidippos' epigrams show many traces of Asklepiades' influence.

Items 1 to 6 are factual, and therefore they do not need further elucidation. But the last item, 7, is a matter of literary interpretation for which Cameron simply refers to Fraser 1972, I 560–571. Fraser composed his work more than thirty years ago, and since then important contributions have been made by Hutchinson 1988, Gutzwiller 1998, and most importantly the 'New Poseidippos', 600 lines of epigrammatic poetry previously unknown, which were published by Bastianini & Gallazzi 2001 and in an *editio minor* by Austin & Bastianini 2002. It may be useful to look again at the relation between the epigrams of these two poets. Let it be said right from the start, by way of anticipation of the results of this inquiry: Asklepiades certainly exercised an influence on Poseidippos' poetry, but the two poets show also marked differences.

I start with the two epigrams which show the intertextual link in the most explicit fashion. Without any doubt Asklepiades' epigram came first:

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[7] To the volume di Marco et al. 2005, Lelli contributed a paper of exceptionally high quality 'Posidippo e Callimaco' (pp. 77–133). In that paper Lelli notes on p. 87 and 97 that before going to Alexandria Poseidippos may have arrived at Samos, home of Asklepiades, and struck up some sort of friendship with Asklepiades there. Asklepiades was quite some years older and already a prominent epigrammatist, probably even the 'inventor' of the sympotic-erotic epigram.

Τοῦθ᾽ ὅτι μοι λοιπὸν ψυχῆς ὅτι δήποτ᾽, Ἔρωτες,
    τοῦτό γ᾽ ἔχειν πρὸς θεῶν ἡσυχίην ἄφετε.
ἢ μὴ δὴ τόξοις ἔτι βάλλετέ μ᾽ ἀλλὰ κεραυνοῖς
    καὶ πάντως τέφρην θέσθε με κἀνθρακίην.
ναί, ναί, βάλλετ᾽, Ἔρωτες, ἐνεσκληκὼς γὰρ ἀνίαις
    ἐξ ὑμεῶν τούτων εἴσετι βούλομ᾽ ἔχειν.

Whatever there may have been left from my soul, Erotes,
    grant it, by the gods, to enjoy rest.
Or no, don't hit me any more with arrows but with lightnings
    and reduce me, by all means, to ash and embers.
Yes, yes! keep hitting me! Having become stiff with pains,
    I want to get more and more of that from you. (XVII G&P)

Then came Poseidippos:

Ναί, ναί, βάλλετ᾽, Ἔρωτες· ἐγὼ σκοπὸς εἷς ἅμα πολλοῖς
    κεῖμαι. μὴ φείσησθ᾽, ἄφρονες· ἢν γὰρ ἐμέ
νικήσητ᾽, ὀνομαστοὶ ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἔσεσθε
    τοξόται ὡς μεγάλης δεσπόται ἰοδόκης.

Yes, yes! keep hitting, Erotes. Here I lie, one single target for so many of
    you
    shooting at once. Don't use your arrows sparingly, you fools!
For if you overpower me, you will be famous among the immortals,
    as archers, masters of an enormous quiver. (V G&P = 135 A&B))

Gutzwiller 1998, 167–168 points out that we have here an intertex-
tual link with a vengeance: Poseidippos starts his own epigram with
a *verbatim* quotation taken from line 5 of Asklepiades' poem, but the
identical words form for him the basis of an entirely different devel-
opment. Asklepiades[8] is a helpless victim—he urges the Erotes to con-
tinue their barrage ('more, more of it!') because he wants to get the
last and lethal shot, but Poseidippos is a reckless challenger: he pro-
vokes the Erotes to spend many, no, all their arrows on him. They
will be utter fools[9] if they use their arrows sparingly, for a few of them
will not really hurt the poet. The poet admits that he has been in love

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[8] If I say 'Asklepiades', this is of course shorthand for 'the narrator', 'the lyrical
ego', the *persona* created by the poet (possibly not too remote from the poet's own
experience/character/personality).

[9] In his comm. Gow observes that ἄφρονες here in Poseidippos V means 'foolish',
while in the context of Asklepiades XV—where the same word is used to qualify the
Erotes—it has another shade of meaning: 'heedless'. The Erotes, who do not care a bit
if Asklepiades succumbs, will just carry on playing knucklebones. One is reminded of
Shakespeare's lines: 'As flies to wanton boys are we to the gods; they kill us for their
sport' (spoken by Gloucester in *King Lear* Act 4).

more than once: surely that is what the many arrows symbolize. 'But because of his capacity for sober reason, he is the Erotes' most difficult target, and so, if conquered, their greatest triumph' (Gutzwiller 1998, 168).

Poseidippos, a poet with a significant capacity for sober reason? Yes, that is certainly the pose he assumes. In another programmatic poem, I G&P (= 123 A&B),[10] where he announces that he will forget for a while the teachings of Zeno and Kleanthes in order to participate joyfully in the pleasures of wine and bittersweet love, he admits that he *has* been taught and *has* been initiated into the teachings of Stoicism. In VI G&P (= 137 A&B), Poseidippos informs his readers that academic wisdom has made him resistent to love: although his soul is being tortured by Love (in this case called Πόθος), ἡ δὲ πρὶν ἐν βύβλοις πεπονημένη ἄλλα θερίζει / ψυχὴ ἀνιηρῶι δαίμονι μεμφομένη, 'my soul, having been previously trained[11] in books, gathers from there another harvest[12] and disapproves of the troublesome god'. In VII G&P (=138 A&B) he repeats this message: εὐοπλῶ καὶ πρός σε μαχήσομαι … σὺ δ' Ἔρως μηκέτι μοι πρόσαγε … ἄχρι δὲ νήφω, τὸν παραταξάμενον πρὸς σὲ λογισμὸν ἔχω. 'I am well-armed and shall keep up my fight … so you, Eros, had better stop attacking me. As long as I stay sober, I have Reason drawn up in battle against you'.

Poseidippos' rational disapproval of Eros stands in the strongest possible contrast to what Asklepiades had said:

> Ἡδὺ θέρους διψῶντι χιὼν ποτόν, ἡδὺ δὲ ναύταις
>   ἐκ χειμῶνος ἰδεῖν εἰαρινὸν Στέφανον·
> ἥδιον δ᾽ ὁπόταν κρύψηι μία τοὺς φιλέοντας
>   χλαῖνα καὶ αἰνῆται Κύπρις ὑπ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων.

> Sweet for the thirsty is a snow-cooled drink, sweet for sailors
>   coming from a storm is it to see spring's Garland.

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[10] Gutzwiller 1998, 157–158 takes it to have been the opening of Poseidippos' first poetry book, essentially a collection of sympotic-erotic verse in imitation of Asklepiades' poetry book (see note 8). The almost encyclopedic collection preserved in the Milan papyrus may have been Poseidippos' third and last poetry book, 'sealed off' by the long piece now easily found as # 118 in the *editio minor*. See K. Gutzwiller 2005, 317–319, and Bremer 2005 (forthcoming).

[11] 'Well-trained' is what πεπονημένη means, cp. Aristotle *EN* 1102a8, *Pol.* 1335b8, also Eur. *I.A.* 209.

[12] The MS reading is αλλαθεριζει. G&P follow Brunck and print ἄλλ᾽ ἀθερίζει 'makes light of other things'. I agree with Gutzwiller (1998, 160, n. 91) that in the context ἄλλα θερίζει makes better sense.

> Sweeter still is it whenever one cloak hides two lovers
>   and both praise Cypris for her gifts. (I G&P)[13]

Gutzwiller 1998, 169 does not overstate her case when she concludes that in I, VI, and VII G&P (= 123, 137, and 138 A&B) Poseidippos takes a Stoic stance in opposition to the unrestricted Epicurean statement contained in Asklepiades' I G&P. Her claim is confirmed if we take a look at another couple of Asklepiadean erotic epigrams and compare Asklepiades' attitude to Poseidippos'. In IV G&P Asklepiades presents himself as the lover of a hetaira who after having welcomed and seduced him, informs him delicately but *sans gêne* about her promiscuity:

> Ἑρμιόνηι πιθανῆι ποτ' ἐγὼ συνέπαιζον ἐχούσηι
>   ζώνιον ἐξ ἀνθέων ποικίλον, ὦ Παφίη,
> χρύσεα γράμματ' ἔχον· διόλου δ' ἐγέγραπτο· 'φίλει με,
>   καὶ μὴ λυπηθῆις ἤν τις ἔχηι μ' ἕτερος'.

> Once upon a time when I was playing with persuasive Hermione,
>   I saw she had a multicoloured sash, o Paphian goddess,
> carrying in golden letters a message written from left to right:
>   'Love me now and do not worry when another has me'. (IV G&P)

The poor man thought he was playing with Hermione (ἐγὼ συνέπαιζον), but now he sees it is in fact the other way round.[14] In the act of undressing Hermione presents her message, πιθανὴ indeed! The very silence of the lover—the poet does not record his reaction—is eloquent (*dum tacet clamat*); he is wounded. In another epigram Asklepiades' reaction is explicit:

> Ἡ λαμυρή μ' ἔτρωσε Φιλαίνιον, εἰ δὲ τὸ τραῦμα
>   μὴ σαφές, ἀλλ' ὁ πόνος δύεται εἰς ὄνυχα.
> οἴχομ', Ἔρωτες, ὄλωλα, διοίχομαι, εἰς γὰρ ἔχιδναν
>   νυστάζων ἐπέβην τήνδ', ἔθιγόν τ' Ἀίδα.[15]

> Wanton Philainion has wounded me, and even if the wound
>   is not there for everyone to see, the pain reaches to my nails.
> I am done for, Erotes, I have perished, I am utterly done for. On this snake
>   I have stepped unawares, and what I touched is: Death. (VIII G&P)

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[13] Gutzwiller 1998, 128–129 takes this epigram as the opening poem of Asklepiades' poetry book.

[14] I took this elegant figure of speech from Ihm 2004, 103. This slight monograph definitely does not contain what the title promises.

[15] Paton (Loeb) reads this pentameter thus: νυστάζων ἐπέβην οἶδ', ἔθιγόν τ' Ἀίδα. 'I stepped unawares. But now I know, and I have touched Death'.

These poems find a strong contrast in Poseidippos. A hetaira Philainis (almost the same name as in Askl. viii) tries to convince her lover by shedding tears and telling him how fond she is of him, but the poet shows himself adamant; he is not at all convinced by these tears, however πιϑανοῖς:

> Μή με δόκει πιϑανοῖς ἀπατᾶν δακρύοισι, Φιλαινί·
>   οἶδα· φιλεῖς γὰρ ὅλως οὐδένα μεῖζον ἐμοῦ—
> τοῦτον ὅσον παρ' ἐμοὶ κέκλισαι χρόνον· εἰ δ' ἕτερός σε
>   εἶχε, φιλεῖν ἂν ἔφης μεῖζον ἐκεῖνον ἐμοῦ.

> Don't think, Philainis, that with convincing tears you deceive me!
>   o yes, I know: you love no man, but no man more than me—
> as long as you are lying beside me. But if another man
>   were holding you, you would say you loved *him* more than me. (II
>   G&P = 125 A&B)

The man speaking in this epigram, when confronted with Philainis' tears, does not want to be emotionally entangled. He pushes the words spoken by the girl (perhaps only implied in her tears) aside as a clever trick of persuasion,[16] and preserves his independence.

In 127 (A&B)[17] Poseidippos gives the same name Philainis to a girl who competes with another girl in 'riding horses', i.e. sitting on top of a man while coupling with him; Gow (*Hell.Epigr.*II, pp. 4, 141) notes that Philainis is the name of the reputed authoress of a treatise on how to enjoy sex: περὶ ἀφροδισίων ἀκόλαστον σύγγραμμα. She evidently was a professional in this trade. And again: this epigram seems to have been made after the model of a similarly pornographic epigram by Asklepiades, viz. VI G&P; the lady-rider of that poem bears the name Lysidike. In both cases the ladies in question will have been professional *hetairai.*[18]

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[16] To my surprise Fraser 1972, I 569 takes both here and in Askl. IV the adjective πιϑανός to mean 'docile'. In my view both ladies are characterized as *persuasive*: they want to get a message across to their respective lovers. Asklepiades' Hermione has two messages: she first uses her persuasive loveliness to seduce him so that he starts 'playing with her'; only then she shows her girdle, and he is thunderstruck, at a loss. Poseidippos keeps his head sober, right from the start.

[17] In G&P vol. I, this poem is printed as Asklepiades XXXV, but in vol. II *ad locum* Gow observes that it is 'somehow more probable that this is a piece by Posidippus'. I agree.

[18] Gutzwiller 1998, 128ff. analyzes Asklepiades' position in matters of love and sexuality. This is the nucleus of what (in the wake of Cameron) she argues: Asklepiades is disappointed in his love-affairs not because his mistresses are venal prostitutes but because in Asklepiades' day women had become free to choose their own sexual partners.

By now it will have become clear that in his epigrams Asklepiades takes the stance (whether it is his authentic experience or a poetical construct we shall never know) of a man for whom the pleasures of love are the summit of human happiness; as he is a highly excitable and yet also vulnerable lover, his erotic experiences lead him to utter despondency and a wish to be dead; this last mood is prevalent in the impressive epigram XVII G&P. Poseidippos plays a subtle game: he quotes characteristic phrases from Asklepiades such as ναί, ναί, βάλλετ' Ἔρωτες—ἤν τις ἔχηι μ' ἕτερος—πιθανή, πιθανοῖς, but then he takes quite another stance, less romantic and perhaps less sympathetic. Without flatly refusing to allow erotic experiences to enter his life, he is careful not to be entangled, not to become deeply attached.

There are several more instances where Poseidippos tries to follow and emulate the elder poet by varying and reacting to his poetry. The effect of these imitations is less dramatic than the previous pairs, but even so they teach us something about the relation between the two epigrammatists.

In Asklepiades XLIII G&P[19] and Poseidippos XVIII G&P (= 65 A&B) the poets describe a statue of Alexander the Great made by Lysippos. Apart from the phrase Ἀλεξάνδρου μορφά, used by both poets, there are no other verbal similarities in the two epigrams. Asklepiades' *frappe* in lines 3–4 is by far the most striking: αὐδάσοντι δ' ἔοικεν ὁ χάλκεος ἐς Δία λεύσσων· / γᾶν ὑπ' ἐμοὶ τίθεμαι, Ζεῦ, σὺ δ' Ὄλυμπον ἔχε. 'His eyes lifted to Zeus, he (Alexander) looks like one on the point of saying: "I am engaged in subjecting the Earth to my sway. Zeus, you may keep Olympus!"' But Poseidippos' point is also well-taken: οὔ τι γε μεμπτοὶ Πέρσαι· συγγνώμα βουσὶ λέοντα φυγεῖν ('The Persians are in no way to be blamed: one forgives cattle if they fly before a lion').

In another pair of epigrams (Asklepiades XIII and Poseidippos IV= 130 A&B) both poets describe the attempt of a young man late at night to get into the house of a girl he is in love with; in each case her name is Pythias. In yet another case (Asklepiades XXI and Poseidippos 136 A&B[20]) both poets describe an attractive boy by comparing him to

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[19] In the *Planudea* this poem is registered as Ἀρχελάου οἱ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδου. Gow (vol. II pp. 146–147) acknowledges that Archelaos is a very unlikely candidate (of him we know some epigrams about snakes, scorpions, wasps) but is very sceptical about the attribution to Asklepiades, mainly on aesthetic grounds: 'we should be loth to believe this commonplace rhetorical quatrain his'. Rhetorical yes, commonplace no. One might as well say that it is a brilliant piece.

[20] In both *Anth.Pal.* and *Planudea* this epigram εἰ καθύπερθε λάβοις κτλ. is attributed

Eros: 'if one would add wings and bow-and-arrows, one would say: "he is Cypris' son himself!"' Asklepiades conveys this conceit in just one distichon, while Poseidippos is more verbose: 'even Cypris herself would not be able to distinguish between her son and this boy'.

In a fourth pair of epigrams both poets introduce as speaker a victim of shipwreck who has been buried close to the beach. In Poseidippos XV G&P (= 132 A&B) the dead person says he is scared by the closeness of the roaring waves which have drowned him, and thanks his mates who have buried him. Asklepiades XXX G&P is the more dramatic of the two: the speaker challenges the sea: 'rough sea, as far as I am concerned you may roar loudly to tell the world how enormous your power is, but even if you get hold of my grave, you will find nothing precious there: just bones and ash'.

In a fifth pair of epigrams the speaker orders his slave to go and buy supplies for a party; one is reminded of scenes in New Comedy where a master gives orders to his cook, or to his slave. The two pieces, Asklepiades XXVI G&P and Poseidippos X G&P (= 124 A&B) are very similar. But Asklepiades had composed another epigram in this genre, XXV G&P, which is a piece of the (for A.) unusual length of twelve lines, 'a thumb-nail mime', as Gow calls it. Here the host begins by ordering his slave to get nuts and garlands for his guests, then quarrels with him about the money needed, and ends by sending him to a μυρόπωλις (dealer in scented oils), who is supposed to come forward with *five* measures of perfume; in case she makes difficulties about these five measures, the slave is ordered to tell her (εἰπὲ δὲ σημεῖον[21]): 'my master has made love to you *five* times in succession; your bed can testify to this accomplishment!' Compared to this lively scene Poseidippos X G&P falls rather flat.

So far I have dealt with the epigrams of the two poets as if no important new body of poetry composed by Poseidippos[22] had been

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to Ἀσκληπιάδου ἢ Ποσειδίππου. In vol I G&P it has been printed as Asklepiades XXXVIII, but in his comment Gow notes (vol. II, p. 142): 'Reitzenstein and Sternbach ascribed it to Posidippus, and he seems the probable author'.

[21] In the Pythias epigram (IV G&P = 130 A&B) referred to above, Poseidippos uses the same phrase εἰπὲ δὲ σημεῖον. There, too, a master gives instructions to a slave how to deal with a girl.

[22] I cannot agree with Schröder 2004, who, after a critical examination of the epigrams on the Milan papyrus, rejects Posidippean authorship of all or most. It would be absurd for me to evaluate here within the compass of a footnote what Schröder says in more than 40 pages, especially because his judgement in most cases is essentially a value-judgement ('Werturteil'). Here only two observations: 1. Schröder neglects the

found. Continuing with this assumption for a moment, I want to assess which new insights have been won, compared with what Fraser had written concerning the influence of Asklepiades on Poseidippos. Out of respect for Fraser, I start with two quotations from his work. First: 'Asclepiades is a figure of great significance in the history of the epigram, since it is in his hands that it liberates itself from its traditional bondage to epigraphical convention, and becomes the vehicle of personal feelings and of portrayals of the most varied and passing experiences.' (p. 560); the other quotation: 'In subject-matter and treatment Posidippus appears as a more vigorous and resourceful poet than Asclepiades, but he unmistakably lacks the wit and delicacy of the latter in erotic themes.' (p. 371).

Hutchinson 1988, 264–276, who discusses only Asklepiades, not Poseidippos, makes the following observations: Asklepiades handles the limits of his chosen form with the greatest dexterity; he presents extremes of emotion and dilutes the seriousness of their impact with admixtures of absurdity (e.g. the rain of tears in xii). There is humour in the gap between the vehemence of the speaker and the detachment of the writer. And above all, there is always his marvellous brevity, a quality he shares with Kallimachos.

Gutzwiller's important contribution is her hypothesis, backed up by many arguments, that Asklepiades (perhaps following the example set by the female epigrammatists Anyte and Nossis) composed from his sympotic-erotic epigrams a poetry book, and that Poseidippos made another from his, organizing it as a complement to the earlier book by Asklepiades. 'While Asclepiades' collection shows a man who hopes for Epicurean contentment coming—painfully—to terms with the reality of his relentless desires, Posidippus' collection shows how a man whose soul is tempered by Stoic rationality manages erotic experience through objective resistance to emotional torment' (p. 169).

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fact that the themes and the very phrases used in the 'Milanese' epigrams 43 and 60 + 61 (A&B) find a striking echo in lines 24–28 of what is universally agreed to be Poseidippos' poetic 'testament', 118 (A&B). The virtual identity between the religious language used in these grave-epigrams on one hand and in Poseidippos' own testament on the other (certainly if seen against the background of evidence about 'mysteries in Pella' presented by Dickie in *ZPE* 109 (1995) 81–86) is in my eyes almost as decisive as the fact that two poems on the Milan papyrus were already known as Posidippean, viz. 15 (A&B) from Tzetzes and 65 (A&B) from the *Anth.Plan.* 2. In his paper 'Posidippus Old and New' (=pp. 29–42 in B. Acosta-Hughes *et al.*, 2004), D. Sider gives a satisfactory explanation of the (indeed striking) difference between the old Poseidippos (Gow&Page *HE* 3054–3180) and the new one.

My own reading of these poems, for what it is worth, agrees very well with what Hutchinson and Gutzwiller have observed. It will certainly have become clear from the preceding pages that Poseidippos picks up many themes and even phrases from Asklepiades. Given the small number of epigrams by Poseidippos preserved in the *Ant. Pal.* and *Plan.*—only 16—it is astonishing that Poseidippos in no less than 8 of them follows a track opened by Asklepiades.[23] Only one conclusion is possible: he *must* have admired the poems of his elder colleague— perhaps they became friends. I like to toy with the idea that around 275 BC they travelled together to that ceremony in Delphi where they were to receive the honour of proxeny. One is reminded of that other pair of famous poets, Simonides and Bakkhylides, uncle and nephew, who may have travelled together in similar fashion to Panhellenic Festivals in the years around and after 500 B.C.

In the light of what we have seen so far, nobody will venture to say that Austin's supplement in the first line of Poseidippos' epigram in *P.Tebt.* I 3 is far-fetched. Asklepiades is certainly better qualified than anyone else alive at that time to fill the lacuna and to receive from Poseidippos this double qualification: 'he is like a brother to me' and 'he deserves to be honoured as one of the experts in producing things of beauty'.

By way of epilogue I can perhaps say something on the question of whether the material contained in the 'New Poseidippos' sheds new light on the relation between Asklepiades and Poseidippos. This answer is: not much. That is not at all astonishing if one takes into consideration that Poseidippos—who in his youth had followed Asklepiades so closely in his innovation of leading the epigrammatic genre, hitherto confined to grave-inscriptions and dedications, into the rich fields of sympotic and erotic experiences—became in later years himself an innovator in composing epigrams on such new themes as precious or intriguing stones, bird-prophecies, sculptors, equestrian victories, healings.[24] Once Poseidippos had daringly entered these fields there was no one, not even his dear friend Asklepiades, he could follow.

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[23] I list these eight instances in the order in which they have been discussed by me so far: 1. Poseidippos 135 ⟨ Asklepiades XVII; 2. Pos. 125 ⟨ Askl. IV+VIII; 3. Pos. 127 ⟨ Askl. VI; 4. Pos. 65 ⟨ Askl. XLIII; 5. Pos. 130 ⟨ Askl. XIII; 6. Pos. 136 ⟨ Askl. XXI; 7. Pos. 132 ⟨ Askl. XXX; 8. Pos. 124 ⟨ Askl. XXV+XXVI. N.B. Pos. ⟨ Askl. means: Poseidippos influenced by Asklepiades.

[24] In Acosta-Hughes et al. 2004, several contributors stress Poseidippos' originality. R. Hunter observes that Poseidippos, while producing innovative epigrams about bird

I have just said that the 'New Poseidippos' does not contribute much to our inquiry. But it does contribute something, although it is an isolated case. On the new papyrus there is one poem which contains two Asklepiadean reminiscences. It is # 63, one of the *Andriantopoiika* which describes a statue of Philitas of Kos, made by Hekataios. Lines 5–6 of that poem run as follows: τὸν ἀκρομέριμνον ὅληι **κατεμάξατο** τέχνηι / πρέσβυν κτλ. 'with all his skill he has modelled the old perfectionist etc'. Poseidippos took κατεμάξατο from Asklepiades' xliii (already referred to above), the epigram on a statue of Alexander by Lysippos: Τόλμαν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ ὅλαν **ἀπεμάξατο** μορφὰν Λύσιππος. And in line 7 of his epigram Poseidippos repeats *verbatim* what Asklepiades had said about Alexander's statue αὐδάσοντι δ' ἔοικεν 'he looks like one on the point of saying'. Of all hundred-odd epigrams we can read on the Milan papyrus, this description of old Philitas is the only one for which Poseidippos could follow Asklepiades.

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omens, shipwrecks, victories in chariot races and stones, reminds his well-read readers that 'all things flow from the Homeric source' (p. 104).—Smith proves that Posidippos managed to digest scientific information about stones in his *lithika*. - Baumbach, at the end of a comprehensive discussion of the *Oionoskopika* qualifies this section of epigrams as a 'fascinating innovation' (p. 159).—As for the *Andriantopoiika*, Posidippos was certainly not the first Greek poet to describe in poetry products of plastic art (e.g. Homer's *Shield*, Hesiod's ditto, Aeschylus' description of the shields in his *Seven*, the chorus of maidens in Euripides' *Ion* who describe the sculptured reliefs on Apollo's temple in Delphi), but he is certainly the first to present in epigrams a discussion of styles in sculpture as if he were an art historian. And his *hippika*—although preceded by the numerous poetical stone-inscriptions which record victories, (see Ebert 1972)—are a *novum* in so far as they represent a systematic attempt to underpin the Ptolemaic construction of the legitimacy of their rule over their empire.

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DEMOS AND LEADERS IN PLUTARCH'S *SOLON*

Lukas de Blois

In this paper, which is dedicated to Ton Kessels in honour of his retirement, I would like to analyse the way in which Plutarch speaks about leadership and crowd in his *Solon*. The crowd, in this case, is the Athenian *demos* of the sixth century B.C. In a recently published article, Suzanne Saïd gives a revealing survey of the terms and expressions that Plutarch uses to describe crowds and notables in all of his works:

> In Plutarch's *Lives* the 'people' is described with objective or pejorative terms. *Polloi* and *plèthos* put emphasis on number. *Demos* in itself is neutral …. *Ochlos*, the 'mob' or the 'rabble', is clearly pejorative. This rather limited vocabulary strikingly contrasts with the wealth of words that designate the 'notables' … by their wealth (*euporoi, plousioi, eudaimones*), their birth (*eugeneis*), their culture (*charientes*), but also by their rank (*prôtoi*), their power (*kratistoi, dunatoi, dunatôtatoi*), their reputation (*gnôrimoi, endoxoi, dokimôtatoi, axiologoi*), and more generally, their excellence (*chrèstoi, kaloi kai agathoi, aristoi*).[1]

This can only mean that Plutarch felt much more at home with the notables than with the crowds. Saïd observes that as a social class a Plutarchean *demos* includes the 'humble', *i.e.* thetes, wage-earners, sailors, workers, and unskilled workers, who are characterized by poverty and a lack of resources, property and consideration. They are destitute, have no house, hearth or place to stay, and are more often than not characterized in a very negative way. As opposed to members of the elite, the masses are said to be lazy, ignorant, and uneducated or—worse—prone to over-confidence, insolence and violence. They are associated with disorder, uproar, meddling, and sedition. In his *Praecepta gerendae reipublicae* Plutarch harshly criticizes the arrogance and violence of the people (*Praec. ger. reip.* 801E).

In Plutarch's works *demoi* are invariably interacting with leaders. In Plutarch's *Praecepta rei publicae gerendae* a good leader is someone who makes his entry into public life out of the right philosophical choice (*prohairesis, Praec. ger. reip.* 798C) and with a good education in order to

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[1] Saïd 2005, 9.

serve the public interest, and not by accident or out of ambition and a desire for profit (*Praec. ger. reip.* 798C–799A). He starts his career in a calm, sound manner and does not abruptly attract attention with a spectacular deed (*Praec. ger. reip.* 804C–806E). He is a virtuous person, also in his private life, and has put his house in order (*Praec. ger. reip.* 800C–801B), so that he serves as an example to other people and inspires confidence by his way of life. A good leader knows how to sensibly delegate tasks, he treats his colleagues with respect and grants his friends opportunities and advantages without being corrupt (*Praec. ger. reip.* 806F–809B; 816A–817C; 819B–D; 823A–E); he is on his guard against extravagant honours, but draws strength from the *eros* that his *aretè* inspires in the people. He cultivates *homonoia* in the community (*Praec. ger. reip.* 823F–825F). In Plutarch's political treatises a leader who wants to guide a *demos* should be a dignified speaker and not a demagogue who stirs up the masses (*Praec. ger. reip.* 801C–804C; 819EF). He should grant the people some amusement without spoiling it with common games and distributions as demagogues and mob flatterers do (*An seni* 788C; 794C; 796EF; *Praec. ger. reip.* 819F–822A); he always has to persuade and calm down fickle mobs, the *demos* of Athens being one of the most dangerous ones. Plutarch knew very well that a leader needed more than philosophy, virtue and good behaviour to rule with success. He should be able to prepare his people, softening and changing its mood before introducing political reforms, persuade his people to the right course of action, and devise tricks and apply force, when needed.

Not only in Plutarch's political treatises, but also in his biographies the interaction between *demos* and leaders was a main topic. In a convincing article on Plutarch's views of Roman politics and statesmen, Christopher Pelling shows that this is the case in Plutarch's Roman *Lives*.[2] In a recently published paper Luisa Prandi comes to the conclusion that Plutarch's Greek *Lives* can be divided into two categories: biographies in which the *politikos* decides almost alone in all circumstances, such as the *Theseus, Alcibiades* and *Lysander,* and *bioi* in which an individual leader has to persuade or overwhelm the masses in order to realize his projects, such as the *Lives* of most Athenian leaders, Timoleon and Aratus. According to Prandi, the second category is characterized by a recurring pattern: the leader can decide only if he is able to persuade the mob, the best example being the *Life of Dion*, where

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[2] Pelling 1986, 159–187 = Pelling 2002, 207–236. See also De Blois 1992, 4568–615.

one quarter of the text is devoted to the *agon* between Dion and the Syracusans.[3]

Plutarch's paradigm of a good leader and statesman was not Plato or his pupil Dion of Syracuse, or another philosophically minded politician, but the legendary Spartan reformer Lycurgus, who had done all this. In his *Life of Lycurgus* 31.1 f., Plutarch says:

> It was not the chief design of Lycurgus then to leave his city in command over a great many others, but he thought that the happiness of an entire city, like that of a single individual, depended on the prevalence of virtue and concord within its own borders. The aim, therefore, of all his arrangements and adjustments was to make his people free-minded, self-sufficing, and moderate in all their ways, and to keep them so as long as possible. His design for a civil polity was adopted by Plato, Diogenes, Zeno and by all those who have won approval for their treatises on this subject, although they left behind them only writings and words. Lycurgus, on the other hand, produced not writings and words, but an actual polity, which was beyond imitation, and because he gave … an example of an entire city given to the love of wisdom, his fame rightly transcended that of all who ever founded polities among the Greeks.[4]

The Athenian demos in Plutarch's Solon[5]

In almost all biographies of Athenian statesmen the *demos* is a main actor and the interaction between leaders and people is a crucial theme. The *demos* follows Themistocles, to the detriment of Aristides, a much wiser and better man, according to Plutarch (*Arist.* 2.1). The

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[3] Prandi 2005, 141–156. See also, in the same volume, Van Raalte 2005, 75–112, esp. 103–110. Cf. Pelling 2002, 341–344.

[4] Plut. *Lyc.* 31.1–2: Οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γε τῷ Λυκούργῳ κεφάλαιον ἦν τότε, πλείστων ἡγουμένην ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν· ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὑτήν, πρὸς τοῦτο συνέταξε καὶ συνήρμοσεν, ὅπως ἐλευθέριοι καὶ αὐτάρκεις γενόμενοι καὶ σωφρονοῦντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον διατελῶσι. ταύτην καὶ Πλάτων ἔλαβε τῆς πολιτείας ὑπόθεσιν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ πάντες ὅσοι τι περὶ τούτων ἐπιχειρήσαντες εἰπεῖν ἐπαινοῦνται, γράμματα καὶ λόγους ἀπολιπόντες μόνον. ὁ δὲ οὐ γράμματα καὶ λόγους, ἀλλ᾽ ἔργῳ πολιτείαν ἀμίμητον εἰς φῶς προενεγκάμενος, καὶ τοῖς ἀνύπαρκτον εἶναι τὴν λεγομένην περὶ τὸν σοφὸν διάθεσιν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἐπιδείξας ὅλην τὴν πόλιν φιλοσοφοῦσαν, εἰκότως ὑπερῆρε τῇ δόξῃ τοὺς πώποτε πολιτευσαμένους ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησι. Passages and translations into English of paragraphs from Plutarch's *Lycurgus* and *Solon* were borrowed from B. Perrin (ed.), *Plutarch's Lives*, vol. I, Loeb (London/ Cambridge MA 1982). Passages and translations into English from Plutarch's *Moralia* were borrowed from H. North Fowler (ed.), *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. X, Loeb (London/ Cambridge MA 1960).

[5] On Plut. *Sol.* see De Blois 2006 (forthcoming).

Athenian crowd scares Pericles, although he was—like Demosthenes—
one of the very few leaders who knew how to guide the *demos*. The
Athenian *ekklesia* loves and applauds Alcibiades, in spite of all his irre-
sponsible behaviour, but sends him into exile with equal frivolity.[6]

In Plutarch's *Solon* the *demos* is an unruly and divided crowd, but also
an important actor within the Athenian political arena. In chapter 12,
Plutarch speaks about the civil strife that arose from the Cylonian affair.
After having plotted against their own *polis* government, Cylon and his
fellow-conspirators had taken sanctuary in the temple of Athena, but
the Alcmeonid Megacles, who was one of the *archontes*, persuaded them
to come out, and in the end executed them on some religious pre-
text. So Megacles and his comrades became religiously polluted, and
Athens by extension. Solon, being in high repute because of some mil-
itary and other successes, with some noblemen's help persuaded the
allegedly polluted men to submit to a trial and accept the verdict. To
get rid of pollutions and defilements the Athenians invited a wise man
from Crete, Epimenides, who was reputed to be a man beloved of the
gods and endowed with a mystical and heaven-sent wisdom in religious
matters. After having arrived, he became Solon's friend, cleansed the
city and made the Athenians more decorous and careful in their reli-
gious services and more easily inclined to unanimity. Epimenides was
vastly admired by the Athenians, who offered him much money and
large honours, but he only accepted some modest gifts and returned
home, after which the Athenians relapsed into their old disputes about
the form of government, the city being divided into as many parties
as there were diversities in its territory (Plutarch, *Solon* 12.1–13.1). So
Epimenides had not been successful in changing the mood and mind
of the Athenians and in turning them away from a wrong materialis-
tic orientation, as Lycurgus had successfully done in Sparta (Plut. *Lyc.*
4–8).[7] After a period of fierce civil strife between aristocratic factions
and between rich and poor the Athenians asked Solon to put an end to
the prevailing dissensions. They cast their eyes upon him, because they
saw that he was the one man least implicated in the errors of the time
and that he was neither associated with the rich in their injustice, nor
involved in the necessities of the poor. According to traditional chronol-
ogy, this must have happened in the beginning of the sixth century
B.C. It is clear that in this Plutarchean story the Athenians—in invit-

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[6] See Pelling 2002, 125–134.
[7] See De Blois 2005B, 145–154.

ing Epimenides and choosing Solon—act on their own initiative and
that they are not easily changed in their quarrelsome and materialistic
orientation, not even by one of the wisest men of the time. This rep-
resentation of the Athenian crowd fits in well with the over-all pattern
detected by Saïd above.

   In *Solon*, chapter 15, the mental orientation of the Athenian *demos*
is at stake again. Plutarch tells us that Solon, being an arbitrator, did
not apply any remedy when conditions were not all right and that he
enacted laws, which were the best possible, given the mentality of his
fellow-citizens. He gave the Athenians the best laws they would receive
(15.2), and adapted his laws to the situation, not the other way round
(22.3). In the period during which Solon enacted his disburdenment
(*seisachtheia*) he came into trouble because of some friends, who quickly
borrowed large sums from the wealthy and bought up great estates, to
enjoy the use of their new properties, refusing to pay the money due
their creditors after the *seisachtheia* had been put into effect (15.6). In
chapter 16, Plutarch observes that Solon's *seisachtheia* pleased neither the
rich nor the poor, because the latter did not receive a redistribution of
the land and the rich lost their securities for debts. Later on, however,
the *demos* discovered how well Solon had done and gave him a new task,
appointing him to reform the constitution. Here we see the fickleness
of a crowd, which cannot be mastered by a good leader. Solon gets into
trouble because of selfish friends who clearly have the worst mental
orientation possible. At the end of his life, Plutarch tells us, Solon had
to witness the rise of tyranny in a period of renewed *stasis* (*Sol.* 29–30).
The Athenian citizenry had not changed its mental attitude and was
shown to have an incurably wrong orientation towards material gain
and wealth, and to be prone to tyranny. Solon was too astute to become
tyrant himself, but he could not stop the rise of Peisistratus to sole rule.

Plutarch's explanation of Solon's partial failure

What may have been, according to Plutarch, the reason why Solon
was not able to dominate and guide the *demos* and could not turn his
fellow-citizens to better thoughts? In *Solon* 16.1–2, the author gives us an
explanation, which comes as a surprise. He says:

> He (= Solon) pleased neither party, however; the rich were vexed because
> he took away their securities for debt, and the poor still more, because
> he did not redistribute the land, as they had expected, nor make all men

equal and alike in their way of living, as Lycurgus did. But Lycurgus was eleventh in descent from Heracles, and had been king in Lacedaemon for many years. He therefore had great authority, many friends, and power to support his reforms in the commonwealth. He also employed force rather than persuasion, insomuch that he actually lost his eye thereby, and most effectually guaranteed the safety and unanimity of the city by making all its citizens neither poor nor rich. Solon, on the contrary, could not secure this feature in his commonwealth, since he was a man of the people and of modest station; yet he in no wise acted short of his real power, relying as he did only on the wishes of the citizens and their confidence in him. Nevertheless he gave offence to the greater part of them, who expected different results, as he himself says of them in the lines: 'Then they had extravagant thoughts of me, but now, incensed, / all look askance at me, as if I were their foe'. And yet had any other man, he says, acquired the same power, 'He had not held the people down, nor made an end/ until he had confounded all, and skimmed the cream'.[8]

So a lack of high status, a too small number of reliable friends, and a lack of Lycurgan *dynamis* and readiness to apply violence hampered Solon in his reforms and prevented him from dominating the *demos*, not a wrong philosophical *prohairesis* or failing wisdom. This is a very un-Platonic thought in a biography written by an otherwise rather Platonizing author. In his *Laws* and *Seventh Epistle* Plato opposes violence and civil strife and recommends among other things reconciliation and non-violence as a prerequisite condition for good reforms of the state.[9]

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[8] Plut. *Sol.* 16.1–2: Ἤρεσε δ᾽ οὐδετέροις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐλύπησε καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἀνελὼν τὰ συμβόλαια, καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς πένητας, ὅτι γῆς ἀναδασμὸν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἐλπίσασιν αὐτοῖς, οὐδὲ παντάπασιν, ὥσπερ ὁ Λυκοῦργος, ὁμαλοὺς τοῖς βίοις καὶ ἴσους κατέστησεν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἐνδέκατος ὢν ἀφ᾽ Ἡρακλέους καὶ βεβασιλευκὼς ἔτη πολλὰ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος, ἀξίωμα μέγα καὶ φίλους καὶ δύναμιν οἷς ἔγνω καλῶς περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ὑπηρετοῦσαν εἶχε, καὶ βίᾳ μᾶλλον ἢ πειθοῖ χρησάμενος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκοπῆναι, κατειργάσατο τὸ μέγιστον εἰς σωτηρίαν πόλεως καὶ ὁμόνοιαν, μηδένα πένητα μηδὲ πλούσιον εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν· Σόλων δὲ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐφίκετο τῇ πολιτείᾳ δημοτικὸς ὢν καὶ μέσος, ἐνδεέστερον δὲ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης δυνάμεως οὐδὲν ἔπραξεν, ὁρμώμενος ἐκ μόνου τοῦ βούλεσθαι καὶ πιστεύειν αὐτῷ τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δ᾽ οὖν προσέκρουσε τοῖς πλείστοις ἕτερα προσδοκήσασιν, αὐτὸς εἴρηκε περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς 'Χαῦνα μὲν τότ᾽ ἐφράσαντο, νῦν δέ μοι χολούμενοι λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρῶσι πάντες ὥστε δήϊον.' καίτοι φησὶν ὡς, εἴ τις ἄλλος ἔσχε τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, 'Οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον, οὐδ᾽ ἐπαύσατο, πρὶν ἀνταράξας, πῖαρ ἐξεῖλεν γάλα.' See Solon, fr. 34.4f. and 37.7f. *ap.* M.L. West, *Iambi et elegi graeci ante Alexandrum cantati* (Oxford 1998, 2nd ed.), 160 and 162.

[9] See *Epistle* 7, 325 B, 327 C, 330 E ff., 336 B, 350 C-E, 351 C; cf. Pl. *Leg.* 627 E f., 735 B ff., 829 A. See De Blois 1978, 128 f.; idem 1979, 278. On Plutarch's Platonism see Aalders & De Blois 1992, 3389–397; Hershbell 2004, 151–162.

With regard to the importance of status this passage is not completely exceptional, not a chance hit. In his *Nicias* Plutarch also seems to emphasize status. In *Nicias* 2.1 he says:

> Accordingly, I may say of Nicias, in the first place, what Aristotle wrote, namely that the three best citizens of Athens,—men of hereditary good will and friendship for the people,- were Nicias the son of Niceratus, Thucydides the son of Melesias, and Theramenes the son of Hagnon. However, this was true of the last in lesser degree than of the other two, because he has been flouted for inferior parentage as an alien from Ceos; and on account of his not being steadfast, but ever trying to court both sides in his political career, was nicknamed 'Cothurnus'.[10]

The statesmen who are, in this passage, rated best by Plutarch were all highly born aristocrats and so had no lack of status, but even they were not the most successful leaders of the Athenian *demos*. Nicias was afraid of the Athenian crowd and did not dare to confront it, but he was extremely rich and was able to buy its approval by acts of *euergesia* in a few cases when he needed it (Plut. *Nic.* 2.4–3.2). Thucydides, the son of Melesias, and Theramenes were no match to Pericles' or Alcibiades' demagogic powers.[11] Thus high status was not sufficient to dominate the Athenian mob. In Plutarch's view Pericles may have come nearest to a complete control of the Athenian crowd. In *Nicias* 3.1 Plutarch remarks that Pericles led Athens by virtue of his true excellence and powerful eloquence (ἀπό τε ἀρετῆς ἀληθινῆς καὶ λόγου δυνάμεως), and had no need to assume any persuasive mannerisms with the multitude.[12] Nonetheless in his *Pericles* Plutarch depicts this successful statesman as a leader who—in spite of all his preponderance, ascendancy and high status—sometimes was afraid of the Athenian *demos*.[13] In the opening years of the Peloponnesian War he even lost its support.[14]

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[10] Plut. *Nic.* 2.1: Ἔνεστιν οὖν περὶ Νικίου πρῶτον εἰπεῖν ὃ γέγραφεν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὅτι τρεῖς ἐγένοντο βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ πατρικὴν ἔχοντες εὔνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν πρὸς τὸν δῆμον, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ Θουκυδίδης ὁ Μελησίου καὶ Θηραμένης ὁ Ἅγνωνος, ἧττον δὲ οὗτος ἢ ἐκεῖνοι· καὶ γὰρ εἰς δυσγένειαν ὡς ξένος ἐκ Κέω λελοιδόρηται, καὶ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνιμον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπαμφοτερίζον ἀεὶ τῇ προαιρέσει τῆς πολιτείας ἐπεκλήθη Κόθορνος. Plutarch borrows this statement from *Ath. Pol.* 28.5. Passages and translations from Plutarch's *Nicias* were borrowed from B. Perrin (ed.), *Plutarch's Lives*, vol. III, Loeb (London/ Cambridge MA 1984).

[11] On Nicias, Thucydides the son of Melesias, and Theramenes see Ziegler *et al.* (eds.) 4, 1979, 103 f.; 5, 1979, 792 and 735 f.

[12] Cf. Van Raalte 2005, 103–112.

[13] See above all Plut., *Per.* 7.1; 33.5.

[14] Plut. *Per.* 31–36.

There is a parallel to this development from Roman late republican history, as Plutarch gives it in some of his Roman biographies. Christopher Pelling convincingly argues that Plutarch—in a number of his Roman *Lives* - describes Julius Caesar as the most adroit of all Roman popular leaders, but that even Caesar lost popular support in the end, tyrannical actions and bad behaviour of some of his friends being the main causes of his growing unpopularity.[15] Philosophically minded politicians, such as Lucullus, Cicero, Cato Minor and Brutus had, according to Plutarch, no chance at all to dominate the Roman mob.[16]

All this does fit in well with opinions that are brought forward in Plutarch's Athenian *Vitae*. In his view both the Athenian *demos* and the late republican Roman mob had an incurably wrong orientation toward material gain and violence, and counted among the most dangerous crowds. In *Phocion* 3.1 he criticizes the intransigent, philosophically based attitude of Cato Minor, who, in Plutarch's opinion, thought that he was living in Plato's state rather than among Romulus' scum. In his *Numa* Plutarch set forth that this king was the last Roman statesman who was able to turn the mood of the Roman citizens toward religion and agriculture instead of war and greed.[17] In *Comparatio Lycurgi et Numae* 4.6 Plutarch says:

> But that which was the end and aim of Numa's government, namely, the continuance of peace and friendship between Rome and other nations, straightway vanished from the earth with him. After his death the double doors of the temple (*i.e.* the temple of Janus) which he had continuously closed, as if he really had war caged and confined there, were thrown wide open, and Italy was filled with the blood of the slain.[18]

According to Plutarch, the mentality of the Athenian *demos* was wrong already in Solon's days. Rich and poor citizens alike were quarrelsome and striving after material gain and could not be changed by a wise man like Epimenides nor reconciled by Solon's *seisachtheia* (see above).

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[15] See Pelling 2002, 55, 63 n. 57, and 104.

[16] See De Blois 1992, 4600–4611.

[17] See De Blois & Bons 1992, 159–188. On virtue (and vice) in Plut. *Vit.* in general see Duff 1999.

[18] Plut. *Comp. Lyc. et Num.* 4.6: Νομᾷ δὲ ὅπερ ἦν τέλος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ φιλίᾳ τὴν Ῥώμην ὑπάρχειν, εὐθὺς συνεξέλιπε· καὶ μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν ἐκείνου τὸν ἀμφίθυρον οἶκον, ὃν κεκλεισμένον αὐτὸς συνεῖχεν, ὥσπερ ὄντως ἐν αὐτῷ τιθασεύων καθειργμένον τὸν πόλεμον, ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀναπετάσαντες αἵματος καὶ νεκρῶν τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐνέπλησαν· ….

In *Solon* 5, 13 and 15 Plutarch speaks about the wrong mental orienta-
tion of the Athenian *demos*, which continued after Epimenides' actions.
The Athenian crowd was never ready for a really good durable state
such as the Spartan *kosmos* that Lycurgus created.

Wise men like Numa and Lycurgus, and philosophically oriented
politicians such as Dion, Cato Minor and Brutus, could only be suc-
cessful, in Plutarch's view, if they could first change the minds of the
citizens for the better. If not, they ended in tragic failure, which actually
happened, among others, to those three politicians, Dion, Cato Minor
and Brutus.[19] Wrongly oriented crowds, in Plutarch's *vitae*, can only be
ruled by very adroit, strong-minded, opportunistic leaders who com-
bine a high inherited status with great authority, many reliable friends,
and power to support reforms, if necessary by means of violence, *i.e.*
men such as Lycurgus, Pericles, Timoleon,[20] and Julius Caesar. But
dangerous *demoi* like those of Athens and late republican Rome could
put even them at risk. In his Plutarchean *vita* Solon is not a leader of
this caliber. In this biography Solon counts as a wise man,[21] a char-
acter trait which is, as we have seen, not very effective over against
a willful, wrongly oriented crowd. Solon's origins and status were not
impeccable; in his youth he had been a merchant, and he had not
been rich (*Solon* 2–3). In *Solon* 2.1 Plutarch clearly feels embarrassed
about his hero's lack of wealth. Solon came to the fore and got popu-
lar attention by a spectacular military deed and not in a quiet sound
manner (*Sol.* 8–9). He did not confront and overcome the people, if
necessary by force, to get a general approval of his reforms, but went
abroad, to avoid irksome questions (*Sol.* 13–16; 25.4f.). Besides Solon
had quite a few unreliable friends, who profited by his *seisachtheia* in a
rather irregular manner (*Sol.* 15). So, unlike Lycurgus, Solon did not
found a durable good state. In this way Plutarch did not consider Solon
a first rate statesman, as Aristotle and Demosthenes had done in the
fourth century, and halfway returned to the image that Solon had had
during the fifth century B.C., for example in the works of Herodotus
and Thucydides: a wise man, but not a very important or effective
reformer.[22]

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[19] See De Blois 1997, 209–219, and idem 1992, 4600–611.
[20] On Timoleon see De Blois 1997, 219–223. Cf. Teodorsson 2005, 215–226.
[21] See Pelling 2004, 98.
[22] See Hdt. 1.29ff.; Thucydides does not mention Solon at all.

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'THE MOST SUPERSTITIOUS AND DISGUSTING OF ALL NATIONS' DIOGENES OF OENOANDA ON THE JEWS

PIETER W. VAN DER HORST

Sometime during Hadrian's reign, a wealthy inhabitant of the city of Oenoanda (in Lycia) called Diogenes had the huge wall of the Stoa (ca. 80x4 meter) on the Agora inscribed with a gigantic inscription. His intention was to instruct his fellow-citizens, probably shortly before his death, in Epicurus' philosophy in order to dispel their fear of death and of the gods. About a century and a half later this building was dismantled and many blocks of the inscription were re-used for the construction of a new fortification wall and other buildings. In 1884 the first fragments of this inscription were discovered in the city. The excavations have continued at that site since then, albeit very inter- mittently, for some 120 years, and time and again new fragments of this curious text were found. The by then complete and well-known Teubner edition of 1967 by C.W. Chilton included 88 fragments. But British investigations at Oenoanda from 1968 till 1983 more than dou- bled the number of known fragments, increasing it from 88 to no less than 212. (It should be added in parentheses, however, that the 88 frag- ments already known contain some 3550 words, whereas the 124 new fragments have only some 2350). These new fragments were discovered and published in a long series of articles by Martin F. Smith. He finally published a new edition of all the fragments, the fullest ever, in 1993.[1]

Ten years later, in 2003, Smith published a supplement because, due to his own industrious search for new fragments, he was able to present eleven more new pieces, including the largest piece found so far.[2] Most of these new fragments yield little new information, but N[ew] F[ragment] 126 is of importance. NF 126, the most substantial

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[1] Smith 1993 (see my review in *Mnem.* 48 (1995) 101–103). In this book one also finds the remarkable story of the gradual discovery of the text of this treatise on stone.

[2] Smith 2003. As a matter of fact Smith had already published most of this new material, which was discovered in 1997, in *Anatolian Studies*; see Smith 1998. The full commentary on these new fragments is to be found in the 1998 article, not in the book of 2003.

and best preserved of all the fragments, is engraved on a block of marble with a width of 165 cm. and it has 5 columns of text. It discusses matters of theology and religion such as that 'the Epicurean conception of the gods as living a life of complete self-sufficiency and tranquillity and not concerning themselves with our world is beneficial to human beings, whereas the conception of them as beings who created the world and human beings and interfere with our affairs, punishing the wicked and rewarding the righteous, is harmful'.[3] All of this is well-known, of course, but one of the more novel aspects of NF 126 is that Diogenes here attacks the Jews and Egyptians. He states the following:

> A clear indication of the inability of the gods to prevent wrongdoings is provided by the nations of the Jews and Egyptians, who, as well as being the most superstitious (*deisidaimonestatoi*) of all peoples, are also the most disgusting (*miarôtatoi*) of all peoples (NF 126 III 8-IV 1).

Some remarks are in order here.[4] Let me begin by saying something more about the immediate context of the statement within the document itself and then add some observations about the wider context in terms of Greek and Roman views of Judaism. NF 126 belongs to the section on Epicurean physics of which theology was a part.[5] Diogenes here argues that evil-doers apparently are not afraid of the gods, otherwise they would not commit their evil acts. Really righteous people, on the other hand, are not righteous out of fear of the gods but because they have the right set of ideas; it is their ethical convictions that keep them from doing evil. Even ordinary people are righteous, 'in so far as they are righteous' (II 7–8), on account of the laws and the penalties imposed by the laws; and even if some of them do keep away from evil on account of the gods, they form only a handful. 'Hardly two or three (of such) individuals are to be found among great segments of the masses, and not even these are steadfast in acting righteously, for they are not fully persuaded about Providence' (II 13–III 7). Then follow the lines about the Jews and Egyptians quoted above, and after that a *vacat* indicates the beginning of a new paragraph.

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[3] Smith 2003, 75.

[4] Smith 1998, 140–142, has some useful comments on these lines, but Diogenes' remarks deserve some closer investigation. For some additional comments see also Ameling 2004, 472–477, who reprints part of the new fragment, offers a German translation, and adds two pages of comments.

[5] See Rist 1972, 140–163; Long 1974, 41–49. A good selection of Epicurean texts on the gods is to be found in Long & Sedley 1987, 139–149.

First it has to be said that this remark about Jews and Egyptians has no parallels in Epicurean literature. In spite of the many critical remarks on traditional religious beliefs in the writings of Epicurus and his followers, we do not find such snide remarks on the Jews (or Egyptians[6]), as far as the fragmentary state of preservation of Epicurean literature permits us to see. As both Smith and Ameling remark, it cannot be ruled out that the great Jewish revolts of 115–117 CE in Egypt and the Cyrenaica and also the Bar Kochba war of 132–135 CE had a negative influence upon Diogenes' attitude towards the Jews.[7] That may be the case, but there is no way of confirming that (but see further below). We will now have to take a closer look at the two qualifications of the Jews as both *pantôn deisidaimonestatoi* and *pantôn miarôtatoi*.

As to the use of *deisidaimôn* for Jews, we have to keep in mind the semantic range of that word. As is well-known, *deisidaimôn* has the dual aspect of 'religious, devout' on the one hand, and of 'excessively scrupulous in religious matters, superstitious' on the other.[8] Both the positive and the negative connotations of the word were in evidence already in classical times, as a comparison of, e.g., Aristotle, *Pol.* 5.11.25 (1315a1–3), and Theophrastus' famous *Character* 16 clearly demonstrates.[9] That the same semantic duality still applied in the period much closer to the time of Diogenes of Oenoanda is proved by, for example, Diodorus Siculus 1.70.8 (where *deisidaimonia* is equated to a *theophilês bios*) on the one hand and Plutarch's critical *Peri deisidaiminias* (*De superstitione*) on the other.[10] The usage in the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus, a near-contemporary of Diogenes, is illustrative in that he employs the word *deisidaimonia* in both senses: for 'religion, system of cultic belief and practice, faithfulness' (referring to the Jewish faith) on the one hand, and for 'religious fanaticism, bigotry, superstition' on the other.[11]

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[6] I will leave the Egyptians out of account here in order to focus on the Jews. For Greek and Roman criticism of the Egyptian religion see Smelik & Hemelrijk 1984, 1852–2000.

[7] Smith 1998, 142; Ameling 2004, 474 n. 14.

[8] See the two books of 75 years ago by our fellow-countrymen Bolkestein 1929 and Koets 1929. For more recent literature see Colera & Somolinos 1998, 231. A very useful short discussion is Spicq 1982, 113–117.

[9] Compare Theophrastus' use of terms denoting fear and cowardice in this context with Aristotle's use of words denoting respect for the gods.

[10] For references to passages in the works of Plutarch apart from *De superstitione* see Spicq 1982, 114–115.

[11] See Rengstorf 1973, 418.

Even though the denigrating sense becomes dominant in later antiquity, the positive or neutral sense is still alive in the time of Diogenes.[12]

But did Diogenes use the word *deisidaimôn* in this sense? Contrary to what one would expect, there are no other occurrences of this word (or of *deisidaimonia*) in the extant fragments, so that one will have to take a decision about the sense of the word solely on the basis of this passage. One might argue that a positive sense would enhance the contrast between piety and disgusting or even criminal behaviour. But one might argue as well that it is exactly an extreme scrupulosity in things religious that would lead one to expect that transgressions of generally accepted rules of conduct will be avoided by the persons concerned out of fear of divine punishment. It may be helpful in this respect to cast a glance at Greek attitudes towards Jewish religion and see how the *deisidaimonia* motif is used there.

All the relevant material has been helpfully collected by the late Menachem Stern (of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem) in his massive and magisterial three-volume work *Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism* (GLAJJ).[13] The first to be mentioned here is the second century BCE historian Agatharchides of Cnidus who, in order to illustrate the stupidity of all sorts of superstition, mentions the fact that by abstaining from work every sabbath the Jews once lost the city of Jerusalem during a war because they were unwilling to defend it during the seventh day. He ridicules their behaviour as a glaring case of *deisidaimonia* (*ap.* Josephus, *Contra Apionem* 1.205–211 = *FGH* A86 F20a–b).[14] About a century later the geographer Strabo castigates Moses' successors (not Moses himself; see *Geogr.* 16.2.35–36)[15] for having introduced a wide variety of superstitious practices, such as circumcision and abstaining from the meat of certain animals (*Geogr.* 16.2.37). Erotianus, a first century CE glossator of Hippocrates, also mentions abstention from pork as a sign of Jewish *deisidaimonia* in a derogatory sense (GLAJJ no. 196). In Plutarch's *De superstitione* the Jews are mentioned

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[12] See also the material collected in Danker 2000, 216.

[13] Stern 1974–1984. In vol. 3, 156, one finds the references to passages with the *deisidaimonia* motif. The motif of 'Jewish superstition' is discussed also by Schäfer 1997, index s.v.

[14] The same story is also to be found in Josephus' *Ant. Jud.* 12.6.

[15] Contrast Quintilian, *Inst.* 3.7.21: 'Founders of cities are detested for concentrating a race which is a curse to others, as for example the founder of the Jewish superstition [=Moses]'.

twice as examples of a reprehensible *deisidaimonia*: in 3 (166A) their keeping of the sabbath is singled out as such; in 8 (169C) it is said that 'because it was the sabbath, the Jews sat immovable in their places while the enemy were planting ladders against the walls and capturing the defenses, and they did not get up but remained there, bound in *deisidaimonia* as in one great net'. In *Stoic. repugn.* 38 (1050E) the opinions held by Jews and Syrians about gods are categorized by Plutarch as *deisidaimonia*. More instances could be given, but these few may suffice to show that Jewish *deisidaimonia* in Greek eyes was always something to be despised or ridiculed. Most of the Greeks (and Romans)[16] had little or no appreciation for the religious ideas and customs of the Jews; they could see little else than superstition in what they regarded as the excessive scrupulosity that this religion entailed. It is very probable that Diogenes of Oenoanda stands in this tradition.

But why does Diogenes say of the Jews: *pantôn eisi miarôtatoi*? Several earlier authors do state that the Jewish religion is a specimen of *deisidaimonia*, but even so they refrain from describing the Jews in such negative terms as Diogenes does. What is the meaning of *miarôtatoi* here? *Miaros* can be said of anything or anyone stained, defiled, or polluted in the literal sense, but more often it denotes immoral behaviour or it pertains to 'something that [or someone who] violates cultic or moral canons to such an extent as to invite revulsion, [hence] abominable, wretched, foul, depraved, wanton'.[17] Parker says about the related word *miainô* that 'it can be used for the pollution of a reputation through unworthy deeds, or of truth through dishonesty; justice, law, and piety are in danger of defilement'.[18] The author who emphasizes the motif of the Jews' *miaria* or *miarotês* more than anyone else is the Graeco-Egyptian priest Manetho (ca. 300 BCE). This early representative of Jew-hatred pictures the Jews as originally a bunch of lepers and otherwise polluted (*miaroi*) persons in Egypt who had to be expelled from the country at divine command because they ritually defiled the country, whereafter they founded their rogue-state in and around Jerusalem (*ap.* Josephus, *Contra Apionem* 1.228–252 = *FGH* C609 F10). That this anti-Jewish version of Jewish beginnings, a perverted version of the exodus story with a strong emphasis on Jewish impurity and defilement,

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[16] For similar Roman views on Jewish *superstitio* see Schäfer 1997, 180–195.
[17] Danker 2000, 650.
[18] Parker 1983, 3.

survived till the time of Diogenes is proved by the spiteful caricature of the Jews and their origins in Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.3–5.[19] However, in the development of this anti-Jewish story between Manetho and Tacitus the emphasis is put more and more on the immoral character of the Jews.[20] They are increasingly blackened in a process of demonisation that finds its (provisional) climax in the work of the first century CE Alexandrian grammarian Apion.[21] He tells a story about an annual cannibalistic ritual in which the Jews slaughter, sacrifice and eat a Greek who has been fattened for that very purpose (*ap.* Josephus, *Contra Apionem* 2.91–96 = *FGH* C616 F4i).[22] This utter moral depravity with its extremely disgusting manifestations, a widespread motif in the anti-Jewish literature of Hellenistic and early Roman times,[23] is what justified more than anything else calling the Jews *miaroi*, or rather *miarôtatoi pantôn*. Acts of cannibalism, and eating a Greek at that, proved beyond doubt that the Jews were the most abominable and depraved of all nations, so it was believed.[24] More than one ancient author, therefore, condemns the Jews as the worst possible atheists and misanthropes. Even though the word *miaros* does not occur often in this context, the idea is expressed in a wide variety of other derogatory terms. It is highly unlikely, in my view, that Diogenes of Oenoanda was wholly unaware of all this, and for that reason it seems very probable that what he had in mind was exactly the moral depravity of the Jews. This also fits in with the context, in which he speaks about his conviction that the gods do not punish evil-doers.

In addition to that, if the above mentioned suggestion that Diogenes' attitude towards the Jews may have been influenced by reports about the war between Jews and Romans and Greeks in Cyrene and Egypt in the years 115–117 has any merits, it may be the following. Less than a century after Diogenes, the historian Cassius Dio relates that the Jews of Cyrene had put a certain Andreas at their head in 115 CE and were destroying Greeks and Romans. 'They would eat the flesh of their victims, make belts for themselves of their entrails, anoint themselves with their blood, and wear their skins for clothing; many they sawed

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[19] On which see now esp. Bloch 2002.

[20] For a brief sketch of this development see van der Horst 2003, 18–34.

[21] See the chapter 'Who Was Apion?' in van der Horst 2002, 207–222.

[22] Note that *miaros* often has the connotation of 'defiled by blood;' see Parker 1983, 104–143.

[23] Tacitus, *Hist.* 5.5.1, speaks about the *pravitas* of the Jewish *ritus*.

[24] See Schäfer 1997, 58, 203. Also Bickermann 1980, 225–255.

in two, from the head downwards; others they gave to wild beasts, and still others they forced to fight as gladiators' (*Hist.* 68.32.1–2). However much of this report may have been exaggerated, as is to be expected of wartime rumors, if even part of this kind of stories had reached the inhabitants of Oenoanda, Diogenes would have had reasons enough to make his statement about the *miaria* of the Jews. As Smith says, if the news of this revolt 'were fresh in Diogenes' mind when he was writing the present passage, and reports about atrocities, including acts of cannibalism, allegedly committed by the rebels, had been part of the news, this would help to explain his strong words about the Jews'.[25] This becomes even more probable if one takes into account that these war rumors fitted in with a tradition of stereotypes of the Jews as cruel cannibals.[26]

Even though we do not have any evidence of Jewish presence in Oenoanda itself, it should be borne in mind that in the imperial period Asia Minor harboured a great many Jewish communities.[27] Lycia, too, had Jewish communities as early as the second century BCE according to a literary source (see *1 Maccabees* 15.23) and there is also epigraphic evidence for Jews in Lycia, in both Limyra and Tlos, from the early Roman period.[28] So there is some reason to believe that Diogenes had some, even if only a distant, acquaintance of Jews. As we all know from modern experience, 'knowing' some Jews never suffices to rid people of long-standing anti-Semitic stereotypes and prejudices. So even if Diogenes had known Jews himself, it is fully within the range of what is possible that he still regarded them as the most superstitious and abominable of all nations. Nonetheless, it is revealing that such an eminently rational and otherwise sympathetic personality as Diogenes was not able to rise above the level of the worst anti-Jewish clichés of his time.[29]

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[25] Smith 1998, 142.

[26] Pagan critics of early Christianity repeated the same motif; see McGowen 1994, 413–442.

[27] See Trebilco 1991.

[28] All the relevant evidence is collected in Ameling 2004, 470–480.

[29] I owe thanks to my friend Dr. James N. Pankhurst for the revision of my English.

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THE CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN ABGAR AND JESUS
A RE-EDITION OF A BODLEIAN PAPYRUS

Rob Salomons

The present fragmentary papyrus text of which a transcription, translation and notes are given below, is being preserved in the Bodleian Library at Oxford and was first published by W.M. Lindsay.[1] It was the great merit of the then Bodleian librarian, E.B. Nicholson, of having almost immediately recognised the fragments as belonging to the so-called Abgar-correspondence. A few weeks after the first publication, he published a revised and improved text with additions based on Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* I 13, 6–10.[2] This text has been integrally included by L.J. Tixeront in his book on the origins of the Edessan church.[3]

E. Von Dobschütz did valuable work by collecting and critically dealing with all Greek and Syriac attestations of the Abgar-legend then known.[4] On page 427 of his article Von Dobschütz published his own version of the Bodleian papyrus, but without having studied the original himself. Compared with Nicholson's readings his emendations, if any, are only marginal. Since none of the above mentioned publications of this interesting papyrus is easily accessible, a new edition with some minor corrections of my own seems well justified. Since the Abgar-legend will probably not be familiar to the readership of this *festschrift*, a summary may render good services.

Abgar V (9–46 A.D.) surnamed the Black and king (in other versions he is a toparch) of the Syrian Edessa (modern Urfa) suffers from an incurable disease. Rumours have reached him of Jesus curing the sick without drugs or herbs. Thereupon he decides to send a letter to Jesus begging him to come to Edessa and to heal him. Since, in addition, he has heard that the Jews are ill-treating Jesus, he offers him an abode in

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[1] Cf. *The Athenaeum*, September 5, 1885, no. 3019 (II 304).
[2] Cf. *The Athenaeum*, October 17, 1885, no. 3025 (II 506).
[3] Tixeront 1888, 194.
[4] Von Dobschütz 1900.

his city. In his answer Jesus praises Abgar for his faith, but turns down
the offer to come to Edessa. Instead he promises to send one of his
disciples to heal him after his dead and ascension.

These are the outlines of the story as Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*
I 13, 6–11 has it. It is this version that the present papyrus goes back
to, except that it has an additional last line, which is lacking in Euse-
bius, in which Jesus guarantees the impregnability of Edessa. I shall
return to this below. The legend found wide-spread dissemination in
the Christian world, both in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. We
know of Greek, Latin, Persian, Armenian, Ethiopic, Arabic and Coptic
translation of this originally Syrian legend. In the Middle Ages it was
translated from the Latin version of Rufinus, made in 402–403, into
Anglo-Saxon, French, Flemish and Norwegian.[5]

The very first to mention the correspondence was Eusebius, who
expressis verbis states that he extracted it from the archives of Edessa
and translated it from Syriac into Greek.[6] The authenticity of the story,
however, was already rejected in Antiquity by the so-called *Decretum
Gelasianum* (494 A.D.), a decree by pope Gelasius in which the corre-
spondence, along with other works, was declared apocryphal, without
any motivation why it was rejected. Von Dobschütz supposes that its
inclusion among the apocryphals might be due to Augustin's contention
that Jesus has left no writings.[7] Modern critical investigations, however,
have yielded enough valid arguments, which can not be repeated here,
to reject the correspondence as a forgery.[8]

The letter as 'proof' of Edessan orthodoxy

According to an attractive and plausible hypothesis of the German
scholar W. Bauer, the story fits into a long standing apologetical tra-
dition. From apostolic times onwards, defenders of orthodoxy had no
scruples to combat the heretics with their own weapons. Just as the
heretics tried to falsify orthodoxy by their writings, so their oppo-
nents did not shrink from defending orthodoxy by 'counter falsifica-

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[5] Cf. Von Dobschütz 1899, 163.

[6] Euseb., *Hist. eccl.* I 13, 5.

[7] Von Dobschütz 1912, ll. 328–329 (caput V 59).

[8] Cf., *inter alios*, Lipsius 1880; Tixeront 1888, 136ff.; Von Dobschütz 1900, 485;
Bauer 1934; Bauer 1959, 327; Segal 1970, 64; Klijn 1962, 28ff.

tions', *i.e.* inventions that should conclusively 'prove' the truth of ortho-doxy. As such Bauer regards the Abgar-legend. It served no other purpose than that of 'proving' the apostolic base of Edessan ortho-doxy, against the mere human base of heresies propagated by men like Marcion, Bardesanes and Mani. Bauer even suggests to search for the *auctor intellectualis* of the story among the orthodox circles around bishop Kûnê or to consider the bishop himself as the inventor. Early in the second decade of the fourth century this cunning man started an orthodox offensive against the prevailing heresies in Edessa. One part of his tactics was, still according to Bauer, the invention of the Abgar-legend. But the bishop had more strings to his bow. Accord-ing to the so-called *Chronicle of Edessa* Kûnê founded the church of Urhai (= Edessa) in year 624 of the Seleucid reckoning, that is, in 313 A.D. There is no reason to doubt this statement of the *Chroni-cle*. The start of the construction of the church at this date and that of an orthodox offensive are certainly no coincidences, but has to be related to the promulgation of the Edict of Toleration, earlier in the same year. In addition, at approximately the same time Eusebius had started writing his ecclesiastical history. On learning this, Kûnê imme-diately saw the value of this work for the propagation of his ortho-dox doctrine. To that end he smuggled his own invention (in Syriac) of the Abgar-correspondence into Eusebius' hands who translated it into Greek and subsequently included it in his *Historia Ecclesiastica*. So far Bauer.[9]

Thus we clearly see the route Kûnê had mapped out in order to repel heresies from Edessa and establish orthodoxy: 1) by founding a church; 2) by inventing the story of the correspondence between Abgar and Jesus as 'proof' of the apostolic base of the Edessan orthodoxy 3) by disseminating the legend by means of the *Historia Ecclesiastica* of his fellow-bishop Eusebius. Indeed, a master stroke that covered a great deal of the elements within his reach that were indispensable for realising his plans. On the other hand, we have to bear in mind that Bauer's reconstruction, however brilliant, is at least partly of a (fairly) high-hypothetical level.

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[9] Cf. W. Bauer 1934, 41 ff.

From proof to palladium

Once the dispute between the two parties had been decided in favour
of orthodoxy and the letter threatened to loose its original function,
fourth century political circumstances gave the Edessans an opportu-
nity to put another specific use to it, viz. that of palladium. Nothing,
however, in the original letter as Eusebius has it, points to a word or
phrase that was specifically apt to protect the city from its enemies. So
an additional line was invented and written below the original text, to
the effect that Jesus guarantees Edessa's impregnability. One of the first
to allude to this extended function of the letter is the famous Gallician
abbess, Egeria, who visited Edessa in April 384 A.D. on her pilgrimage
to the Holy Land.[10] On a guided tour through the city, the bishop of
Edessa narrates to her, among other things,

> … *sed statim Aggarus epistolam domini ferens ad portam cum omni exercitu suo*
> *publice orauit et post dixit: 'Domine Iesu, tu promiseras nobis, ne aliquis hostium*
> *ingrederetur ciuitatem istam, et ecce nunc Persae impugnant nos'. Quod cum dixisset,*
> *tenens manibus leuatis epistolam ipsam apertam rex, ac subito tantae tenebrae factae*
> *sunt …, sed ita mox tenebris turbati sunt, ut uix castra ponerent … Nam et*
> *postmodum quotiescumque uoluerunt uenire et expugnare hanc ciuitatem hostes, haec*
> *epistola prolata est et lecta est in porta et statim nutu Dei expulsi sunt omnes*
> *hostes'.*[11]

In this narration we no longer find any trace of or allusion to a 'proof ',
rather a crystallized city-protecting function of the letter. It would seem
that the letter has received the additional last line somewhere between
324/325, when Eusebius wrote the last version of his *Historia Ecclesiastica*,
and the visit of Egeria to Edessa in April 384. It is not too hazardous
to point out a military event between these two dates that must have
caused the accretion: the disastrous defeat of Julian at the hands of the
Persians on the banks of the Tigris in 363 A.D. As a consequence of this
defeat the neighbouring city Nisibis fell into the hands of the Persians
leaving Edessa unprotected and open to the attacks of the enemy. That
the Persians abandoned an attack on Edessa appeared to the Edessans,
we may presume, little less than a miracle that could only be attributed
to the letter.[12] Afterwards the text of the letter was inscribed on the city

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[10] The date of her pilgrimage is not undisputed. Cf. Segal 1970, 183 footnote. 4. The
date A.D. 384 has been adopted from Devos 1967, 165, in particular 176 ff.

[11] Cf. *Itinerarium Egeriae* XIX 9 and 13 (*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 39).

[12] For a detailed description of Julian's final campaign, cf. Bowersock 1978, 106 ff.

gates of Edessa, as Procopius, writing in the middle of the sixth century, informs us.[13]

This palladium function of the letter has been brilliantly confirmed by archaeological evidence from outside Syria. At Philippi in Macedonia, for instance—but also elsewhere—an inscription has been found with the text of the correspondence and Jesus' promise of impregnability, significantly enough, attached to the city gates.[14]

From palladium to amulet

From the city-protecting function of the letter it is only a small step to the third and final stage of its evolution: that of an apotropaic object, but now no longer averting evil (the enemy) from the city and its community, but evil (disease) from the individual.[15] Jesus' promise of healing Abgar was naturally the source for others to believe that his words might be also applicable to them. In order to be effective the (papyrus) text would be worn folded up and tied up around the neck (?) of the believer. He obviously did not bother about the text being only a copy. What mattered was the intrinsic, magical power of the word that protected the wearer from evil.[16] Of course, the believe that the answer to Abgar had been written by Jesus himself may have helped increase the believe in the healing properties of the letter and explain its popularity.[17]

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[13] Procop., *De Bello Persico* II 12, 26.

[14] Cf. Guarducci 1978, 357 ff.

[15] In the absence of solid evidence, it is only a sophisticated guess that the few papyri containing the correspondence were used as amulets. It may be that the amulet function came into being soon after the publication of Eusebius' *H.E.* The reason to take this function as the final stage of the evolution of the correspondence is that our papyrological evidence concerning the letter thus far dates from the late Byzantine period, that is, the sixth or seventh century A.D.

[16] The secondary literature on the subject is immense. A selected bibliography can be found in Meyer & Mirecki 1995, 8 ff. I found particularly illuminating an essay by D. Frankfurter in that volume, *Narrating Power: The Theory and Practice of the Magical Historiola in Ritual Spells*, 457 ff.

[17] In this connection it may be appropriate to refer here also to the belief in the healing properties of the word of another highly respected authority in Late Antiquity, viz. Homer, as is evident from a number of magical papyri. Women, for instance, suffering from pain in the breasts or womb are advised to write the words of Iliad II 548 in order to get rid of their ailments: θρέψε Διὸς θυγάτηρ, τέκε δὲ ζείδωρος ἄρουρα. Cf. Preisendanz 1973, XXIIa 9–10. The writing down of the first hemistichion was

To date, two other papyrus texts containing the correspondence have come to light. One (P. Colt Nessana II 7, 6th–7th c.) was found in the Negev desert and is a close parallel to the present papyrus, the other, the fragmentary P. Gothembourg 21, also dating from the 6th–7th century, has a unique *praescriptio*, which can not be pursued here more deeply.[18]

Provenance: Fayûm (6th–7th century A.D.)

Ms. Gr. Th. b. 1 (P). ca 37 cm (h.)xca 32 cm (br.). The papyrus is irregularly broken off at the edges, except for the right-hand edge. In its present state it consists of four greater and smaller fragments. The writing runs along the fibres. The scribe left a blank space of about 1.5 cm between the lines. The ink has faded out at places. The back seems to contain a late Byzantine private letter, but hardly yields any connected sense.

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 1                                                        ] .
 2                                    διὰ τοῦτο τοίν]υν
 3  γράψας ἐδεήθην σου σκυλῆναι] πρός με
 4  καὶ τὸ πάθος ὃ ἔχω, θεραπεῦσαι, καὶ γὰρ ἤ]κουσταί μοι ὅτι
 5  οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι καταγογγύζουσί σου καὶ] διώκουσίν σε
 6  καὶ βούλονται κακῶαι σε, πόλις δὲ μοί ἐσ]τιν σμικροτάτη
 7  [καὶ σεμνή, ἥτις ἐξαρκεῖ ἀμφοτέροις                ]
 8  lost
 9  ca 25                    ] .... ᾳ .. [ ca 8          ]
10     μακά]ριος εἶ ὅτι ἐπίστευσας ἐν ἐμοί, μὴ [ἑωρ]ακώς με.
11  γέγραπτ]αι γὰρ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτι οἱ ἑωρακότες οὐ μὴ πιστεύ-
12  σωσιν ἐ]ν ἐμοί καὶ οἱ μὴ ἑωρακότες με αὐτοὶ
13  πιστεύσ]ουσιν καὶ ζήσονται, περὶ δὲ οὗ ἔγραψάς μοι
14  ἐλθεῖν πρὸς σέ, δέον ἐστι πάν]τα δι᾽ ἃ [ἀπε-
15  στάλην ἐνταῦθα πληρῶσαι καὶ μετὰ τὸ πληρῶσαι
16  ἀγαλημφθῆγαι πρὸς τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με
17  κ[αὶ] ἐπειδὰν ἀγα[λ]ημφθ[ῶ, ἀποστελῶ σ]οί τινα
18  τῶν μαθητ[ῶν μου, ἵνα τὸ πάθος σο]υ ἰάσηται
19  καὶ ζωὴν κα[ί σο]ι [καὶ τοῖς σὺν σοι π]αράσχηται
20  καὶ τῇ] πόλε[ι            ]ωγ
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     5 pap. διωκουσϊν   18 pap. ϊασηται

… for that reason I write to beg you to hasten to me and heal the suffering that I have. Moreover, it has reached my ear that the Jews are mocking you and persecute you and want to ill-treat you. I have a very

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believed to cure the pain in the breasts, the second to heal the womb. In classical Greek literature 'arable land' (ἄρουρα) is a common metaphor for the womb.

    [18] The interpretation and understanding of the Gothenburg papyrus has been greatly furthered by Youtie 1930; Youtie 1931.

small city … (Answer of Jesus) Blessed art thou that thou believed in me, not having seen me, for it is written about me that those who have seen me, will not believe in me and that those who have not seen me themselves will believe and live. Now concerning what you wrote to me, to come to you, it is necessary to fulfill here all for which I was sent and after the fulfilment to be taken up to him who has sent me and when I have been taken up, I will send to you one of my disciples in order to heal your suffering and to give life to you and those with you and to your city …

Notes

1–2 A substantial part must have broken off at the top of the papyrus. Compared with the text of Eusebius or P. Colt Nessana II 7, at least some ten lines are missing at the top. To give an impression of the contents of the lost portion, a transcription taken from Eusebius *Historia Ecclesiastica* I 13, 6ff. follows without the prescript:

> Ἄβγαρος Οὐχαμα τοπάρχης Ἰησοῦ σωτῆρι ἀγαθῷ ἀναφανέντι ἐν τόπῳ Ἱε-
> ροσολύμων χαίρειν. ἤκουσταί μοι τὰ περὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν σῶν ἰαμάτων ὡς ἄνευ
> φαρμάκων καὶ βοτανῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ γινομένων. ὡς γὰρ λόγος, τυφλοὺς ἀνα-
> βλέπειν ποιεῖς, χωλοὺς περιπατεῖν καὶ λεπροὺς καθαρίζεις καὶ ἀκάθαρτα
> πνεύματα καὶ δαίμονας ἐκβάλλεις καὶ τοὺς ἐν μακρονοσίᾳ βασανιζομένους
> θεραπεύεις καὶ νεκροὺς ἐγείρεις. καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἀκούσας περὶ σοῦ κατὰ
> νοῦν ἐθέμην τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον, ἢ ὅτι σὺ εἶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ καταβὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐ-
> ρανοῦ ποιεῖς ταῦτα, ἢ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ ποιῶν ταῦτα. διὰ τοῦτο τοίν]υν κτλ.

7–9 Line 7 has been supplied on the basis of what all sources have, in total 29 letters plus, probably, a cross marking the end of Abgar's letter. Tradition has divergent versions of what comes thereafter. They all agree in having a *praescriptio* and therefore it is a plausible assumption that the Bodleian text had one as well. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* I 13, 9 has: τὰ ἀντιγραφέντα ὑπὸ Ἰησοῦ διὰ Ἀνανίου ταχυδρόμου τοπάρχῃ Ἀβγάρῳ (55 letters); P. Colt Nessana II 7, 13: + ἐπιστολὴ Ἰ(ησο)ῦ Χ(ριστο)ῦ υἱ(ο)ῦ τοῦ Θ(εο)ῦ Αὔγαρον τοπάρχην πόλεως Ἐδέσης (46 letters plus a cross).[19] We can not be sure, however, at which point in the text the *praescriptio* started. Assuming that the papyrus had the above-mentioned Eusebian version (which seems likely) and that the *praescriptio* started immediately after ἀμφοτέροις in l. 7, the *praescriptio* would have occupied the remaining part of l. 7 (ca 11 letters) and the whole of l. 8

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[19] For other variations, cf. Von Dobschütz 1900, 438.

(ca 44 letters). With an average length of 40 letters per line, this reconstruction is perhaps somewhat too long. Alternatively, if the *praescriptio* started at the beginning of l. 8 (which has my preference), an additional line 9 has to be inserted.

The damaged traces of some 7 letters in about the middle of the line, one of which may be an alpha, most probably belong to the Euseban version of the *praescriptio*. But unfortunately too little is left to ascertain which part of the *praescriptio* we have here before us.

10 The line may have started with a cross. The following text is a paraphrase of the Gospel of St. John 20, 29: ὅτι ἑώρακάς με, πεπίστευκας, μακάριοι οἱ μὴ ἰδόντες καὶ πιστεύσαντες. These words are spoken by Jesus to Thomas. It may be that the phrase intended to introduce Thomas into the Abgar-legend.[20] In the Eusebian version it is Thaddeus who is sent as an apostle to Edessa by Thomas. Probably on account of his greater reputation the Edessans in later times claimed Thomas as 'their' apostle, although there is no evidence that he—or any other apostle—ever visited Edessa during his lifetime. The body of Thomas is said to have been transferred from India, where he was believed to have died a martyr, to Edessa in 232 A.D., where it was put in a shrine outside the city wall. The story of Thomas' visit to India and his martyrdom there is, however, not beyond doubt.[21]

19 The supplement is based on Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* I 13, 10.

20 As stated in the introduction, there can hardly be any reasonable doubt that the papyrus contained an additional line, which is lacking in Eusebius. In this line Jesus guarantees the impregnability of Edessa. We can not be sure, however, how the promise was articulated. Von Dobschütz has discussed the various recensions of the promise, which need not be repeated here.[22] To give an impression of how the text may have run, there follow, *exempli gratia*, possible supplements of ll. 20 and 21, taken from an inscription found at Tchorum which contains the correspondence: 20 καὶ τῇ] πόλε[ι σου πρὸς τὸ μηδένα τῶν ἐχθρ]ῶν (*32 l.*) 21 σου κατακυριεῦσαι αὐτῆς. ἀμην +[23]

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[20] Cf. Segal 1970, 65.
[21] Cf. Segal 1970, 174f.; Klijn 2003, 27ff.
[22] Von Dobschütz 1900, 452ff.
[23] The first editor of the inscription, Anderson 1900, 156ff., printed τῷ adding: (perh.

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τό). In my opinion, τώ is Koine spelling for τό. For the interchange of ο ⟩ ω, cf. Gignac 1975, 277.

PART V

LATIN LITERATURE

POST EXITUM UNICI REVERTOR IN PATREM
SENTENTIAE IN ROMAN DECLAMATION

BÉ BREIJ

'If one candidate is trying to scare you and the other is trying to get you to think, if one candidate is appealing to your fears and the other one is appealing to your hope, you better vote for the one who wants you to think and hope', former American president Bill Clinton said during a rally in support of the unfortunate John Kerry. Pithy pronouncements like this, with a generic, often moral tenor, are called sound bites since the early eighties of the previous century. This does not mean that they take their existence from that period, however. As γνώμη and *sententia* (maxims) they were already very popular with the ancient Greeks and Romans, who used them for the same purpose: to present their points of view in a condensed, poignant phrase which was meant to make a lasting impression.

In this article, I would like to sketch an outline of the character and use of *sententiae* in Roman rhetoric. On the basis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria* I will first describe their nature and development; subsequently, I will discuss their application in a genre which was notoriously rife with *sententiae*, namely, declamation.

In *On Rhetoric*, Aristotle defines the γνώμη as follows:

> ἔστι δὴ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι οὔτε περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· οὔτε περὶ πάντων, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. (Ar. *Rhet.* 1394a 21–26)

> A maxim is an assertion—not, however, one about particulars, such as what kind of a person Iphicrates is, but of a general sort, and not about everything (for example, not that the straight is the opposite of the crooked) but about things that involve actions and are to be chosen or avoided in regard to action. (transl. George A. Kennedy)

A bit further on, Aristotle discerns two ways in which γνῶμαι, if carefully chosen, can contribute to a speaker's moral credibility, because they reveal the ἦθος (character, attitude) he wants to present. In the first

place, since they tend to confirm popular experiences and opinions (or prejudices), they present the speaker to the audience as a kindred spirit; secondly, they reveal his moral predilections:

> ἔχουσι δ' εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν μὲν διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι γὰρ ἐάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν (…) καὶ ἑτέραν κρείττω· ἠθικοὺς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ἦθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις. (Ar. *Rhet.* 1395a 32-b 14)

> Maxims make one great contribution to speeches because of the uncultivated mind of the audience; for people are pleased if someone in a general observation hits upon opinions that they themselves have about a particular instance (…) and another is greater; for it makes the speech 'ethical'. Speeches have character insofar as deliberate choice is clear.

The moral calibre of the γνώμη clearly stands out from Aristotle's examples, such as εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης ('one omen is best, to fight for one's country')[1] or οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὅστις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος / ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστιν ἢ τύχης ('There is no one of men who is free. For he a slave of money or of chance').[2] As for their form, Aristotle discerns four species. The γνώμη can be expressed by itself or with a supplement; if it comes by itself, it is either 1) indisputable or 2) self-evident. If it is supplemented with a cause or reason, it is either 3) part of an enthymeme or 4) enthymematic (i.e. it does not strictly have the form of an enthymeme, but a reason or cause can be distilled from it).[3]

In the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4,24–25) we find an account of *sententiae* which by its emphasis on their generic and ethical character is similar to Aristotle's observations:

> *Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit (…) Sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi praeceptores videamur esse. Cum ita interponentur, multum adferent ornamenti. Necesse est enim conprobet eam tacitus auditor, cum ad causam videat adcommodari rem certam, ex vita et moribus sumptam.*

> A Maxim is a saying drawn from life, which shows concisely either what happens or ought to happen in life (…) We should insert maxims only rarely, that we may be looked upon as pleading the case, not preaching morals. When so interspersed, they will add much distinction. Fur-

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[1] *Rhet.* 1395a 13–14; Aristotle quotes Hom. *Ill.* 12,243.
[2] *Rhet.* 1394b 4–6; Aristotle quotes Eur. *Hec.* 864–865.
[3] *Rhet.* 1394b 7–33. The enthymeme, also known as the rhetorical syllogism, will be discussed presently.

thermore, the hearer, when he perceives that an indisputable principle drawn from practical life is being applied to a cause, must give it his tacit approval. (transl. H. Caplan)

The Auctor, too, uses a division in four species, but differs from Aristotle in that he discerns *sententiae simplices* and *duplices* (the latter contrast two situations or points of view); both categories can be *cum* or *sine ratione*.

Quintilian devotes an entire chapter of the eighth book of his *Institutio* (which deals with *elocutio*) to the *sententia*. His description of the *sententia* tallies with those of Aristotle and the Auctor ad Herennium, but indicates that the concept has broadened in the course of time; his offhand, pragmatic categorization recalls both authors:

> 3) *Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie, quamvis omnibus idem nomen sit, sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci gnomas appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis. Est autem haec vox universalis, quae etiam citra complexum causae possit esse laudabilis, interim ad rem tantum relata, ut 'nihil est tam populare quam bonitas': interim ad personam, quale est Afri Domiti: 'princeps qui vult omnia scire necesse habet multa ignoscere'. 4) Hanc quidam partem enthymematis, quidam initium aut clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt, et est aliquando, non tamen semper. Illud verius, esse eam aliquando simplicem, ut ea quae supra dixi, aliquando ratione subiecta: 'nam in omni certamine qui opulentior est, etiam si accipit iniuriam, tamen quia plus potest facere videtur': nonnumquam duplicem: 'obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit'.* (*Inst.* 8,5, 3–4)

> 3) Oldest of all—and properly called *sententiae*, though the same name serves for all types—are what are called in Greek *gnōmai*. (Both names come from the fact that these sayings are like proposals or decrees.) It is a universal pronouncement (such as might be praiseworthy even outside the context of a Cause), relating sometimes simply to things ('Nothing is so popular as goodness of heart'), sometimes to persons ('An emperor', said Domitius Afer, 'who wants to know everything has to forgive much'. 4) Some have thought of a *sententia* as part of an Enthymeme, some as the major premiss or conclusion of an Epichireme. And so it is sometimes, but not always. A better classification is into (1) simple *sententiae* (like those just quoted); (2) *sententiae* with an added reason ('In any contest, the better resourced, even if he is the victim, is thought to be the aggressor, because of his greater power'); (3) double *sententiae* ('Obsequiousness wins friends, truth enmity'). (transl. D.A. Russell)

Although all three authors are very much in favour of *sententiae*, they advocate a judicious and sparing use. Aristotle cautions that maxims are chiefly proper for older, experienced people;[4] the Auctor ad Heren-

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[4] *Rhet.* 1395a 2–3.

nium wants to curtail their use to avoid the impression of lecturing.[5]
Quintilian dismally observes that in his own period, public speakers
have really run riot in their use of *sententiae*, which diminishes their
effectiveness.[6]

It has been said that the function of the *sententia* changed throughout
the centuries from a tool of logical argument to a stylistic device.[7]
Such a development may at least be inferred from the position the
sententia has in the several *artes rhetoricae*: Aristotle discusses it between
παράδειγμα and enthymeme, while the Auctor and Quintilian include
it in their treatments of style. It should be noted, however, that the
increased attention for the ornamental function of *sententiae* does not
imply that they have become mere embellishments. Rather, it is by
means of their terse and striking form that they continue to contribute
to argumentation. Their importance in this respect is to emerge further
on, when I get to the use of *sententiae* in declamation, but it can also
be gleaned from the various authors' choices of examples. Aristotle
derives all his γνῶμαι from the belles-lettres (esp. Homer and Euripides),
whereas the Auctor consults not only Roman comedy, but also Stoic
and Epicurean philosophers. Later, Quintilian is the first to include
examples from orators.

After the γνῶμη, a second, major type of *sententia* is the versatile
enthymeme, which has already been mentioned several times. Greek
ἐνθύμημα simply means 'thought' so that it is hardly surprising that
the word should cover a large number of concepts. For Aristotle, the
enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism; it can contain a γνώμη as either
of its premises or as its conclusion. He states that the enthymeme
is to the syllogism as the paradigm is to induction (εἰσαγωγή).[8] That
is, although enthymeme and paradigm do not yield such irrefutable
evidence as their dialectical counterparts, they are considered tools of
logical argument. The difference between enthymeme and syllogism is
twofold, originating from both form and content. In form, it should be
as concise as possible:

> οὔτε γὰρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ
> ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν. (*Rhet.* 1395b
> 24–26)

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[5] *Rhet. ad Her.* 4,25.
[6] *Inst.* 8,5,25–31; compare 8,5,13–14.
[7] E.g. Kennedy 1991, 182.
[8] See *Rhet.* 1356b 10–17; compare 1393a 26–27 (paradigm); 1395b 22–24 (enthymeme).

> [F]or the conclusion should not be drawn from far back, nor is it neces-
> sary to include everything. The former is unclear because of the length
> [of the argument], the latter tiresome because of stating what is obvious.

This means that more often than not, the enthymeme is a 'truncated' syllogism, because either one of the premises or the conclusion can be left out.[9] However, it is not its form by which the enthymeme is deter-mined, but its content.[10] Whereas syllogisms can only consist of axioms and pronounce on categories, enthymemes deal with εἰκότα (probabil-ities) and σημεῖα (signs which do not entail necessity);[11] moreover, they can refer to individuals.[12]

Other Greek rhetoricians also discuss the enthymeme, but their ap-proach differs from Aristotle's.[13] Alcidamas stays close to the word's original meaning and uses it to refer to basic ideas to be expressed in a speech;[14] Isocrates assigns it to pithy expressions of striking thoughts, the equivalent of Latin *lumina*.[15] The most influential understanding of the enthymeme, however, is found in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, where it is propounded as a terse expression of an antithesis or absurdity (the difference is only in degree):

> Ἐνθυμήματα δέ ἐστιν οὐ μόνον τὰ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ πράξει ἐναντιούμενα,
> ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι. λήψῃ δὲ πολλὰ μετιών, ὡς ἐν τῷ ἐξεταστικῷ
> εἴδει εἴρηται, καὶ σκοπῶν, εἴ πῃ ὁ λόγος (ἑαυτῷ) ἐναντιοῦται ἢ τὰ πεπρα-
> γμένα τοῖς δικαίοις ἢ τῷ νόμῳ ἢ τῷ συμφέροντι ἢ τῷ καλῷ ἢ τῷ δυνατῷ
> ἢ τῷ ῥᾳδίῳ ἢ τῷ εἰκότι ἢ τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος ἢ τῷ ἔθει τῶν πραγμάτων.
> (*Rhet.* 1430a 23–30)

> Considerations are (1) facts that run counter to the speech or action in
> question, and also (2) those that run counter to anything else. You will
> obtain a good supply of them (…) by considering whether the speech
> contradicts itself in any way, or the actions committed run counter to
> the principles of justice, law, expediency, honour, feasibility, facility or

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[9] It usually takes the form of γνώμη with supplement. Sometimes, however, just the one premise or the conclusion suffices.

[10] See Sprute 1982, 131–132; Conley 1984, 169.

[11] *Rhet.* 1357a 22–25; elaborate and enlightening discussion in Sprute 1982, 74–80 and 88–109.

[12] Sprute 1982, 76.

[13] A good overview can be found in Sprute 1982, 140–143.

[14] Muir 2001, *passim*, consistently translates 'argument' which is correct, though a bit narrow.

[15] E.g. Isocrates 13,16, where, to describe the use of the enthymeme, he employs the word καταποικῖλαι, which seems to be echoed in Quint. *Inst.* 8,5,28: *ut adferunt lumen clavus et purpurae loco insertae.*

probability, or to the character of the speaker or the usual course of events. (transl. H. Rackham)

When Cicero, to turn to the Romans, discusses the enthymeme in his *Topica* 54–56, it is clear that for him too, it essentially expresses an antithesis. He succinctly explains how the term developed from a very broad concept, via the disjunctive third type of argumentation in dialectic,[16] to a kind of antithetical *sententia*:

> *Ex hoc*[17] *illa rhetorum ex contrariis conclusa, quae ipsi appellant ἐνθυμήματα; non quin omnis sententia proprio nomine dicatur, sed ut Homerus propter excellentiam commune poetarum nomen efficit apud Graecos suum, sic cum omnis sententia dicatur, quia videtur ex ea quae ex contrariis conficitur acutissima, sola proprie nomen commune possedit.* (*Top.* 55[18])

> From this spring the rhetoricians' arguments concluded from contraries which they themselves call enthymemes. Not that every expressed reasoning was not properly called enthymeme, but just as Homer made his name the common designation for 'poet' among the Greeks on the grounds of his excellence, so, although every expressed reasoning is called an enthymeme, only the type which is made up of contraries has properly taken possession of the common name, because it is thought to be the most pointed. (transl. T. Reinhardt)

Enthymemes are not mentioned in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, which only contains the rules for constructing (fully syllogistic) argumentations[19] and a short discussion, directly after the *sententia*, of the *contrarium*, the definition of which squares with that of Cicero's enthymeme.[20]

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[16] *Appellant autem dialectici eam conclusionem argumenti in qua, cum primum assumpseris, consequitur id quod annexum est primum conclusionis modum. Cum id quod adnexum est negaris ut id quoque cui fuerit adnexum negandum sit, secundus is appellatur concludendi modus. **Cum autem aliqua coniuncta negaris et ex iis unum aut plura sumpseris ut quod relinquitur tollendum sit, is tertius appellatur conclusionis modus.** ('But the dialecticians call that type of argument in which, when you take the first as posited, that which is attached to it follows, the first type of argument. When you deny that which is attached, so that that to which it is attached is to be denied, this is called the second type of argument. **But when you deny a conjunction of propositions, and take as posited one or more constituent propositions of this conjunction so that that which is left is to be refuted, this is called the third type of argument.**').

[17] I.e. from the *tertius conclusionis modus*.

[18] Compare Quint. *Inst.* 8,5,9: *Enthymema quoque est omne quod mente concepimus, proprie tamen dicitur quae est sententia ex contrariis, propterea quod eminere inter ceteras videtur, ut Homerus 'poeta', 'urbs' Roma.* ('Enthymeme also means any thought formed in the mind; but more particularly it means a *sententia* based on contraries, because this is regarded as a *sententia par excellence*, as Homer is *the* poet, and Rome *the* city.'); see also 5,10,1.

[19] *Rhet. Her.* 2,27 ff.

[20] *Rhet. Her.* 4,25: *Contrarium est, quod ex rebus diversis duabus alteram breviter et facile*

Quintilian discerns two uses of the enthymeme, which are not mutually exclusive. In the fifth book of his *Institutio*, the enthymeme is presented as a tool of argument. Apart from the very general denotation of enthymeme, Quintilian discerns three species in *Inst.* 5,10,1–3: 1 the *sententia cum ratione* (which is the Aristotelian conception of the enthymeme) or *quaedam argumenti conclusio* 2 *vel ex consequentibus* 3 *vel ex repugnantibus.* In 5,14,1–4, not entirely consistently, only the last two types are mentioned, with Quintilian expressing a strong partiality for number three as a *fortior multo probatio*. In *Inst.* 8,5,9 the enthymeme recurs in a different capacity: in the form of the *sententia ex contrariis*, the *sententia per excellence*, it serves *ornatus* rather than argument.

Before we can turn to a short survey of the use of *sententiae* in Roman declamation, there are a few more species of *sententia* which merit a brief discussion. They are conveniently grouped in Quintilian's *Institutio* 8,5.

The *epiphonema*, according to Quintilian,[21] is a *rei narratae vel probatae summa adclamatio* and *extrema quasi insultatio*, which always appears in the *clausula*, i.e. the rhythmic ending of a period.[22] It practically coincides with a type of *sententia* which is termed, inconveniently but logically, *clausula*. Quintilian approves of this *clausula* if it merely incorporates a conclusion, but deplores the modern tendency to make every period end with a bang:

> *Sed nunc aliud volunt, ut omnis locus, omnis sensus in fine sermonis feriat aurem. Turpe autem ac prope nefas ducunt respirare ullo loco qui adclamationem non petierit. Inde minuti corruptique sensiculi et extra rem petiti: neque enim possunt tam multae bonae sententiae esse quam necesse est multae sint clausulae.* (*Inst.* 8,5,13–14)

> Nowadays, however, something more is wanted, namely that every passage, every sentence, should strike the ear with its final phrase. Speakers think it a disgrace, almost a crime, to pause for breath at any point which does not call for applause. Hence a lot of little sentences, fragmented, affected, and irrelevant; for there cannot be as many good *sententiae* as there must be closures.

The most enigmatic type of *sententia* is the *noema, qua voce omnis intellectus accipi potest, sed hoc nomine donarunt ea quae non dicunt verum intellegi volunt* ('the *noēma* ["thought"], a word which can mean any idea, but which

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confirmat ('Reasoning by Contraries is the figure which, of two opposite statements, uses one so as neatly and directly to prove the other.').

[21] *Inst.* 8,5,11.

[22] Hermog. *Inv.* 4,9 (περὶ ἐπιφονήματος) discerns three types of *epiphonema*: 1. the epiphonema proper, i.e. the closure of a period in which there is adduced something

they have given specially to things which they want to be understood without their being said', *Inst.* 8,5,12).[23] On the basis of this characterization, Zinsmaier observes a close connection between *noema* and *emphasis* ('insinuation'), a figure of thought *cum ex aliquo dicto latens aliquid eruitur*.[24] This figure was hugely popular in Roman declamation, where it was used to impart insinuations and covert accusations and even to colour an entire speech. Such a speech was called a *controversia figurata*: a fictitious forensic speech in which the speaker hides his actual goal behind another, ostensible goal.

Having listed the main species of *sententia*, Quintilian gives a brief sketch of a number of modern types of *sententia*: *ex inopinato* ('based on surprise' or paradox); *alio relata* ('alluding to other events'); *aliunde petita* ('transferred from one context to another'); by repetition; *ex contrariis* ('contrast of opposites'); *cum aliqua comparatione* ('illuminated by a comparison').[25] Earlier however, when discussing various classifications of *sententiae*, the pragmatic Quintilian has already remarked that any figure of thought can serve to phrase a *sententia*, so that there are as many kinds of *sententia* as there are figures of thought.[26] This implies, of course, that views may diverge as to whether a particular sentence is a *sententia* or not. Some types of *sententia*, e.g. the γνῶμη and the enthymeme, are easy to recognize on the basis of their fixed formats, but often doubts can arise. In such cases it is best to take brevity and salience as one's criteria and to consider the sentence's context, because *sententiae* are very often used to conclude a particular line of thought or reasoning.

After all these theoretical explanations and classifications, it is high time to look at the occurrence of *sententiae* in Roman declamation. The first collection to consult is, of course, the one drawn up by the elder Seneca for his sons. Since the 1970s it is available as *Declamations* in an excellent edition with translation and notes by Michael Winterbottom, but the book's official title is a better indication of its nature: *Oratorum et rhetorum sententiae divisiones colores*. Like two of the three other

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that does not directly ensue from what precedes; 2. the closure of a period which merely recapitulates the preceding; 3. the sustained metaphor.

    [23] Although the *noema* frequently occurs in especially declamations, very few authors discuss it. Vossius 1681 (II) 421 repeats Quint. Inst. 8,5,12 and also alludes to a different notion of the concept, i.e. the *noema* as a γνώμη *personae alicui accommodata*.

    [24] 1993,62.
    [25] *Inst.* 8,5,15–19.
    [26] *Inst.* 8,5,5.

extant collections of Roman declamations, it consists of excerpts,[27] but it is special in that these are not mere summaries, but consist of three categories of highlights: the most striking *sententiae*, divisions (structures of argumentation) and *colores* (subjective colouring of facts) from the countless declamations heard by the elder Seneca during his lifetime.

During this period, the *genus dicendi ardens et concitatum* had become (and was to remain) the style most in vogue. It was characterized by *non lentas nec vacuas explicationes, sed plus sensuum quam verborum habentes* and consequently abundant in *sententiae*, which indeed became almost a goal in itself.[28] It is therefore not surprising to read about Seneca's friend and hero Marcus Porcius Latro:

> *Solebat autem et hoc genere exercitationis uti, ut aliquo die nihil praeter epiphonemata scriberet, aliquo die nihil praeter enthymemata, aliquo die nihil praeter has translaticias quas proprie sententias dicimus, quae nihil habent cum ipsa controversia inplicitum, sed satis apte et alio transferuntur.* (Sen. *Contr.* 1 *praef.* 23)

> He practised another sort of exercise: one day he would write only 'exclamations', one day only enthymemes, one day nothing but the traditional passages we properly call *sententiae*, that have no intimate connection with the particular *controversia*, but can be quite aptly placed elsewhere too. (transl. M. Winterbottom)

Samples of his inventiveness can be found in *Controversia* 2,7, an unique declamation in that it consists of a large fragment of continuous text by Latro, which unfortunately breaks off after nine paragraphs. Its *thema*[29] is the following:

> *Quidam, cum haberet formonsam uxorem, peregre profectus est. In viciniam mulieris peregrinus mercator commigravit; ter illam appellavit de stupro adiectis pretiis; negavit illa. Decessit mercator, testamento heredem omnibus bonis reliquit formonsam et adiecit elogium: 'pudicam repperi'. Adit hereditatem. Redit maritus, accusat adulteri ex suspicione.*

> A man with a beautiful wife went off abroad. A foreign trader moved into the woman's neighbourhood. He three times made her propositions of a sexual nature, offering sums of money. She said no. The trader died,

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[27] The one collection of complete declamations is that of pseudo-Quintilian's *Declamationes Maiores*.

[28] *Contr.* 3 *praef.* 7; Fairweather 1981,200–214 gives an excellent description of this declamatory style.

[29] The *thema* or *argumentum* of a declamation is a brief (and usually fictional) case history, followed by, or referring to, the (sometimes fictional) law or laws to be applied to the case at hand.

leaving her all his wealth in his will, to which he added the clause: 'I found her chaste'. She took the bequest. The husband returned and accuses her of adultery on suspicion.

Latro took the husband's part. A choice of various *sententiae* will give an impression of his use of this device:

> *Muliebrium vitiorum fundamentum avaritia est.*
> The root of the vices of woman is avarice (gnomic).[30]

> *Feminae quidem unum pudicitia decus est; itaque ei curandum est esse ac videri pudicam.*
> For a woman, in fact, the one glory is chastity; so she must take care to be chaste—and to be seen to be chaste (gnomic, enthymeme; *Contr.* 2,7,9).

> *Quod proximum est a promittente, rogata stuprum tacet.*
> Asked for sex, she keeps silent—the next thing to promising it (enthymeme; *Contr.* 2,7,6).

> *Plus ⟨ista⟩ intra unam viciniam quam ego toto mari quaesit.*
> *She* has acquired more in a single neighbourhood than *I* did on all the seas there are (epiphonema as well as antithetical enthymeme; *Contr.* 2,7,1).

> *Tace paulisper nomen auctoris: numquid non testamentum viri creditis?*
> Suppress for a moment the name of the writer; would you not suppose this was the will of a *husband*? (noema, *Contr.* 2,7,7).

> *O nos nimium felici et aureo, quod aiunt, saeculo natos! Sic etiam qui inpudicas quaerunt pudicas honorant?*
> We are indeed born in a fortunate and as they say a golden age! Can it be that even men who go in search of unchaste women pay tribute to the chaste ones? (by means of the figures *exclamatio* and *interrogatio*; *ex inopinato*; *Contr.* 2,7,7).

Apart from the gnomic ones, the majority of the *sententiae* is bitter and sarcastic. Most of them are meant to express righteous anger, thus contributing to the speaker's ἦθος and his moral credibility. The enthymematic *sententiae*, because they constitute mini-arguments, also contribute to λόγος or rational argumentation. The brevity of all *sententiae*, finally, made sure of a lasting impression.

It is time to turn to the *Major Declamations*, a unique collection of nineteen complete *controversiae* dating in all probability from the sec-

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[30] At this point we only have a fourth-century excerpt of the text, which does not include the declaimers' names. It is possible that this *sententia* was pronounced by someone else.

ond century CE. Already in antiquity they were attributed to Quintil-
ian,[31] but they run counter to so many of his precepts that today, no
one in his right mind will insist that they flowed out of the famous
rhetor's pen. Instead, it is generally assumed that they were composed
by a group of four different *rhetores*,[32] who may have used them to
promote their schools and/or to provide their students with sample
speeches. Compared with the declamations collected by Seneca the
Elder, their overall structure is relatively transparent, as is the struc-
ture of their argumentations. Their subject matter, while not diverging
radically from that of Seneca's *controversiae*, consists more exclusively of
themes which must have had great appeal for Roman youngsters. The
majority concerns the relationship between men and women, parents
and children, and focuses on such issues as *pietas* and the *patria potes-
tas* (the Roman father's extreme, absolute power over his family), with
a great deal of attention for the position of the underdog. For added
excitement, there is also ample space for sex, murder and the supernat-
ural.

The style of the *Major Declamations* is very much *ardens et concitatum*: it
is fierce and dramatic, often caustic, insinuative or even pathetic. Of
course numerous *sententiae* play a crucial part to achieve this effect.
In fact, some declamations are so crammed with *sententiae*, even in
the *narratio* and in *descriptiones*, that 'normal' sentences are few and far
between. On average, the *sententiae* are somewhat cruder, more striking,
more laboured and easier to classify than those found in Seneca. A
selection from a number of *Major Declamations* will give an impression of
their character and function.

Major Declamation 12 deals with a lugubrious case of cannibalism. The
story behind it will emerge from the *thema*:

> *Cum civitas fame laboraret, misit ad frumenta legatum praestituta die, intra quam
> rediret. profectus ille emit et ad aliam civitatem tempestate delatus duplo vendidit
> et duplum frumenti modum comparavit. illo cessante corporibus suorum pasti sunt.
> reversus ad praestitutam diem rei publicae laesae accusatur.*

> When a city was suffering from a famine, it dispatched an agent to buy
> grain. A date was established by which he should return. He departed
> and bought the grain but, carried off course by a storm to another city,
> he sold it for twice the price. He then purchased double the original

[31] See Lehnert 1905: 352–353, where one finds e.g. SHA 24 (Trebell. Pollio: *XXX tyr.*)
4,2; Auson. *commem. prof.* 1,2,6; Hier. *ad Galat.* 3,7; *in Is. 8 praef.*
[32] The assumption originates with Ritter 1881, 1–217; 257–272.

amount of grain. When he failed to appear, the inhabitants of his city ate the corpses of their fellow citizens. Although he returned on the day agreed upon, he was charged with harming the state. (transl. L. Sussman)[33]

The most striking *sententiae* in this declamation pertain to the horrors of the famine and especially the guilt with which it has burdened the inhabitants of the city:

> *O fames inaudita, in qua levius est, quod esurimus!*
> What an unusual famine where the least of our misfortunes was our hunger! (*ex inopinato*, 12,2).
>
> *Famam ipsam infamavimus, et, quod miseris ultimum est, miserationem quoque perdidimus.*
> We have defamed the very word famine, and what is the last straw for the pitiful, we have also lost our claim to pity (*a verbo*, 12,3; *sententiae* based on puns are always *vitiosae* according to Quint. *Inst.* 8,5,20).
>
> *Me miserum! Iam fames desinit.*
> And—my heart breaks as I say this—now our starvation ended (*noema per exclamationem*, 12,7).
>
> *Non habitant una pudor et fames.*
> Honour and hunger do not exist side by side (gnomic, 12,8).
>
> *Adeo mors placet: iam etiam cibis nostris invideo.*
> Death is such a pleasing prospect; now I even envy my own former food (*noema*, the former food of course being the speaker's dead fellow-citizens; 12,14).
>
> *Credibiles fabulas fecimus, felices miserias, scelera innocentia.*
> We have made the old legends believable, ordinary troubles a source of joy, criminal conduct blameless (*alio relata*, 12,26).

The speaker reproaches the agent for his lateness and for the fact that he has made a profit:

> *At non tua culpa fames coepit; sed vulneratum iugulasti, titubantem stravisti, fumantem incendisti.*
> But of course it was not your fault that the famine started; still, you finished us off after we were wounded, you knocked us down as we staggered, you set us on fire while we were just smoking (*anticipatio*[34] by means of a metaphor, 12,15).

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[33] All translations of quotes from the *Major Declamations* are based on Sussman's.

[34] The figure of *anticipatio* or *prolepsis* is used to forestall a possible objection (Rutil. 2,4; *Carm. de Fig.* 124).

> *Innocentiam publicam vendis. Frumentum non naufragio perdidimus, non latrocinio; lucro perimus!*
> You bartered away your people's innocence; we lost our grain neither through shipwreck nor piracy; we perished through profit! (enthymeme, 12,18).

> *Ne frumentum salva classe perderemus, non timuimus.*
> We did not fear that we would lose our grain when our fleet was safe (*ex inopinato*, 12,20).

> *In portu naufragium fecimus et frumentum ad ancoras perdidimus.*
> We were shipwrecked—in a port, and we lost our grain—riding at anchor! (*ex inopinato*, 12,23).

As in Sen. *Contr.* 2,7, most *sententiae* express moral outrage; in this case, it is convincingly used to conceal the fact that although the citizens want him condemned, the merchant is actually not liable to punishment. Two characteristics of these *sententiae* makes them really effective: they are rephrased and repeated several times, and they are often enigmatic, which challenges the audience and makes them feel intellectually superior when they have solved them.

These two characteristics can be found at least as frequently in *Major Declamations* 18 and 19, two declamations that are speeches for the prosecution and the defence in a particularly lurid case:

> *Malae tractationis sit actio.*
> *Speciosum filium, infamem, tamquam incestum cum matre committeret, pater in secreta parte domus torsit et occidit in tormentis. interrogat illum mater, quid ex filio compererit; nolentem dicere malae tractationis accusat.*

> Law: Maltreatment may be actionable.
> Case: A father interrogated his handsome son under torture in a secluded part of the house and killed him on the rack, since he was suspected of committing incest with his mother. The mother asked her husband what he had learned from their son. Since he refuses to tell, she accuses her husband of maltreatment. (transl. after Sussman)

The accusation of maltreatment because of the father's silence (*DM* 18) may seem strange, but the mother's advocate has an underlying purpose: he wants to clear the mother's name and denounce the father's murder of his son. The father's goals, in *DM* 19, are the reverse: under the pretext of defending himself against the charge of maltreatment, he tries to justify the murder by means of an unremitting torrent of innuendo against mother and son. Both declamations are therefore *controversiae figuratae*. *DM* 18 is aimed to expose the father's insinuations and especially his silence, which is actually an eloquent form of innuendo:

Incestum probaretur silentio patris, si taceret et mater.
The father's silence would prove incest, if the mother also kept quiet
   (enthymeme, 18,2).

Parcere nunc illum cuiquam tacendo creditis? Loqui se cum maxime putat.
Do you suppose that he is now showing mercy to anybody by keeping
   still? At this very moment he thinks that he is speaking (*per subiec-
   tionem,*[35] 18,2).

Potest mater admittere, quod loqui non potest pater?
Is it possible for a mother to perpetrate something which a father cannot
   repeat? (antithetical enthymeme *per interrogationem*, 18,10).

*Non verba tibi contra miseram, sed argumenta desunt; non voce, sed probatione
   deficeris.*
You don't lack words to use against this poor woman, but proof; you
   are found wanting not in voice but in logical argument (antithetical
   enthymeme and synonymy, 18,16).

In *DM* 19, the father's refusal to speak clearly becomes an unvoiced
accusation, which is all the more eloquent and powerful because it is
hard to combat silence with words, and because the silence is presented
as a virtue and the final word of a person who is emphatically in the
moral right:

Non quia occidi filium taceo, sed occisus est, ut tacerem.
I am not silent because I killed my son, but, rather, he was killed so that
   I could remain silent (antithetical enthymeme, 19,1).

Utrumque de filio fieri non potest, ut et occiderim et fatear cur meruerit occidi.
In my son's case, it is impossible for me to do both; first, to kill him,
   next, to confess why he deserved to be killed (enthymeme, 19,1).

Cur filium occiderim, indicare non possum, nec paenitet quod occidi.
I cannot reveal why I killed my son, yet I have no regrets that I did kill
   him (*epiphonema*, 19,2).

The mother's charge is an occasion to accuse her in covert terms:

*Ipsius animus potest scire, quid filius meus dixerit, quae me putat habere, quod
   dicam.*
She is able to know in her own heart what my son said, seeing that she
   thinks I have something to say (enthymeme, 19,2).

Quisquis de tacente queritur, multo minus ferre poterit loquentem.
Whoever complains about keeping silent can much less tolerate one who
   opens his mouth (gnomic, 19,7).

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[35] *Subiectio* or *schema per suggestionem* is a figure where the speaker raises a question and
immediately answers it to his own advantage (*Rhet. ad Her.* 4,33; Quint. *Inst.* 9,2,15).

> *Quid iuvenis in tormentis dixerit, tamquam ignoret, interrogat: nihil me comperisse non credit, tamquam sciat, quid dixerit.*
> She asks what the young man said under torture as if she didn't know; she does not believe that I didn't discover anything, as if she knows what he said (*epiphonema*, 19,10).

The murder is presented as an act of fatherly love:

> *Maioris adfectus est filium occidere quam vindicare.*
> It takes more love to kill a son than it does to whitewash him (gnomic, 19,5).
>
> *Atquin summorum facinorum ipsa inmanitas innocentia est.*
> Yet the very cruelty of the most horrendous acts implies their innocence (gnomic, 19,5).
>
> *Post exitum unici revertor in patrem.*
> After my only son's death I become a father once again (*noema*, 19,11).
>
> *In gratiam me cum filio reduxit orbitas, iram nostram mors severa conposuit.*
> The loss of my son reconciles me to him, and his dreadful death has allayed my anger (*epiphonema*, 19,11).
>
> *Non perdidi tamen, non perdidi unici mortem, fortuna, non perdidi.*
> Yet I didn't waste the death of my only son, no I didn't, my good fortune, I didn't waste it (*ex inopinato, per exclamationem*, 19,15).

The above collection of one-liners will have given a clear picture of what the declamatory *sententia* was about. Indeed, it would be fair to say that they make use of all three means of persuasion listed by Aristotle.[36] Λόγος or argument can be found especially in the enthymemes, which contain truncated arguments, but also in the ones that rely on such figures as *anticipatio* and *subiectio*. Gnomic *sententiae* provide ἦθος; πάθος is occasioned by more flamboyant stylistic devices, such as metaphor, *exclamatio* and *interrogatio*. Moreover the majority of *sententiae* require some, but not too much, interpretation by the audience, an exercise which will have awarded them with amusement and a feeling of intellectual and moral superiority. Rhetorically speaking, they are extremely effective and it is therefore hardly surprising that their popularity has never waned until the present day.

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[36] *Rhet.* 1356a 1–4; they are λόγος (rational argument), ἦθος (the speaker's character) and πάθος (emotions aroused in the audience).

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CICEROS BERICHT ÜBER DIE EINFÜHRUNG DER RECHTSMITTEL GEGEN ARGLIST (*DOLUS MALUS*) DURCH AQUILIUS GALLUS

Leon ter Beek

In seinem wichtigen Werk *De oratore* hebt Cicero an mehreren Stellen hervor, dass ein tüchtiger Redner in allen Wissenschaftsbereichen bewandert sein soll.[1] Dies trifft vor allem für das Gebiet des Rechts zu.[2] In diesem Beitrag wende ich mich zwei Textstellen aus den Werken des Cicero zu, die für unsere Kenntnisse des römischen Rechts von großer Bedeutung sind, weil sie in die problematische Entwicklungsgeschichte der für das römische Recht grundlegenden Rechtsmittel gegen Arglist (*dolus malus*) Licht bringen können.

Am Anfang des ersten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts wuchs unter den römischen Juristen immer stärker das Bedürfnis nach einem allgemeinen Rechtsmittel um gegen den *dolus malus*, das heißt die Intention, etwas Unerlaubtes zu tun, vorzugehen. Bis zu dieser Zeit hatten die Gesetze lediglich gewisse arglistig ausgeführte Handlungen strafbar gemacht oder mit einer Geldstrafe belegt, das heißt, dass eine Handlung mit einer Geldstrafe belegt oder strafbar gemacht wurde, wenn man sie bewusst und arglistig (*sciens dolo malo*) oder arglistig (*dolo malo*) ausgeführt hatte. Manchmal auch verordnete das Gesetz, dass eine Handlung ohne Arglist (*sine dolo malo*) ausgeführt werden solle.[3] In all diesen Fällen bildet die Arglist (*dolus malus*) eine Voraussetzung für die Haftung auf Grund einer gesetzlichen Anordnung, durch welche die Arglist (*dolus malus*) nur mittelbar strafbar gemacht oder mit einer Geldstrafe belegt wird. Ein Rechtsmittel mit dem man gegen Arglist an sich vorgehen konnte war nicht vorhanden.

Der Jurist C. Aquilius Gallus hat, wie aus einer von Cicero in seinem Werk *De officiis* erzählten Geschichte hervorgeht, ein solches Rechts-

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[1] Vgl. Cic., *De orat.* I 5.17–18.

[2] Das legt Cicero, *De orat.* I 36.166–46.203 durch Crassus, dem Cicero seine eigenen Ansichten in den Mund legt, ausführlich dar, am deutlichsten zum *ius civile* vielleicht *De orat.* I 38.173; zum *ius publicum* (Strafrecht) *De orat.* I 46.201.

[3] Die einschlägigen Texte findet man bei Ter Beek 1999 I, 321–538 aufgelistet und besprochen.

mittel geschaffen. Cicero berichtet wie der römische *eques* C. Canius[4]
von dem aus Syrakus stammenden Bankier Pythius betrogen wurde. Es
handelt sich um folgenden Text:

> *C. Canius eques Romanus, nec infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi,*
> *ut ipse dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat se hortulos aliquos*
> *emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod*
> *cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales*
> *quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam*
> *hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, qui*
> *esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab*
> *eis petivit ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur, dixitque quid eos facere vellet.*
> *Ad cenam tempori venit Canius; opipare a Pythio adparatum convivium, cumbarum*
> *ante oculos multitudo; pro se quisque quod ceperat adferebat; ante pedes Pythi pisces*
> *abiciebantur. Tum Canius:* ,*Quaeso*', *inquit,* ,*quid est hoc, Pythi? Tantumne piscium?*
> *Tantumne cumbarum?*' *Et ille:* ,*Quid mirum?*' *inquit,* ,*hoc loco est Syracusis quidquid*
> *est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt*'. *Incensus Canius cupiditate*
> *contendit a Pythio ut venderet. Gravate ille primo. Quid multa? Impetrat. Emit homo*
> *cupidus et locuples tanti quanti Pythius voluit, et emit instructos. Nomina facit,*
> *negotium conficit. Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature, scalmum*
> *nullum videt. Quaerit ex proximo vicino num feriae quaedam piscatorum essent, quod*
> *eos nullos videret.* „*Nullae, quod sciam*', *inquit,* ,*sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque*
> *heri mirabar quid accidisset*'. *Stomachari Canius, sed quid faceret? Nondum enim*
> *C. Aquilius collega et familiaris meus protulerat de dolo malo formulas.*[5]

Als Gaius Canius, ein römischer Ritter (*eques Romanus*), ziemlich geist-
reich (*nec infacetus*)[6] und recht gebildet (*et satis litteratus*), sich nach Syrakus,
um sich zu erholen (*otiandi*), wie er selbst zu sagen pflegte (*ut ipse dicere*
solebat), nicht Geschäfte halber (*non negotiandi causa*), begeben hatte, ließ er
verlauten (*dictitabat*), er wolle ein Landgut (*hortulos aliquos*) kaufen, wo er
Freunde einladen (*quo invitare amicos*) und sich ohne Störenfriede (*sine inter-*
pellatoribus) amüsieren könne. Als sich dies herumgesprochen hatte (*quod*
cum percrebruisset), teilte ihm ein gewisser Pythius (*Pythius ei quidam*), der in
Syrakus Bankier war (*qui argentariam faceret Syracusis*),[7] mit, er wolle sein
Landgut zwar nicht verkaufen (*venales quidem se hortos non habere*), es stehe
Canius aber frei es zu gebrauchen (*sed licere uti Canio*), wenn er wolle (*si*
vellet), als gehöre es ihm selbst (*ut suis*), und zugleich (*simul*) lud er Canius

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[4] Dieser war um 115 v.Chr. aktiv; vgl. Watson 1965, 30 Anm. 3.

[5] *De off.* III 14.58–60.

[6] Ein Beispiel für seinen Witz erzählt Cic., *De orat.* II 69.280: *Cum Scaurus accusaret*
Rutilium ambitus, cum ipse consul esset factus, ille repulsam tulisset, et in eius tabulis ostenderet litteras
A.F.P.R. idque diceret esse ,*actum fide P. Rutili*', *Rutilius autem* ,*ante factum, post relatum*', *C. Canius*
eques Romanus, cum Rufo (sc. *Rutilio*) *adesset, exclamat neutrum illis litteris declarari.* ,*Quid ergo?*'
inquit Scaurus.—,*Aemilius fecit, plectitur Rutilius*'.

[7] Hierzu vgl. Holden 1899=1966, 390: ,The conjunctive *faceret* is difficult to explain:
qui is probably = *quippe qui*, so that the sense is ,as might be expected from a money-
changer', or it may be used consecutively as referring to a class, not an individual.'

für den nächsten Tag (*in posterum diem*) auf sein Landgut (*in hortos*) zum Essen (*ad cenam*) ein. Als dieser zugesagt hatte (*cum ille promisisset*), da rief Pythius, der als Bankier (*ut argentarius*)[8] in allen Kreisen Einfluss hatte (*apud omnes ordines gratiosus*),[9] Fischer zusammen (*piscatores ad se convocavit*) und bat sie (*et ab eis petivit*), am nächsten Tag vor seinem Landgut zu fischen (*ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur*), und er legte ihnen dar, was sie tun sollten (*dixitque quid eos facere vellet*). Canius erscheint pünktlich (*tempori*) zum Essen (*ad cenam tempori venit Canius*); Pythius hatte ein üppiges Festmahl herrichten lassen (*opipare a Pythio adparatum convivium*), vor ihren Augen gab es jede Menge Boote (*cumbarum ante oculos multitudo*). Jeder für sich (*pro se quisque*) brachte heran, was er gefangen hatte (*quod ceperat adferebat*). Zu Füßen des Pythius wurden die Fische niedergeworfen. Darauf fragte Canius: ‚Sag' mal, was ist denn das, Pythius? Soviele Fische? Soviele Boote?‘ Und dieser sagte: ‚Kein Wunder (*quid mirum?*). An dieser Stelle (*hoc loco*) befinden sich vor Syrakus alle Fische (*quidquid piscium*), hier nehmen sie Wasser ein (*hic aquatio*), diese Villa ist für die unentbehrlich (*hac villa isti carere non possunt*)‘. Vor Verlangen entbrannt (*incensus cupiditate*) drängte Canius den Pythius (*contendit a Pythio*), ihm sein Landgut zu verkaufen (*ut venderet*). Dieser gab sich zunächst unwillig (*ille gravate primo*). Aber kurz und gut (*quid multa?*), er erhält es (*impetrat*). Er kaufte es (*emit*), kauflustig und reich wie er war (*homo cupidus et locuples*), zu dem Preis, den Pythius verlangte (*tanti quanti Pythius voluit*), und er kaufte es mit allem Zubehör (*et emit instructos*). Dieser trägt Canius' Namen in sein Hausbuch ein (*nomina facit*) und besiegelt das Geschäft (*negotium conficit*). Am nächsten Tag (*postridie*) lädt Canius seine Freunde (*familiares suos*) ein, selbst kommt er frühzeitig (*venit ipse mature*), sieht keine Dolle (*scalmum nullum videt*). Er fragt beim nächsten Nachbar nach (*quaerit ex proximo vicino*), ob die Fischer etwa Ferien hätten (*num feriae quaedam piscatorum essent*), weil er keine sähe (*quod eos nullos videret*). ‚Nein, soviel ich weiß (*nullae, quod sciam*)‘, sagte dieser, ‚aber gewöhnlich fischt hier keiner (*sed hic piscari nulli solent*); deshalb wunderte ich mich gestern (*itaque heri mirabar*) über das, was geschehen war (*quid accidisset*)‘. Canius wütend (*Canius stomachari*), aber was hätte er machen können (*sed quid faceret?*)[10] Noch hatte ja Gaius Aquilius, mein

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[8] Zu diesem *ut* vgl. Kühner-Stegmann 1992 II 2, 452: ‚in begründendem Sinne. So zur Angabe eines tatsächlichen Grundes‘, mit Hinweis auf u. a. die vorliegende Stelle.

[9] Von Lübtow 1963, 185 übersetzt hier ungenau: ‚als Bankier bei allen Schichten beliebt‘; auch Lewis-Short 1879=1993, 826 s. v. *gratiosus* I, übersetzen unrichtig ‚enjoying favor, in favor, popular, regarded, beloved, agreeable‘. Auch in Rom waren Bankiers nicht gerade beliebt. Die Übersetzung von Resta Barrile in Narducci-Resta Barrile 1995, 361: ‚che come banchiere godeva credito presso ogni genere di persone‘ ist zweifelhaft. Korrekt übersetzt Büchner 2001, 265: ‚der als Bankier bei allen Ständen Einfluss hatte‘.

[10] Der Konjunktiv des Imperfekts stellt den Potentialis der Vergangenheit dar; vgl. Kühner-Stegmann 1992 II 1, 179–180, §46, 3. Man kann den Konjunktiv auch als einen Deliberativ der Vergangenheit deuten; vgl. Kühner-Stegmann 1992 II 1, 181, §47, 3. So Holden 1899=1966, 392 sowie Büchner 2001, 267: ‚was hätte er tun sollen‘.

Amtsgenosse und Freund (*collega et familiaris meus*), seine Prozessformeln über Arglist (*de dolo malo formulas*)[11] nicht veröffentlicht.[12]

Mit *formulae* zielt Cicero auf die festen Prozessformeln in denen eine Klage oder eine Einrede abgefasst war.[13] Die Worte *dolo malo* weisen auf die Prozessformeln der *exceptio doli* und der *actio de dolo* hin. Neben der vorliegenden Textstelle erwähnt Cicero auch sonst wo, dass C. Aquilius die *actio de dolo* entworfen habe. Er umschreibt die *actio de dolo* hier als ein ‚Schleppnetz (*everriculum*) gegen jegliche Schlauheiten (*malitiarum omnium*)‘:[14]

> … *inde everriculum malitiarum omnium, iudicium de dolo malo, quod C. Aquilius familiaris noster protulit* …[15]

Wir wissen nicht in welcher Eigenschaft C. Aquilius Gallus die *formulae de dolo* entworfen hat. Möglicherweise hat er sie geschaffen als er Prätor war, es ist aber ebenfalls durchaus denkbar, dass der *iurisconsultus* Aquilius die *formulae* zunächst als Privatmann abgefasst hat, woraufhin der amtierende Prätor sie in sein Edikt aufgenommen hat. Fest steht, dass Aquilius im Jahre 66 v.Chr. als Prätor der *quaestio ambitus* vorsaß.[16] Es ist aber nicht ausgeschlossen, dass er im gleichen Jahr *praetor peregrinus* war. Hierauf weist überdies die Tatsache hin, dass Cicero den Aquilius als seinen Amtskollegen (*collega meus*) bezeichnet.[17]

Cicero berichtet, die Geschichte von Canius und Pythius habe sich zu einer Zeit zugetragen, als Aquilius die *formulae de dolo* noch nicht ins Leben gerufen hatte. Aus diesem Grund verfügte Canius noch nicht über eine Möglichkeit, etwas gegen den von Pythius verübten Betrug zu unternehmen. Wenn zwischen Canius und Pythius ein Kaufkontrakt

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[11] Vgl. Ter Beek 1999 II, 598; Nörr 2004, 173.

[12] Zu diesem Text vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 184; Watson 1965, 29–30; Dyck 1996, 566–569; Ter Beek 1999 II, 595–603.

[13] Vgl. Holden 1899=1966, 392.

[14] Vgl. Watson 1974, 72–73; Ter Beek 1999 II, 598–599 und 803–804 mit 804 Anm. 1; Nörr 2004, 173.

[15] *De nat. deor.* III 30.74.

[16] Vgl. Cic., *Pro Cluentio* LIII 147; Broughton 1952, 152; Von Lübtow 1963, 186; Watson 1974, 73.

[17] Vgl. Cic., *De off.* III 30.74: *collega et familiaris meus*. Meines Erachtens kann man auf Grund der Quellenlage mit einiger Vorsicht davon ausgehen, dass Aquilius im Jahr 66 v.Chr. als *praetor peregrinus* die *formulae de dolo* eingeführt hat. Der Terminus *proferre*, den Cicero, *De off.* III 14.60 und *De nat. deorum* III 30.74 anwendet, ist zwar nicht der übliche Fachausdruck zur Bezeichnung des Erlassens einer Ediktformel (das ist *proponere*), ist aber andererseits auch kein Argument dafür, dass Aquilius, als er die *formulae* einführte, die Prätur nicht bekleidete; vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 187; Watson 1965, 258–259.

(*emptio venditio*) abgeschlossen wäre, wäre Canius, falls er den Kaufpreis nicht bezahlen wollte, als Beklagter in einer von Pythius eingeleiteten *actio venditi* ohne weiteres freigesprochen: Diese Klage untersteht ja der *bona fides*. Aus diesem Grund legte Pythius es darauf an, den Canius auf eine abstrakte Weise dazu zu verpflichten, die Kaufsumme zu bezahlen. Dies gelingt ihm, indem er die von Cicero beschriebene Situation in Szene setzt. Canius ist entschlossen, das Landgut zu erwerben und fleht den Pythius an, es ihm zu verkaufen. Als dieser, angeblich nachdem er seine Bedenken aufgegeben hatte, nachgibt, will Canius natürlich das Eisen schmieden, solang es heiß ist. Er ist aber nicht in der Lage, auf der Stelle zu bezahlen (was Pythius ja gerade beabsichtigt hatte), worauf Pythius ihm freundlicherweise ein Darlehen gewährt (*nomina facit*).[18] Cicero schreibt nicht *nomen facit*, sondern *nomina facit*, was möglicherweise darauf hinweist, dass Pythius verschiedene Notizen in seinem Hausbuch macht.[19] Dies könnte wiederum darauf hinweisen, dass es sich hier um eine *litterarum obligatio* handelt,[20] welche im gegebenen Fall auf eine Umwandlung einer kausalen Forderung (auf Grund eines Kaufvertrags) in eine abstrakte Forderung hinausläuft[21] und welche der römische Jurist Gaius[22] als *nomen transscripticium* bezeichnet.[23] Die Sache ist dann folgende. Pythius verbucht in seinem Hausbuch eine Verpflichtung des Canius, ihm den Kaufpreis zu bezahlen sowie eine Verpflichtung seiner selbst, dem Canius ein Darlehen über denselben Betrag auszuzahlen. Eine zweite Möglichkeit besteht darin, dass Canius sich gegenüber Pythius verpflichtet hat, indem er eine *stipulatio* abgelegt hat, welche Cicero allerdings nicht erwähnt hat.[24] Sowohl im Falle einer *litterarum obligatio* wie auch im Falle einer *stipulatio* konnte Pythius den Canius mit einer *actio stricti iuris* verklagen, und zwar im ersten Fall

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[18] Der Ausdruck *nomen facere* heißt buchstäblich: ‚den Namen (eines Schuldners) (in das Hausbuch) eintragen', das heißt ‚einen Betrag als ausgeliehen verbuchen', ‚eine Forderung verbuchen'; vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 188–189; Thilo 1980, 303; Jouanique 1968, 9–11.

[19] Vgl. Babják 2001, 11–19.

[20] Vgl. Watson 1965, 31.

[21] Vgl. Babják 2001, 15.

[22] *Inst.* III 128–134.

[23] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 188–189. Im Falle eines *nomen transscripticium* wurde der Empfang einer Geldsumme durch den Schuldner (Canius) und die Zahlung an ihn eines gleichen Betrages als *creditum* fingiert (= *transscriptio a re in personam*; vgl. Gaius, *Inst.* III 129). Man sehe über diese Problematik im allgemeinen Thielmann 1961, 118.

[24] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 190, mit Argumenten 188–189; Watson 1965, 30–31; Dyck 1996, 566–567.

mit einer *actio certae creditae pecuniae* oder *condictio* und im zweiten Fall mit einer *actio certa ex stipulatu*.[25] Da es noch nicht die Möglichkeit gab, eine *exceptio doli* zu erheben, wäre Canius in beiden Fällen verurteilt und dazu gezwungen, Pythius den Kaufpreis zu bezahlen.

Diese Interpretationen sind aber beide problematisch. Erstens ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Pythius ein *peregrinus* war;[26] es ist aber zweifelhaft, ob *peregrini* durch *nomina transscripticia* eine *litterarum obligatio* begründen konnten.[27] Gegen die zweite Möglichkeit, dass Canius sich mittels einer *stipulatio* verpflichtet hat, spricht hingegen schon die Tatsache, dass Cicero diese nicht erwähnt. Die vielen Probleme und Unsicherheiten, welche mit der von Cicero erzählten Geschichte verbunden sind, bilden für Von Lübtow und Watson einen Anlass, festzustellen, dass über die Art und Weise, in der Canius sich gegenüber Pythius verpflichtet hat, keine Gewissheit erlangt werden kann. Fest steht nur, dass diese Verpflichtung auf eine solche Weise zustande gekommen ist, dass Pythius auf Grund dessen über die Möglichkeit verfügte, eine *actio stricti iuris* zu erheben.[28]

Anschließend hat Thilo darauf hingewiesen, dass der Ausdruck *nomina facere* sich nicht unbedingt auf das Zustandebringen einer *litterarum obligatio* bezieht, sondern oft die allgemeine Bedeutung ‚eine Forderung auf Grund eines Darlehens ins Leben rufen‘ hat.[29] Pythius trägt den Canius also als Schuldner in sein Hausbuch ein, wobei fingiert wird, dass Pythius dem Canius eine Geldsumme bezahlt hat.[30] Die Rückzahlung dieser Geldsumme lässt Pythius sich formell versprechen, und

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[25] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 190, mit Literaturhinweisen.

[26] Hierfür sprechen sein (griechischer und einfacher) Name, sein Beruf (*argentarius* in Syrakus) und der Gegensatz den Cicero, *De off.* III 14.58 zwischen *C. Canius, eques Romanus* und *Pythius quidam* konstruiert; vgl. Watson 1965, 31; Thilo 1980, 302; Dyck 1996, 566. Von Lübtow 1963, 189–190, geht stillschweigend davon aus, dass Pythius ein *peregrinus* sei.

[27] Fest steht nur, dass es *peregrini* untersagt war, bei *nomina transscripticia* als *debitor* zu fungieren: vgl. Gaius, *Inst.* III 133. Thilo 1980, 302 spricht von einer *litteris obligatio iuris civilis*, was aber aus dem Gaiustext nicht ohne weiteres hervorgeht.

[28] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 190; Watson 1974, 32, der es für wahrscheinlich hält, dass entweder Pythius dennoch römischer Bürger war, oder dass Cicero den Hergang nicht genau beschreibt.

[29] Vgl. Sen., *De benef.* I 1.2: *nomina facturi diligenter in patrimonium et vitam debitoris inquirimus*; *ibid.* II 23.2: *quidam nolunt nomina secum fieri* (= ‚wollen nicht schriftlich als Schuldner eingetragen werden‘); *ibid.* III 15.2: *Ille per tabulas plurium nomina interpositis parariis* (‚Vermittler‘) *facit*; wichtig ist namentlich Cic., *Ad fam.* VII 23.1: *nomina facturum* = ‚ein Darlehen gewähren zu wollen‘; vgl. Thilo 1980, 303–305.

[30] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 188–189, mit Hinweis auf Thielmann 1961, 118.

zwar mündlich, im Beisein aller Gäste, die beim Essen auf dem Land-
gut anwesend waren. Pythius fasst dieses Versprechen natürlich auf eine
abstrakte Weise ab.[31] Somit hatte sich Canius formell als Schuldner
gegenüber Pythius verbunden. Diese Schuldverbindlichkeit tritt an die
Stelle von der alten, aus dem Kaufkontrakt erwachsenen, Verpflich-
tung,[32] die jetzt erloschen ist, was in den Worten *negotium conficit* zum
Ausdruck kommt.[33]

Die von Cicero verwendeten Worte *de dolo malo formulae* sind aus juris-
tischer Sicht ungenau formuliert. Der Plural *formulae* weist aber darauf
hin, dass Cicero sich hier auf die Formeln der *actio de dolo* und der
exceptio doli bezieht.[34] Dies leuchtet auch ein, wenn man bedenkt, dass
Canius sich tatsächlich sowohl mit Hilfe einer *exceptio doli* wie auch mit-
tels der *actio de dolo* hätte Gerechtigkeit verschaffen können: Gegen eine
von Pythius erhobene *condictio* oder *actio ex stipulatu* hätte er die *excep-
tio doli* einwenden können, während er, wenn er wünschte, auch selbst
den Pythius mit der *actio de dolo* hätte belangen können. Auf Grund der
in der Formel dieser Klage aufgenommenen Restitutionsklausel[35] wäre
Pythius dann gezwungen, die durch Canius abgelegte Stipulation mit
Hilfe einer *acceptilatio* formell zu erlassen.

Es liegt nahe, C. Aquilius Gallus als den Schöpfer sowohl der *actio de
dolo*[36] als auch der *exceptio doli* zu betrachten. Von Lübtow hat glaubhaft
gemacht, dass Aquilius zunächst die *exceptio doli* und einige Zeit später
die *actio de dolo* entworfen hat.[37] Aus dem Werk des Juristen Gaius ist uns
die Formulierung der *exceptio doli* bekannt. Sie lautete: ,wenn in dieser
Sache (*si in ea re*) nichts (*nihil*) durch die Arglist (*dolo malo*) des Aulus
Agerius[38] geschehen ist (*factum sit*) oder geschieht (*neque fiat*)':

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[31] Zum Beispiel: *Fidepromittisne mihi HS … dare? Fidepromitto*; vgl. Thilo 1980, 304.

[32] Es handelt sich hier um eine Novationsstipulation; vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 191.

[33] *Negotium conficere* heißt ,ein Geschäft abwickeln', auch in übertragenem Sinne; vgl.
Cic., *Pro Flacco* VI 14: *ad hoc negotium conficiendum*; *id.*, *Philipp.* II 33: *confecto negotio*; *id.*, *De
fato* XII 26: *confectum negotium* (,und damit basta'); *id.*, *De divin.* II 103: *quam paucis verbis
confectum negotium putant*; Thilo 1980, 304. Für die Bedeutung ,ein Rechtsverhältnis durch
Bezahlung der Schuld tilgen': Cic., *Ad Att.* V 21.11: *ut negotium conficerent*; *id.*, *Pro Roscio
com.* XIII 38: *in re tam vetere, in negotio tam confecto, in societate dissoluta*.

[34] So auch Von Lübtow 1963, 191; Watson 1965, 259.

[35] Hierauf komme ich in der Folge zurück.

[36] Vgl. Cic., *De nat. deor.* III 30.74: *iudicium de dolo malo*.

[37] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 194. Für die *clausula doli* weise ich auf Ter Beek 1999 I,
539–559 hin.

[38] Das ist der Kläger (*agere* = ,klagen'). Man könnte den Blankettnamen Aulus Age-
rius mit ,Karl Kläger' übersetzen. Ebenso war den römischen Juristen zur Bezeichnung

>   *… si in ea re nihil dolo malo Auli Agerii factum sit neque fiat …*[39]

Diese Einrede zerfällt in zwei Teile. Der Teil *si factum sit* weist auf die Vergangenheit hin und bezieht sich somit auf die Arglist, welche der Kläger sich beim abschließen des Kontrakts hat zuschulden kommen lassen. Der zweite Teil *neque fiat* weist auf die Gegenwart hin und bezieht sich also auf die Arglist des Klägers beim Erheben der Klage.[40]

Der römische Jurist Ulpian hat die Worte, mit denen im prätorischen Edikt die *actio de dolo* ausgefertigt wurde, teilweise überliefert.[41] Auf der Grundlage der Mitteilungen anderer römischer Juristen kann der betreffende Teil des Edikts wie folgt rekonstruiert werden: ‚Wenn in Bezug auf diejenigen Sachen (*si de his rebus*), welche, wie behauptet werden wird, auf arglistige Weise geschehen sind (*quae dolo malo facta esse dicentur*), eine andere Klage nicht vorhanden sein wird (*alia actio non erit*)[42] und nach meinem Ermessen ein triftiger Grund vorliegen wird (*et iusta causa esse videbitur*), werde ich innerhalb eines Jahres (*intra annum*), seitdem es zum ersten Mal die Möglichkeit gegeben haben wird, Klage zu erheben (*cum primum experiundi potestas fuerit*), eine Klage gewähren (*iudicium dabo*)‘:[43]

>   *Quae dolo malo facta esse dicentur, si de his rebus alia actio non erit et iusta causa*
>   *esse videbitur, intra annum, cum primum experiundi potestas fuerit, iudicium dabo.*[44]

Auf Grund verschiedener Zeugnisse hat Lenel es ebenfalls geschafft, die Formel der *actio de dolo* wiederherzustellen. Der Wortlaut ist wahrscheinlich wie folgt: ‚Wenn es sich herausstellt (*si paret*), dass durch die Arglist des Numerius Negidius geschehen ist (*dolo malo Numerii Negidii factum esse*), dass Aulus Agerius dem Numerius Negidius das Landgut, worum es sich handelt (*fundum quo de agitur*), durch Manzipation übereignete (*mancipio daret*),[45] und es nicht mehr als ein Jahr her ist (*neque plus quam annus est*), seit es zum ersten Mal die Möglichkeit gegeben hat,

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des Beklagten der Blankettname Numerius Negidius geläufig (*numerare* = ‚bezahlen‘, *negare* = ‚sich weigern‘), was man mit ‚Bodo Beklagter‘ wiedergeben könnte.

   [39] *Inst.* IV 119; vgl. Lenel 1927=1974, 512 (*ed. perp.* XLIV 227).

   [40] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 192.

   [41] Vgl. Ulp., *Ad edictum* XI = *Dig.* IV 3.1.1.

   [42] Diese Worte bilden die Subsidiaritätsklausel, in welcher der Umstand Erwähnung findet, dass die *actio de dolo* nur dann gewährt wird, wenn kein anderes Rechtsmittel (*actio*) zur Verfügung steht.

   [43] Vgl. Watson 1965, 162.

   [44] *Ed. perp.* X 40; vgl. Lenel 1927=1974, 114.

   [45] Dieser Abschnitt bildet die *intentio* der Formel; vgl. Gaius, *Inst.* IV 41: *Intentio est ea pars formulae qua actor desiderium suum concludit.*

Klage zu erheben (*cum experiundi potestas fuit*), und die Sache nicht nach dem Ermessen des Richters zurückerstattet werden wird (*neque ea res arbitrio iudicis restituetur*),[46] soll der Richter den Numerius Negidius dem Aulus Agerius zur Zahlung eines Betrags in Höhe des Wertes der Streit-sache (*quanti ea res erit, tantam pecuniam*) verurteilen (*condemnato*); wenn dies sich nicht herausstellt (*si non paret*), soll er ihn freisprechen (*absolvito*)'[47]:

> *Si paret dolo malo Numerii Negidii factum esse ut Aulus Agerius Numerio Negidio fundum quo de agitur mancipio daret, neque plus quam annus est, cum experiundi potestas fuit, neque ea res arbitrio iudicis restituetur, quanti ea res erit, tantam pecu-niam iudex Numerium Negidium Aulo Agerio condemnato, si non paret absolvito.*[48]

Die *actio de dolo* musste also innerhalb eines Jahres, nachdem die betref-fende Arglist verübt worden war, erhoben werden und enthielt eine Restitutionsklausel, durch welche der Beklagte der Verurteilung ent-kommen konnte; mit der *actio de dolo* klagt man auf einfachen Scha-densersatz.[49]

Von Bedeutung ist ferner der Umstand, dass es schon vor der Ein-führung der *exceptio doli* eine Einrede gegeben hat, die eine ähnliche Funktion hatte und deshalb als einen Vorläufer der *exceptio doli* betrach-tet werden kann. Cicero erwähnt die fragliche Einrede in einem Brief an Atticus, geschrieben am 20. Februar 50 v.Chr., als Cicero Statt-halter der Provinz Cilicien war.[50] Er teilt Atticus mit, in Sachen des Edikts von Bibulus[51] gäbe es nichts Neues zu melden (*de Bibuli edicto nihil novi*)[52] außer der Einrede, über die Atticus ihm berichtet hatte, sie sei

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[46] Diese Worte bilden die Restitutionsklausel, welche bestimmt, dass der Beklagte der Verurteilung entgehen kann, indem er die streitige Sache (*res*) zurückerstattet (*restituere*).

[47] Dieser Schlußteil der Formel heißt *condemnatio*, vgl. Gaius, *Inst.* IV 43: *Condemnatio est ea pars formulae qua iudici condemnandi absolvendive potestas permittitur.*

[48] *Ed. perp.* X 40; vgl. Lenel 1927=1974, 115, mit Begründung.

[49] Ferner gehörte die *actio de dolo* zu den infamierenden Klagen, das heißt, dass Verurteilung den Verlust der bürgerlichen Ehre mit sich brachte. Vgl. Iul., *Ad edictum* I = *Dig.* III 2.1; Ulp., *Ad edictum* VI = *Dig.* III 2.4, 5; Iust., *Inst.* IV 16.2.

[50] Cicero bekleidetete dieses Amt vom 1. Juli 51 bis zum 30. Juni 50 v.Chr.; zu dieser Periode als *proconsul* vgl. Lintott 1993, 60–62.

[51] Es handelt sich hier nicht, wie ich früher (Ter Beek 1999 II, 607 Anm. 3) irrtümli-cherweise geschrieben habe, um Ciceros Vorgänger als Statthalter in Cilicien (das war der *proconsul* Appius Claudius Pulcher, vgl. Jashemski 1950=1966, 148 und Broughton 1952, 242), sondern um M. Calpurnius Bibulus, der Statthalter (*proconsul*) der Provinz Syrien war; vgl. Jashemski 1950=1966, 156; Broughton 1952, 250.

[52] Diese Interpretation scheint mir wahrscheinlicher als die ebenfalls mögliche An-sicht, Cicero wäre über das Edikt des Bibulus überhaupt nicht im Bilde, wobei *novi* nicht als partitiver Genitiv, sondern als Perfektform gedeutet wird. Vgl. hierzu Peppe 1991, 30.

allzu ungünstig für ihren Stand (*nimis gravi praeiudicio in ordinem nostrum*).[53] Cicero hat in seinem Edikt[54] eine gleichwertige (ἰσοδυναμοῦσαν) aber in verblümteren Worten gefasste (*sed tectiorem*) Einrede aus dem *edictum Asiaticum* des Q. Mucius Scaevola[55] übernommen: ‚ausgenommen ein Rechtsgeschäft ist in solcher Weise zustande gekommen (*extra quam si ita negotium gestum est*), dass es sich auf Grund der Redlichkeit (*ex fide bona*)[56] nicht gehört, es einzuhalten (*ut eo stari non oporteat*)‘:[57]

> *De Bibuli edicto nihil novi praeter illam exceptionem de qua tu ad me scripseras nimis gravi praeiudicio in ordinem nostrum. Ego tamen habeo* ἰσοδυναμοῦσαν *sed tectiorem ex Q. Muci P. f. edicto Asiatico: ‚extra quam si ita negotium gestum est ut eo stari non oporteat ex fide bona‘* …[58]

Der Zusammenhang dieses Fragments[59] bringt ans Licht, dass diese Einrede im Edikt des Scävola, der um das Jahr 97 v.Chr. *praeses* der Provinz Asia war, ebenso wie das Edikt Ciceros, das im Jahr 51–50 in Cilicien in Kraft war, sich lediglich auf Sachen bezog, welche die Steuerpächter (*publicani*) anbelangten.[60] Die hier gemeinte Einrede war in ihrer Wirkung also mit der späteren *exceptio doli* identisch, nur war ihr Bereich beschränkt. Ferner fehlte in Scävolas Einrede eine präsentische Alternative. Demzufolge war sie nur gegen Verhaltensweisen wirksam, die sich in der Vergangenheit abgespielt hatten. Neben der Einrede des Scävola kann man auch die *clausula doli* als eine Art Vorläufer der *exceptio doli* betrachten.[61]

Ich habe schon darauf hingewiesen, dass die *exceptio doli* einen zweigliedrigen Inhalt hat: die Klausel *factum sit* weist auf den *dolus malus* hin, der in dem Moment, in dem der Kontrakt abgeschlossen wird, begangen wird, während die Alternative *neque fiat* sich auf den Zeit-

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[53] Kasten 1990, 341, übersetzt: ‚Reichlich verletzende Voreingenommenheit gegenüber meinem Stande‘. Man sehe weiter Peppe 1991, 30; Lintott 1993, 61.

[54] Hierzu vgl. Peppe 1991, 14–93.

[55] Es handelt sich hier um Q. Mucius Scaevola Pontifex, den die späteren römischen Juristen als Q. Mucius oder Q. Scaevola bezeichneten; vgl. Bauman 1983, 340–341.

[56] Zu diesem Begriff vgl. Ter Beek 1999 I, 299–309, mit Literaturhinweisen.

[57] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 193–194; Watson 1965, 263; Martini 1969, 33 und 40; Watson 1974, 67; Behrends 1976, 35; Mancuso 1983, 421–422.

[58] *Ad Att.* VI 1.15.

[59] Vgl. Cic., *Ad Att.* VI 1.15–16.

[60] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 194; Martini 1969, 40–41. Diese Verfasser meinen, die Einrede beziehe sich auf das *edictum de aere alieno et de syngraphis*. Vgl. Torrent 1973, 97; Behrends 1976, 35; Mancuso 1983, 425–426; Peppe 1991, 37; Lintott 1993, 61.

[61] Vgl. Ter Beek 1999 I, 539–593; Nörr 2004, 173–174.

punkt bezieht, in dem der Kläger auf Grund dieses Kontrakts Klage erhebt.[62] Aus Ciceros Bericht über die Ereignisse kann man erschlie-ßen, dass eine eventuell von Canius erhobene *exceptio doli* auf Grund der ersteren Klausel *factum sit* wirksam gewesen wäre. Die Arglist des Pythius hatte ja in der Vergangenheit stattgefunden, das heißt in dem Moment, in dem der Kontrakt mit Canius abgeschlossen wurde.

Neben den auf uns gekommenen Werken und Fragmenten der römi-schen Juristen stellen auch Ciceros Werke eine wichtige Quelle für unsere Kenntnisse des römischen Rechts dar. In seinen Gerichtsre-den erweist Cicero sich, den von ihm selbst in seinem Werk *De oratore* gestellten Anforderungen entsprechend, seinen juristischen Aufgaben mehr als gewachsen. Aus den in diesem Beitrag erörterten Textstellen stellt sich überdies heraus, dass das Interesse, das Cicero der Rechts-wissenschaft entgegen brachte, es ihn, als er Statthalter in Cilicien war, ermöglichte, auch in seiner eigenen Rechtspraxis, ebenso wie vorher sein *collega et familiaris* Aquilius Gallus, neue Wege zu gehen.

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[62] Vgl. Von Lübtow 1963, 192.

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WORTGESCHICHTE IM ALTCHRISTLICHEN
LATEIN: *CREATURA* UND *GENIMEN*

A.A.R. Bastiaensen

Wörter haben ihre Geschichte, und diese zu entdecken ist Aufgabe der Philologie und ihrer Nachbardisziplinen. Ein ausgelesenes Gebiet für derartige Untersuchungen ist der Wortschatz einer neuen Gemeinschaft, gekennzeichnet durch den Umgang mit zuvor unbekannten Ideen und Formen, für die es den passenden Ausdruck zu finden gilt. Es ist eine erbliche Verpflichtung der Nimwegener Universität, auf die sprachlichen Änderungen, die das Einwachsen des Christentums in die lateinische Welt mit sich brachte, die Aufmerksamkeit zu richten. Ist doch, wie die *École de Nimègue* mit Schrijnen, Mohrmann und ihren Nachfolgern wiederholt nachgewiesen hat, das Latein durch den Sprachgebrauch der Christen mit einer großen Anzahl neuer Wörter bereichert worden. Zwei von diesen nicht etymologisch, aber doch begrifflich verwandten Wörter sind im Folgenden Gegenstand unserer Untersuchung. Es handelt sich um *creatura* und *genimen*, beide dem Anschein nach lateinisch, im klassischen Latein aber unbekannt.[1] Über Entstehen und erstmaligen Gebrauch im lateinischen Sprachraum fehlen genaue Daten. Deutlich ist aber, dass sie im Latein der sich verchristlichenden westlichen Welt eine nicht unwichtige Rolle gespielt haben.

Creatura

Erstmaliges Erscheinen

Es ist nicht bekannt, wann und auf welche Weise *creatura* seinen Platz im christlichen Sprachgebrauch bekommen hat. Es muss in den Anfangsjahren der Latinisierung der westlichen Christenheit gewesen sein, einer Periode von Herumtasten und Ausprobieren, in Rom, Karthago,

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[1] Mit Hilfe von Chadwick – Healy, *Patrologia Latina Database* wurden die für diese Untersuchung wichtigen Stellen aufgesucht.

Tarragona und andernorts. Für die Übersetzung der zwei griechischen Bibelwörter κτίσις ‚Schöpfung' und κτίσμα ‚Geschöpf' prägte man das eine lateinische Wort *creatura*. Man hat auch das an sich logischere *conditio* (dem griechischen κτίζειν ‚stiften' 〉 ‚erschaffen' entspricht das lateinische *condere*) benützt, wie aus den um 200 verfassten Schriften Tertullians hervorgeht. Aber Tertullian verwendet auch, sei es nur an wenigen Stellen, *creatura*, und nach dem dritten Jahrhundert hat dieser Terminus die Oberhand erhalten.[2]

Er hatte eine zweifache Bedeutung, denn er war Ausdruck für die schöpferische Aktivität Gottes, das Aus-dem-Nichts-Hervorbringen, und für das Ergebnis dieser Aktivität, das Erschaffene, die Schöpfung. Im letzten Sinne gab es noch den Unterschied zwischen Singular und Plural. Auf die Schöpfung als Ganzes bezog sich der Singular, auf eines oder mehrere der unterschiedlichen Geschöpfe bezogen sich Singular beziehungsweise Plural. Bemerkenswert ist, dass im Fortleben in den romanischen Sprachen letztere Bedeutung überwiegt: ital. *creatura*, frz. *créature*, span. *criatura* bezeichnen soviel wie ‚erschaffenes Wesen', ‚Geschöpf', ‚Wesen'. Für ‚Schöpfung' im Sinne von ‚Aus-dem-Nichts-Hervorbringen' bediente man sich des im klassischen Latein schon bekannten und auf eine Aktivität hindeutenden Wortes *creatio*: ital. *creazione*, frz. *création*, span. *creación* deuten an erster Stelle auf das Erschaffen des Weltalls durch Gott, nebenbei auch auf das Weltall schlechthin.

Wir richten unsere Aufmerksamkeit auf das Wort *creatura*, den nunmehr speziellen Gegenstand unserer Untersuchung. Sein Erscheinen in den altchristlichen Texten war nicht von vornherein ein durchschlagender Erfolg. Nicht nur gab es die Konkurrenz von *conditio*, Unsicherheit herrschte auch in anderer Hinsicht. Illustrativ sind die Daten der *Vetus Latina* (*Itala*), der Sammlung biblischer Lesarten aus anderen Textformen als die *Vulgata*.[3] Mal ist *creatura* die alleinige Lesart, mal finden wir neben *creatura* andere Lesarten, wie *creatio, conditio, quae creata sunt*.[4] Aber die in das dritte oder vierte Jahrhundert zu datierende Übersetzung von Irenäus' *Adversus haereses* hat eine Stelle, die *creatura* deutlich in seiner doppelten Funktion, als Bezeichnung der unterschiedlichen Lebewesen und als Bezeichnung der Schöpfung in ihrer Ganzheit, aufführt:

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[2] Vgl. die Schlussfolgerungen in Braun 1962.

[3] Die Hinweise sind auf die *Itala*-Ausgabe von Jülicher und auf die bisher erschienenen Teile der Beuron'schen *Vetus Latina*–Ausgabe.

[4] Allein *creatura* in Mt 26,29; Mk 16,15; 1 Tm 4,4; 2 Pe 3,4. Als Alternativen haben He 4,13 *creatio*, Ja 1,18 *conditio*, Ap 9,8 *quae creata sunt*.

> *Oportet … nos oblationem deo facere … primitias earum quae sunt eius creaturarum offerentes; … ecclesia offert cum gratiarum actione ex creatura eius.*

> Wir müssen Gott opfern … und Ihm die Erstlinge der von Ihm erschaffenen Früchte darbringen; die Kirche opfert unter Danksagung aus seiner Schöpfung.[5]

Dass in den Schriften des klassizistischen Apologeten Laktanz am Anfang des vierten Jahrhunderts *creatura* fehlt, ist kein Wunder. Aber für die nach ihm kommenden christlichen Autoren im vierten und fünften Jahrhundert ist *creatura* eine Selbstverständlichkeit. In seiner Verteidigung von Christi göttlicher Natur sagt Hilarius, dass es für das Heil des Menschen notwendig ist:

> *… neque in Christum tantum sperasse, sed in Christo dei filio, neque in creatura, sed in deo creatore ex deo nato.*

> … und auch nicht einfach auf Christus zu hoffen, sondern auf Christus als Sohn Gottes, und nicht auf Christus als Geschöpf, sondern auf Christus als Gott Schöpfer, aus Gott geboren.[6]

Ein sprechender Text ist auch folgender aus einer der Taufkatechesen des Ambrosius im letzten Viertel des vierten Jahrhunderts:

> *Iussit dominus, factum est caelum; iussit dominus, facta est terra; iussit dominus, facta sunt maria; iussit dominus, omnis creatura generata est.*

> Der Herr befahl, der Himmel entstand; der Herr befahl, die Erde entstand; der Herr befahl, das Meer entstand; der Herr befahl, die ganze Schöpfung kam ins Dasein.[7]

Zu Beginn des fünften Jahrhunderts schreibt Hieronymus ablehnend über eine zweite Ehe von Witwer oder Witwe: ‚*Primi hominis creatura nos doceat plures nuptias refutare*‘. ‚Die Schöpfung des ersten Menschen muss uns lehren, mehr als eine Ehe abzuweisen‘.[8]

Wie selbstverständlich *creatura* geworden war, erhellt auch aus der Tatsache, dass Augustinus in einer in 393 zu Hippo abgehaltenen Kirchenversammlung, eigentlich zu seiner eigenen Verwunderung, feststellte, dass das dem Christen vertraute Nomen *creatura* der Bezeichnung nach mehr mit dem Zeitwort *condere* als mit dem Zeitwort *creare* übereinstimmte:

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[5] *Adversus haereses* 4,31.
[6] *De trinitate* 1,17.
[7] *De sacramentis* 4,4,15.
[8] *Epist.* 123,11.

> *Excluduntur etiam illi qui creaturam esse dicunt filium, quamvis non talem, quales sunt ceterae creaturae. Quantamcumque enim creaturam dicunt, si creatura est, condita est et facta est. Nam idem est condere, quod creare, quamquam in latinae linguae consuetudine dicatur aliquando creare, pro eo quod est gignere; sed graeca discernit. Hoc enim dicimus creaturam quod illi κτίσμα vel κτίσιν vocant; et si sine ambiguitate loqui volumus, non dicimus creare, sed condere.*

> Nicht in Betracht kommen auch diejenigen, die sagen, der Sohn ist ein Geschöpf, sei es denn auch nicht wie die anderen Geschöpfe. Denn wie erhaben sie dieses Geschöpf auch nennen, wenn es ein Geschöpf ist, ist es erschaffen und nicht eigener Herkunft. Denn *condere* ist dasselbe wie *creare*, obgleich im lateinischen Sprachgebrauch *creare* manchmal *gignere* (,erzeugen') bedeutet. Der griechische Sprachgebrauch unterscheidet hier. Denn wir nennen *creatura*, was die Griechen κτίσμα oder κτίσιν nennen, und wenn wir ohne Zweideutigkeit sprechen wollen, sagen wir nicht *creare*, sondern *condere*.[9]

Für die intellektuelle Oberschicht hatte *creatura* noch etwas Ungewöhnliches, aber es war doch Eigentum der lateinischen Sprache geworden, und machte als solches den Übergang in die romanischen Sprachen mit.

Der Grund, weshalb *creatura* anfänglich auf Bedenken stieß, ist also die Unausgeglichenheit zwischen der Herkunft und der Bedeutung des Wortes. Das Wort *creare* enthielt nicht die Idee von einem Hervorbringen aus dem Nichts, sondern von einem Hervorbringen aus vorhandener Materie, einem Erzeugen aus existierenden irdischen oder geistlichen Wesen. Auch in einem religiösen oder philosophischen Kontext rief *creare* im klassischen Altertum stets den Gedanken eines organischen Wachstums, einer aufgegliederten Entwicklung hervor, wie in der Atomlehre des Lukrez und in Ciceros Ideen über das von der Gottheit angetriebene Wachstum irdischer Substanz.[10] Es versteht sich, dass gebildete und sprachlich begabte Menschen wie Tertullian und Augustinus auf diese Neuerscheinung mit Zurückhaltung und Verwunderung reagierten.

Eine Erinnerung an das klassische creare

In den Schriften des Cyprian von Karthago im dritten Jahrhundert finden wir *creatura* zweimal, aber der Unterschied zwischen den beiden Stellen ist groß. In einer ist die Verbindung mit klassischem *creare*

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[9] *De fide et symbolo* 4,5.
[10] Lucr. 3,229; Cic. *Off.* 1,22.

‚erzeugen', ‚Wachstum schenken' noch deutlich erkennbar. Es handelt sich um ein Wort Jesu beim Abendmahl mit seinen Jüngern. Nach dem Segen über dem Wein sagt Er, dass Er nicht von ‚der Frucht des Weinstocks' trinken wird, bis zu dem Tage, an dem Er sie neu trinken wird in der Herrschaft seines Vaters.[11] Der griechische Bibeltext lautet ‚ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου'. In vielen nicht-*Vulgata*-Handschriften ist die Wiedergabe: *de (ex) hac creatura vitis*. Mit *creatura vitis* zitiert auch Cyprian die Worte Jesu: *non bibam amodo ex ista creatura vitis*.[12] Deutlich ist, dass hier nicht die spezifisch-christliche Bedeutung von ‚Schöpfung', ‚Geschöpf' durchklingt, sondern dass in *creatura* hier das klassische *creare* ‚Wachstum schenken', ‚erzeugen' sich vernehmen lässt. Das Wort ist auch nicht die Übersetzung von κτίσις oder κτίσμα, sondern von γένημα / γέννημα, einem Terminus aus der Welt der Landwirtschaft. Andere Texttraditionen und die *Vulgata* übersetzen γένημα hier mit *genimen*: *non bibam amodo de hoc genimine vitis*. Von diesem *genimen* wird im Folgenden noch die Rede sein.

Creatura *in der Liturgie*

a. *Cyprian und Ambrosius über creatura in der Liturgie*
Neben dem *creatura*, das in der Bedeutung von ‚Frucht' mit dem klassischen *creare* verwandt ist, finden wir in den Schriften Cyprians ein völlig anderes *creatura*. Es betrifft einen Passus aus einem Konzilsschreiben von Cyprian und seinen Kollegen an eine Bischofsversammlung in Numidien. Es handelte sich um das heiß diskutierte Problem, ob Ketzer und Schismatiker, die zur orthodoxen Gemeinschaft zurückkehrten, von neuem getauft werden müssten. Cyprian hielt, mit seinen Kollegen, dass diese Rückkehr eine abermalige Taufe fordere, weil die von Nichtrechtgläubigen gespendete Taufe und die dazu gehörende Salbung ungültig wären. Betreffs der Taufe waren die Konzilsväter der Meinung, dass, wer nicht die Kirche habe, wie die Häretiker und sonstige Andersgläubige, auch nicht die Taufe der Kirche habe. Und bezüglich der Salbung sagt ihr Brief, dass wer nicht mit auf dem Altar geheiligtem Öl salbe, nichts zustande bringe:

> *Vngi quoque necesse est eum qui baptizatus est, ut accepto chrismate, id est unctione, esse unctus dei et habere in se gratiam Christi possit. Porro autem eucharistia est,*

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[11] Mt 26,29 und Mk 14,25.
[12] *Epist.* 63,9.

> *unde baptizati unguntur, oleum in altari sanctificatum. Sanctificare autem non potuit olei creaturam, qui nec altare habuit nec ecclesiam. Vnde nec unctio spiritalis apud haereticos potest esse, quando constet oleum sanctificari et eucharistiam fieri apud illos omnino non posse.*

> Auch muss derjenige, der getauft ist, gesalbt werden, damit er durch den Empfang des Salböls, das heißt durch die Salbung, ein Gesalbter Gottes sein und die Gnade Christi in sich haben kann. Nun ist es aber so, dass die gesegnete Materie,[13] womit die Getauften gesalbt werden, auf dem Altar geheiligtes Öl ist. Aber wer weder Altar noch Kirche hatte, konnte das Geschöpf Gottes, was Öl ist (*olei creatura*), nicht heiligen. Daher kann es bei Ketzern auch keine geistliche Salbung geben, weil feststeht, dass Öl zu heiligen und zu geweihter Materie zu erheben bei ihnen absolut unmöglich ist.[14]

Die Ketzerei, die weder Kirche noch Altar hat, kann die Sünde nicht vergeben und das Öl, *olei creatura*, nicht heiligen.

Aus der Passage geht hervor, dass der Ausdruck *olei creatura* eine liturgische Formel war. Die bischöflichen Briefschreiber setzen voraus, dass diese Formel eine allgemein bekannte war, Bestandteil eines liturgischen Rituals. Es geht um die Segnung einer gewissen, für sakramentalen Gebrauch bestimmten Quantität Öl. Weil Öl ein wertvolles Geschöpf Gottes, *creatura*, ist, kann es zur Verwendung in einer höheren Funktion in Gottes Welt gerufen werden. Elemente der stofflichen Welt sind also keine unnützen, toten Gegenstände, sondern wertvolle Geschöpfe Gottes.[15]

Dieses *creatura* in einem liturgischen Kontext finden wir auch anderswo in den Schriften des christlich-lateinischen Altertums. So zum Beispiel im vierten Jahrhundert bei Ambrosius in der ersten seiner Taufkatechesen, wo er spricht über die Weihe des Wassers, womit seine Zuhörer getauft worden sind. Der Verlauf des liturgischen Vorgangs ist anders als bei Cyprian. Die Heiligung des Taufwassers, die der Taufe vorangeht, verläuft selbst in zwei Phasen. Erst spricht der Bischof eine Exorzismusformel, dann sagt er ein Gebet um das Wasser zu heiligen und die göttliche Dreieinigkeit herbeizurufen, so dass die Taufe im Namen des Vaters und des Sohnes und des Heiligen Geistes vollzogen werden kann:

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[13] Das Wort *eucharistia* bezeichnet dasjenige, worüber ein Segen ausgesprochen ist.

[14] *Epist.* 70,2,2.

[15] Vgl. für diese und ähnliche Ausdrücke: Blaise 1966, 486, Fußnote 4: ‚*Ce ne sont pas de simples objets, inertes et sans signification, mais des créatures de Dieu*'; vgl. auch 205, Fußnote 3.

> *… cum forma baptismatis et usus hoc habeat ut ante fons consecretur, tunc descendat qui baptizandus est. Nam ubi primum ingreditur sacerdos, exorcismum facit secundum creaturam aquae, invocationem postea et precem defert ut sanctificetur fons et adsit praesentia trinitatis aeternae.*

> … weil beim Spenden der Taufe die gebräuchliche Form diese ist, dass erst das Taufwasser geheiligt wird und dann der Täufling ins Taufbecken hinabsteigt. Sobald der Bischof hineintritt, verrichtet er einen Exorzismus, der sich auf das Wasser als Geschöpf bezieht (*secundum creaturam aquae*). Danach bringt er Gott ein Gebet mit Anrufung dar, dass das Wasser geheiligt werde und die ewige Dreieinigkeit anwesend sei.[16]

Das Ritual der Taufwasserweihe ist komplizierter als jenes der Ölweihe bei Cyprian. Der Exorzismus, wovon hier die Rede ist, ist nicht die eigentliche Weihe, sondern deren Einleitung, und somit doch Bestandteil der sakralen Verarbeitung jener irdischen Materie, die das Wasser ist. Weil das Wasser, wie bei Cyprian das Öl, *creatura* ist, kann die Heiligung für eine sakramentale Funktion an ihm vollzogen werden.

b. *Creatura in den liturgischen Texten*
Die von Cyprian und Ambrosius genannten Ausdrücke finden wir in den Gebeten der lateinischen Liturgie, die uns aus der frühen Periode bewahrt sind, ausgeschrieben. Auch hier handelt es sich um eine Aufwertung irdischer Substanz, die den Inhalt der Segnungsformeln ausmacht. In die älteste Sammlung lateinischer Gebetstexte, das *Sacramentarium Veronense*, ist in der Nacht zum Pfingstsonntag eine in das eucharistische Hochgebet eingefügte Segnung von den Neugetauften auszuteilenden Speisen und Getränken aufgenommen: ‚*Benedic, domine, et has tuas creaturas fontis, mellis et lactis*‘. ‚Segne, Herr, auch diese von Dir erschaffenen irdischen Sachen, Wasser, Honig und Milch‘.[17]

Von einem Exorzismus ist hier nicht die Rede, vermutlich weil die Formel in das eucharistische Hochgebet der Pfingstnacht aufgenommen war.[18] In eine ganz andere Situation führt uns das *Sacramenta-*

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[16] *De sacramentis* 1,5,18. In der vierten Katechese ist *creatura* zugleich ein besonderes und doch auch gewöhnliches Wort: *Venisti ad altare, adtendisti sacramenta posita super altare et ipsam quidem miratus es creaturam. Tamen creatura solemnis et nota.* ‚Du bist zum Altar gekommen und hast die geheiligten Gaben auf dem Altar liegen gesehen, und hast mit Bewunderung auf diese edele Materie geschaut. Sie ist jedoch eine gewöhnliche und bekannte Materie‘ (*De sacramentis* 4,3,8).

[17] *Sacramentarium Veronense* 205.

[18] Das Segnungsgebet endet im *Sacramentarium* in abgekürzter Form: ‚*in Christo Iesu domino nostro: per quem haec omnia*‘. Die Ergänzung ist: ‚*domine, semper bona creas, vivificas, benedicis et praestas nobis; per ipsum et cum ipso …*‘. Mithin stellt es sich heraus, dass unser

rium Gelasianum, die Gebetssammlung der römischen Stadtkirchen. In einer der Gebetsformeln von diesem Sakramentar liegt ein Text für die Zubereitung von Weihwasser zum Schutz von Haus und Feld vor. Es bedarf eines doppelten Exorzismus, eines über dem Wasser selbst, eines über dem Salz als zusätzlicher Stärkung. Der Exorzismus über dem Wasser lautet:

> *Exorcizo te, creatura aquae, in nomine dei Patris omnipotentis et in nomine Iesu Christi Filii eius et Spiritus Sancti. Omnis virtus adversarii, omnis incursio diaboli, omne fantasma* [*omnem inimici potestatem*][19] *eradicare et effugare ab hac creatura aquae. Vnde exorcizo te, creatura aquae, per deum verum et per deum vivum, per deum sanctum et per dominum nostrum Iesum Christum, ut efficiaris aqua sancta, aqua benedicta: ut ubicumque effusa fueris vel aspersa, sive in domo, sive in agro, effuges omnem fantasiam, omnem inimici potestatem.*

> Ich exorziere Dich, Geschöpf Wasser, im Namen Gottes des Vaters und im Namen Iesu Christi, seines Sohnes, und des Heiligen Geistes. Alle Kräfte des Gegners, alle Angriffe des Teufels, alle Gespenster: seid entwurzelt und verjagt aus diesem Geschöpf Wasser. Darum exorziere ich Dich, Geschöpf Wasser, bei dem wahren und lebendigen Gott, bei dem heiligen Gott und bei unserem Herrn Jesus Christus, dass Du heiliges Wasser, gesegnetes Wasser wirst, damit Du überall, wo Du ausgegossen oder gesprengt wirst, sei es im Haus, sei es auf dem Feld, alle Gespenster, alle Macht des Feindes verjagst.[20]

Für den Verfasser der Exorzismusformel ist das Wasser, obgleich Geschöpf Gottes, teuflischer Wirkung ausgesetzt und muss also von dieser bösen Macht befreit werden. Das Wasser ist umkämpft, und der Exorzismus, ‚Teufelsaustreibung‘, verteidigt die irdische Materie gegen Inbesitznahme durch die Höllenmächte und bewahrt sie in ihrem Status von Geschöpf Gottes. Der zweite Exorzismus spricht in gleicher Weise das Salz an: ‚*Exorcizo te, creatura salis‘*. ‚Ich exorziere Dich, Geschöpf Salz‘, und gibt schließlich dem Wunsche Ausdruck, dass ‚*omnes daemonum temptaciones‘* ‚alle Verführungen der Dämone‘ beendet werden.[21]

   Das dritte der römischen Sakramentarien, das *Sacramentarium Gregorianum* der päpstlichen Liturgie, hat auch einige Exorzismustexte in der vertrauten Form. Ein Exorzismus über dem Taufwasser übernimmt, mit einiger Anpassung, den ersten Teil des Wasserexorzismus des *Sacra-*

Segnungsgebet der Schluss des eucharistischen Gebetes ist.

   [19] Ich vermute, dass die drei Worte aus dem zweiten Textsatz eingedrungen und hier zu streichen sind.

   [20] *Sacramentarium Gelasianum* 1557.

   [21] *Ibid.* 1559.

mentarium Gelasianum: ,*Exorcizo te, creatura aqua, in nomine domini Iesu Christi Filii dei et Sancti Spiritus; si qua fantasma, si qua virtus inimici, si qua incursio diaboli: eradicare et effugare ab hac creatura aquae*'.[22] Große Übereinkunft mit dem *Gelasianum* zeigt auch eine andere Formel, für die Zubereitung von Weihwasser: ,*Exorcizo te, creatura aquae, in nomine dei Patris omnipotentis et in nomine Iesu Christi Filii eius domini nostri, ut fias aqua exorcidiata ad effugandam omnem potestatem inimici et ipsum inimicum eradicare et explantare cum angelis suis apostaticis*' ,… dass Du exorziertes Wasser wirst, um alle Mächte des Feindes zu verjagen und den Feind selbst mit seinen abtrünnigen Engeln mit Stumpf und Stiel auszurotten'.[23]

In der Gallikanischen Liturgie finden wir einen anderen, sehr ansprechenden Gebrauch von *creatura*. In einem *Post secreta*-Gebet, als Epiklese unmittelbar nach den Einsetzungsworten auszusprechen, wird gebeten, dass über die Gaben auf dem Altar der Heilige Geist ausgegossen werden möge:

> *Recolentes igitur et servantes praecepta Vnigeniti depraecamur, Pater omnipotens, ut his creaturis altario tuo superpositis Spiritum sanctificationis infundas, ut per transfusione caelestis adque invisibilis sacramenti panis hic mutatus in carne et calex translatus in sanguine sit totius ⟨populi⟩ gratia, sit sumentibus medicina.*

> Eingedenk also der Vorschriften des eingeborenen Sohnes und bemüht sie einzuhalten, bitten wir, allmächtiger Vater, dass Du über diese auf dem Altar liegenden köstlichen Gaben (*creaturis*) den Geist der Heiligung ausgießt, dass durch das Einströmen von himmlischer unsichtbarer Heiligungskraft dieses Brot sich wandelt in Fleisch und der Wein im Kelch sich wandelt in Blut und dass diese Gaben ein angenehmes Geschenk sind für die ganze Gemeinde, und Heilmittel für diejenigen, die davon essen und trinken.[24]

Wie es auch in östlichen Liturgien der Fall ist, wird der Inhalt der Einsetzungsworte (,Dies ist mein Leib, dies ist mein Blut') bewirkt durch das Herabflehen (die Epiklese) des Heiligen Geistes über die Gaben. Aber in dem Augenblick, wo die Einsetzungsworte gesprochen sind, sind Brot und Wein in Erwartung dieses Herabsteigens natürlich allerköstlichste Gaben. Ihnen kommt der Ehrenname *creaturae* zu.

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[22] *Sacramentarium Gregorianum* 981.

[23] *Ibid.* 985.

[24] *Missale Gallicanum Vetus* 321 (= Formel 55 des von Fr. J. Mohne in 1850 entzifferten Palimpsesttextes mit einer Serie Messformulare der Gallikanischen Liturgie). Der Text (nicht die Entzifferung!) ist fehlerhaft. Ich konjiziere *spiritum* statt *spiritus*, *mutatus* statt *mutatur* und die Einfügung von *populi*. Eine gewisse Nachlässigkeit spricht aus der Schreibweise *adque* statt *atque* und *calex* statt *calix*.

Genimen

Entstehen und erste Geschichte von genimen

Wie wir oben gesehen haben, hat Cyprian das Wort Jesu beim Abendmahl, dass Er nicht mehr ‚von dieser Frucht des Weinstocks' trinken würde, bis zu dem Tage, an dem Er sie neu trinken würde in der Herrschaft seines Vaters[25], folgendermaßen wiedergegeben: ‚*non bibam amodo de hac creatura vitis …*', Übersetzung von ‚ἐκ τούτου τοῦ γενήματος τῆς ἀμπέλου'. Statt dieses an das klassische *creare* erinnernden *creatura* verwenden die *Vulgata* und andere Textgattungen den Terminus *genimen*: *de hoc genimine vitis*. Wie *creatura* ist *genimen* ein christliches Wort. Seinen Eintritt in die christlich-lateinische Welt verdankt es ohne Zweifel den ältesten Übersetzungen des neutestamentlichen Textes. Für die Übersetzung von γένημα wurde ein Wort geformt, das dem griechischen Terminus ähnelte und zugleich eine Art von Verwandtschaft mit den lateinischen Wortformen *gigno, genui, genitus* ausstrahlte (Das durch den indoeuropäischen Ursprung echt verwandte Wort ist *germen*). Merkwürdig ist übrigens die Tatsache, dass der Gebrauch von *genimen* größtenteils auf zwei, von einander sehr verschiedene Bibeltexte beschränkt ist. Befremdlich ist auch, dass Tertullian, der sich neuen Termini gegenüber eher zurückhaltend verhielt, mit einer gewissen Vorliebe *genimen*, auch außerhalb des biblischen Kontextes, verwendete.

Genimen *bei Tertullian*

Die Worte Jesu beim Abendmahl, dass Er vorläufig ‚von dieser Frucht des Weinstocks' nicht trinken würde, finden wir bei Tertullian nicht. Aber er hat wohl ein anderes Bibelwort mit einem sehr unangenehm klingenden *genimen*, den im Lukasevangelium aufgezeichneten harten Vorwurf Johannes des Täufers gegen böswillige Zuhörer, gekennzeichnet als *genimina viperarum*, Übersetzung von γεννήματα ἐχιδνῶν, ‚Natterngezücht'.[26] Im Matthäusevangelium lautet der Vorwurf *progenies viperarum*,[27] welche Lesart auch bei Cyprian verzeichnet ist.[28] Tertullian hat

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[25] Mt 26,29 und Mk 14,25.

[26] Lk 3,7; der griechische Ausdruck steht auch an den bei Tertullian nicht zitierten Stellen Mt 3,7; 12,34 und 23,33. Tertullian schließt in seinem Zitat aus Lukas auch den folgenden Vers, Lk 3,8, ein.

[27] Mt 3,7.

[28] *Epist.* 59,3,3.

das lukanische *genimina viperarum* übrigens nur zweimal, dabei an zwei sich sehr ähnelnden Stellen. In *Adversus Hermogenem* lesen wir: „*genimina viperarum non facient paenitentiae fructum*:' ‚(in besonderen Situationen) wird Natterngezücht keine Früchte der Buße tragen'.[29] Und in einer Passage aus der späteren Schrift *De anima* fragt er die häretischen Valentinianer, die die Seele für ein unveränderliches Wesen hielten, wie denn das Evangelium behaupten kann, dass in gewissen, nichtnatürlichen Umständen ‚… *nec genimina viperarum facere paenitentiae fructus*'. ‚… auch das Natterngezücht keine Früchte der Buße trägt'.[30] Undeutlich ist, ob die lateinische Bildung Tertullians eigene Erfindung ist oder ob er sie einer existierenden Bibelübersetzung entnommen hat. Vermutlich trifft letzeres zu. Wie dem auch sei, die Verbindung von *genimina* und *fructus* ist nicht lauter Zufall. Die Gegenüberstellung bei Tertullian von den Termini *genimina* und *fructus* ruft den Gedanken an ein Wachstum, das zur Reifung von Früchten führt, hervor, so wie es auch bei Lukas mit der Gegenüberstellung von γεννήματα und καρπούς der Fall ist.

Tertullian hat *genimen* auch in nichtbiblischen Passagen, stets mit Hinweis auf abweichende gnostische und andere Vorstellungen. Über die Lehre der Valentinianer in Bezug auf die Äonen, Wesen göttlicher Herkunft, die in großer Zahl im Kosmos umherirren, schreibt er:

> *Sed qui ex aliqua conscientia venerit fidei, si statim inveniat tot nomina aeonum, tot coniugia, tot genimina, tot exitus, tot eventus, felicitates, infelicitates dispersae atque concisae divinitatis, dubitabitne ibidem pronuntiare has esse fabulas et genealogias indeterminatas, quas apostoli spiritus, his iam tunc pullulantibus seminibus haereticis, damnare praevenit?*

> Aber wenn jemand kommt, der einige Kenntnis hat vom Glauben, und er hört gleich bei Ankunft von so vielen Äonen, so vielen Ehen, so vielen Geburten, so vielen Lebensenden, so vielen Abenteuern von Glück und Unglück, die aus der auseinanderfallenden und in Stücke gerissenen Gottheit hervorkommen, wird er dann zögern und nicht gleich auf der Stelle aussprechen, dass dies alles Fabeln sind und endlose Genealogien, die der Geist des Apostels Paulus, weil es schon damals wimmelte von Samen der Ketzerei, im voraus verurteilt hat?[31]

Aus dem Kontext geht hervor, dass *genimen* hier eine Geburt andeutet, aber eine Geburt von esoterischer Beschaffenheit, so wie die Valentinianer sie sich vorstellten.

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[29] *Adversus Hermogenem* 12,2; cf. Mt 3,8.
[30] *De anima* 21,4.
[31] *Adversus Valentinianos* 3,4.

Der Unterschied zwischen ‚Geburt' und ‚Neugeborener' ist nicht groß. Wir finden *genimen* denn auch in anderer Verwendung für neugeborene Kinder. In einer Ablehnung von heidnischen Praktiken, die die Geburt eines Kindes begleiten, schreibt Tertullian:

> *Ita omnes idololatria obstetrice nascuntur, dum ipsi adhuc uteri infulis apud idola confectis redimiti genimina sua daemoniorum candidata profitentur, dum in partu Lucinae et Dianae eiulatur, dum per totam hebdomadem Iunoni mensa proponitur, dum ultima die Fata Scribunda advocantur, dum prima etiam constitutio infantis super terram Statinae deae sacrum est.*

> So werden alle mit Abgötterei als Hebamme geboren, indem sie (die Wöchnerinnen) noch mit den Bändern aus den Götzenläden umkränzt ihre Neugeborenen als für den Dämonendienst bestimmt erklären, denn während der Niederkunft wird Lucina und Diana zu Ehren geschrien, eine ganze Woche lang wird für Juno ein Tisch bereitgestellt, am letzten Tag werden *Fata Scribunda* (die ‚Geschriebenen Lebensjahre'?) angerufen und die ersten Fußstapfen auf der Erde eines Neugeborenen sind rituell der Göttin Statina gewidmet.[32]

Ein umfangreiches götzendienerisches Ritual begleitet Geburt und erste Entwicklung eines Kindes, und das bedeutet, dass die Frauen ihr Baby als für den Götzendienst bestimmt betrachten. Das Wort *genimen* hat einen unangenehmen Klang: ‚das, was die Frau gebärt'. Tertullian hat es gewiss absichtlich gewählt.

Eine andere Passage aus *De anima* setzt uns in Kenntnis von einer der phantastischen Erzählungen, die in christlichen Kreisen über Simon den Magier aus Samaria (cf. Apg 8,9–24) die Runde machten. Simons Tochter Helena, im Lauf der Weltgeschichte von einer Frauengestalt in die andere rollend, war auch die Helena, die das Schicksal des trojanischen Königs Priamus wurde:

> *Simon Samarites … se quidem fingit summum patrem, illam (Helenam quandam Tyriam) vero iniectionem suam primam, qua iniecerat angelos et archangelos condere; huius eam propositi compotem exilisse de patre et in inferiora desultasse atque illic praevento patris proposito angelicas potestates genuisse ignaras patris, artifices mundi huius; ab his non perinde animo retentam, ne digressa ea alterius genimina viderentur, et idcirco omni contumeliae addictam, ut nusquam discedere depretiatam liberet, humanae quoque formae succidisse velut vinculis carnis coercendam; ita multis aevis per alios atque alios habitus femininos volutatam etiam illam Helenam fuisse exitiosissimam Priamo.*

> Simon von Samaria … bildet sich ein, dass er der höchste Vater ist und dass die Frau (eine gewisse Helena aus Tyrus) sein erster Gedanke war,

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[32] *De anima* 39,2.

mit welchem Gedanken er Engel und Erzengel erschuf. Helena, ihres Vaters Absicht durchschauend, rückte sich weg von ihm und sprang in niedrigere Regionen hinab, und dort, ohne Rücksicht auf ihres Vaters Vorhaben, gebar sie Engelmächte, die den Vater nicht kannten, die Architekten dieser Welt. Von diesen wurde sie nicht mit gleichem Wohlwollen behandelt, sondern zurückgehalten, aus Angst, dass, wenn sie (Helena) wegginge, sie selbst (die Architekten) für die Nachkommen eines anderen Wesens gehalten werden würden; deshalb wurde sie zu jeder Art von Beschimpfung verurteilt, so dass sie, entehrt, keine Lust hatte irgendwohin zu entkommen und sie das Opfer wurde einer ihr aufgezwungenen menschlichen Gestalt als ein in Fesseln des Fleisches gefangenzuhaltendes weibliches Wesen. So rollte sie viele Zeitalter hindurch von einer Frauengestalt in die andere und wurde auch die Helena, die Priamus zum greulichen Verhängnis wurde.[33]

Hier bedeutet *genimina* soviel wie Nachwuchs in einer exotischen geistlichen Fortpflanzungsreihe. Das Wort hat nicht die Absicht zu beleidigen, macht aber doch fühlbar, dass es sich um eine Art Fortpflanzung handelt, die es in einer normalen Welt nicht gibt.

Unser letzter Text aus Tertullian ist ein drittes Zitat aus *De anima*, in dem eine Theorie von Platon zur Sprache gebracht wird. Im *Timaeus*, so Tertullian, behauptet der Philosoph ‚*quod genimina dei delegata sibi mortalium genitura accepto initio animae immortali mortale ei circumgelaverint corpus*' ‚dass die Nachkommen Gottes, als ihnen das Gebären sterblicher Wesen auferlegt war, erst einen Zugriff auf ein unsterbliches Stück Seele machten und dieses dann von einem sterblichen Körper „umfrieren" ließen'.[34] Der Terminus *genimina* ist Wiedergabe des platonischen γεννήματα[35], wie auch in den oben zitierten Bibeltexten *genimina* der lateinische Ausdruck für γεννήματα war. Tertullian hat offenbar mit dieser Übersetzung keine Mühe. *Genimina* hat hier keinen unangenehmen Klang, weil es die objektive Wiedergabe des griechischen Terminus ist. Im Kontext gesehen aber handelt es sich um eine mit dem nichtorthodoxen Gebrauch von *genimen* verwandte Situation.

Wir konkludieren, dass Tertullian mit *genimen* keine großen Probleme hatte. Einerseits gebrauchte er das Wort im selben Sinn als der neutestamentliche Text es gebrauchte, andererseits war *genimen* für ihn ein bequemes Wort für die Beschreibung von Abstammungverhältnissen in heidnischen und ketzerischen Weltbildern und Denksystemen.

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[33] *De anima* 33,4.
[34] *De anima* 23,5.
[35] Pl. *Ti.* 69C: vgl. Waszink 1947, 302.

Genimen *im dritten und vierten Jahrhundert*

Ein Durchsehen der christlichen Literatur nach Tertullian macht deutlich, dass die Position von *genimen* alles in allem schwach war. Cyprian hat das Wort nicht. Bei Hilarius und Ambrosius sucht man es auch vergeblich. Augustinus hat es nur in den zwei Bibelzitaten, deren eines, *genimina viperarum*, einer manichäischen Schrift entstammt[36] und das andere, *‚non bibam de hoc genimine vitis‘*, einem von ihm benützten Bibeltext entnommen ist.[37] Es gehörte offenbar nicht zu seinem Wortschatz. Die Zitate mit *genimen* in den Bibelexzerpten seines *Speculum*[38] bestätigen die von den meisten Philologen vertretene Ansicht, dass der Text dieser Exzerpte später überarbeitet wurde.

Genimen *bei Hieronymus*

Die Sache sieht bei Hieronymus anders aus. Er verzeichnet neben den neutestamentlichen Ausdrücken *genimina viperarum*[39] und *‚non bibam de hoc genimine vitis‘*[40] eine nicht geringe Anzahl anderer Verbindungen mit *genimen*. Fast immer betrifft es einen alttestamentlichen Text, sei es, aber nur selten, aus seiner eigenen *Vulgata*, sei es aus einer anderen Übersetzung; in gewissen Fällen handelt es sich um einen auf die biblische Sprache abgestimmten Wortgebrauch.

    Übereinstimmung zwischen dem *Vulgata*-Text von Hesekiel und Hieronymus' Kommentar zum Text gibt es, wo in beiden von *genimina agri* die Rede ist.[41] Das Psalmwort: *‚rivos eius inebria, multiplica genimina eius‘* ‚tränke reichlich seine Ströme, vermehre sein Gewächs‘ führt Hieronymus in einem seiner Briefe auf mit *sulcos* statt *rivos* (‚tränke reichlich seine Furchen‘), aber mit unverändertem *multiplica genimina*.[42]

    Meistens aber sind die Formulierungen an anderer Stelle verschieden von denen in der *Vulgata*. Im Jesaja-Kommentar zitiert Hieronymus aus dem *canticum* des Moses in Deuteronomium: *‚In Moysi cantico*

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[36] *Contra Adimantum* 5,1.

[37] *Quaestiones in Matthaeum* 43.

[38] Spr 8; Ijob 31; Mt 23.

[39] *Commentarius in Hiezechielem* 4,14,1–11; *in Matthaeum* 4,23,33.

[40] *Commentarius in Hiezechielem* 13,44,1–3; *in Esaiam* 17,62, 8–9; *in Matthaeum* 4,26, 29.

[41] Hesekiel 36,30; zweimal in *Commentarius in Hiezechielem* 11,36,16–38.

[42] Ps 64(65),11; *Epist.* 129,2. Allerdings ist undeutlich, ob Hieronymus diese Lesart selbst gebildet oder einem existierendem *psalterium* entnommen hat. In seinem *Psalterium iuxta Hebraeos* hat er: *‚sulcos eius inebria, multiplica fruges eius‘* und wählt damit den normaleren Terminus.

legimus: „Ignis … devorabit terram et genimina eius."' ‚Wir lesen im Lied des
Moses: „Feuer … wird die Erde und ihre Gewächse verschlingen"'.[43]
In seiner eigenen *Vulgata* schreibt er: ‚*Ignis … devorabit … terram cum ger-
mine suo*'. Ein ähnlicher Unterschied besteht bei einem anderen Zitat
aus Deuteronomium, das im Kommentar zu Hesekiel lautet: ‚*Benedicti
filii uteri tui et genimina terrae tuae*' ‚Gesegnet sind die Kinder deines Scho-
ßes und die Gewächse deiner Erde', während es in der *Vulgata* mit dem
doppelten Gebrauch von *fructus* ‚normaler', aber auch ziemlich prosa-
isch, klingt: ‚*Benedictus fructus ventris tui et fructus terrae tuae*'.[44] Während
die *Vulgata* als Text vom Propheten Habakuk ‚*Ficus non florebit et non erit
germen in vineis*' ‚Der Feigenbaum wird nich blühen und es wird keine
Früchte geben in den Weingärten' hat, lautet der Vers im Kommentar
von Hieronymus zu Habakuk: ‚*… non erunt genimina in vineis* und … *nec
erant genimina in vineis eorum*'.[45] Ein Zitat aus dem Hohen Liede in der
Vulgata: ‚*Descendi ad hortum nucum ut viderem poma convallis, ut inspicerem, si
floruisset vinea*' ‚Ich stieg hinab in den Nussgarten um mir die Früchte im
Tal anzuschauen und zu sehen, ob der Weinstock schon Blüten getrie-
ben hatte' hat eine ganz andere Form, mit *genimen*, in einer Passage
aus dem Kommentar zum Propheten Sacharja: ‚*Descendi ut viderem in
genimine torrentis, si floruisset vinea*' ‚Ich stieg hinab um zu sehen, ob im
Gewächs des Bachtales der Weinstock schon Blüten getrieben hatte.'[46]
Im Kommentar zum Propheten Nahum finden wir als Übersetzung
für ‚ein Schwarm Heuschrecken' neben einander die Ausdrücke *locustae
locustarum* der *Vulgata* und *parva genimina locustarum* anderer Herkunft.[47]
Eine zweifache Wiedergabe treffen wir auch für eine Wendung im Text
des Jesaja an, die in der *Vulgata* lautet: *orbis et omne germen eius* ‚die Erde
und alle ihre Gewächse' und die Hieronymus in seinem Kommentar
mit *orbis et cuncta genimina eius* aufführt.[48] An einer anderen Stelle in
seinem Kommentar benützt er den Text von Jesaja nach der griechi-
schen *Septuaginta* und schreibt: *genimina aspidum volantium* ‚die Jungen von
fliegenden Nattern' und weicht damit von seiner *Vulgata* ab, die ‚*vipera
et regulus volans*' ‚die Natter und die fliegende Schlange' hat; es nimmt
nicht wunder, dass er sofort danach in seinem Text, auf diese *genimina*

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[43] *Commentarius in Esaiam* 18,65,6–7 mit Zitat aus Deuteronomium 32,22.
[44] Dtn 28,4; *Commentarius in Hiezechielem* 14,45,13–14.
[45] Hab 3,17 und *Commentarius in Abacuc* 3,17–19 zweimal.
[46] Hld 6,10; *Commentarius in Zachariam* 3,12,11–14.
[47] Nah 3,17; *Commentarius in Naum* 3,13,17.
[48] Jes 34,1; *Commentarius in Esaiam* 10,34,1–7.

aspidum hinweisend, das vertraute *genimina viperarum* hat.[49] Eine fremde Situation ist die von einer Passage aus Jesajas Klage über Ariel, die im *Vulgata*-Text ‚*additus est annus ad annum*‘ ‚die Jahre folgten auf einander‘ lautet, und die, übersetzt, nach der *Septuaginta*, in einer verbreiterten Fassung erscheint als: ‚*congregate genimina; annum super annum comedite*‘ ‚sammelt die Früchte; esset Jahr nach Jahr‘.[50]

Schließlich treffen wir auch ein oder zwei Mal auf einen eigenen hieronymianischen Gebrauch von *genimen*, der nicht direkt mit dem eines Bibeltextes korrespondiert, aber sich doch in Gedanken und Formulierung einer biblischen Ausdrucksweise annähert. So vergeistigt er in seinem Kommentar zu Matthäus den Text über die Endzeit: ‚*Vae … praegnatibus und nutrientibus in illis diebus*‘ ‚Wehe den Schwangeren und Säugenden in jenen Tagen‘ zu ‚*Vae illis animabus quae non in perfectum virum sua genimina perduxerunt:*‘ ‚Wehe den Seelen, die ihr innerliches Wachsen nicht zum Maß eines vollkommenen Menschen gebracht haben‘.[51] Und wo Jesaja spricht von einer Hütte im Weingarten, spricht Hieronymus von den Früchten jenes Weingartens, die er *genimina* nennt.[52]

Alles in allem ist es klar, dass der auffallende Gebrauch von *genimen* bei unserem Autor durch die lateinische Übersetzung alttestamentlicher Texte bestimmt ist. Hierzu muss aber auch bemerkt werden, daß die Stellen mit γέν(ν)ημα / γεν(ν)ήματα im griechischen Text der *Septuaginta* viel zahlreicher sind als die lateinischen Wiedergaben mit *genimen* – *genimina*.[53] Der lateinische Übersetzer, sei es Hieronymus, sei es ein Anonymus, hat offenbar niemals *genimen* als das selbstverständliche Übersetzungswort betrachtet. Dass der Terminus doch noch ein kümmerliches Leben im lateinischen Wortschatz zu fristen imstande war, verdankte er vielmehr den zwei wiederholt wiederkehrenden neutestamentlichen Stellen als dem willkürlichem Zitieren von alttestamentlichen Übersetzungen. Der Unterschied von *creatura*, das bis in die romanischen Sprachen fortlebt, ist außerordentlich groß.

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[49] Jes 30,6; *Commentarius in Esaiam* 9,30,6–7.
[50] Jes 29,1: *Commentarius in Esaiam* 9,29,1–8.
[51] Mt 24,10; *Commentarius in Matthaeum* 4,24,19.
[52] Jes 1,8; *Commentarius in Esaiam* 1,1,8.
[53] Vgl. Hatch, E. – Redpath, H. 1954 (= 1897). *A Concordance to the Septuagint*: 238–239.

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WARUM IST OVID VERBANNT WORDEN
UND WO IST ER GESTORBEN?
EIN KURZER SPAZIERGANG DURCH
MITTELALTERLICHE KLATSCHGESCHICHTEN

A.P. ORBÁN

> Dir den in wilde unwirthbare Wüsten
> wo nie ein Glücklicher sich schauen ließ
> auf Pontus ferne meerumtobte Küsten
> der Grimm von Romas tück'schem Herrscher stieß;
> dir armer Dulder weih' ich diese Blätter,
> denn gleiches Loos beschieden uns die Götter.
>
> Weil du zu viel gesehn, zu viel gesprochen
> traf dich des Kaisers harter Richterspruch
> doch welch Vergehn wird denn an mir gerochen …[1]

In diesen von Grillparzer 1812/13 geschriebenen Versen (*An Ovid*, Str. 1.4) führt der Dichter zwei Gründe an, warum Ovid seiner Meinung nach von Kaiser Augustus verbannt worden sei: er habe zuviel gesehen und zuviel gesprochen. Letzteres bezieht sich zweifellos auf Ovids verbalen Freimut, zumal in seiner *Ars amatoria*, den auch Ovid als eine der Ursachen seiner Verbannung nennt (siehe unten). Erklärt Ovid aber seine Verbannung auch aus der Tatsache, dass er zuviel gesehen habe? Und was ,zuviel'? Oder nimmt Grillparzer sich hier dichterische Freiheiten heraus?

Ovids Nebelschleier

Der tatsächliche Grund von Ovids Verbannung (8 n. Chr.) nach Tomi[2] ist immer noch nicht ganz aufgeklärt und ist nach wie vor in einen geheimnisvollen Schleier gehüllt. Es ist auch Ovid selber, der sich über

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[1] Sauer, A. (Ed.) 1909–1944, II, 5: 119.
[2] Da man im Mittelalter nie an der Wahrheit dieser Verbannung gezweifelt hat, möchten wir uns hier nicht mit der in jüngerer Zeit vorgeschlagenen Theorie befassen, Ovid habe Tomi nie betreten; siehe beispielsweise Fitton Brown 1985, 18–22; Claassen 1986, 24 (eine übersichtliche Darstellung der Geschichte dieser Theorie).

die Ursachen seiner Verbannung stets in dunkler, unbestimmter Weise ausspricht. Schanz – Hosius (1967, 209) geben sich in ihrer allbekannten Geschichte der römischen Literatur alle Mühe, die gesamten Ovidstellen herauszustellen, an denen der Dichter etwas über die Ursachen seiner Verbannung verlauten lässt.

In diesem Zusammenhang werden immer die Ovidverse *Tr.* 2, 207–212 als die wichtigste Belegstelle herangezogen: ‚Obschon es zwei Vergehen sind, die zu meinem Untergang führten, eine Dichtung und ein Irrtum, muss ich schweigen von der Schuld, die mit der einen Tat verknüpft ist: ich bin es nicht wert, Caesar, dass meinetwegen deine Wunde aufgerissen wird; mehr als genug, dass du einmal Schmerz empfunden hast. Es bleibt der zweite Punkt: da werde ich nach Lektüre einer anstößigen Dichtung beschuldigt, Anstifter zu schamlosem Ehebruch zu sein‘.[3]

Über ‚den Irrtum‘ also wünscht Ovid nicht zu reden. Dass er mit dem *turpe carmen* ohne Zweifel seine *Ars amatoria*[4] gemeint hat, macht er in seinen Gedichten stellenweise auch klar: *Pont.* 2, 9, 73 *stultam conscripsimus Artem*; *Pont.* 2, 9, 75–76 *ecquid praeterea peccarim, quaerere noli, / ut lateat sola culpa sub Arte mea*. Es erscheint sehr glaubwürdig, dass dem Kaiser Augustus eine Schrift äußerst zuwider war, die seinen *politischen* Bemühungen zur Beförderung der Sittlichkeit und der Ehe entgegenwirkte. Aber seit dem Erscheinen derselben waren zehn Jahre verflossen; der nächste und höchstwahrscheinlich der schwerste Anstoß muss daher eine andere Verfehlung gewesen sein, und zwar diejenige, die von Ovid mit dem Namen *error*[5] bezeichnet wird. Und eben über diesen ‚Irrtum‘ spricht sich Ovid immer nur in geheimnisvollen Andeutungen aus. Aber die Begründung dieses Schweigens mit der Absicht, nicht den

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[3] *Perdiderint cum me duo crimina, carmen et error, / alterius facti culpa silenda mihi: / nam non sum tanti, renovem ut tua vulnera, Caesar, / quem nimio plus est indoluisse semel. / altera pars superest, qua turpi carmine lecto / arguor obsceni doctor adulterii*. Die deutschen Übersetzungen der *Tristia* haben wir Luck 1967 entnommen.

[4] Vgl. auch Owen 1967, 11: ‚The Ars Amatoria is constantly described as a direct cause of his disgrace‘.

[5] und nicht mit *scelus*, siehe *Tr.* 1, 3, 37–38 *caelestique viro, quis me deceperit error, / dicite, pro culpa ne scelus esse putet*, ‚und sagt dem göttlichen Mann, welch ein Irrtum mich verleitete, damit er meine Schuld nicht für ein Verbrechen hält‘; *Tr.* 3, 6, 25–26 *(rogo …) idque ita, si nullum scelus est in pectore nostro, / principiumque mei criminis error habet*, ‚(Das erbitte ich von dir), so wahr in meinem Herzen keine Sünde ist und am Anfang meines Vergehens ein Irrtum stand‘; *Tr.* 4, 10, 89–90 *scite, precor, causam (nec vos mihi fallere fas est) / errorem iussae, non scelus, esse fugae*, ‚so wisst, dass die Ursache der verhängten Verbannung ein Irrtum, kein Verbrechen war‘; *Pont.* 3, 3, 75 *tu licet erroris sub imagine crimen obumbres*; *Pont.* 1, 6, 25 *quicquid id est, ut non facinus, sic culpa vocanda est*.

Schmerz des Kaisers zu erneuern (vgl. *Tr.* 2, 207–09 = Fußnote 3), zeigt vielleicht, dass dieser dadurch in seinen *persönlichen* Beziehungen verletzt gewesen sein muss.[6]

Bezüglich des objektiven Tatbestands lässt Ovid sich nur zu folgenden Äußerungen verlocken: *Tr.* 3, 6, 27–28 *nec breve nec tutum, quo sint mea, dicere, casu / lumina funesti conscia facta mali*, ‚Es ist weder leicht noch gefahrlos zu sagen, durch welche Fügung meine Augen Zeugen eines grässlichen Unglücks wurden'; *Tr.* 2, 103–106 *cur aliquid vidi? cur noxia lumina feci? / cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi? / inscius Actaeon vidit sine veste Dianam: / praeda fuit canibus non minus ille suis*, ‚Warum sah ich etwas? Warum ließ ich meine Augen schuldig werden? Warum erblickte ich unvorsichtig eine verbotene Handlung? Unwissentlich sah Aktaion Diana im Bade[7]—er fiel seinen Hunden trotzdem zur Beute', und *Tr.* 3, 5, 49–52 *inscia quod crimen viderunt lumina, plector, / peccatumque oculos est habuisse meum. / non equidem totam possum defendere culpam, / sed partem nostri criminis error habet*, ‚Weil meine Blicke unwissentlich eine verbrecherische Handlung sahen, trifft mich Strafe; mein Vergehen besteht darin, Augen zu haben. Gewiss, ich kann die Schuld nicht gänzlich von mir weisen, aber einen Teil meines Verbrechens trägt Irrtum'.

Kurzum, Ovid hat also eine strafbare Handlung wider Willen mitangesehen; er muss jedoch darüber schweigen, um nicht die Wunden des Kaisers wieder aufzureißen. Und da Ovid seine Augen als den schuldigen Teil anklagt—seine Augen, die ‚unwissentlich' (*inscius*) ‚Mitwisser' (*conscius*) eines ‚grässlichen Verstoßes' (*funestum malum*) geworden sind—, so ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, dass er bei einem Mitglied der kaiserlichen Familie Zeuge und Mitwisser einer schuldhaften Handlung geworden war. Man vermutet, dass der Ehebruch, den die Enkelin des Augustus, Julia, die Gemahlin des L. Aemilius Paulus, mit D. Silanus begangen hatte, das Verbrechen war, in das Ovid verwickelt wurde.[8]

In diesem Kontext nennt Ovid seine eigene Schuld einen *error* (*Tr.* 2, 207; 4, 1, 23; 4, 10, 90), eine *stultitia* (*Tr.* 3, 6, 35 *stultitiamque meum crimen debere vocari*, ‚dass man mein Vergehen eine Dummheit nennen

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[6] Vgl. *Tr.* 2, 133–344 *ita principe dignum—/ ultus es offensas, ut decet, ipse tuas*, ‚du selbst hast, wie es sich für einen Herrscher ziemt, deine Kränkung gerächt'.

[7] Vgl. Luck 1977, 105–106: ‚Im Bild der Aktaion-Sage … deutet Ovid verhüllend an, was geschehen ist. … Was Ovid gesehen hat, mag eine erotische Szene gewesen sein, aber er beteuert ja seine eigene Unschuld; er war nicht selbst irgendwie beteiligt'.

[8] Vgl. Owen 1967, 21; Gluck 1977, 117: ‚Auf Grund dieser Stelle (= *Tr.* 2, 211f.) nimmt man vielfach an, Ovid habe das Verhältnis von Julia mit D. Silanus begünstigt (vgl. Tac. Ann. 4, 24)'.

müsste'; *Tr. 1, 2, 99–100 si me meus abstulit error, / stultaque mens nobis, non scelerata fuit*, ‚wenn es eine Verblendung war, die mich hinriss, wenn ich törichten, doch nicht verbrecherischen Sinns war'; *Pont. 2, 9, 73 stultam conscripsimus Artem*), eine *simplicitas* (*Tr. 1, 5, 42 sed hanc merui simplicitate fugam*, ‚ich habe bloß durch meine Einfalt die Verbannung verdient') und weist die Einschätzung als *scelus* zurück (*Pont. 2, 9, 67ff.*).[9] Er möchte nur ein *non sapiens* bzw. *stultus* und *timidus* genannt werden (*Pont. 2, 2, 17 nil nisi non sapiens possum timidusque vocari*) und bestimmt nicht ein *sceleratus* (*Tr. 1, 2, 100*). Die Hauptschuld wurde jedoch offenbar Ovid zugeschrieben, gegen welchen Augustus vielleicht noch von der *Ars amandi* her verstimmt war, zumal da deren Veröffentlichung in dem gleichen Jahre erfolgte, in dem Augustus seine Tochter Julia verbannen musste, so dass Ovid wegen seiner *Ars amandi* als rückfälliger Verführer erscheinen konnte.[10] Auch die Scham und Furcht raten unserem Dichter, die Übeltat in Finsternis zu hüllen.[11] Die Furcht vor Unannehmlichkeiten mag mitbestimmend gewesen sein, und wirklich spricht er neben dem *error*, der ihn zu Fall gebracht habe, auch von dem *timor*: ‚Meine Angst oder ein Irrtum—eher ein Irrtum—brachten mich zu Fall', *aut timor aut error nobis, prius obfuit error* (*Tr. 4, 4, 39*).

Aus all diesen Andeutungen müssen wir schließen, dass das Vergehen höchstwahrscheinlich nicht gegen den Kaiser als politische Person gerichtet war, also keinen politischen Charakter hatte: ‚Schließlich kann ich nicht alle Hoffnung auf Rettung begraben, da doch keine Bluttat Grund meiner Strafe ist', *denique non possum nullam sperare salutem, / cum poenae non sit causa cruenta meae* (*Tr. 3, 5, 43–44*). Ovid wurde höchstwahrscheinlich wider Willen Zeuge des ehebrecherischen Verhältnisses der Julia, der Enkelin des Kaisers; Ovid wurde schuldig, als er es nicht verhinderte, sondern dazu schwieg, es vielleicht begünstigte (Schanz – Hosius 1967, 209).

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[9] Vgl. Owen 1967, 13: ‚It (= *error*) was due to folly, simplicity, and timidity almost amounting to insanity'.

[10] Vgl. Teuffel 1875, 523–524; Owen 1967, 8: ‚By a coincidence Ovid's Ars Amatoria was published about the same time as Julia's exile, and, though her indiscretions dated from long before, the indignant emperor may well have suspected some not mysterious connexion between the teaching of the poet and the practice of his daughter'.

[11] Vgl. *Tr. 3, 6, 29–32 mensque reformidat, veluti sua vulnera, tempus / illud, et admonitu fit novus ipse dolor; / et quaecumque adeo possunt afferre pudorem, / illa tegi caeca condita nocte decet*, ‚Mein Geist schreckt vor jenem Moment zurück, als würde seine Wunde berührt, und in der Erinnerung erneuert sich der Schmerz. Überhaupt muss alles, was mich mit so tiefer Scham erfüllen kann, in dunkle Nacht gehüllt werden'. Für den Kontext dieser Verse siehe oben *Tr. 3, 6, 27–28*.

Mittelalterliche Lösungen des Problems

Dies sind Annahmen, die sich auf Deutungen von Ovid-Texten grün-
den und von neuzeitlichen Literaturhistorikern wie Teuffel, Schanz,
Hosius, Luck, Owen usw. entfaltet sind. Diese Problematik intrigierte
jedoch auch die Leute im Mittelalter, und bereits an der Schwelle
des Mittelalters kam der erste mittelalterliche christliche Schriftsteller
mit einer Lösung der Frage, warum Ovid verbannt worden sei. Und
auch er meinte (wie die modernen Literaturhistoriker), die Lösung im
Bereich der persönlichen Beziehungen finden zu können.

   Sidonius Apollinaris (zweite Hälfte des 5. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.,
Schriftsteller aus Lyon und Bischof von Clermont) spricht ja als erster
die Meinung aus, dass ‚der weiche Ovid, bekannt um seine wollüstigen
Lieder und nach Tomi verbannt, einst allzusehr der Sklave war von
Caesars Tochter (=Julia), die er mit dem fingierten Namen Corinna
nannte‘.[12] Hiermit schlägt Sidonius zwei Fliegen mit einer Klappe: der
konkrete Grund von Ovids Verbannung ist geliefert und die Person hin-
ter dem von Ovid in seinen *Amores* verwendeten Pseudonym Corinna
ist entlarvt. Unsere literarischen altchristlichen Quellen vor Sidonius
verheimlichen jedoch ihr (mögliches) Interesse an Ovid nahezu völ-
lig. Das ist kein Wunder: er war ja ein Heide mit einer sogar für die
Heiden bedenklichen Lebensführung, der außerdem von einem heid-
nischen Kaiser verurteilt und verbannt worden war.

   Diese politische Verurteilung Ovids wird kurz darauf literarisch von
Quintilian wiederholt. Quintilian (etwa 35 bis um 100 n. Chr.), Leh-
rer der Beredsamkeit in Rom und Prinzenerzieher am Hof Domitians,
schreibt ein maßgebendes Lehrbuch ‚Über die Erziehung zum Red-
ner‘ (*De institutione oratoria*). Das 10. Buch enthält einen Abriss der grie-
chischen und römischen Literaturgeschichte mit einer fein ausgegliche-
nen Würdigung der einzelnen Autoren. Quintilians Urteil über Ovid ist
nicht schmeichelhaft. Stets wenn er über Ovid spricht, wirft er ihm vor,
er sei *lascivus* ‚liederlich, wollüstig, affektiert‘: das ist er, nach Quintilian,
in seinen *Metamorphosen* (*Inst. or.* 4, 1, 77), in seinen *Heroides* (*Inst. or.* 10, 1,
88), aber auch in seinen Elegien. Er hätte jedoch mehr geleistet, wenn
er weniger seinem *ingenium*, seinem Talent gefolgt wäre: ‚Die ‚Medea‘
des Ovid scheint mir ein Bild davon zu geben, was dieser Mann zu
leisten vermocht hat, hätte er nur lieber seinem Talent gebieten statt

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[12] Sidon. Apoll. 23, 158–161: *et te carmina per libidinosa / notum, Naso tener, Tomosque
missum, / quondam Caesareae nimis puellae / ficto nomine subditum Corinnae.*

nachgeben wollen', *Ovidi Medea videtur mihi ostendere, quantum ille vir prae-stare potuerit, si ingenio suo imperare quam indulgere maluisset* (*Inst. or.* 10, 1, 98). Quintilians größtes Bedenken gegenüber Ovid ist tatsächlich, ‚dass Ovid gar zu sehr in das eigene Talent verliebt ist', *Ovidius … nimium amator ingenii sui* (*Inst. or.* 10, 1, 88). Und die Ironie des Schicksals ist, dass von dem gesamten Oeuvre Ovids eben seine Tragödie über Medea (mit Ausnahme von zwei Verszeilen) verlorengegangen ist.

Doch haben die Gedichte und die Person Ovids auch die Christen immer fasziniert, und Ovid hat dementsprechend in der vorkarolingi-schen Ära (zwischen etwa 500 und 800 n. Chr.) schon das Podium der Schulautoren betreten. Dies steht außer Frage, obwohl wir aus dieser Zeit nur einen Autor kennen, der über Ovid ausdrücklich sagt, er sei einer der lateinischen Schulautoren.

Etwa 500 n.Chr. schreibt Fulgentius in Nordafrika seine *Mythologia-rum libri tres*, einen Dialog der Muse Kalliope mit dem Autor. In *Myth.* 1, 21 behandelt er die Geschichte der drei Gorgonen, welche er nur bei-läufig berührt, da ‚wir es für überflüssig halten, diese Fabel zu erzählen, weil sie schon von den im Elementarunterricht durchaus bekannten Dichtern Lukan (*Phars.* 9, 629ff.) und Ovid (*Met.* 4, 617ff.) beschrieben ist', *quarum quia fabulam Lucanus et Ovidius scripserunt poetae grammaticorum scolaribus rudimentis admodum celeberrimi, hanc fabulam referre superfluum duxi-mus.*

Der erste Autor, der explizit behauptet, dass die heidnischen Dich-ter wie Ovid ‚unter dem falschen Deckmantel' manche (christliche) Wahrheit verkündigen, ist Theodulf von Orléans (etwa 750–821), der, als Alkuin sich vom Hofe Karls des Großen zurückzog, der Vertraute und der einflussreichste theologische Berater des Kaisers wurde. Diese Rolle spielte er zunächst auch als Bischof von Orléans unter Ludwig dem Frommen, von dem er jedoch 818 als angeblicher Verschwörer abgesetzt und nach Angers verbannt wurde, wo er schließlich 821 starb. *Carmen* 45, vielleicht das berühmteste seiner Gedichte, trägt den Titel *De libris quos legere solebam*, in dem er folgendes schreibt: ‚Ich las mal Pompeius, mal dich, Donatus; und bald Vergil, bald dich, geschwätzi-ger Naso. Die Schriften dieser enthalten zwar viele triviale Sachen (*fri-vola*), unter dem falschen (= dichterischen) Deckmantel jedoch versteckt sich manche Wahrheit'.[13]

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[13] *Et modo Pompeium, modo te, Donate, legebam, / et modo Virgilium, te modo, Naso loquax. / In quorum dictis quamquam sint frivola multa, / plurima sub falso tegmine vera latent* (Theodulf. *Carm.* 45, 17–20).

Theodulf übt also noch einige—obligatorische?—Kritik an Ovid: er nennt ihn *loquax*, möglicherweise im Anschluss an Quintilian, dessen größtes Bedenken gegenüber Ovid war, er sei *nimium amator ingenii sui* (s. oben). Die alte Kritik an dem (unmoralischen) Inhalt der Gedichte Ovids ist bei Theodulf verstummt und hat sogar Platz gemacht für ein Lob des Inhalts seiner Poesie: unter dem Deckmantel seiner dichterischen Sprache, dem *falsum tegmen*, verkündige Ovid viele philosophische und christlich-theologische Wahrheit.

Auch das antike Bedenken gegenüber Ovid, er sei von Augustus nicht umsonst, sondern mit Recht wegen eines groben Fehltritts verbannt, fällt in den literarischen Kreisen Karls des Großen. Theodulf erhielt 820 nämlich einen poetischen Brief von seinem Freund Modoin, dem übrigens am Hofe Karls des Großen das *epitheton ornans* ‚Naso‘ verliehen wurde; letzteres setzt bereits eine völlige Rehabilitation Ovids im literarischen, wissenschaftlichen Kreis des Kaisers voraus. Modoin war damals Bischof von Autun und versuchte mit diesem Gedicht seinen verbannten Kollegen zu trösten. Modoin schreibt hier Theodulfs Verbannung dem *livor edax*,[14] ‚dem fressgierigen Neid‘, zu. Dasselbe ist nun auch dem Dichter Ovid passiert: ‚Weißt du nicht, dass Naso einen langen Leidensweg zu gehen hatte? Er ist unschuldig verbannt worden, aus Neid‘, *Pertulit an nescis quod longos Naso labores? / Insons est factus exul ob invidiam* (Modoin. *Ad Theodulfum episcopum* 47–48, MGH Poetae 1: 571).

Ein ‚Sonderrecht‘ der lateinischen Schulautoren im Mittelalter ist, dass sie einen *accessus*, eine Art von Einführung, bekommen. In diesem *accessus* werden über die Schulautoren im Prinzip vier Fragen gestellt und beantwortet: Was ist das Thema des Werks (*operis materia*)? Was ist die Absicht des Autors (*scribentis intentio*)? Was ist der Nutzen (*utilitas*) bzw. das Ziel des Werks (*finalis causa*)? Zu welchem Teil der Philosophie soll das Werk gerechnet werden (*cui parti philosophiae subponatur*)? Was ein mittelalterlicher *accessus* über Ovid berichtet, ist selbstverständlich nicht unerheblich, da das Ovidbild der mittelalterlichen Leser zu einem großen Teil durch eine solche präliminare Auskunft bestimmt wird.

Der älteste uns bekannte mittellateinische *Accessus ad auctores* (11./12. Jh.) schneidet im Zusammenhang von Ovids *Tristia* die Frage an, warum Ovid vom Kaiser verbannt wurde, und führt dann drei mögliche Gründe auf: wegen der *Ars amatoria*, in der Ovid die jungen Männer gelehrt habe, die römischen *matronae* zu verführen; wegen Ovids Liaison

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[14] Für diesen Ausdruck siehe etwa Ovid. *Amores* 1, 15, 1; *Rem.* 389.

mit Livia, der Gattin des Kaisers; oder weil Ovid gesehen habe, wie der Kaiser sich einem Knaben (*puero*) vergriffen hat, und Octavianus fürchtete, von Ovid deswegen verraten oder erpresst zu werden.[15] In diesem Kontext ist es jedoch nicht klar, ob der Autor dieses *accessus* uns zwischen den drei Möglichkeiten wählen lässt, oder ob seines Erachtens die Kombination der genannten Gründe die wirkliche Ursache von Ovids Verbannung bildete.

Während dieser anonyme *Accessus ad auctores* und der in nahezu derselben Zeit verfasste *Dialogus super auctores* Konrads von Hirsau (um 1070–1150) einige Gedichte Ovids—wie etwa die *Metamorphosen*—noch unbesprochen lassen, schreibt Arnulf, Lehrer in Orléans in der zweiten Hälfte des 12. Jahrhunderts, einen ausführlichen Kommentar ausgerechnet über Ovids *Metamorphosen*, die von Konrad soeben noch als ‚ein Stück Abgötterei' abgetan wurden.[16] In seinen *Allegoriae super Ovidii Metamorphosin* führt dieser Arnulf, wenn er Ovids *Epistulae ex Ponto* einleitet, wieder drei mögliche Ursachen seiner Verbannung auf: sein Gedicht *De arte amandi*, seinen verborgenen Ehebruch (mit wem?—das verrät Arnulf nicht); oder weil Ovid durch Zufall gesehen habe, wie der Kaiser seinen Geliebten missbrauchte.[17] Die letztgenannte Option begründet er als erster mittelalterlicher Ovidkommentator auch noch mit einem Beleg aus Ovids *Tristia*: ‚Wehe mir, dass ich es gesehen habe (oder: was habe ich doch gesehen?) Warum ließ ich meine Augen schuldig werden?', *unde ait in libro Tristium: ‚heu michi quod vidi, cur noxia lumina feci'*[18] (Ghisalberti 1932, 173).

Ovid hat also allerdings ‚zuviel gesehen',—auch dem Magister Wilhelm von Orléans zufolge, dem Verfasser der *Bursarii super Ovidios*. Wilhelm schreibt um 1200 in seiner Einführung in Ovids *Tristia* fast dasselbe wie Arnulf und unsere obenerwähnten Quellen, mit dem großen Unterschied, dass er *alle* drei möglichen Ursachen von Ovids Verbannung (die *Ars amatoria*; Augustus missbrauchte einen Knaben; Ovids Liaison mit Livia) mit Belegen aus seinen Gedichten zu begründen ver-

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[15] *Tres sententiae dicuntur: Prima, quod concubuit cum uxore Caesaris Livia nomine, secunda, quod sicut familiaris transiens eius porticum vidit eum cum amasio suo coeuntem, unde timens Caesar ne ab eo proderetur, misit eum in exilium. Tertia, quod librum fecerat de amatoria arte in quo iuvenes docuerat matronas decipiendo sibi allicere, et ideo offensis Romanis dicitur missus esse in exsilium* (Huygens 1970, 35–36).

[16] *maximam dixerim partem ydolatrie in Metamorfosion* (Huygens 1970: Zeile 1337).

[17] *Sunt etenim tres cause quare in exilio sit positus: vel pro libro de arte amandi, vel latenti adulterio, vel quia Cesarem suo amasio vidit abutentem forte, unde ait in libro Tristium: heu michi quod vidi, cur noxia lumina feci* (Ghisalberti 1932, 173).

[18] *Tr. 2, 103 Cur aliquid vidi? Cur noxia lumina feci?*

sucht: *Sed a diversis diverse assignantur cause, quare missus sit in exilium. Quidam enim dicunt, quod missus est propter Ovidium ‚De Arte‘, in quo docuit non docenda, unde ipse in Ovidio De Ponto: „Neve roges, que sit, stultam conscripsimus Artem: Innocuas nobis hec vetat esse manus‘ [Ex Ponto 2, 9, 73–74]. Alii dicunt, quod propter hoc missus sit, quod vidit Caesarem puero abutentem. Unde in hoc libro habetur: ‚Heu mihi, quid vidi? Cur noxia lumina feci? Cur imprudenti cognita culpa michi?‘ [Tr. 2, 103–104]. Alii dicunt, quod missus est, quia diligebat imperatricem, quam falso nomine Corinnam appellavit. Unde illud in hoc libro: ‚Moverat ingenium totam cantata per Urbem nomine non vero dicta Corinna michi‘ [Tr. 4, 10,59–60]* (Engelbrecht 2003).

In diesem Kontext fällt weiter noch auf, dass die obenerwähnte von Sidonius Apollinaris ersonnene Lösung, Corinna sei in Wirklichkeit ein Pseudonym für die Tochter des Kaisers Augustus, in den *Bursarii* eine Variante bekommt: ‚das Liebchen‘ Ovids, Corinna, sei nicht Julia, sondern Livia, die Gemahlin des Kaisers. Letztgenannte Ansicht vertritt auch der Autor einer in Hs. Città del Vaticano 1479, f. 53^r (s. XIV) überlieferten *Vita Ovidii*: *Postea adamavit Liviam uxorem imperatoris, quam falso nomine appellavit Corinnam, q⟨uasi⟩ ‚cor urens‘.*

Arnulf von Orléans war nicht nur der erste uns bekannte mittelalterliche Kommentator von Ovids *Metamorphosen*, sondern auch derjenige, der—und das ist vielleicht seine größte Leistung—die allegorische und moralisierende Auslegung der *Metamorphosen* in die mittelalterliche Tradition eingeführt hat. Wir müssen hiernach jedoch ein ganzes Jahrhundert warten, bis wieder ein neuer Kommentar zu Ovids *Metamorphosen* erscheinen wird.

Im Jahre 1322–1323 schreibt Giovanni del Virgilio (Magister Johannes de Virgilio) in Bologna seine *Allegorie librorum Ovidii Metamorphoseos*: ein Buch voller Allegorisierungen der *Metamorphoses*, ein Prosimetrum, in dem Giovanni Prosa und (eigene) Poesie miteinander abwechselt. Giovanni ‚plündert‘ hierin fast all seine Vorgänger und die ‚Fusion‘ all dieser ‚Opfer‘ mündet in einen fortlaufenden Kommentar, in dem Giovanni auch noch zahllose Marginalglossen aus verschiedenen Ovidhandschriften eingliedert. Wir möchten nun einen Augenblick bei Giovannis Einführung in Ovids Schriften verweilen. Es ist fast natürlich, dass jede Einführung—gleichwie das Corpus der Glossen in den Handschriften—mit den Jahr(hundert)en immer wächst: die Magistri verbinden die Kenntnisse ihrer Vorgänger und ergänzen diese mit ihren eigenen Ideen und Kenntnissen. So finden wir in dem *accessus* von Giovanni bekanntes, zuweilen einigermaßen anders abgetöntes Material aus der Feder seiner Vorgänger, angefüllt mit neuen ‚Ansichten‘.

Gerade so wie Arnulf unterscheidet auch Giovanni beispielsweise in seinem einführenden Kapitel über die *causa materialis* von Ovids *Metamorphosen* drei Arten von Verwandlungen: die *transmutacio naturalis, spiritualis, magica*. Aber seine Auslegung dieses Fundes von Arnulf ist dialektischer. Die *transmutatio naturalis* finde auf zweifache Weise statt: durch *generatio*, wenn aus Nichts ein gewisses Etwas entstehe, oder durch *corruptio*, wenn ein gewisses Etwas sich in Nichts ändere. Die *transmutatio spiritualis* ist bei Giovanni ebenfalls zweierlei: wenn aus einer gesunden Person eine ungesunde Person entstehe, oder wenn eben das Gegenteil davon stattfinde. Die *transmutatio magica* vollziehe sich durch Zauberer, die zum Beispiel einen Menschen eine Stute scheinen ließen (*faciunt apparere*), während er es faktisch nicht sei.

So lesen wir in der *Vita Antonii* von Athanasius, erzählt Giovanni, dass ein gewisser Magier sich in ein Mädchen verliebte und sich mit ihr verheiraten wollte. Da die Eltern des Mädchens diese Ehe ablehnten, sorgte er mit seiner Zauberkunst dafür, dass sie eine Stute zu sein schien. Als die Eltern ihre Tochter so sahen, gingen sie betrübt zu Antonius und baten ihn, ihre Tochter von der Gestalt einer Stute zu erlösen. Der heilige Antonius sagte zu ihnen: ‚*Ihr* habt Pferdeaugen, und deshalb scheint sie euch eine Stute. Sie ist aber eine Frau! Und nach einem Gebet besprengte Antonius sie mit gesegnetem Wasser, und der Nebel (*caligo*) wurde von ihren Augen entfernt' (Ghisalberti 1933, 17).

Auch die traditionelle Reihe von Fragen, die in den früheren *accessus* über den betreffenden Schulautor gestellt wurden (*materia, utilitas, intentio, cui parti philosophiae*), musste bei Giovanni einem mehr systematischen, scholastischen, aristotelisch-dialektischen Verfahren Raum machen. Giovanni sucht nach der *causa efficiens, causa materialis, causa formalis* und der *causa finalis* von Ovids Gedichten. Und diese *causae* lassen sich für Giovanni selbstverständlich nie in der Einzahl lösen. Bei der Behandlung der *causa efficiens* von Ovids Oeuvre stellt er denn auch fest: ‚Man kann sagen, dass die *causa efficiens* zweifach ist, und zwar eine bewegende und eine bewegte Ursache. Die bewegende Ursache war Gott selbst, der das erste bewegende Prinzip ist', *Potest tamen dici quod causa efficiens fuit duplex s. movens et mota. Movens fuit ipse deus qui est primum movens* (Ghisalberti 1933, 14). Und ‚das bewegte ausführende Prinzip', das *efficiens motum*, war Ovid selber, geboren in der Stadt Sulmo usw. (Ghisalberti 1933, 14).

Im Kontext der *causa efficiens* geht Giovanni auch wieder auf die Frage ein, warum Ovid verbannt wurde. Und auch hier lässt sich die

Tendenz jedes mittelalterlichen Lehrers erkennen, überall seine eigenen Spuren zu hinterlassen. Außer den drei bereits fast traditionell gewordenen Gründen zählt Giovanni noch eine vierte mögliche Ursache von Ovids Verbannung auf: Nach der Meinung einiger Leute sei er verbannt worden, weil er in seiner *Ars amandi* Unkeuschheit unterrichtet habe. Andere bringen einen anderen Grund vor: Ovid soll mit der Kaiserin geschlafen haben. Wieder andere glauben, dass Ovid, als er eines Tages durch das Haus des Augustus lief, gesehen habe, dass der Kaiser *incestuose et turpiter* handelte (mit wem?—das läßt Giovanni unerwähnt). Schließlich sagen andere wieder—und dies ist neu!—, dass Ovids Verbannung die Folge davon gewesen sei, dass er zufällig die Kaiserin nackt im Bade erblickt hatte. Und nach Giovanni ist letzteres durchaus nicht auszuschließen: Ovid schreibe ja selber ‚ich habe Diana ohne Kleidung gesehen‘, *vidi sine veste Dyanam*[19], und wolle hiermit die Ursache seiner Verbannung introduzieren.[20]

Ein ‚pikantes‘ Detail in diesem Zusammenhang ist, dass Arnulf oben Ovids *Tr.* 2, 103 als Belegstelle und Grund für Ovids Verbannung anführt (weil er zufälligerweise gesehen hatte, dass der Kaiser seinen Geliebten missbrauchte), während Giovanni aus demselben Kontext (*Tr.* 2, 105) schließen zu können meint, dass Ovid die Kaiserin nackt in Bade gesehen hatte und deswegen vom Kaiser verbannt wurde. Es lag also wieder an Ovids Augen …

Auch über Ovids Tod gehen Giovanni zufolge die Ansichten auseinander. Einige behaupten, er sei im Exil gestorben; nach anderen jedoch soll er von Caesar Octavianus aus seinem Verbannungsort zurückgeholt und während seiner ‚Joyeuse Entrée‘ in Rom inmitten der Massen von begeisterten Römern erstickt sein.[21]

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[19] *Tr.* 2, 105 *Inscius Actaeon vidit sine veste Dianam*, ‚Unwissentlich sah Aktaion Diana im Bade‘.

[20] *Tercio descripsit Ovidium in arte amandi, in quo docuit quomodo iuvenes debent procari, ob quam causam in odium Ottaviani est constitutus. Et ob hoc ut quidam dicunt exulavit a Roma, quia docuerat impudicos etc. Alii dicunt quod causa fuit quia ipse cum imperatrice concubuit. Alii dicunt quod causa fuit quia semel transiens per domum Ottaviani vidit ipsum incestuose agentem et turpiter. Alii dicunt quod causa fuit quia ipse vidit dominam imperatricem nudam in balneo et hec fuit causa, ut credo, unde ipse in libro de tristibus sic dicit: Iussus et Atheon vidi sine veste Dyanam … hoc ipse Ovidius introducit ut causam exilii demonstret* (Ghisalberti 1933, 15).

[21] *Sed de relegatione ipsius dicunt aliqui quod ipse mortuus in exilio … Aliqui dicunt quod Cesar Ottavianus mortuus est per biennium ante Ovidium et sic religatus fuit. Aliqui dicunt quod Cesar Ottavianus eum traxit de exilio, et cum veniret Romam tanta multitudo populi ivit sibi obvia propter famam suam quod cum Romam intraret in medio populi suffocatus est* (Ghisalberti 1933, 17). Ein anderer Giovanni, der große Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375), ein jüngerer Zeitgenosse unseres Giovanni del Virgilio, schreibt mit fast denselben Worten über Ovids Tod:

Wir bleiben noch einen Augenblick in derselben Zeit. 1356 schreibt der italienische Humanist Petrarca etwas nuancierter und für einen Humanisten gar nicht übertrieben positiv über Ovid: ,Er [= Ovid] scheint mir einerseits ein sehr talentierter Mann gewesen zu sein, aber andererseits jemand mit einem liederlichen, schlüpfrigen Geist, ein unbeschränkter Weibernarr, der sich so viel an der weiblichen Gesellschaft freute, dass er sich darin den Höhepunkt all seines Glücks zu finden bemühte. Er schrieb denn auch seine *Ars amatoria*, ein verrücktes Werk, womit er es (wenn ich mich nicht irre) verdient hatte, verbannt zu werden'.[22] Hierin lehre Ovid—fährt Petrarca fort—, wie die römischen Matronae und Mädchen von den Männern verführt werden können. Und Ovid schildere das eine oder andere so schamlos, dass es sogar zu garstig sei, es zu erzählen. Hätte Ovid jedoch nicht diese Mentalität und Lebensführung gehabt, dann hätte er ein besseres Ansehen ,bei den ernsthaften Männern'(*apud graves viros*) und hätte er seine Verbannung am Schwarzen Meer nicht erleiden müssen oder gleichmütiger getragen. Bei Petrarca gibt es also keine spekulativen Grübeleien über die Ursachen von Ovids Verbannung; er weiß es genau: die *Ars amatoria* war bestimmt Ovids einzige Übeltat.

Etwa fünfzig Jahre später, in ihrer um 1405–1407 geschriebenen ,Stadt der Frauen' (*Le livre de la Cité des Dames*) stellt Christine de Pizan an die (allegorische Personifikation der) Vernunft die Frage: ,Gnädige Frau, wie kam es, dass Ovid, der den Ruf hat, der größte unter den Dichtern zu sein—obwohl viele (unter denen ich) die Ansicht vertreten, dass Vergil mehr gerühmt werden soll (Sie dürfen mich korrigieren)— den Frauen soviel Böses nachsagte … wie in seiner *Ars amatoria* und seinen *Remedia amoris*'(Curnow 1975, 647). Die Vernunft antwortete hierauf folgendes: ,Ovid war zwar scharfsinnig auf dem Gebiete der Poesie, frönte jedoch allen Eitelkeiten und jedem fleischlichen Genuss, und ließ sich—soviel er konnte—von allen Frauen hinreißen; er blieb aber keiner einzigen Frau treu; die Belohnung, die ihm zuteil wurde, war denn auch: Schmach, Verlust von Gütern und Körperteilen, und Verbannung (*c'est assavoir deffame et perte de biens et de membres … il en fu mené*

Aliqui dicunt quod Cesar Octavianus eum traxit de exilio et cum veniret Romam tanta fuit multitudo populi ruens in obviam ei propter famam suam quod cum romam intraret in medio prope suffocatus est (Ghisalberti 1933, 17 Anm. 41).

[22] *De vita solitaria* 2, 7, 2: *Ille [= Ovidius] mihi quidem magni vir ingenii videtur, sed lascivi et lubrici et prorsus mulierosi animi fuisse, quem conventus feminei delectarent usque adeo, ut in illis felicitatis suae summamque reponeret. Itaque Amatoriam artem scribens, insanum opus et meritam, nisi fallor, exilii sui causam.*

en exil, Curnow 1975, 648). Nachdem er durch die Gönnerschaft einiger junger mächtiger Römer, die seine Anhänger waren, aus seinem Verbannungsort zurückgerufen war, verfiel er aufs neue in seinen alten Fehler. Er wurde deshalb wiederum vertrieben und verstümmelt (*fu par ses demerites chastiez et diffourmez de ses membres*, Curnow 1975, 648). Und als er sah, dass er nicht mehr das Leben führen konnte, das er so genoss, fing er an, die Frauen mit seinen gewandten Auseinandersetzungen zu verlästern, und bemühte sich hiermit dafür zu sorgen, dass sie anderen missfallen würden' (*quant il vit que plus ne pourroit mener la vie ou tant se souloit delitter, prist a blasmer les femmes par ses soubtilles raisons et par ce s'efforça de les faire aux autres desplaire*, Curnow 1975, 648–649).

Christine de Pizan hat Ovid als Mann m.a.W. viel negativer geschildert als es in den antiken Geschichten geschah:[23] Ovid sei ein Mann gewesen, der nur für die (fleischlichen) Lüste lebte, ein ausgemachter Casanova, eine wandelnde Gefahr für alle Frauen. Deshalb—und nicht wegen seiner Dichtung und wegen des verderblichen Einflusses dieser Poesie auf die römische Jugend—wurde Ovid nach Christine de Pizan (sogar zweimal!) verbannt und verstümmelt.

Letzteres hat Christine nicht aus den antiken oder mittellateinischen Ovidquellen übernommen, sondern aus dem zwischen 1380 und 1387 geschriebenen, altfranzösischen *Livre de Leesce*, in dem der Dichter Jean Le Fèvre (um 1320 bis um 1387)—der allbekannten Geschichte des Petrus Abaelardus entsprechend?—behauptet, dass Ovid kastriert und verbannt wurde und hierauf anfing, die Frauen wegen seines physischen Hemmnisses zu verleumden: ‚Sie waren Heiden / und wir sind Christen. / Ihre Erdichtungen und Erfindungen / sind nach unserem Glauben ketzerisch, / und man soll ihnen deshalb nicht glauben, / ebensowenig wie denjenigen, die in dieselbe Kerbe hauen, / namentlich als sie über Frauen / sprachen und jene verlästerten. / Sie verkündigten viele Stupiditäten über sie, / über Jupiter und Phoebus / und über die vornehmen Damen aus dem Land, / und darum muss man diese Leute wohl hassen. / Glaube nun nicht, dass ich nur etwas erfinde: / nie fällt ein Kapphahn auf eine Henne. / Dies habe ich aus Anlass von Ovid gesagt; / denn man behauptet wahrheitsgemäß, / dass man ihm die beiden Hoden abgeschnitten hat; / mit Flöckchen und weichen Eiern wurde die Wunde abgedichtet und geheilt. / Darauf hat er noch Jahre gelebt / und wurde er verbannt / und übers

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[23] Für das Verhältnis von Christine de Pizan zu ihren antiken Quellen siehe Orbán 2004, 111–140.

Meer geschickt. / Den Grund dessen soll ich jedoch nicht erzählen, / denn ich habe keine Zeit, dabei zu verweilen. / Nun kann man aber annehmen und sagen, / dass er, voller Hass und Wut, / hiernach die Frauen verketzerte / und sie seitdem nicht mehr liebte'.[24]

Nein, nach den ‚orthodoxen' mittelalterlichen Schriftstellern ist Ovid nie aus seinem Verbannungsort zurückgekehrt. Er starb in Tomi. Aber auch nach seinem Tod fuhr er fort, die Nachwelt zu überraschen, wie uns der mittellateinische *accessus* des Gedichts *De vetula* erzählt. Als ja die Gräber des *cimiterium publicum* von Tomi geräumt wurden, fand man sein Grab wieder und darin ein mit armenischen Buchstaben geschriebenes Epigramm, dessen lateinische Interpretation lautet: *hic iacet Ovidius ingeniosissimus poetarum* (Robathan 1968, 42). Am Kopfende dieses Grabes entdeckte man weiter eine unbeschädigte, elfenbeinerne[25] *capsella*, in der das Gedicht *De vetula*, das geistliche Testament eines Pseudo-Ovid, erhalten geblieben ist, mit dem der Autor die Absicht hatte, ‚uns von der unbesonnenen Liebe zurückzurufen', *Intentio … ut … nos ab amore temerario revocaret* (Robathan 1968, 43). Er lässt uns sogar aus dem Jenseits, aus seinem Grab wissen: Ich bin nicht nur ein Christ geworden, sondern sogar ein Heiliger!

Auf Folio 1ʳ der Handschrift Freiburg, Universitätsbibliothek 380 (10./11. Jhr.) hat ein Scriba im dreizehnten Jahrhundert eine Ovidlegende hinzugefügt. Augenscheinlich hat ein mittelalterlicher Leser jedoch an dieser Ovidlegende Anstoß genommen, denn er hatte angefangen, sie auszuradieren. Diese Legende erzählt, dass in einem bestimmten Augenblick zwei Kleriker an Ovids Grabe ‚im Land von Thomi' gestanden hätten und beim Lesen seines Epitaphs über die Frage diskutiert hätten, welche nun Ovids schönste bzw. schwächste

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[24] Il tenoient la loy payenne / Et nous tenons la crestienne. / Leurs fables et leurs poësies / En nostre loy sont heresies, / Et pour ce ne font pas a croire, / Ne ceulx qui suivent leur ystoire, / Principaument quant il parlerent / Des femmes et qu'il les blasmerent; / Il en dirent moult de rebus, / De Jupiter et de Phebus / Et des grans dames du païs; / S'en doivent bien estre haïs. / Ne cuidiés pas que je devine; / Oncques chapon n'ama geline, / Pour Ovide l'ay recité. / Car on raconte en verité / Qu'on lui coupa ambdeux le couilles; / Aux estoupes et aux oeufs douilles / Furent restraintes et sanées; / Puis vesqui par oluseurs années / Et en exil fu envoyés / Et oultre la mer convoyés. / Ja n'en convient dire la cause, / Car loisir n'ay de faire pause. / Si puet on presumer et dire / Que, haïneus et tout plain d'ire, / Femmes après ce fait blasma / N'oncques depuis ne les ama (Jean Le Fèvre, Le livre de Leesce, 2695–2722; van Hamel 1905, 85–86).

[25] Für ein anderes, in einem bleiernen Schächtelchen erhaltenes *Testamentum Ovidii*, siehe Sedlmayer 1884, 145 Anm. 13.

Verszeile sei. Nach dieser Auseinandersetzung hätten sie sich entschieden, für ‚diesen großen Mann' ein Vaterunser zu beten. Aber dann habe eine Stimme aus dem Grabe gesagt (die sich am Ende der Legende als die Stimme des Teufels erwies): ‚Ich möchte kein Vaterunser; geht fort, Reisende!'

Viele würden jedoch bestätigen (geht die Ovidlegende weiter), dass Ovid gerettet worden sei und sogar zur Schar der Heiligen, *numerus sanctorum*, gehöre. Denn zur Zeit seiner Verbannung sei Johannes der Evangelist durch das Land gezogen und habe die Wahrheit verkündet. Die Inseln ‚Pathmos und Thomos' seien nun nicht weit voneinander entfernt. Als der hochbejahrte Ovid die Wahrheit gehört habe, habe er sich sofort zum Christentum bekehrt und sei von Johannes getauft worden. Er sei darauf ein großer Glaubensprediger geworden, da er die Sprache jener Barbaren beherrschte, wie er selber sagt: ‚Ich habe bereits Getisch und Barbarisch gelernt', *Iam didici Getice barbariceque loqui.*[26] Als Johannes nun aus seiner Verbannung zurückgerufen worden sei, habe er Ovid, einen sehr weisen und gelehrten Mann, zum Bischof von Tomi ernannt. Und dort sei er für den christlichen Glauben den Märtyrertod gestorben und werde als heiliger Naso verehrt. Und dies alles habe ich nun, sagt der Erzähler, von vielen Predigern gehört: *passus est pro fide et dicitur sanctus Naso, et ego audivi hoc a multis predicatoribus* (Bischoff 1952, 272). Ende gut, alles gut! Oder könnte einem ein besseres Schicksal beschieden sein?

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[26] *Tr.* 5, 12, 58 *nam didici Getice Sarmaticeque loqui.*

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POLYBIUS AND *PRUDENTIA*

JAN WASZINK

In this short piece I shall discuss a few opinions on and modes of reception of the Greek historian Polybius (ca. 200-ca. 118 BC) from the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century. My aim is to show that after Machiavelli recognised Polybius as an important thinker on reason of state[1] and political *Prudentia* early in the 16th century, Polybius was of special interest to intellectual intellectual circles interested in Tacitism, Machiavellism and *Realpolitik* (for example with Justus Lipsius and Isaac Casaubonus), but that a generation later with Hugo Grotius those sharp edges were wearing off again, and Polybius returned to a role much closer to his original role in Renaissance historical and political thought, i.e. as a perceptive and authoritative author on social and political organisation, and a source of historical material and examples that could be used to illustrate particular points in social, constitutional or political arguments.

Among the literature on the reception of Polybius in the Renaissance, two articles by Arnoldo Momigliano are especially important.[2] In the first, Momigliano gives an outline of the reception of Polybius from the discovery of books 1–5 around 1415, until well into the sixteenth century. Book 6 which was so crucially important for subsequent Western political thought, was only discovered and added to the Polybius' surviving oeuvre around the year 1500. Most of the activities connected with Polybius in the 15th and early 16th centuries took place in Florence. In the 15th century, Polybius was appreciated first of all as a source of knowledge on the Punic wars (to replace a missing part of Livy; Leonardo Bruni made a Latin translation of Polybius' book 1–2 in the style of Livy), and on the Gallic and Illyrian wars. Apart from that, Polybius furnished themes and material for a debate on histori-

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[1] The idea that 'it might on occasion be legitimate for a ruler to discount the virtues, and to engage in a morally reprehensible course of action, if this could be shown either to be in his own best interests, or else to be a means of attaining a greater profit for the community as a whole' (definition Skinner 1978 I, 248). As we shall see, in Lipsius' redefinition of the concept it included the greater profit of the community only.

[2] Momigliano 1980.

cal methodology. Machiavelli, having access to book 6 in the early 16th century, saw the importance of Polybius as a political philosopher and the great value of his work for the 'realistic' (rather than predominantly moral) mode of historical and political analysis that he was interested in. As a result, the most vocal appreciations of Polybius in the 16th century are to be found where there was an interest in the 'Machiavellian' and Tacitean themes of politics, power and the state, including military power. Jean Bodin for example praises Polybius. In this period, Polybius' description and analysis of the Roman republic and army made him an important author on the mixed (tripartite) constitution (the concept of which was indeed first formulated by Polybius), and an author of chief importance for the new study of the Roman army which contributed to the military reforms of the later 16th century.

In the second article, Momigliano continues to relate the story of Polybius' reception in Europe, and focuses particularly on 17th-century England (where Polybius continued to furnish material for constitutional debates) and on the European fear of the Turkish threat, which helped promote the closer study of Polybius in connection with military questions (such as the question of whether the Turkish military tactics derived from those of the Macedonian phalanx, or even from Roman tactics, which might in turn call into question prospects of a victory over them). The article departs from the modern attempts to understand the phenomenon of Roman imperialism, and warns against writing off too easily the analyses of an ancient historian who continued to teach and inspire in such different historical situations, but calls for an ongoing 'discussion' as if between fellow-historians instead. For this article we shall now concentrate on three well-known humanist authors from the later sixteenth and early seventeenth century: Justus Lipsius, Isaac Casaubonus and Hugo Grotius.

Justus Lipsius (1547–1606)

In 1590 Lipsius added *Notae* to his political magnum opus of 1589, the *Politicorum sive civilis doctrina*, shortly *Politica*.[3] In these notes he praises Polybius for his *Iudicium* and *Prudentia*, and recommends him as useful reading for kings and princes rather than Thucydides because Poly-

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[3] Lipsius 2004.

bius writes simpler Greek, the meaning of which one does not have to search for. Unfortunately, he adds, a large part of Polybius' work has been lost, which is a great loss to mankind. The use here of the word *Prudentia* is meaningful; it is a key concept in Lipsius' ideas on reason of state as expressed in the *Politica*. Lipsius thus gives Polybius a place among the ancient sources of his theory of reason of state, and employs his help to legitimise his own political thought, which was controversial when it was written. This in turn might have given a controversial edge to Polybius' name and works in the context of the heated debates on morality and reason of state in the period around 1600, which touched on the most sensitive political issues of the day, i.e. those of religious politics, the relationship between church and state, and the very definition of good and bad in government.

The year before, Lipsius had drawn attention to himself by publishing the *Politica*, his 'handbook' of monarchical government in which ideas from the spheres of Tacitism and even Machiavellism were included. Lipsius put the survival and stability of the state (in the old meaning of the word, 'the state *of* someone') first, as best guarantee for the safety, peace and well-being of all. According to Lipsius even the interests of the true faith and the Church should be subjected to safety and peace if this serves the interests of his state and subjects, and the prince should in principle be allowed to use deception and even deceit against his own subjects or foreigners, albeit only in very serious circumstances and from a moral inspiration (i.e. in order to defend the public good), not for trivial or personal reasons. Lipsius thus criticised the traditional political morality, ultimately based on Christian morals and the moral philosophy of Cicero, in which there was no place for any kind of *fraus* by a prince, and the defence of the true faith was his first moral duty. If the safety of all was at stake, Lipsius thus put realism before morality. This does *not* mean that Lipsius' politics were a-moral; but he redefined the moral duties of the prince in terms of the commonwealth, or in other words, the highest *duty* of the prince for him was the *effective* defence of the well-being of his state and its subjects, which must be given priority over all other and/or partial interests such as that of the Church, and in extreme cases even over morality. In an imperfect world, a good ruler simply cannot always keep his hands clean, and he must be prepared to risk his own soul for the sake of his people (as he can only hope that ultimately God will take his special position into account). Lipsius' word for this statesmanship, which has

realism as its chief moral duty, is *prudentia*. It can be seen as the end to which all teaching to princes, *civilis doctrina* ('political instruction'; 'political training'), is geared.

His own experience and, secondly, historical literature are the sources of a prince's *prudentia*. Historiography is the more readily available and easily accessible of the two. Not surprisingly, *prudentia* also appears as a key quality of the historian in Lipsius' discussion of his favourite author, Tacitus. Next to *prudentia*, *iudicium* appears as an important quality of the authors recommended to rulers, princes and their counsellors. Tacitus is called the greatest teacher of politics because of his own *prudentia* and *iudicium*.[4]

Lipsius' message however was controversial in its time as, in the eyes of many, it opened the door to tyranny and Machiavellism. Worse still, in the eyes of hard-liners from all confessional camps, both Catholic and Protestant, Lipsius' submission of religion to politics amounted to the submission of God to man. To make the acceptance of his ideas easier, Lipsius therefore gave the *Politica* a complex literary form, in which he spoke to the reader through quotations from classical Roman and Greek literature, primarily the historians. This indirect form brought the reader's own reading knowledge of the classics into his reading of the *Politic*a, which gave him a certain freedom of interpretation, but at the same time made him co-responsible for its conclusions (which Lipsius of course made sufficiently unambiguous). Lipsius chief source' in the *Politica* was Tacitus, in whose works he saw the true laws of human psychology and politics made visible, together with Machiavelli, to whom he referred very cautiously, and while dismissing the immoral implications of Machiavellism, but whose realism he considered indispensible for the good prince. It should be noted that Lipsius was not the first to have these ideas, but he was certainly one of the most influential voices in a chorus of critical reflection on the prevailing political morality of the day. It is typical that this strand of thought sought political wisdom in the ancient historians rather than the philosophers (including Cicero), and it is no coincidence that Lipsius also turned away from the Ciceronian literary style cherished by humanism, in favour of the short and irregular forms of Tacitus' Silver Latin, which he found sharper, more revealing and more provocative, and thus more suitable for instruction and persuasion. In the perception of the defenders of

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[4] Lipsius 2004, *Nota* to *Politica* I.9.

the traditional style, however, this was a deliberate choice for an anti-eloquence, which earned Lipsius a great deal of criticism.

A few years later, in 1593, Lipsius turned to Polybius again, and more extensively, in order to explore Polybius' works for knowledge on the Roman army. He prepared a book on this topic which would appear in 1595 as *De Militia Romana*. It is generally believed that this work had a direct influence on the military reforms carried out by Willem Lodewijk and Prince Maurits in the Northern Dutch army in the 1590s which had such crucial consequences for the success of the Revolt. Lipsius' *De Militia Romana* is set up as a commentary to Polybius 6.19–40, which is an important source of information on the Roman army. However, and like many others of Lipsius' works, the commentary is written in the form of a dialogue between Lipsius and an anonymous interlocutor, in order to liven up an otherwise scholarly work. In a letter to Nicolas van den Brande in October 1593, Lipsius writes on *De Militia Romana*:

> *Scribo* De Militia, *ut audivisti, sed non de argumento aut fine, quo censes. Quid? Ut militiam nostram corrigam? Ego? Non ipse Corbulo, si reviviscat. Odi et aspernor has sordes; militiam veterem explico et qualis a Polybio descripta, nec tam ut nostri imitentur (si viderint), sed ut faculam istam historiarum rectoribus illuceamus, quarum argumentum et materies pleraque militaris. Haeremus autem sine priscae eius cognitione. En consilium meum, et singillatim deinde observationum historialium libros addemus eidem illi fini. Cur non magis seria, inquies? O quam vellem, si aevum hoc vellet! Nam natura et iudicium etiam me fert ad ipsam sapientiae arcem. Sed quam haec talia exposita morsibus aut calumniis, tu audis, ego sensi; et mens mihi non sit, nisi premam aut differam hanc mentem. Non pono tamen aut exuo, sed pro communium iudiciorum ventis pergam aut sistam in hoc cursu.*[5]

Lipsius claims here that he has no intention to reform the armies of his own time, but only to clarify Roman military matters that can be encountered in the books of history, and to do so especially for the benefit of rulers. However, the book itself when it appeared in 1595 ended with an unequivocal call for imitation of the discipline and organisation of the ancient Roman army by contemporary armies. However this may be, in the quote above we find Polybius praised again for his *sapientia* (sister of *prudentia*) and *iudicium*. Nevertheless, Lipsius indicates that he does not aim at any greater result from his work on Polybius than the historiographical fruit, and it seems justified to connect this with what we know about the unfavourable reception of the

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[5] Lipsius 1994, no. 93 10 22.

kind of moral and political thought that Lipsius had expressed in the *Politica*. His appreciation of Polybius, Lipsius writes, may be the cause of *morsus* and *calumnia* to him, attacks and invectives from his contemporaries, like those he previously endured, because the times are not ready for Polybius' wisdom. He has therefore decided simply to shut up about it and concentrate on the academic interest of Polybius' work. It is relevant to note in this respect that in the months before he wrote the above passage, Lipsius had heard from the Vatican that his *Politica* was about to be put on the Vatican Index of Forbidden Books because of the ideas on religious policy and reason of state that it contained. In the summer of 1593, he had received a detailed report of what the Vatican objected to, and had made some changes in the text in response to prevent inclusion of the work in the *Index*.[6]

Thus Lipsius makes a direct connection between Polybius and the controversial world of thought of political realism and *prudentia* that endeavoured beyond the boundaries of generally accepted political morality. To return to the *Politica*, we find a clear example of this connection in chapter 5.17 on the acceptability of the use of stratagems and deceit in war, in which, among others, Polybius is quoted as a supporter of such use:

> *Ipse Polybius admirator paullo ante Achaeorum, palam ad nos transit. et ait*: τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἔργων ἐλάττω τὰ προδήλως καὶ μετὰ βίας ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν μετὰ δόλου καὶ σὺν καιρῷ πραττομένων: *Facinorum militarium ea esse minoris laudis ac momenti, quae propalam et per vim patrantur, his quae ex occasione et per dolum* (from Polyb. 9.12.2).

A fascinating aspect of the reception of Polybius in this period is the connection between the realm of reason of state and that of the contemporary military reforms. On the level of military ethics and culture (which were not always in harmony with the realities of the field), there was a particularly strong tension between 'new' realism and 'old' ideals about honour and valour. Military reforms and reason of state shared the aim of a rationalisation of warfare (e.g. with respect to hierarchy and organisation, wage-payments, the position of the infantry, and technical improvements such as drill, volley-fire and military engineers), which would unavoidably affect the position of existing army units and practices and of chivalric military ethics, just as the new polit-

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[6] See Lipsius 2004, 120–122, 173–190-, 712–716.

ical realism was perceived as being in opposition to traditional political ethics. As can be seen in Lipsius, Polybius figures prominently among the scientific foundations of these military rationalisations and reforms.

Isaac Casaubonus (1559–1614)

The French humanist scholar Isaac Casaubonus published an edition of Polybius' histories in 1595, preceded by a long introduction.[7] This introduction has the form of an epideictic oration and is addressed to King Henry IV of France. Casaubonus first praises historiography as a teacher of political practice, then Polybius (and compares him with other historians, notably Livy), and finally praises the King himself. Casaubonus' praise of historiography consists essentially of a long excursion on the importance of historiography for politics and administration, and includes many examples of Roman statesmen and generals who referred to history books while accomplishing their great deeds. However, according to Casaubonus, although true wisdom begins with a study of history, it is not brought to perfection by it, for this perfection requires the accession of philosophy and theology:

> *Vere igitur sapientiae mater historiae: (…). Enimvero sapientiam quidem historia inchoat, non tamen perficit; ducit enim ad Deum, sed non perducit: (…) cui philosophia et sacra theologia (…) suarum deinceps demonstrationum substructiones arte subtiliore et otio maiore immoliantur* (pp. 54–56).

Still, just like Lipsius for his *Politica* consulted the ancient historians first, rather than the philosophers, Casaubonus too considers history as the best *magistra vitae*, and consequently as the best teacher for political and administrational practice. *Historia*, *prudentia* and *civilis doctrina* have both their aims and means in common:

> *At prudentiae et civilis doctrinae, eadem et fundamenta ponit, et fastigium supremamque manum prope sola illis imponit. Hic utique est campus, in quo Historia decurrit; hic scopus, hic finis ad quem se profitetur collimare. Plane, si definitionem admittemus ab antiquis philosophis proditam, prudentia nihil est aliud, nisi multarum rerum memoria, ut usus complurium negotiorum ex quo fit perspicuum, quam sint non dicam affines, sed pene idem prudentia atque historia. Quid namque aliud legitime scripta historia agit, nisi ut res hominum, mores, instituta, gesta, memoriae commendet? vitam exemplis instruat? causas, eventus, et modo quo res geri quaeque, sive a togatis, sive a sagatis solent, aperiat, narret, et narrando, cum praesentes tum post*

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[7] Polybius 1609. The introduction was re-published separately as Polybius 1991.

*futuros doceat? Unde sequitur necessario, eum qui in memoria rerum seriam et diligen-
tem operam posuerit, multiplicis experientiae fructum, non multo aliter fore laturum,
quam si periculum ipsemet fecisset* (p. 56).

Note the great similarity to the terms used by Lipsius, who has brief but
essentially similar comments on the connections between *prudentia* and
historia in *Politica* I.7–9. In Casaubonus however, we find them much
further elaborated and, it must be assumed, with special application to
Polybius, for we find this in the introduction to Polybius' text.

When Casaubonus then addresses Polybius's works specifically, he
stresses the need for a political practice based on the lessons of history,
and a practice of reading history not for knowledge for its own sake or
for the sake of debate, but for the application in actual practice:

> *Enimvero quum dos praecipua, quae Polybium antiquis commendabat, non in elo-
> quentia nuda et verborum fucatorum lenocinio, sed in rerum politicarum et militarium
> exquisita explicatione sit posita;*[8] *cuius gratia viri principes et politici omnes olim in
> pretio magno eum habebant; quia longe diversa hodie studiorum ratio obtinet, evenit,
> ut his praestantiam illius parum intelligentibus; verborum et linguae dumtaxat stu-
> diosi, patienter eo carerent. Loqui enim, non vivere, plerique omnes hodie discimus:
> et historiam, quae vitae magistra audit,*[9] *non ad vitam formandam referimus: sed vel
> ad linguarum alicuius notitiam, dicendive facultatem augendam, vel ad rerum anti-
> quarum cognitionem percipiendam. Atque ut Politicam et moralem Philosophiam,* In
> qua consilium vitae regimenque locatum, *aut omnino non docemur, aut non
> nisi disputandi causa: sic et historiam, quae practica quaedam philosophia est, non ut
> utamur discimus, verum ut sciamus* (p. 100).

Casaubonus also shares Lipsius' ideal of a morally sound reason of
state, and protests against an all-too-easy dismissal of 'mixed prudence':
though simpler minds have condemned all that went beyond the unam-
biguously virtuous, wise men and those with political experience have
always appreciated the difference between malice and realism, and
praised the latter, for critical circumstances may necessitate unorthodox
responses. However, Casaubonus distances himself from every defence
of Machiavelli (*Etruscus*), who to him represents the perversion of politi-
cal thought:

> *Neque tamen is est Polybius, qui supercilium quoddam Stoicum, aut rusticam sim-
> plicitatem, ad iudicandum de actionibus hominum politicorum afferat. Faciunt hoc
> umbratici quidam Sophi, rerum humanarum imperiti, ac propterea iniqui persaepe*

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[8] Cp. the phrasing of Lipsius' praise of Tacitus: *Cornelius Tacitus* [*Latinorum historico-
rum agmen*] *mihi ducat. Ante Livium? inquies. Non in eloquentia, aut aliis virtutibus: sed in iis quas
nunc consideramus, Prudentia et Iudicii notis*. etc; Lipsius 2004, *Nota* to *Politica* I.9.

[9] *audit* can be used with the meaning *dicitur*.

virorum magnorum censores, quorum rationes non capiunt. Sciebat homo negotiorum calentissimus, et tanto usu praeditus, quid sit discriminis ponendum inter eam quae simpliciter dicitur prudentia, et περιστατικὴν, *cuius consilia, ut necessitate temporum expressa, et sapientes excusant; prudentes vero etiam laudant. Atque haec est, quam solet ipse* πολιτικὴν συνυπόκρισιν *nominare, quoniam aliud simulatur, aliud agitur: res toto genere diversa ab illa veteratoria malitia, ut in nostris commentariis diligenter exposuimus.*

Discant igitur ab hoc doctore iuvenes studii politici candidati, veram prudentiam et eius leges; non ab illo Etrusco, in opprobrium religionis Christianae nato; cui probitas, fides, integritas atque adeo in Deum pietas (O seculi dedecus!) inania sunt sine re nomina; prudentia, ars fallendi; politica doctrina, instrumentum inhumanae tyrannidis. Discant et qui ad scribendum res gestas animum applicant (pp. 114–116).

Thus, Lipsius' and Casaubonus' approach to Polybius have in common their ideal of *Prudentia*, a morally sound reason of state founded on realism and the lessons of experience and history. They call for a 'reformation' of political practice and especially for the recognition of reason of state as a valid, and morally acceptable form of political analysis for political practice. They differ in that Casaubonus stresses the role of historical literature in this much more than Lipsius does, and that he unreservedly dismisses Machiavelli, which Lipsius had defended (though cautiously and with important qualifications).

Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)

With Grotius, however, the Polybius of the *Prudentia*, and the envisaged role of Polybius as an almost direct advisor in matters of political practice recedes into the background again, nor does Grotius connect the figure of Polybius with any pressing moral or political imperatives. Grotius' use of Polybius is more documentary in nature, and seems geared to adding the weight of authoritative historical analysis to his own argument. We shall concentrate here on Grotius' magnum opus *De Iure Belli ac Pacis* of 1625.[10] In response to the atrocities of the civil and religious wars of his time, in order to bind even war to rules of justice and humanity, Grotius set out to formulate a set of basic rules that govern the relationships between independent states and peoples, especially in war (i.e. the law of embassies and treaties, *ius ad bellum* and *ius in bello*). As foundations of these rules Grotius took universal

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[10] Grotius 1625.

principles of natural law (not of religion(s), as these were among the contested objects). From these he develops his rules, so to speak, by mathematical reasoning, in order to arrive at rules which have the same claim to validity as the original principles. The validity of Grotius' rules is then demonstrated by examples from history, mostly taken from ancient literature. Grotius takes his examples from the distant but universally shared and studied past of classical Antiquity both because Antiquity provides the most obvious and richest reservoir of historical examples, and because he has to keep his argument unimpeded by partialities from his own world that might hinder the acceptation of his views.

Polybius' work figures quite prominently among these ancient sources,[11] and Grotius uses Polybius in two ways. First as a source of historical examples to illustrate the unwritten rules that govern the relationships between states and peoples. An example of this is the argument in *De Iure Belli* 2.16.13, on the extent to which nations which join an existing party or coalition are bound to observe the conditions of existing treaties by which that party is bound. Grotius discusses a controversy between Rome and Carthage on the interpretation of a treaty which prescribed that the allies of neither side should attacked by the other side (*Utriusque populi socii ab utroque populo tuti sunto*). The Carthaginians argued that an ally of theirs who had *subsequently* joined their party, was exempt from the obligations under this treaty, an argument which was refuted by Rome (and the refutation accepted by Carthage). The material comes, among others, from Polybius 3.29.

The second way Polybius is employed by Grotius is as a thinker on constitutionalism and political analysis, i.e. as a an authoritative interpreter of historical and political processes and causation. Although this way of referring to Polybius is certainly connected with Polybius' earlier role in connection with debates on reason of state and political *prudentia*, Grotius puts little emphasis on Polybius as an author on 'mixed prudence' and of reason of state. It seems likely that this shift in approach is in turn connected with Grotius' dismissal in *De Iure Belli*

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[11] The appendix to Bederman 1996 counts 127 classical authors in the first edition of *De Iure Belli*. Only 8 of those are quoted more than 20 times, of which Cicero is the one most often quoted (79 times), followed by Aristotle (40), Livy (37), Tacitus (28), Plutarch (27), Thucydides (24), Seneca (23) and Ulpian (21). Polybius and Paulus (the legislator) follow right behind this group with 18 citations each.

of reason of state as a whole: as the work is concerned with what is just and how things *should* be done rather than with how they come out in practice, *prudentia* and reason state are not what Grotius is defending.[12]

An important case of Grotius' use of Polybius as a historical and political analyst is found at the opening of *De Iure Belli* § II.22, where Grotius names Polybius as the first to make the distinction distinguish between a just cause for war (αἰτία) and a persuasive argument which in reality is merely a pretext (πρόφασις), a distinction obviously vital to the argument of *De Iure Belli*. A second example comes from *De Iure Belli* §1.1.11.1:

> *Polybius cum narrasset quibus initiis primum convenissent homines, addit, si quis in parentes aut beneficos iniurius fuisset fieri non potuisse quin id caeteri aegre ferrent, ratione addita:* τοῦ γὰρ γένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταύτῃ διαφέροντες τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ᾗ μόνοις αὐτοῖς μέτεστι νοῦ καὶ λογισμοῦ, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ εἰκὸς παρατρέχειν αὐτοὺς τὴν προειρημένην διαφοράν, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἀλλ' ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τὸ γινόμενον καὶ δυσαρεστεῖσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι:[13] *Quoniam enim humanum genus hoc aliis animantibus distat, quod mente ac ratione utitur, omnino credibile non est tam alienum a natura sua actum ab ipsis dissimulaturum iri, ut in aliis animantibus: sed quod factum est, revocatum iri ad animum cum offensae significatione. Quod si quando brutis animantibus iustitia tribuitur, id fit improprie ex quadam in ipsis umbra rationis atque vestigio. An vero actus ipse de quo ius naturae constituit, sit nobis communis cum aliis animantibus, ut prolis educatio, an nobis proprius, ut Dei cultus, ad iuris ipsam naturam nihil refert.*

Outside *De Iure Belli ac Pacis*, Grotius can be supposed to lean on Polybius' political analysis when he sings the praise of the young Dutch republic by comparing it with the early Roman republic:[14] it was Polybius' account of the constitution of the Roman republic (Polybius 6.11–18) which led many to feel that Rome had been at the apex of its glory in the days of the early Republic. In his defence of the legitimacy and maturity of the Dutch Republic, *De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae* of 1610, he refers to Polybius' discussion of the Spartan constitution as a flattering comparison for the Dutch republic.[15]

Thus, with Grotius, Polybius' work recedes to a more 'scientific' role in the background. It is primarily used as an authoritative source of

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[12] Cp. the discussion of stratagems in § III.1; for Grotius' earlier thought on reason of state, see Waszink 2004.

[13] Greek text quoted from the TLG CD-rom because Grotius' text appears to be antiquated.

[14] In the *Parallelon Rerumpublicarum* (see the edition by Meermann, Haarlem, 1803).

[15] Grotius 2000, §§ V. 20 and VII.18.

examples and analysis removed from the heated debates on *prudentia* and reason of state for which Polybius was employed by scholars like Lipsius and Casaubonus a generation earlier.

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GREEK AND LATIN
IN DUTCH SECONDARY EDUCATION:
OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

M.J.H. van der Weiden

The interest in Greek and Latin in secondary schools has continued to be strong over the past fifteen years in the Netherlands. Yet the circumstances have been difficult, for two reasons mainly. In the first place these school subjects have been subject to numerous changes from the Ministry of Education, and in the second place graduates in classical languages and culture do not automatically opt for a teaching career in high schools. The latter has caused a substantial shortage of qualified teachers in these subjects.

The relevant university departments consider this to be a major problem and have sought practical solutions. A good example is the special three-year programme in Greek, Latin and classical culture for unqualified teachers, initiated in Nijmegen by Ton Kessels, which attracted approximately 40 students in its first two years (2003/4 and 2004/5).

In this article, first the position of the classical languages and culture in Dutch high schools will be described. Special attention will be given to the motives of students (and their parents) to choose a high school programme including Greek and/or Latin. Next, the lack of qualified teachers will be discussed. The special programme developed at the Radboud University in Nijmegen will be given as an example of the solutions that are being sought.

Greek and Latin in secondary schools

In the Netherlands the system of secondary education consists of three separate streams:

- four-year programmes to prepare for further vocational education and training ('voorbereidend middelbaar beroepsonderwijs' VMBO),

– five-year programmes to prepare for universities of professional education ('hoger algemeen vormend onderwijs' HAVO),
– six-year programmes to prepare for research universities ('voorbereidend wetenschappelijk onderwijs' VWO).

Within the VWO programme a school may offer the classical languages, Greek and/or Latin, and classical culture. In that case the stream is called gymnasium. Some institutions offer all streams under one roof, or a combination of HAVO and VWO, while others offer the four-year programmes (VMBO) or the six-year programmes (VWO) only. In the latter case these VWO schools usually offer both classical languages and classical culture and are then called 'independent gymnasiums'. Students select a stream at the age of twelve, based on their comparative scores on a national test and the advice of the principal of their primary school.

The following table shows how many students selected Greek or Latin as a subject for their final examination over the last 15 years.

Table 1. Number and percentage of candidates final examination VWO, Greek and Latin 1988–2003 (Source: Inspectorate of Education)

	Total nr. of VWO candidates	Latin	Latin	Greek	Greek	Greek and Latin	Greek and Latin
1988	39015	4938	13%	2183	6%		
1989	38055	4569	12%	2114	6%		
1990	36162	4568	13%	2072	6%		
1991	36162	4293	12%	1985	5%		
1992	33937	4252	13%	2020	6%		
1993	33462	4409	13%	1870	6%		
1994	32925	4407	13%	1884	6%		
1995	32030	4316	13%	2102	7%		
1996	32002	4701	15%	2117	7%		
1997	31122	4822	15%	2077	7%		
1998	31285	4867	16%	2119	7%		
1999	30663	4794	16%	2143	7%	459	1.5%
2000	29884	4908	16%	2125	7%	507	1.7%
2001	29719	5107	17%	2030	7%	508	1.7%
2002	26277	4716	18%	1764	7%	437	1.7%
2003	27934	5096	18%	1911	7%	435	1.6%

While the total number of VWO candidates has decreased considerably since 1988, the number of candidates who have selected Latin or Greek as an examination subject has remained more or less stable. So the

position of Greek and (especially) Latin has improved statistically over the past 15 years. The figures for 2002 show a remarkable dip, with a partial recovery in 2003. This is probably the result of the introduction of the new examination structure in 1999/2000, for which the first final examinations took place in 2002 (SLO 2003, 63, 69 and 74): the original plans led to a substantial increase in study load for gymnasium streams and gymnasiums because the classical language(s) had to be added to the regular VWO examination programme. This requirement was withdrawn in the following year and the classical language(s) were made part of the regular study load.

Motives to select Greek or Latin

When we investigate the motivation of students to opt for a gymnasium stream in a comprehensive school or for a separate gymnasium we must keep in mind that the students' parents play a major role in this selection process and that at that age, in fact, the choice is often made by the parents rather than by the students themselves.

1. An argument to opt for the gymnasium may be that students with a gymnasium background achieve better results in university than students without Latin or Greek. This is indeed the outcome of research in the Netherlands (De Jong 1998; De Jong 2000), Flanders (Hoornaert and Oosterlinck 2000–2001) and the USA (National Committee for Latin and Greek 2004a). De Jong shows that compared to other alumni (VWO without Latin or Greek) students who have learned Greek or Latin in high school complete more credits in their first year at university, succeed more often in completing their first year without delay and drop out less often. According to Hoornaert and Oosterlinck the success rates of medical students with Latin as a secondary school subject are significantly higher (94–95%) than for students without Latin (86%). The website of the National Committee for Latin and Greek shows that the 2001 SAT (Scholastic Aptitude Test) scores for students with Latin are higher (665) than for students with other languages (583–633) and certainly higher than the average SAT score (506). They also report a significant positive correlation between studying Latin and college GPA (grade point average) and performance in English classes.
   This may be an attractive argument for parents and students, but the problem with this argument is its suggested causality: students who

attend gymnasium are generally the brighter students, so would be expected to do better than average in university anyway. Similarly, for the American SAT scores it is reasonable to suggest that the average SAT score is the result for a very wide range of students and that the students who select a foreign language as a high school subject are the brighter students. Students who select Latin are probably the top group of these bright students.

De Jong 2000 shows that the relationship is more complex: the better results of gymnasium alumni at university are not primarily caused by their intellectual capabilities (as indicated by their stronger career in primary and secondary education), but mainly by their motivation (intrinsic rather than extrinsic) and their attitude (willingness to study more hours per week and intention to complete the first year without delay). Students with Greek and/or Latin in their examination programme are not only brighter than other VWO students, but are on the average more studious. Whether this character trait was already there to start with or if it is the result of the gymnasium curriculum and environment cannot be determined on the basis of De Jong's research.

2. Many promotional publications stress the advantages of Greek and especially Latin for the study of other languages and science. This is because in these subjects the systematic study of grammar is such an important part of the curriculum which helps the study of other languages (Vrienden van het Gymnasium 2000; Waiblinger 1992) and which stimulates students to be observant, accurate, analytical and logical, and helps them to solve problems and to be organised and methodical (National Committee for Latin and Greek 2004a; Waiblinger 1992; Zehnder 1985). Other related arguments are that knowledge of Latin makes it so much easier to study one of the Roman languages (Waiblinger 1992) and that much of our (scientific) vocabulary is based on Greek and Latin words (National Committee for Latin and Greek 2004a and 2004b).

3. Another set of reasons is that Greek and Latin give students first-hand knowledge of the roots of our Western civilisation, including philosophy, politics, law, pedagogic, rhetoric and literature (National Committee for Latin and Greek 2004b; Vrienden van het Gymnasium 2000; Waiblinger 1992). The most important intrinsic value of these subjects in high school is the study of ancient literary texts and

ancient philosophical schools of thought (Kessels 1989, 24). Such knowledge enables students to judge current developments in the light of the past and therefore to be more critical and less vulnerable to manipulation.

4. The arguments mentioned above are based on the value of the classical languages and culture, and do not differentiate between gymnasium streams in larger schools and independent gymnasiums. The last argument is very different and probably very specific to the Netherlands, i.e. that parents choose an independent gymnasium because such schools are relatively small and attract a much more homogeneous population (in terms of social and ethnic background) than the schools which offer the (VMBO and) HAVO programmes as well (Karsten et al. 2003). Another advantage of these specialised schools is that the learning environment is more positive towards children who like to learn, whereas supposedly in larger schools such students are seen as 'nerds' (Vrienden van het gymnasium, 2000). In 2000 217 schools where Greek and Latin are taught, offered all streams (VMBO, HAVO, VWO, gymnasium), while 48 offered HAVO, VWO and gymnasium and 38 were independent gymnasiums. Seven of these schools with a gymnasium stream at that time also offered bilingual programmes. The independent gymnasiums continue to grow and attract more students.

For some parents the status of the school also counts. Observations in personal social networks indicate that upper (middle) class parents are proud when their children are admitted to the VWO and that many try to avoid the VMBO even if this would best suit the capabilities of their children. Within the VWO the stream with the classical languages is generally considered to be even more difficult and therefore more prestigious.

The competition of bilingual schools

If gymnasiums and gymnasium streams in larger schools attract more than average students, an interesting question is if these schools feel the competition of another type of school with high intellectual demands and a relatively new position in the Netherlands, i.e. the bilingual schools. Bilingual schools offer the regular HAVO and VWO programmes and have a separate stream where max. 50 % of the subjects

is taught in English. The first bilingual school started in 1989 and since then the number has increased to 64, while six other schools plan to start in 2005.

Table 2. Number of schools offering bilingual education. Source: Netwerk TTO.

	English	German		English	German
1989	1		1997	1	
1990			1998	5	
1991			1999	2	1
1992	4		2000	3	
1993			2001	9	
1994	2		2002	11	
1995	5		2003	9	
1996	2		2004	10	

Arguments used to attract students to bilingual schools are:

1. Better language ability in the second language (usually English),
2. Preparation and orientation to a more international society, e.g. by a more extensive cultural and internationally oriented (extracurricular) programme,
3. Preparation for study abroad (or in the Netherlands where many of the study materials in higher education are in English and often even the working language is English),
4. Many extra activities and contacts which make the programme more interesting.

Let us compare these arguments with those that are used to illustrate the value of Latin and Greek, as mentioned above.

While it can be expected that alumni from bilingual schools do better in higher education because of the use of English, no research has been done to investigate if their study progress is indeed better than for other students. The advantages of Greek and Latin (systematic grammar, accuracy) cannot be expected for English because of the different type of language and the different way in which it is taught: more communicative rather than based on grammar. A more open mind is expected from both types of school: for gymnasiums based on the knowledge of cultural history, for bilingual schools based on the students' encounter with the international character of our society. The separate, homogeneous community found in independent gymnasiums cannot be found in the bilingual schools, since the bilingual programmes are always part

of a larger, more comprehensive school. That the more difficult programmes are more prestigious and therefore more attractive is valid for both types of schools: also bilingual programmes will appeal to the more ambitious students (and their parents) and will certainly require a more than average intellectual ability.

The conclusion is that for students who aspire to a programme that offers something extra the bilingual schools are an attractive alternative to the gymnasiums. The advantage of being very fluent in English, the *lingua franca* in our globalised world, is a very strong argument.

The growth of bilingual schools has, however, not led to a decrease in gymnasiums: as shown in table 1, the percentage of students with Greek or Latin has even increased over the past fifteen years. So there seems to be a market for both types of 'extra', appealing to different types of students.

In line with the results of De Jong 2000 I would suggest that the bilingual student is more similar to the regular VWO student whom she contrasted with the gymnasium student in her study. I would therefore expect that the gymnasium student is more intrinsically motivated (interested in further development of his/her faculties and in the subject of the chosen study) while the motivation of bilingual students is more extrinsic and utilitarian (interested in the study as a means to get a better job and higher income). De Jong also found a difference in the choice of study: students who studied Greek and/or Latin in high school are found more often in medicine and humanities and less often in economics and technical studies, as compared with the other VWO students. No research has been done to investigate this for the separate group of bilingual students.

Lack of qualified teachers

While the growth of Latin and Greek in secondary education is a positive development in itself, this has to be accompanied by a similar growth in the number of available teachers. And here we face a problem.

The only way to become a qualified teacher in Latin and Greek is to study Greek and Latin language and culture at a research university. The official admission requirement for these programmes is for a student to have done both Greek and Latin as a final examina-

tion subject. The numbers for 1999–2003 range from 435 to 508 (see Table 1). In recent years the departments have not applied this admission requirement very strictly and in practice they also accept students who have done their final examination in only one of these languages. To accommodate these students they adjust the first year programme by offering a remedial programme (grammar and translation skills) for the 'missing' language. This enlarges the group of potential recruits, but increases the risk of drop outs because it makes the university programme substantially heavier. So far the net effect of this policy does not seem to be very large: in Nijmegen the more lenient admission policy has so far not led to many additional students nor does the department face a significant increase in drop outs.

Focussing on those who did both languages as the most likely group to be recruited from, it is obvious that not all of these students will go on to study Greek and Latin language and culture at university. The actual numbers for the past fifteen years are given below:

Table 3. Number of first year students Greek and Latin language and culture in Dutch universities 1985–2003. (Source: VSNU, 2004)

	Nr. of first year students		*Nr. of first year students*
1988	50	1996	75
1989	50	1997	71
1990	46	1998	70
1991	51	1999	65
1992	47	2000	74
1993	58	2001	73
1994	62	2002	54
1995	70	2003	57

Not all students who enter one of the five programmes in Greek and Latin language and culture offered by universities in the Netherlands, will graduate. The attrition rates are fairly high, both in the first year and in the final three years. The average success rates of first year students (= having completed all credits of the first year programme, calculated after three years of enrolment) in the Faculties of Humanities where Greek and Latin language and culture are taught in the Netherlands (Nijmegen, Groningen, Leiden, Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), is 60 % (VSNU 1998, 30).

The average success rate of the final three years of the programme is calculated for those students who continue with their programme

after having successfully completed all credits of the first year pro-
gramme, because this is supposed to be the group that is capable of
and interested in completing the programme. This success rate is 65%
for Humanities students (VSNU 1998, 31).

Table 4. Estimated number of graduates Greek and Latin language and
culture in the Netherlands, calculated on the basis of average success rates
in the Humanities.

	number of first year students	estimated number of doctoral students (60% of column 2)	estimated number of graduates (65% of column 3)
1988	50	30	20
1989	50	30	20
1990	46	28	18
1991	51	31	20
1992	47	28	18
1993	58	35	23
1994	62	37	24
1995	70	42	27
1996	75	45	29
1997	71	43	28
1998	70	42	27
1999	65	39	25
2000	74	44	29
2001	73	44	29
2002	54	32	21
2003	57	34	22

On the one hand, we might expect that the success rates for students
of Greek and Latin language and culture will be lower, since many of
the students face serious problems, especially because of the linguistic
emphasis in the programme, and therefore drop out (NRC 2003, 39).
On the other hand, students of Greek and Latin language and culture
may be more motivated and studious, since their choice of study is
less obvious and therefore better argued than a choice for one of the
modern languages or history.

   It turns out that the success rates are remarkably similar for the
general group of Humanities students and for our specific group. An
average of 53% of those who started their studies in Greek and Latin
language and culture between 1999 and 2001 succeeded in completing
all first year credits within two years (VSNU, 2005) and it is not unlikely
that after three years a success rate of 60% can be reached. For the

specific group the success rates for the whole four-year programme are calculated in a different way but the outcomes are similar as for the general group of Humanities students: 32% of all those who started to study Greek and Latin language and culture in the period 1995–1997 have graduated after six years. This figure increases to 44% after eight years for those who started between 1993 and 1995. Of this latter group an average of 20% is still enrolled after eight years (VSNU, 2005), theoretically making it possible that the success rate will rise although after such a long time of enrolment these chances must not be overestimated.

The next question is how many of these graduates will start a teaching career in secondary education (some may go on for a doctorate and it seems that compared to twenty years ago a smaller percentage of graduates opts for a teaching career), and how many are needed. To be a qualified teacher a student needed to do an additional one-year teaching training programme in the old system. Similarly, in the bachelor/master system a student has to complete two years at master level, either a one-year teaching training master on top of a one-year master programme in the classical languages and culture, or a two-year integrated educational master programme, preparing for a teaching career. Universities have chosen different ways to organise these programmes.

SLO (2002, 26) reports on the basis of a fairly recent questionnaire (2001/02) that within ten years 29% of all classics teachers will probably retire because they are 55 or older at the time of the survey. Their retirement will open up positions for approximately 160 new teachers. This is in line with the overall expected shortage of language teachers in VWO: ROA (2004) expects that 5800 replacements for academically trained language teachers will be needed until 2008, which is very high.

Already almost half (49.1%) of all schools offering Greek and Latin have at least one unqualified teacher (SLO 2002, 28). In the questionnaire schools report that in total 1279 hours per week are taught by unqualified teachers. These teachers are often staff members of the schools involved who are qualified to teach another subject, usually another language (48.7%) or a social science (32.9%, most often history) (SLO 2002, 29). Others will be teachers-in-training, who are expected to be fully qualified within one year. Figures of the Ministry confirm the relatively high percentage of un(der)qualified teachers in classical languages (14.3%) (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 2003a). The Inspectorate of Education has to give permission to use unqualified teachers and does so quite liberally.

In 2007 the study load of each of the classical languages in the final three years of secondary education will increase from 480 hours to 600 hours. Evaluation of the new examination structure concluded that for some subjects, including Greek and Latin, the available hours were not sufficient to achieve the required examination level. In addition, the Minister has opened up more possibilities to fit both of these languages into the examination structure, not only in the available hours for optional subjects (students are free to select two subjects in addition to the compulsory programme) but also as an optional subject in one of the four VWO sub-streams (Culture and Society) (Ministry of Education, Culture and Science 2003b). Obviously, this will require more teachers, and will therefore increase the shortage of qualified staff.

To find a way out of this problem three kinds of solutions can be distinguished:

1. Enlarging the potential group of new teachers, by attracting more students to study Greek and Latin language and culture and by improving their success rates (reducing the number of dropouts). As discussed above there is a delicate balance between relaxing the entrance requirements (accepting students who have finished Greek or Latin instead of both) and the expected dedication of students (more investment of time and energy needed to graduate), because the final graduation level may not be compromised. Higher attrition rates may be the outcome, thereby undoing the effects of the higher intake.

The general appreciation of teaching jobs is a factor in the background: status, level of wages and (perceptions of) workload play a role for students to decide for or against a teaching career. This seems to have improved recently. Teaching in the classical languages is more vulnerable and susceptible to trends in supply and demand than teaching in other subjects, since opportunities to use the specific knowledge and skills elsewhere are more restricted: the modern languages offer more alternatives, e.g. in business or government. As long as the demand continues to grow, as it is expected to do for the near future, this specific vulnerability will not be seen as a problem and will not be a counter-argument to choose a teaching career in classical languages and culture.

2. Increasing the workload of the remaining qualified teachers by spreading the vacant hours over those who do not teach fulltime, either those who have a fulltime position but do not teach fulltime (doing non-teaching tasks in the school or teaching another subject) or those who

have a part-time position. These numbers are substantial: 40.4 % of the schools have fulltime staff members who do not teach Greek or Latin fulltime (SLO 2002, 30–31).

3. Organising study programmes for unqualified teachers to turn them into qualified teachers. Unqualified teachers can be either those who are qualified to teach another subject or those who have studied Greek and Latin language and culture but without the one-year teaching training programme required to be a qualified teacher. The programme for the former group must consist of Greek and Latin grammar and literature, for the latter group a teaching training is needed. Dutch government subsidises such teaching training courses on the basis of an assessment of the candidate's capability, as part of its policy to cope with the shortage of qualified teachers in secondary education.

Since most of the graduates in classics do the teaching training as part of their master programme, the additional capacity will mainly have to come from those who are qualified to teach another subject and who would like to extend their qualification to the classical languages. How can these programmes be organised in such a way that they are attractive for older students who have to combine the programme with work and family obligations, and that they still meet the official qualification standards?

A condition for fully qualified teachers is that all grammar and literature of the university programme must be included in these qualification courses. It is a fact that motivated and experienced learners can do a lot more than young students who also want to enjoy university life, so this may help. And of course some of the optional courses can be left out, but focussing on the languages only and omitting subjects like philosophy and history may narrow the programme too much, so this would have to be monitored carefully.

The Radboud University in Nijmegen has taken this direction, organising a three-year part-time course for those who have had Greek and Latin in secondary school, have an academic background and are qualified to teach another subject (and therefore have teaching experience). The curriculum includes the courses in Greek and Latin as taught in the regular programme plus some courses on classical culture. The interdisciplinary courses (linguistics, literary science and information science) and the bachelor and master theses are waived. After successful completion of the course the student is fully qualified to teach Greek and Latin at all levels in secondary schools.

Hopefully the positive development in students' appreciation for the classical languages in secondary schools can be met by sufficient measures to increase the number of qualified staff to teach these subjects, so as many as possible can enjoy the Greek and Roman culture and literature. The steps taken so far, especially the Nijmegen initiative started by Ton Kessels, are encouraging.

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

GERARD BARTELINK is Emeritus Professor of early christian Greek and Latin, vulgar and medieval Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen. Among his numerous publications in the field of classics may be mentioned his editions of Athanasius' *Vita Antonii* (Sources Chrétiennes 400; Paris 1994) and Palladius' *Historia Lausiaca* (Mondadori; Milan 1974).

ANTON A.R. BASTIAENSEN was Associate Professor of early christian Greek and Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has edited and commented on several Latin hagiographical texts, including the Lifes of Cyprian, Ambrose and Augustine, and written studies on Latin hymnology and the history of christian Latin terminology.

JEROEN A.E. BONS is Professor for the History of Rhetoric at the University of Amsterdam, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature and Classics, and Fellow of University College at Utrecht University. He has published on the history of classical rhetoric and ancient literary theory. Most recently he contributed an article on "Gorgias the Sophist and Early Greek Rhetoric" to the Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric (Oxford 2006).

BÉ BREIJ teaches Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen. She has published articles in the fields of Roman declamation and Neo-Latin, and is currently completing her dissertation on pseudo-Quintilian's *Declamationes Maiores* 18 and 19.

JAN MAARTEN BREMER is Emeritus Professor of Ancient Greek Literature at the University of Amsterdam. He has contributed many books and articles to the study of Greek poetry, especially Athenian drama, Homer and lyric poetry. Together with William Furley (Heidelberg University) he recently published *Greek Hymn: Selected Cult Songs from the Archaic to the Hellenistic period*, 2 vols. (Tübingen 2001).

JAN N. BREMMER is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Groningen. He has published widely on Greek, Roman, and early Christian religion as well as on the history of the discipline Religious Studies, including *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife* (Routledge; London and New York 2002).

JAN H. BROUWERS is Emeritus Professor of Latin Language and Literature at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published on classical Latin literature, especially Roman historical epic (Lucan, Silius Italicus) and Roman elegy (notably Propertius).

LUKAS DE BLOIS is Professor of Ancient History at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published books and articles on the history of the Roman Empire in the third century A.D., the history of the Late Roman Republic, ancient historiography (Sallust, Tacitus, Cassius Dio), Plutarch's works, and Greek Sicily in the fourth century B.C.

IRENE J.F. DE JONG is Professor of Ancient Greek Literature at the University of Amsterdam. She has published on Homer, Herodotus, and drama. Recent publications include *A Narratological Commentary on the Odyssey* (Cambridge 2001). She is currently editing (with R. Nünlist, Brown University) a series of *Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative* (Brill; Leiden).

JAN DEN BOEFT is Emeritus Professor of Latin at the Vrije Universiteit at Amsterdam and of Hellenistic Religions at Utrecht University. He is a member of the team of commentators on the *Res Gestae* of Ammianus Marcellinus and editor in chief of *Vigiliae Christianae*.

ANNETTE HARDER is Professor of Greek Language and Culture at the University of Groningen. She has published widely on classical and Hellenistic Greek poetry and has edited a number of volumes in the series Hellenistica Groningana. She is currently working on a text with introduction and commentary of Callimachus' *Aetia*, which will soon go to press.

VINCENT HUNINK is Associate Professor of classical and early christian Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published commentaries, studies and translations of various authors, notably Lucan, Apuleius and Tertullian (*De Pallio*; 2005). Since 1991 he has been a member of the team that prepared the final volumes of the Groningen Commentaries on Apuleius.

ANDRÉ P.M.H. LARDINOIS is Professor of Greek Language and Culture at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published widely on archaic and classical Greek poetry, including *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*, which he co-edited with Josine Blok (Brill; Leiden 2006).

ERIC M. MOORMANN is Professor of Classical Archaeology at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has written extensively on Greek and Roman sculpture, painting and the reception of antiquity in post-medieval times. His publications include *Ancient Sculpture in the Allard Pierson Museum Amsterdam* (Amsterdam 2000). With S.T.A.M. Mols, he has recently edited *Omni pede stare. Saggi architettonici e circumvesuviani in memoriam Jos de Waele* (Naples 2005).

A.P. ORBÁN is Professor of medieval and renaissance Latin at Utrecht University and of early christian Greek and Latin, vulgar and medieval Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published several text editions with Brepols, including *Polythecon, Vitae metricae Katharinae Alexandrinae*, and *Sermones in Assumptionem Mariae*. Recently he completed an edition of *Arator, Historia apos-*

tolica cum glossis en commentariis mediaevalibus, 2 vols., which will appear at Brepols in 2006.

ROB SALOMONS is Papyrologist at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published several papyrus texts, including *Einige Wiener Papyri* (P. Vindob. Salomons) and *Papyri Bodleianae I* (P. Bodl. I).

DICK M. SCHENKEVELD is Emeritus Professor of Greek Language and Literature at the Vrije Universiteit at Amsterdam. He has written widely on Greek literature, rhetoric and the ancient grammarians. Most recently he has published an edition with translation and commentary of *A rhetorical grammar: C. Iulius Romanus, Introduction to the Liber de adverbio as incorporated in Charisius' Ars grammatica II.13* (Brill; Leiden 2004).

WILLEON SLENDERS is Assistant Professor of ancient and modern Greek at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published two articles on Greek satyr plays and is currently finishing his dissertation on the language of satyr plays, supervised by Ton Kessels.

LEON TER BEEK is Assistant Professor of Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen and teacher of Latin and Greek at the Jeroen Boschcollege in 's-Hertogenbosch. He has published on classical and christian Latin literature, notably Cicero and Tertullian, and on Roman Law, including *Dolus. Een semantisch-juridische studie* (GNI; Nijmegen 1999).

PIETER W. VAN DER HORST is Professor of New Testament exegesis, early Christian Literature, and the Jewish and Hellenistic Context of early Christianity at Utrecht University. He has published widely on the interactions between ancient Christianity, Judaism, and Hellenism, including his recent volume *Jews and Christians in their Graeco-Roman Context* (Mohr Siebeck; Tübingen 2006).

MARC VAN DER POEL is Professor of Latin Language and Culture at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published on Latin literature, especially in the Renaissance, and on ancient rhetoric and its history. He is the author of several text editions, including *Rudolph Agricola. Ecrits sur la dialectique et l'humanisme, choix de textes, introduction, édition, traduction et notes* (Champion; Paris 1997).

MARIANNE VAN DER WEIDEN is manager Strategy and Education at the BVE Raad (Dutch council for vocational education and training and adult education) in De Bilt, the Netherlands. She wrote her dissertation on the Dithyrambs of Pindar in 1991 under the guidance of Ton Kessels.

A. MARIA VAN ERP TAALMAN KIP is Emeritus Professor of Greek Literature at the University of Amsterdam. She has written extensively on Greek poetry, especially Greek drama. Her publications include *Reader and Spectator* (Amsterdam 1990).

GERRY C. WAKKER is Associate Professor of Ancient Greek Linguistics at the University of Groningen. She has published widely on different subjects of the syntax and semantics of Ancient Greek, including *Conditions and Conditionals. An investigation on Ancient Greek* (Gieben; Amsterdam 1994).

ANTON VAN HOOFF recently retired as Associate Professor of Ancient History at the Radboud University Nijmegen. He has published numerous studies on ancient self-killing, starting with his 1990 monograph *From Autothanasia to Suicide. Self-killing in Classical Antiquity.*

HEATHER VAN TRESS successfullly defended her dissertation, *Poetic Memory: Allusion in the Poetry of Callimachus and the Metamorphoses of Ovid* (Brill; Leiden 2004), which was supervised by Ton Kessels. She continues her research and writing, while teaching Greek, Latin and English at a gymnasium in the Netherlands.

HERMAN T. WALLINGA is Emeritus Professor of Ancient History at Utrecht University. His main area of study is ancient maritime history, on which he has published several monographs, including most recently *Xerxes' Greek Adventure: The Naval Perspective* (Brill; Leiden 2005).

JAN WASZINK is post-doctoral researcher in Neo-Latin at the Radboud University Nijmegen, working on a project on the Tacitism in Hugo Grotius' *Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis*. He has published several articles on Neo-Latin historical literature and political thought, and completed editions and translations of the *Politica* of Justus Lipsius and *De Antiquitate Reipublicae Batavicae* of Hugo Grotius. He is the chief editor of the series Bibliotheca Latinitatis Novae.

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